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/*
* Copyright 2006 Juan Lang
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
*
*/
#include <stdarg.h>
#define NONAMELESSUNION
#include "windef.h"
#include "winbase.h"
#define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
#define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
#include "wincrypt.h"
#include "wininet.h"
#include "wine/debug.h"
#include "wine/unicode.h"
#include "crypt32_private.h"
WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt);
WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain);
#define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7
static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_defaultChainEngine;
/* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include
* the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used.
* It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement
* CTLs or complex certificate chains.
*/
typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine
{
LONG ref;
HCERTSTORE hRoot;
HCERTSTORE hWorld;
DWORD dwFlags;
DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
} CertificateChainEngine, *PCertificateChainEngine;
static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection,
DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
{
DWORD i;
for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
CertAddStoreToCollection(collection, stores[i], 0, 0);
}
static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
{
DWORD i;
for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
CertCloseStore(stores[i], 0);
}
static const WCHAR rootW[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 };
/* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */
static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store,
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
{
PCCERT_CONTEXT matching = NULL;
BYTE hash[20];
DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID, hash, &size))
{
CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
matching = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, cert->dwCertEncodingType,
0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH, &blob, NULL);
}
return matching;
}
static BOOL CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store)
{
BOOL ret = TRUE;
if (store)
{
HCERTSTORE rootStore = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL, check;
do {
cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store, cert);
if (cert)
{
if (!(check = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore, cert)))
ret = FALSE;
else
CertFreeCertificateContext(check);
}
} while (ret && cert);
if (cert)
CertFreeCertificateContext(cert);
CertCloseStore(rootStore, 0);
}
return ret;
}
HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root,
PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig)
{
static const WCHAR caW[] = { 'C','A',0 };
static const WCHAR myW[] = { 'M','y',0 };
static const WCHAR trustW[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 };
PCertificateChainEngine engine =
CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine));
if (engine)
{
HCERTSTORE worldStores[4];
engine->ref = 1;
engine->hRoot = root;
engine->hWorld = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
worldStores[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine->hRoot);
worldStores[1] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, caW);
worldStores[2] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, myW);
worldStores[3] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, trustW);
CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld,
sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]), worldStores);
CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld,
pConfig->cAdditionalStore, pConfig->rghAdditionalStore);
CRYPT_CloseStores(sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]),
worldStores);
engine->dwFlags = pConfig->dwFlags;
engine->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout = pConfig->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
engine->MaximumCachedCertificates =
pConfig->MaximumCachedCertificates;
if (pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus)
engine->CycleDetectionModulus = pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus;
else
engine->CycleDetectionModulus = DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS;
}
return engine;
}
typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT
{
DWORD cbSize;
HCERTSTORE hRestrictedRoot;
HCERTSTORE hRestrictedTrust;
HCERTSTORE hRestrictedOther;
DWORD cAdditionalStore;
HCERTSTORE *rghAdditionalStore;
DWORD dwFlags;
DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
} CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT;
BOOL WINAPI CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig,
HCERTCHAINENGINE *phChainEngine)
{
BOOL ret;
TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig, phChainEngine);
if (pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT)
&& pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG))
{
SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
return FALSE;
}
*phChainEngine = NULL;
ret = CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
if (ret)
{
HCERTSTORE root;
HCERTCHAINENGINE engine;
if (pConfig->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG) &&
pConfig->hExclusiveRoot)
root = CertDuplicateStore(pConfig->hExclusiveRoot);
else if (pConfig->hRestrictedRoot)
root = CertDuplicateStore(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
else
root = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
engine = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(root, pConfig);
if (engine)
{
*phChainEngine = engine;
ret = TRUE;
}
else
ret = FALSE;
}
return ret;
}
VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine)
{
PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine);
if (engine && InterlockedDecrement(&engine->ref) == 0)
{
CertCloseStore(engine->hWorld, 0);
CertCloseStore(engine->hRoot, 0);
CryptMemFree(engine);
}
}
static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine(void)
{
if (!CRYPT_defaultChainEngine)
{
CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config = { 0 };
HCERTCHAINENGINE engine;
config.cbSize = sizeof(config);
CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(&config, &engine);
InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&CRYPT_defaultChainEngine, engine,
NULL);
if (CRYPT_defaultChainEngine != engine)
CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine);
}
return CRYPT_defaultChainEngine;
}
void default_chain_engine_free(void)
{
CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(CRYPT_defaultChainEngine);
}
typedef struct _CertificateChain
{
CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context;
HCERTSTORE world;
LONG ref;
} CertificateChain, *PCertificateChain;
static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
{
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
DWORD size;
BOOL ret;
if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
{
CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
&info, &size);
if (ret)
{
if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
{
PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
DWORD i;
for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
== CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
directoryName =
&info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
if (directoryName)
{
ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
&directoryName->u.DirectoryName, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer)
&& CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
&cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber);
}
else
{
FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
ret = FALSE;
}
}
else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
