Tests for "git am --[no-]scissors" [1] work in the following way:
1. Create files with commit messages
2. Use these files to create expected commits
3. Generate eml file with patch from expected commits
4. Create commits using git am with these eml files
5. Compare these commits with expected
The test for "git am --scissors" is supposed to take an e-mail with a
scissors line and in-body "Subject:" header and demonstrate that the
subject line from the e-mail itself is overridden by the in-body header
and that only text below the scissors line is included in the commit
message of the commit created by the invocation of "git am --scissors".
However, the setup of the test incorrectly uses a commit without the
scissors line and without the in-body header in the commit message,
producing eml file not suitable for testing of "git am --scissors".
This can be checked by intentionally breaking is_scissors_line function
in mailinfo.c, for example, by changing string ">8", which is used by
the test. With such change the test should fail, but does not.
Fix broken test by generating eml file with scissors line and in-body
header "Subject:". Since the two tests for --scissors and --no-scissors
options are there to test cutting or keeping the commit message, update
both tests to change the test file in the same way, which allows us to
generate only one eml file to be passed to git am. To clarify the
intention of the test, give files and tags more explicit names.
[1]: introduced in bf72ac17d (t4150: tests for am --[no-]scissors,
2015-07-19)
Signed-off-by: Andrei Rybak <rybak.a.v@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Tan <pyokagan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.15:
Git 2.15.2
Git 2.14.4
Git 2.13.7
verify_path: disallow symlinks in .gitmodules
update-index: stat updated files earlier
verify_dotfile: mention case-insensitivity in comment
verify_path: drop clever fallthrough
skip_prefix: add case-insensitive variant
is_{hfs,ntfs}_dotgitmodules: add tests
is_ntfs_dotgit: match other .git files
is_hfs_dotgit: match other .git files
is_ntfs_dotgit: use a size_t for traversing string
submodule-config: verify submodule names as paths
* maint-2.14:
Git 2.14.4
Git 2.13.7
verify_path: disallow symlinks in .gitmodules
update-index: stat updated files earlier
verify_dotfile: mention case-insensitivity in comment
verify_path: drop clever fallthrough
skip_prefix: add case-insensitive variant
is_{hfs,ntfs}_dotgitmodules: add tests
is_ntfs_dotgit: match other .git files
is_hfs_dotgit: match other .git files
is_ntfs_dotgit: use a size_t for traversing string
submodule-config: verify submodule names as paths
* maint-2.13:
Git 2.13.7
verify_path: disallow symlinks in .gitmodules
update-index: stat updated files earlier
verify_dotfile: mention case-insensitivity in comment
verify_path: drop clever fallthrough
skip_prefix: add case-insensitive variant
is_{hfs,ntfs}_dotgitmodules: add tests
is_ntfs_dotgit: match other .git files
is_hfs_dotgit: match other .git files
is_ntfs_dotgit: use a size_t for traversing string
submodule-config: verify submodule names as paths
* jk/submodule-fix-loose:
verify_path: disallow symlinks in .gitmodules
update-index: stat updated files earlier
verify_dotfile: mention case-insensitivity in comment
verify_path: drop clever fallthrough
skip_prefix: add case-insensitive variant
is_{hfs,ntfs}_dotgitmodules: add tests
is_ntfs_dotgit: match other .git files
is_hfs_dotgit: match other .git files
is_ntfs_dotgit: use a size_t for traversing string
submodule-config: verify submodule names as paths
There are a few reasons it's not a good idea to make
.gitmodules a symlink, including:
1. It won't be portable to systems without symlinks.
2. It may behave inconsistently, since Git may look at
this file in the index or a tree without bothering to
resolve any symbolic links. We don't do this _yet_, but
the config infrastructure is there and it's planned for
the future.
With some clever code, we could make (2) work. And some
people may not care about (1) if they only work on one
platform. But there are a few security reasons to simply
disallow it:
a. A symlinked .gitmodules file may circumvent any fsck
checks of the content.
b. Git may read and write from the on-disk file without
sanity checking the symlink target. So for example, if
you link ".gitmodules" to "../oops" and run "git
submodule add", we'll write to the file "oops" outside
the repository.
