Otherwise, starting any guest on a non-Linux guests results in
qemu-system-arm: Couldn't set property 'merge' on 'memory-backend-ram': Invalid argument
Cc: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The calculation of FrameTemp is done using the size indicated by mo_pushpop()
before being written back to EBP, but the final writeback to EBP is done using
the size indicated by mo_stacksize().
In the case where mo_pushpop() is MO_32 and mo_stacksize() is MO_16 then the
final writeback to EBP is done using MO_16 which can leave junk in the top
16-bits of EBP after executing ENTER.
Change the writeback of EBP to use the same size indicated by mo_pushpop() to
ensure that the full value is written back.
Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2198
Message-ID: <20240606095319.229650-5-mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When OS/2 Warp configures its segment descriptors, many of them are configured with
the P flag clear to allow for a fault-on-demand implementation. In the case where
the stack value is POPped into the segment registers, the SP is incremented before
calling gen_helper_load_seg() to validate the segment descriptor:
IN:
0xffef2c0c: 66 07 popl %es
OP:
ld_i32 loc9,env,$0xfffffffffffffff8
sub_i32 loc9,loc9,$0x1
brcond_i32 loc9,$0x0,lt,$L0
st16_i32 loc9,env,$0xfffffffffffffff8
st8_i32 $0x1,env,$0xfffffffffffffffc
---- 0000000000000c0c 0000000000000000
ext16u_i64 loc0,rsp
add_i64 loc0,loc0,ss_base
ext32u_i64 loc0,loc0
qemu_ld_a64_i64 loc0,loc0,noat+un+leul,5
add_i64 loc3,rsp,$0x4
deposit_i64 rsp,rsp,loc3,$0x0,$0x10
extrl_i64_i32 loc5,loc0
call load_seg,$0x0,$0,env,$0x0,loc5
add_i64 rip,rip,$0x2
ext16u_i64 rip,rip
exit_tb $0x0
set_label $L0
exit_tb $0x7fff58000043
If helper_load_seg() generates a fault when validating the segment descriptor then as
the SP has already been incremented, the topmost word of the stack is overwritten by
the arguments pushed onto the stack by the CPU before taking the fault handler. As a
consequence things rapidly go wrong upon return from the fault handler due to the
corrupted stack.
Update the logic for the existing writeback condition so that a POP into the segment
registers also calls helper_load_seg() first before incrementing the SP, so that if a
fault occurs the SP remains unaltered.
Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2198
Message-ID: <20240606095319.229650-4-mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Fixes: cc1d28bdbe ("target/i386: move 00-5F opcodes to new decoder", 2024-05-07)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Instead of directly implementing the writeback using gen_op_st_v(), use the
existing gen_writeback() function.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20240606095319.229650-3-mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This will make subsequent changes a little easier to read.
Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20240606095319.229650-2-mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
DISAS_NORETURN suppresses the work normally done by gen_eob(), and therefore
must be used in special cases only. Document them.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
HLT uses DISAS_NORETURN because the corresponding helper calls
cpu_loop_exit(). However, while gen_eob() clears HF_RF_MASK and
synthesizes a #DB exception if single-step is active, none of this is
done by HLT. Note that the single-step trap is generated after the halt
is finished.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
PAUSE uses DISAS_NORETURN because the corresponding helper
calls cpu_loop_exit(). However, while HLT clear HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK
to correctly handle "STI; HLT", the same is missing from PAUSE.
And also gen_eob() clears HF_RF_MASK and synthesizes a #DB exception
if single-step is active; none of this is done by HLT and PAUSE.
Start fixing PAUSE, HLT will follow.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
From vm entry to exit, VMRUN is handled as a single instruction. It
uses DISAS_NORETURN in order to avoid processing TF or RF before
the first instruction executes in the guest. However, the corresponding
handling is missing in vmexit. Add it, and at the same time reorganize
the comments with quotes from the manual about the tasks performed
by a #VMEXIT.
Another gen_eob() task that is missing in VMRUN is preparing the
HF_INHIBIT_IRQ flag for the next instruction, in this case by loading
it from the VMCB control state.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
If the required DR7 (either from the VMCB or from the host save
area) disables a breakpoint that was enabled prior to vmentry
or vmexit, it is left enabled and will trigger EXCP_DEBUG.
This causes a spurious #DB on the next crossing of the breakpoint.
To disable it, vmentry/vmexit must use cpu_x86_update_dr7
to load DR7.
Because cpu_x86_update_dr7 takes a 32-bit argument, check
reserved bits prior to calling cpu_x86_update_dr7, and do the
same for DR6 as well for consistency.
