In preparation for marking BlockingResult [[nodiscard]], there are a few
places that perform infinite waits, which we never observe the result of
the wait. Instead of suppressing them, add an alternate function which
returns void when performing and infinite wait.
We now follow a common capitalization throughout the project:
./Ports/openssh/ReadMe.md
./Ports/python3/patches/ReadMe.md
./Ports/ReadMe.md
./Meta/Lagom/ReadMe.md
./ReadMe.md
This filename is still obvious enough to be seen immediately.
You can now use the READONLY_AFTER_INIT macro when declaring a variable
and we will put it in a special ".ro_after_init" section in the kernel.
Data in that section remains writable during the boot and init process,
and is then marked read-only just before launching the SystemServer.
This is based on an idea from the Linux kernel. :^)
Currently, graphs are defined in terms of graph color. This means that
when the system palette is changed, the old colors are still used. We
switch to storing the color roles and looking up the palette colors on
paint events. We also define the graph line background color as the
graph color at half-transparency.
Since kernel stacks are much smaller (64 KiB) than userspace stacks,
we only add a small bit of randomness here (0-256 bytes, 16b aligned.)
This makes the location of the task context switch buffer not be
100% predictable. Note that we still also add extra randomness upon
syscall entry, so this patch primarily affects context switching.
This patch adds a random offset between 0 and 4096 to the initial
stack pointer in new processes. Since the stack has to be 16-byte
aligned, the bottom bits can't be randomized.
Yet another thing to make things less predictable. :^)
We were doing stack and syscall-origin region validations before
taking the big process lock. There was a window of time where those
regions could then be unmapped/remapped by another thread before we
proceed with our syscall.
This patch closes that window, and makes sys$get_stack_bounds() rely
on the fact that we now know the userspace stack pointer to be valid.
Thanks to @BenWiederhake for spotting this! :^)
`length` is only the (trimmed) size of the word vector, so we have to
multiply it with the size of each element to ensure all bytes are
compared.
Fixes#5335.
If we try to align a number above 0xfffff000 to the next multiple of
the page size (4 KiB), it would wrap around to 0. This is most likely
never what we want, so let's assert if that happens.
Let's be a little more expressive when inducing a kernel panic. :^)
PANIC(...) passes any arguments you give it to dmesgln(), then prints
a backtrace and hangs the machine.
realpath(1) is specific to coreutils and its behavior can be had
with readlink -f
Create the Toolchain Build directory if it doesn't exist before
calling readlink, since realpath(3) on at least OpenBSD will error
on a non-existent path
Now that we no longer need to support the signal trampolines being
user-accessible inside the kernel memory range, we can get rid of the
"kernel" and "user-accessible" flags on Region and simply use the
address of the region to determine whether it's kernel or user.
This also tightens the page table mapping code, since it can now set
user-accessibility based solely on the virtual address of a page.
The signal trampoline was previously in kernelspace memory, but with
a special exception to make it user-accessible.
This patch moves it into each process's regular address space so we
can stop supporting user-allowed memory above 0xc0000000.
I noticed that programs running in the terminal had an open file
descriptor for the system theme buffer, inherited from the Terminal.
Let's be nice and always mark incoming fds with FD_CLOEXEC.