Again, both of those are problems that _could_ be solved
with sufficient code, but given the complications in (1) and
(2), we're better off just outlawing it explicitly.
Note the slightly tricky call to verify_path() in
update-index's update_one(). There we may not have a mode if
we're not updating from the filesystem (e.g., we might just
be removing the file). Passing "0" as the mode there works
fine; since it's not a symlink, we'll just skip the extra
checks.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
In the update_one(), we check verify_path() on the proposed
path before doing anything else. In preparation for having
verify_path() look at the file mode, let's stat the file
earlier, so we can check the mode accurately.
This is made a bit trickier by the fact that this function
only does an lstat in a few code paths (the ones that flow
down through process_path()). So we can speculatively do the
lstat() here and pass the results down, and just use a dummy
mode for cases where we won't actually be updating the index
from the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
We're more restrictive than we need to be in matching ".GIT"
on case-sensitive filesystems; let's make a note that this
is intentional.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
We check ".git" and ".." in the same switch statement, and
fall through the cases to share the end-of-component check.
While this saves us a line or two, it makes modifying the
function much harder. Let's just write it out.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
We have the convenient skip_prefix() helper, but if you want
to do case-insensitive matching, you're stuck doing it by
hand. We could add an extra parameter to the function to
let callers ask for this, but the function is small and
somewhat performance-critical. Let's just re-implement it
for the case-insensitive version.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
This tests primarily for NTFS issues, but also adds one example of an
HFS+ issue.
Thanks go to Congyi Wu for coming up with the list of examples where
NTFS would possibly equate the filename with `.gitmodules`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
When we started to catch NTFS short names that clash with .git, we only
looked for GIT~1. This is sufficient because we only ever clone into an
empty directory, so .git is guaranteed to be the first subdirectory or
file in that directory.
However, even with a fresh clone, .gitmodules is *not* necessarily the
first file to be written that would want the NTFS short name GITMOD~1: a
malicious repository can add .gitmodul0000 and friends, which sorts
before `.gitmodules` and is therefore checked out *first*. For that
reason, we have to test not only for ~1 short names, but for others,
too.
It's hard to just adapt the existing checks in is_ntfs_dotgit(): since
Windows 2000 (i.e., in all Windows versions still supported by Git),
NTFS short names are only generated in the <prefix>~<number> form up to
number 4. After that, a *different* prefix is used, calculated from the
long file name using an undocumented, but stable algorithm.
For example, the short name of .gitmodules would be GITMOD~1, but if it
is taken, and all of ~2, ~3 and ~4 are taken, too, the short name
GI7EBA~1 will be used. From there, collisions are handled by
incrementing the number, shortening the prefix as needed (until ~9999999
is reached, in which case NTFS will not allow the file to be created).
We'd also want to handle .gitignore and .gitattributes, which suffer
from a similar problem, using the fall-back short names GI250A~1 and
GI7D29~1, respectively.
To accommodate for that, we could reimplement the hashing algorithm, but
it is just safer and simpler to provide the known prefixes. This
algorithm has been reverse-engineered and described at
https://usn.pw/blog/gen/2015/06/09/filenames/, which is defunct but
still available via https://web.archive.org/.
These can be recomputed by running the following Perl script:
-- snip --
use warnings;
use strict;
sub compute_short_name_hash ($) {
my $checksum = 0;
foreach (split('', $_[0])) {
$checksum = ($checksum * 0x25 + ord($_)) & 0xffff;
}
$checksum = ($checksum * 314159269) & 0xffffffff;
$checksum = 1 + (~$checksum & 0x7fffffff) if ($checksum & 0x80000000);
$checksum -= (($checksum * 1152921497) >> 60) * 1000000007;
return scalar reverse sprintf("%x", $checksum & 0xffff);
}
print compute_short_name_hash($ARGV[0]);
-- snap --
E.g., running that with the argument ".gitignore" will
result in "250a" (which then becomes "gi250a" in the code).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Both verify_path() and fsck match ".git", ".GIT", and other
variants specific to HFS+. Let's allow matching other
special files like ".gitmodules", which we'll later use to
enforce extra restrictions via verify_path() and fsck.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
We walk through the "name" string using an int, which can
wrap to a negative value and cause us to read random memory
before our array (e.g., by creating a tree with a name >2GB,
since "int" is still 32 bits even on most 64-bit platforms).