This scenario is tested by the "host_rflags" test in kvm-unit-tests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
DR7.GD triggers a #DB exception on any access to debug registers.
The GD bit is cleared so that the #DB handler itself can access
the debug registers.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use decode.c's support for intercepts, doing the check in TCG-generated
code rather than the helper. This is cleaner because it allows removing
the eip_addend argument to helper_pause(), even though it adds a bit of
bloat for opcode 0x90's new decoding function.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use decode.c's support for intercepts, doing the check in TCG-generated
code rather than the helper. This is cleaner because it allows removing
the eip_addend argument to helper_hlt().
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
ICEBP generates a trap-like exception, while gen_exception() produces
a fault. Resurrect gen_update_eip_next() to implement the desired
semantics.
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When preparing an exception stack frame for a fault exception, the value
pushed for RF is 1. Take that into account. The same should be true
of interrupts for repeated string instructions, but the situation there
is complicated.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* require x86-64-v2 baseline ISA
* SEV-SNP host support
* fix xsave.flat with TCG
* fixes for CPUID checks done by TCG
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Merge tag 'for-upstream' of https://gitlab.com/bonzini/qemu into staging
* virtio-blk: remove SCSI passthrough functionality
* require x86-64-v2 baseline ISA
* SEV-SNP host support
* fix xsave.flat with TCG
* fixes for CPUID checks done by TCG
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# gpg: Signature made Wed 05 Jun 2024 02:01:10 AM PDT
# gpg: using RSA key F13338574B662389866C7682BFFBD25F78C7AE83
# gpg: issuer "pbonzini@redhat.com"
# gpg: Good signature from "Paolo Bonzini <bonzini@gnu.org>" [full]
# gpg: aka "Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>" [full]
* tag 'for-upstream' of https://gitlab.com/bonzini/qemu: (46 commits)
hw/i386: Add support for loading BIOS using guest_memfd
hw/i386/sev: Use guest_memfd for legacy ROMs
memory: Introduce memory_region_init_ram_guest_memfd()
i386/sev: Allow measured direct kernel boot on SNP
i386/sev: Reorder struct declarations
i386/sev: Extract build_kernel_loader_hashes
i386/sev: Enable KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hcall for SNP guests
i386/kvm: Add KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL handling for KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE
i386/sev: Invoke launch_updata_data() for SNP class
i386/sev: Invoke launch_updata_data() for SEV class
hw/i386/sev: Add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled
i386/sev: Add support for SNP CPUID validation
i386/sev: Add support for populating OVMF metadata pages
hw/i386/sev: Add function to get SEV metadata from OVMF header
i386/sev: Set CPU state to protected once SNP guest payload is finalized
i386/sev: Add handling to encrypt/finalize guest launch data
i386/sev: Add the SNP launch start context
i386/sev: Update query-sev QAPI format to handle SEV-SNP
i386/sev: Add a class method to determine KVM VM type for SNP guests
i386/sev: Don't return launch measurements for SEV-SNP guests
...
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
When guest_memfd is enabled, the BIOS is generally part of the initial
encrypted guest image and will be accessed as private guest memory. Add
the necessary changes to set up the associated RAM region with a
guest_memfd backend to allow for this.
Current support centers around using -bios to load the BIOS data.
Support for loading the BIOS via pflash requires additional enablement
since those interfaces rely on the use of ROM memory regions which make
use of the KVM_MEM_READONLY memslot flag, which is not supported for
guest_memfd-backed memslots.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-29-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Current SNP guest kernels will attempt to access these regions with
with C-bit set, so guest_memfd is needed to handle that. Otherwise,
kvm_convert_memory() will fail when the guest kernel tries to access it
and QEMU attempts to call KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES to set these ranges
to private.
Whether guests should actually try to access ROM regions in this way (or
need to deal with legacy ROM regions at all), is a separate issue to be
addressed on kernel side, but current SNP guest kernels will exhibit
this behavior and so this handling is needed to allow QEMU to continue
running existing SNP guest kernels.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
[pankaj: Added sev_snp_enabled() check]
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-28-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Introduce memory_region_init_ram_guest_memfd() to allocate private
guset memfd on the MemoryRegion initialization. It's for the use case of
TDVF, which must be private on TDX case.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-4-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
In SNP, the hashes page designated with a specific metadata entry
published in AmdSev OVMF.
Therefore, if the user enabled kernel hashes (for measured direct boot),
QEMU should prepare the content of hashes table, and during the
processing of the metadata entry it copy the content into the designated
page and encrypt it.