{
ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
{
LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
if (buf)
{
CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size);
CryptMemFree(buf);
}
}
else
ret = FALSE;
}
LocalFree(info);
}
}
else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
{
CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
&info, &size);
if (ret)
{
if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
{
ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
&info->CertIssuer, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer) &&
CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->CertSerialNumber,
&cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber);
}
else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
{
ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
{
LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
if (buf)
{
CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size);
CryptMemFree(buf);
}
else
ret = FALSE;
}
else
ret = FALSE;
}
else
ret = FALSE;
LocalFree(info);
}
}
else
ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
&cert->pCertInfo->Subject, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer);
return ret;
}
static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element)
{
CertFreeCertificateContext(element->pCertContext);
CryptMemFree(element);
}
static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
{
DWORD i, j, cyclicCertIndex = 0;
/* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */
for (i = 0; !cyclicCertIndex && i < chain->cElement; i++)
for (j = i + 1; !cyclicCertIndex && j < chain->cElement; j++)
if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo))
cyclicCertIndex = j;
if (cyclicCertIndex)
{
chain->rgpElement[cyclicCertIndex]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
/* Release remaining certs */
for (i = cyclicCertIndex + 1; i < chain->cElement; i++)
CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
/* Truncate chain */
chain->cElement = cyclicCertIndex + 1;
}
}
/* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */
static inline BOOL CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain)
{
if (chain->cElement)
return chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
& CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC;
else
return FALSE;
}
static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS *chainStatus,
const CERT_TRUST_STATUS *elementStatus)
{
/* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */
chainStatus->dwErrorStatus |= elementStatus->dwErrorStatus;
/* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the
* chain.
*/
chainStatus->dwInfoStatus |= (elementStatus->dwInfoStatus & 0xfffffff0);
}
static BOOL CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, DWORD subjectInfoStatus)
{
BOOL ret = FALSE;
PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
if (element)
{
if (!chain->cElement)
chain->rgpElement = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
else
chain->rgpElement = CryptMemRealloc(chain->rgpElement,
(chain->cElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
if (chain->rgpElement)
{
chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement++] = element;
memset(element, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
element->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT);
element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert);
if (chain->cElement > 1)
chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 2]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus
= subjectInfoStatus;
/* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */
if (!(chain->cElement % engine->CycleDetectionModulus))
{
CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain);
/* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is
* cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated.
*/
element = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
}
CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
&element->TrustStatus);
ret = TRUE;
}
else
CryptMemFree(element);
}
return ret;
}
static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
{
DWORD i;
for (i = 0; i < chain->cElement; i++)
CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
CryptMemFree(chain->rgpElement);
CryptMemFree(chain);
}
static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot,
PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
{
PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot,
rootElement->pCertContext);
if (!trustedRoot)
rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT;
else
CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot);
}
static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hRoot,
PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
{
PCCERT_CONTEXT root = rootElement->pCertContext;
if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root->dwCertEncodingType,
CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT, (void *)root,
CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT, (void *)root, 0, NULL))
{
TRACE_(chain)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n");
rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
}
CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot, rootElement);
}
/* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
* or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a
* CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets
* constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified.
* Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded.
*/
static BOOL CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert,
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *constraints, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified)
{
BOOL ret = TRUE;
PCERT_EXTENSION ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
constraints->fPathLenConstraint = FALSE;
if (ext)
{
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
DWORD size = 0;
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
NULL, &info, &size);
if (ret)
{
if (info->SubjectType.cbData == 1)
constraints->fCA =
info->SubjectType.pbData[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG;
LocalFree(info);
}
}
else
{
ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2,
cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
if (ext)
{
DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
0, NULL, constraints, &size);
}
else
constraints->fCA = defaultIfNotSpecified;
}
return ret;
}
/* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with
* remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the
* basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be
* allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also
* allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.)
* This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming
* CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are
* used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches
* section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the
* application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate
* through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the
* certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so
* accepting locally installed ones is a compromise.
* Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic
* constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the
* root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue
* the next certificate in the chain.
* Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if:
* 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or
* 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's
* Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation
* occurs.
* Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining
* chain is valid.