Worse, this is easy to trigger during the fsck_tree() check,
which is supposed to be protecting us from malicious
garbage.
Note one bit of trickiness in the existing code: we
sometimes assign -1 to "len" at the end of the loop, and
then rely on the "len++" in the for-loop's increment to take
it back to 0. This is still legal with a size_t, since
assigning -1 will turn into SIZE_MAX, which then wraps
around to 0 on increment.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file,
but we blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our
on-disk repo paths. This means you can do bad things by
putting "../" into the name (among other things).
Let's sanity-check these names to avoid building a path that
can be exploited. There are two main decisions:
1. What should the allowed syntax be?
It's tempting to reuse verify_path(), since submodule
names typically come from in-repo paths. But there are
two reasons not to:
a. It's technically more strict than what we need, as
we really care only about breaking out of the
$GIT_DIR/modules/ hierarchy. E.g., having a
submodule named "foo/.git" isn't actually
dangerous, and it's possible that somebody has
manually given such a funny name.
b. Since we'll eventually use this checking logic in
fsck to prevent downstream repositories, it should
be consistent across platforms. Because
verify_path() relies on is_dir_sep(), it wouldn't
block "foo\..\bar" on a non-Windows machine.
2. Where should we enforce it? These days most of the
.gitmodules reads go through submodule-config.c, so
I've put it there in the reading step. That should
cover all of the C code.
We also construct the name for "git submodule add"
inside the git-submodule.sh script. This is probably
not a big deal for security since the name is coming
from the user anyway, but it would be polite to remind
them if the name they pick is invalid (and we need to
expose the name-checker to the shell anyway for our
test scripts).
This patch issues a warning when reading .gitmodules
and just ignores the related config entry completely.
This will generally end up producing a sensible error,
as it works the same as a .gitmodules file which is
missing a submodule entry (so "submodule update" will
barf, but "git clone --recurse-submodules" will print
an error but not abort the clone.
There is one minor oddity, which is that we print the
warning once per malformed config key (since that's how
the config subsystem gives us the entries). So in the
new test, for example, the user would see three
warnings. That's OK, since the intent is that this case
should never come up outside of malicious repositories
(and then it might even benefit the user to see the
message multiple times).
Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of
concept from which the test script was adapted goes to
Etienne Stalmans.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Hotfix for a recent topic.
* tg/worktree-create-tracking:
git-worktree.txt: fix indentation of example and text of 'add' command
git-worktree.txt: fix missing ")" typo
Code clean-up.
* nd/shared-index-fix:
read-cache: don't write index twice if we can't write shared index
read-cache.c: move tempfile creation/cleanup out of write_shared_index
read-cache.c: change type of "temp" in write_shared_index()
Doc updates.
* ks/submodule-doc-updates:
Doc/git-submodule: improve readability and grammar of a sentence
Doc/gitsubmodules: make some changes to improve readability and syntax
Test fixes.
* sg/test-i18ngrep:
t: make 'test_i18ngrep' more informative on failure
t: validate 'test_i18ngrep's parameters
t: move 'test_i18ncmp' and 'test_i18ngrep' to 'test-lib-functions.sh'
t5536: let 'test_i18ngrep' read the file without redirection
t5510: consolidate 'grep' and 'test_i18ngrep' patterns
t4001: don't run 'git status' upstream of a pipe
t6022: don't run 'git merge' upstream of a pipe
t5812: add 'test_i18ngrep's missing filename parameter
t5541: add 'test_i18ngrep's missing filename parameter
Completion of "git merge -s<strategy>" (in contrib/) did not work
well in non-C locale.
* nd/list-merge-strategy:
completion: fix completing merge strategies on non-C locales
The split-index mode had a few corner case bugs fixed.
* tg/split-index-fixes:
travis: run tests with GIT_TEST_SPLIT_INDEX
split-index: don't write cache tree with null oid entries
read-cache: fix reading the shared index for other repos
Crash fix for a corner case where an error codepath tried to unlock
what it did not acquire lock on.
* mr/packed-ref-store-fix:
files_initial_transaction_commit(): only unlock if locked
