Subject alternative name entries containing IP addresses will now be
parsed and added to the list of SANs. This should allow for certificate
verification when accessing IP addresses directly.
Root and intermediate CA certificates should have these extensions set
to indicate that they are allowed to sign other certificates. The values
reported in these extensions is now also checked by `verify_chain` to
make sure no non-CA certificates are used to sign another certificate.
The certificate parser now also aborts when a critical extension is
detected which is unsupported, as is required by the specification.
The ASN.1 decoder was originally using AK::BitmapView for decoded
BitStrings, however the specification requires that the bits are stored
in a byte from the most significant to the least significant.
Storing three bits '110' would result in a byte '1100 0000', i.e. 0xC0.
However, AK::BitmapView expects the bits to be stored at the bottom like
'0000 0110', i.e. 0x06. For the current uses the data was always a
multiple of eight bits, resulting in complete bytes, which could
directly be interpreted correctly.
For the implementation of the key usage extension of certificates the
correct implementation of the BitString is required.
ASN.1 encodes booleans as false is zero and true is non-zero. The
decoder currently returned true when the boolean was zero.
Since this decoder was barely used it did not cause any problems,
however for support of other certificate extensions the correct version
is required.
The wildcard specified in a certificates subject can only match a single
level of subdomains. Originally, this function could match multiple
levels of subdomains with a single "*.".
As an example, https://wrong.host.badssl.com/ should fail to load, as
the certificate provided by the server only specifies "*.badssl.com".
However this was correctly matching anyway. With this change this page
now correctly fails to load.
The `build_rsa_pre_master_secret` function originally called
`verify_chain_and_get_matching_certificate`, which verified the chain
and returned a certificate matching the specified hostname.
Since the first certificate in the chain should always be the one
matching with the hostname, we can simply use that one instead. This
means we can completely remove this method and just use `verify_chain`.
To make sure the hostname is still verified, `verify_chain` now also
checks that the first certificate in the chain matches the specified
hostname. If the hostname is empty, we currently fail the verification,
however this basically never happen, as the server name indication
extension is always used.
In this format the year is specified using two digits. In the case that
these digits are 50 or more, we should assume that the year is in
1950-1999. If it is 49 or less, the year is 2000-2049.
This is specified in RFC5280 section 4.1.2.5.1.
With this change the certificate chain sent by the server will actually
be verified, instead of just checking the names of the certificates.
To determine if a certificate is signed by a root certificate, the list
of root certificates is now a HashMap mapping from the unique identifier
string to the certificate. This allows us to take the issuer of a
certificate and easily check if it is a root certificate. If a
certificate is not signed by a root certificate, we will check that it
is signed by the next certificate in the chain.
This also removes the ad-hoc checking of certificate validity from
multiple places, and moves all checking to the verify_chain.
The CA certificates list now contains the actual certificate data for
approximatly a hundred certificate authorities. These certificates were
generated from https://mkcert.org, which uses the Mozilla CA certificate
list.
This also updates the code for reading the CA certificates.
The RSA key exchange was the only one actually verifying the validity of
the certificate chain supplied by the server. Now the DHE and ECDHE key
exchanges also check the certificate chain.
Each LibGL test can now be tested against a reference QOI image.
Initially, these images can be generated by setting `SAVE_OUTPUT` to
`true`, which will save a bunch of QOI images to `/home/anon`.
It's a bit cleaner to just rely on AK/IPv4Address' ability to determine
the validity of the given input. If a valid IP address is not returned,
then input will be processed as a hostname.
Taotao Gu has been fuzzing serenity libs with their own custom fuzzer.
They reported some issues it found privately, this overflow was found
in the JPGLoader using that fuzzer.
Reported-by: Taotao Gu <gutaotao1995@qq.com>
Similar reasoning to making Core::Stream::read() return Bytes, except
that every user of read_line() creates a StringView from the result, so
let's just return one right away.
A mistake I've repeatedly made is along these lines:
```c++
auto nread = TRY(source_file->read(buffer));
TRY(destination_file->write(buffer));
```
It's a little clunky to have to create a Bytes or StringView from the
buffer's data pointer and the nread, and easy to forget and just use
the buffer. So, this patch changes the read() function to return a
Bytes of the data that were just read.
The other read_foo() methods will be modified in the same way in
subsequent commits.
Fixes#13687
This is a normative change in the ECMA-262 spec. See:
https://github.com/tc39/ecma262/commit/e7979fd
Note that this implements a FIXME in InitializeTypedArrayFromTypedArray,
now that shared array buffers are no longer a concern there. We already
have test coverage for the now-handled case.
This is an editorial change in the ECMA-262 spec. See:
https://github.com/tc39/ecma262/commit/a90670d5
This also adds missing spec comments to the following prototypes which
were affected by this change:
Atomics.load
Atomics.store
%TypedArray%.prototype.slice
%TypedArray%.prototype.subarray