Note that in SNP (unlike SEV and SEV-ES) the measurements is done in
whole 4KB pages. Therefore QEMU zeros the whole page that includes the
hashes table, and fills in the kernel hashes area in that page, and then
encrypts the whole page. The rest of the page is reserved for SEV
launch secrets which are not usable anyway on SNP.
If the user disabled kernel hashes, QEMU pre-validates the kernel hashes
page as a zero page.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-24-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Move the declaration of PaddedSevHashTable before SevSnpGuest so
we can add a new such field to the latter.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-23-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Extract the building of the kernel hashes table out from
sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes() to allow building it in
other memory areas (for SNP support).
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-22-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM will forward GHCB page-state change requests to userspace in the
form of KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE, so make sure the hypercall handling is
enabled for SNP guests.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-32-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE will be used to send requests to userspace for
private/shared memory attribute updates requested by the guest.
Implement handling for that use-case along with some basic
infrastructure for enabling specific hypercall events.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-31-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Invoke as sev_snp_launch_update_data() for SNP object.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-27-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add launch_update_data() in SevCommonStateClass and
invoke as sev_launch_update_data() for SEV object.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-26-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
As with SEV, an SNP guest requires that the BIOS be part of the initial
encrypted/measured guest payload. Extend sev_encrypt_flash() to handle
the SNP case and plumb through the GPA of the BIOS location since this
is needed for SNP.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-25-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV-SNP firmware allows a special guest page to be populated with a
table of guest CPUID values so that they can be validated through
firmware before being loaded into encrypted guest memory where they can
be used in place of hypervisor-provided values[1].
As part of SEV-SNP guest initialization, use this interface to validate
the CPUID entries reported by KVM_GET_CPUID2 prior to initial guest
start and populate the CPUID page reserved by OVMF with the resulting
encrypted data.
[1] SEV SNP Firmware ABI Specification, Rev. 0.8, 8.13.2.6
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-21-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
OVMF reserves various pages so they can be pre-initialized/validated
prior to launching the guest. Add support for populating these pages
with the expected content.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-20-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
A recent version of OVMF expanded the reset vector GUID list to add
SEV-specific metadata GUID. The SEV metadata describes the reserved
memory regions such as the secrets and CPUID page used during the SEV-SNP
guest launch.
The pc_system_get_ovmf_sev_metadata_ptr() is used to retieve the SEV
metadata pointer from the OVMF GUID list.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-19-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Once KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH is called the vCPU state is copied into the
vCPU's VMSA page and measured/encrypted. Any attempt to read/write CPU
state afterward will only be acting on the initial data and so are
effectively no-ops.
Set the vCPU state to protected at this point so that QEMU don't
continue trying to re-sync vCPU data during guest runtime.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-18-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Process any queued up launch data and encrypt/measure it into the SNP
guest instance prior to initial guest launch.
This also updates the KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE call to handle partial
update responses.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-17-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SNP_LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch
context within the firmware.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-16-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Most of the current 'query-sev' command is relevant to both legacy
SEV/SEV-ES guests and SEV-SNP guests, with 2 exceptions:
- 'policy' is a 64-bit field for SEV-SNP, not 32-bit, and
the meaning of the bit positions has changed
- 'handle' is not relevant to SEV-SNP
To address this, this patch adds a new 'sev-type' field that can be
used as a discriminator to select between SEV and SEV-SNP-specific
fields/formats without breaking compatibility for existing management
tools (so long as management tools that add support for launching
SEV-SNP guest update their handling of query-sev appropriately).
The corresponding HMP command has also been fixed up similarly.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by:Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-15-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV guests can use either KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM, KVM_X86_SEV_VM,
or KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM depending on the configuration and what
the host kernel supports. SNP guests on the other hand can only
ever use KVM_X86_SNP_VM, so split determination of VM type out
into a separate class method that can be set accordingly for
sev-guest vs. sev-snp-guest objects and add handling for SNP.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-14-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
[Remove unnecessary function pointer declaration. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-SNP guests, launch measurement is queried from within the guest
during attestation, so don't attempt to return it as part of
query-sev-launch-measure.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-13-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SNP guests will rely on this bit to determine certain feature support.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-12-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SNP does not support SMM and requires guest_memfd for
private guest memory, so add SNP specific kvm_init()
functionality in snp_kvm_init() class method.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-11-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Some aspects of the init routine SEV are specific to SEV and not
applicable for SNP guests, so move the SEV-specific bits into
separate class method and retain only the common functionality.