*/
static BOOL CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *chainConstraints,
DWORD remainingCAs, BOOL isRoot, BOOL *pathLengthConstraintViolated)
{
BOOL validBasicConstraints, implicitCA = FALSE;
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
if (isRoot)
implicitCA = TRUE;
else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 ||
cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2)
{
BYTE hash[20];
DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID,
hash, &size))
{
CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CertFindCertificateInStore(
engine->hWorld, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH,
&blob, NULL);
if (localCert)
{
CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert);
implicitCA = TRUE;
}
}
}
if ((validBasicConstraints = CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert,
&constraints, implicitCA)))
{
chainConstraints->fCA = constraints.fCA;
if (!constraints.fCA)
{
TRACE_(chain)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs + 1);
validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
}
else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint)
{
/* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the
* entire remaining chain.
*/
if (!chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint ||
constraints.dwPathLenConstraint <
chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
{
TRACE_(chain)("setting path length constraint to %d\n",
chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint = TRUE;
chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint =
constraints.dwPathLenConstraint;
}
}
}
if (chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint &&
remainingCAs > chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
{
TRACE_(chain)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n",
remainingCAs, chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
*pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
}
return validBasicConstraints;
}
static BOOL domain_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name)
{
BOOL match;
/* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
* "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name...
* When the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one
* or more labels. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by
* both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint
* ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint
* does not begin with a period, it specifies a host."
* and for email addresses,
* "To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the
* constraint is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint
* "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the host
* "example.com". To specify any address within a domain, the constraint
* is specified with a leading period (as with URIs)."
*/
if (constraint[0] == '.')
{
/* Must be strictly greater than, a name can't begin with '.' */
if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
constraint);
else
{
/* name is too short, no match */
match = FALSE;
}
}
else
match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
return match;
}
static BOOL url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
{
BOOL match = FALSE;
TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
if (!constraint)
*trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
else if (!name)
; /* no match */
else
{
LPCWSTR colon, authority_end, at, hostname = NULL;
/* The maximum length for a hostname is 254 in the DNS, see RFC 1034 */
WCHAR hostname_buf[255];
/* RFC 5280: only the hostname portion of the URL is compared. From
* section 4.2.1.10:
* "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.
* The constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name
* and MAY specify a host or a domain."
* The format for URIs is in RFC 2396.
*
* First, remove any scheme that's present. */
colon = strchrW(name, ':');
if (colon && *(colon + 1) == '/' && *(colon + 2) == '/')
name = colon + 3;
/* Next, find the end of the authority component. (The authority is
* generally just the hostname, but it may contain a username or a port.
* Those are removed next.)
*/
authority_end = strchrW(name, '/');
if (!authority_end)
authority_end = strchrW(name, '?');
if (!authority_end)
authority_end = name + strlenW(name);
/* Remove any port number from the authority. The userinfo portion
* of an authority may contain a colon, so stop if a userinfo portion
* is found (indicated by '@').
*/
for (colon = authority_end; colon >= name && *colon != ':' &&
*colon != '@'; colon--)
;
if (*colon == ':')
authority_end = colon;
/* Remove any username from the authority */
if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
name = at;
/* Ignore any path or query portion of the URL. */
if (*authority_end)
{
if (authority_end - name < sizeof(hostname_buf) /
sizeof(hostname_buf[0]))
{
memcpy(hostname_buf, name,
(authority_end - name) * sizeof(WCHAR));
hostname_buf[authority_end - name] = 0;
hostname = hostname_buf;
}
/* else: Hostname is too long, not a match */
}
else
hostname = name;
if (hostname)
match = domain_name_matches(constraint, hostname);
}
return match;
}
static BOOL rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
{
BOOL match = FALSE;
LPCWSTR at;
TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
if (!constraint)
*trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
else if (!name)
; /* no match */
else if (strchrW(constraint, '@'))
match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
else
{
if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
match = domain_name_matches(constraint, at + 1);
else
match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
}
return match;
}
static BOOL dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
{
BOOL match = FALSE;
TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
if (!constraint)
*trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
else if (!name)
; /* no match */
/* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
* "DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS name
* that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the
* left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For example,
* www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but host1.example.com
* would not."
*/
else if (lstrlenW(name) == lstrlenW(constraint))
match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
else if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
{
match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
constraint);
if (match)
{
BOOL dot = FALSE;
LPCWSTR ptr;
/* This only matches if name is a subdomain of constraint, i.e.
* there's a '.' between the beginning of the name and the
* matching portion of the name.
