Consolidate all of the bounce tests into the BUS_DMA_COULD_BOUNCE flag.
Allocate the bounce zone at either tag creation or map creation to help
avoid null-pointer derefs later on. Track total pages per zone so that
each zone can get a minimum allocation at tag creation time instead of
being defeated by mis-behaving tags that suck up the max amount.
Allocate the bounce zone at either tag creation or map creation to help
avoid null-pointer derefs later on. Track total pages per zone so that
each zone can get a minimum allocation at tag creation time instead of
being defeated by mis-behaving tags that suck up the max amount.
reading past 'stop' in various places when converting multibyte characters.
Reading too far caused truncation to not be detected when it should have
been, eventually causing regexec() to loop infinitely in with certain
combinations of patterns and strings in multibyte locales.
PR: 74020
MFC after: 4 weeks
building the kerberos5 includes. This is not the same patch that
Bjoern A. Zeeb came up with, but the credit still goes to him for finding
the problem. Thanks!
without ever being changed to actually work with an i8251. Nobody is
working on this either at the moment, so it's not about to change
soon.
When the code necessary to support the i8251 is committed, this can
be reverted again.
not used and aliases for other defines.
o Add REG_DATA as an alias for com_data. Likewise for other register
defines.
o Add LCR_SBREAK and make CFCR_SBREAK an alias for it. Likewise for
the other LCR register bits that are known with the CFCR prefix.
o Add MCR_IE and make MCR_IENABLE an alias for it.
o Add LSR_TEMT and make LSR_TSRE an alias for it.
o Add LSR_THRE and make LSR_TXRDY as alias for it.
o Add FCR_ENABLE and make FIFO_ENABLE as alias for it. Likewise for
the other FCR register bits that are known with the FIFO prefix.
o Add EFR_CTS and make EFR_AUTOCTS an alias for it.
o Add EFR_RTS and make EFR_AUTORTS an alias for it.
This is a first step in cleaning up the definitions in this file.
more strict check against PPP packets, but does not involve
a DoS vulnerability.
The ``DoS Vulnerability'' in last commit message (rev. 1.5) is
actually a false positive, because pppd(8) will fork for every
connection and thus the issue closed in rev. 1.5 will not block
subsequent connections, nor affect connections of other users.
Pointed out by: josef
USPACE_SVC_STACK_TOP, USPACE_SVC_STACK_BOTTOM, USPACE_UNDEF_STACK_TOP,
and USPACE_UNDEF_STACK_BOTTOM look wrong to me, so I'm leaving them
alone.
Reviewed by: arch@