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-10-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add a simple helper to check if the current guest type is SNP. Also have
SNP-enabled imply that SEV-ES is enabled as well, and fix up any places
where the sev_es_enabled() check is expecting a pure/non-SNP guest.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-9-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV-SNP support relies on a different set of properties/state than the
existing 'sev-guest' object. This patch introduces the 'sev-snp-guest'
object, which can be used to configure an SEV-SNP guest. For example,
a default-configured SEV-SNP guest with no additional information
passed in for use with attestation:
-object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0
or a fully-specified SEV-SNP guest where all spec-defined binary
blobs are passed in as base64-encoded strings:
-object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0, \
policy=0x30000, \
init-flags=0, \
id-block=YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg==, \
id-auth=CxHK/OKLkXGn/KpAC7Wl1FSiisWDbGTEKz..., \
author-key-enabled=on, \
host-data=LNkCWBRC5CcdGXirbNUV1OrsR28s..., \
guest-visible-workarounds=AA==, \
See the QAPI schema updates included in this patch for more usage
details.
In some cases these blobs may be up to 4096 characters, but this is
generally well below the default limit for linux hosts where
command-line sizes are defined by the sysconf-configurable ARG_MAX
value, which defaults to 2097152 characters for Ubuntu hosts, for
example.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Acked-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> (for QAPI schema)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-8-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When sev-snp-guest objects are introduced there will be a number of
differences in how the launch finish is handled compared to the existing
sev-guest object. Move sev_launch_finish() to a class method to make it
easier to implement SNP-specific launch update functionality later.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-7-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When sev-snp-guest objects are introduced there will be a number of
differences in how the launch data is handled compared to the existing
sev-guest object. Move sev_launch_start() to a class method to make it
easier to implement SNP-specific launch update functionality later.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-6-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Currently all SEV/SEV-ES functionality is managed through a single
'sev-guest' QOM type. With upcoming support for SEV-SNP, taking this
same approach won't work well since some of the properties/state
managed by 'sev-guest' is not applicable to SEV-SNP, which will instead
rely on a new QOM type with its own set of properties/state.
To prepare for this, this patch moves common state into an abstract
'sev-common' parent type to encapsulate properties/state that are
common to both SEV/SEV-ES and SEV-SNP, leaving only SEV/SEV-ES-specific
properties/state in the current 'sev-guest' type. This should not
affect current behavior or command-line options.
As part of this patch, some related changes are also made:
- a static 'sev_guest' variable is currently used to keep track of
the 'sev-guest' instance. SEV-SNP would similarly introduce an
'sev_snp_guest' static variable. But these instances are now
available via qdev_get_machine()->cgs, so switch to using that
instead and drop the static variable.
- 'sev_guest' is currently used as the name for the static variable
holding a pointer to the 'sev-guest' instance. Re-purpose the name
as a local variable referring the 'sev-guest' instance, and use
that consistently throughout the code so it can be easily
distinguished from sev-common/sev-snp-guest instances.
- 'sev' is generally used as the name for local variables holding a
pointer to the 'sev-guest' instance. In cases where that now points
to common state, use the name 'sev_common'; in cases where that now
points to state specific to 'sev-guest' instance, use the name
'sev_guest'
In order to enable kernel-hashes for SNP, pull it from
SevGuestProperties to its parent SevCommonProperties so
it will be available for both SEV and SNP.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> (QAPI schema)
Co-developed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-5-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Ask the ConfidentialGuestSupport object whether to use guest_memfd
for KVM-backend private memory. This bool can be set in instance_init
(or user_complete) so that it is available when the machine is created.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Right now QEMU is importing arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
because it includes definitions for kvmclock and for KVM CPUID
bits. However, other definitions for KVM hypercall values and return
codes are included in include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h and they will be
used by SEV-SNP.
To ensure that it is possible to include both <linux/kvm_para.h> and
"standard-headers/asm-x86/kvm_para.h" without conflicts, provide
linux/kvm_para.h as a portable header too, and forward linux-headers/
files to those in include/standard-headers. Note that <linux/kvm_para.h>
will include architecture-specific definitions as well, but
"standard-headers/linux/kvm_para.h" will not because it can be used in
architecture-independent files.
This could easily be extended to other architectures, but right now
they do not need any symbol in their specific kvm_para.h files.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This updates kernel headers to commit 6f627b425378 ("KVM: SVM: Add module
parameter to enable SEV-SNP", 2024-05-12). The SNP host patches will
be included in Linux 6.11, to be released next July.
Also brings in an linux-headers/linux/vhost.h fix from v6.9-rc4.
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240530111643.1091816-3-pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Linux has <misc/pvpanic.h>, not <linux/pvpanic.h>. Use the same
directory for QEMU's include/standard-headers/ copy.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