*/
for (ptr = name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint);
!dot && ptr >= name; ptr--)
if (*ptr == '.')
dot = TRUE;
match = dot;
}
}
/* else: name is too short, no match */
return match;
}
static BOOL ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *constraint,
const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *name, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
{
BOOL match = FALSE;
TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint->cbData, constraint->pbData,
name->cbData, name->pbData);
/* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for
* IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively.
*/
if (constraint->cbData != sizeof(DWORD) * 2 && constraint->cbData != 32)
*trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
else if (name->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) &&
constraint->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) * 2)
{
DWORD subnet, mask, addr;
memcpy(&subnet, constraint->pbData, sizeof(subnet));
memcpy(&mask, constraint->pbData + sizeof(subnet), sizeof(mask));
memcpy(&addr, name->pbData, sizeof(addr));
/* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we
* don't need to swap to host order
*/
match = (subnet & mask) == (addr & mask);
}
else if (name->cbData == 16 && constraint->cbData == 32)
{
const BYTE *subnet, *mask, *addr;
DWORD i;
subnet = constraint->pbData;
mask = constraint->pbData + 16;
addr = name->pbData;
match = TRUE;
for (i = 0; match && i < 16; i++)
if ((subnet[i] & mask[i]) != (addr[i] & mask[i]))
match = FALSE;
}
/* else: name is wrong size, no match */
return match;
}
static BOOL directory_name_matches(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *constraint,
const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
{
CERT_NAME_INFO *constraintName;
DWORD size;
BOOL match = FALSE;
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME, constraint->pbData,
constraint->cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &constraintName, &size))
{
DWORD i;
match = TRUE;
for (i = 0; match && i < constraintName->cRDN; i++)
match = CertIsRDNAttrsInCertificateName(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
CERT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_IS_RDN_ATTRS_FLAG,
(CERT_NAME_BLOB *)name, &constraintName->rgRDN[i]);
LocalFree(constraintName);
}
return match;
}
static BOOL alt_name_matches(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint, DWORD *trustErrorStatus, BOOL *present)
{
BOOL match = FALSE;
if (name->dwAltNameChoice == constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
{
if (present)
*present = TRUE;
switch (constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
{
case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
break;
case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
match = dns_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
break;
case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
match = url_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
break;
case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
match = ip_address_matches(&constraint->u.IPAddress,
&name->u.IPAddress, trustErrorStatus);
break;
case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
&name->u.DirectoryName);
break;
default:
ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n",
constraint->dwAltNameChoice);
*trustErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
}
}
else if (present)
*present = FALSE;
return match;
}
static BOOL alt_name_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
{
DWORD i;
BOOL match = FALSE;
for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
match = alt_name_matches(name,
&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus, NULL);
return match;
}
static BOOL alt_name_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
BOOL *present)
{
DWORD i;
BOOL match = FALSE;
for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
match = alt_name_matches(name,
&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus,
present);
return match;
}
static inline PCERT_EXTENSION get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO *cert)
{
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2,
cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
if (!ext)
ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
return ext;
}
static void compare_alt_name_with_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *altNameExt,
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
{
CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectAltName;
DWORD size;
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
altNameExt->Value.pbData, altNameExt->Value.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
&subjectAltName, &size))
{
DWORD i;
for (i = 0; i < subjectAltName->cAltEntry; i++)
{
BOOL nameFormPresent;
/* A name constraint only applies if the name form is present.
* From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
* "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
* present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
* the certificate is acceptable."
*/
if (alt_name_matches_excluded_name(
&subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
trustErrorStatus))
{
TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d excluded\n",
subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
*trustErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
}
nameFormPresent = FALSE;
if (!alt_name_matches_permitted_name(
&subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
{
TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d not permitted\n",
subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
*trustErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
}
}
LocalFree(subjectAltName);
}
else
*trustErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
}
static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
{
DWORD i;
BOOL match = FALSE;
for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
{
const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
(LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
}
return match;
}
static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
BOOL *present)
{
DWORD i;
BOOL match = FALSE;
for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
{
const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
{
*present = TRUE;
match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
(LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
}
}
return match;
}
static void compare_subject_with_email_constraints(
const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
{
CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
DWORD size;
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
subjectName->pbData, subjectName->cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
{
DWORD i, j;
for (i = 0; i < name->cRDN; i++)
for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
if (!strcmp(name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId,
szOID_RSA_emailAddr))
{
BOOL nameFormPresent;
/* A name constraint only applies if the name form is
* present. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
* "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
* present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
* the certificate is acceptable."
*/
if (rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(
&name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
trustErrorStatus))
{
TRACE_(chain)(
"email address in subject name is excluded\n");
*trustErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
}
nameFormPresent = FALSE;
if (!rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(
&name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
{
TRACE_(chain)(
"email address in subject name is not permitted\n");
*trustErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
}
}
LocalFree(name);
}
else
*trustErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
}
static BOOL CRYPT_IsEmptyName(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
{
BOOL empty;
if (!name->cbData)
empty = TRUE;
else if (name->cbData == 2 && name->pbData[1] == 0)
{
/* An empty sequence is also empty */
empty = TRUE;
}
else
empty = FALSE;
return empty;
}
static void compare_subject_with_constraints(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
{
BOOL hasEmailConstraint = FALSE;
DWORD i;
/* In general, a subject distinguished name only matches a directory name
* constraint. However, an exception exists for email addresses.
* From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.6:
* "Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is
* embedded in the subject distinguished name as an emailAddress
* attribute [RFC2985]."
* If an email address constraint exists, check that constraint separately.
*/
for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree;
i++)
if (nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree;
i++)
if (nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
if (hasEmailConstraint)
compare_subject_with_email_constraints(subjectName, nameConstraints,
trustErrorStatus);
for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
{
CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME &&
directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName, subjectName))
{
TRACE_(chain)("subject name is excluded\n");
*trustErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
}
}
/* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
* "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is present.
* If no name of the type is in the certificate, the certificate is
* acceptable."
* An empty name can't have the name form present, so don't check it.
*/
if (nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree && !CRYPT_IsEmptyName(subjectName))
{
BOOL match = FALSE, hasDirectoryConstraint = FALSE;
for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
{
CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
{
hasDirectoryConstraint = TRUE;
match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
subjectName);
}
}
if (hasDirectoryConstraint && !match)
{
TRACE_(chain)("subject name is not permitted\n");
*trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
}
}
}
static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(
const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, const CERT_INFO *cert,
DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
{
CERT_EXTENSION *ext = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert);
if (ext)
compare_alt_name_with_constraints(ext, nameConstraints,
trustErrorStatus);
/* Name constraints apply to the subject alternative name as well as the
* subject name. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
* "Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to
* subject alternative names."
*/
compare_subject_with_constraints(&cert->Subject, nameConstraints,
trustErrorStatus);
}
/* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO *cert)
{
CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info = NULL;
CERT_EXTENSION *ext;
if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, cert->cExtension,
cert->rgExtension)))
{
DWORD size;
CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info,
&size);
}
return info;
}
static BOOL CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info)
{
DWORD i;
BOOL ret = TRUE;
/* Make sure at least one permitted or excluded subtree is present. From
* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
* "Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an
* empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the
* excludedSubtrees MUST be present."
*/
if (!info->cPermittedSubtree && !info->cExcludedSubtree)
{
WARN_(chain)("constraints contain no permitted nor excluded subtree\n");
ret = FALSE;
}
/* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum.
* See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
* "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
* any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
* absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
* constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
* maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
* application MUST either process these fields or reject the
* certificate."
* Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we
* reject any name constraint that contains them.
*/
for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
if (info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
{
TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n");
ret = FALSE;
}
for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
if (info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
{
TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n");
ret = FALSE;
}
return ret;
}
static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
{
int i, j;
/* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to
* MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's
* name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280,
* the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate
* in the chain, not just the end cert.
* Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the
* certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated
* them.
* In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while
* still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name
* constraints.
*/
for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
{
CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
if ((nameConstraints = CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo)))
{
if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints))
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
else
{
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
{
DWORD errorStatus = 0;
/* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name
* constraints checked unless they're the end cert.
*/
if (j == 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext))
{
CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints,
chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
&errorStatus);
if (errorStatus)
{
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
errorStatus;
CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
&chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
}
else
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_HAS_VALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
}
}
}
LocalFree(nameConstraints);
}
}
}
/* Gets cert's policies info, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
static CERT_POLICIES_INFO *CRYPT_GetPolicies(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
{
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies = NULL;
ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
if (ext)
{
DWORD size;
CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
&policies, &size);
}
return policies;
}
static void CRYPT_CheckPolicies(const CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies, CERT_INFO *cert,
DWORD *errorStatus)
{
DWORD i;
for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
{
/* For now, the only accepted policy identifier is the anyPolicy
* identifier.
* FIXME: the policy identifiers should be compared against the
* cert's certificate policies extension, subject to the policy
* mappings extension, and the policy constraints extension.
* See RFC 5280, sections 4.2.1.4, 4.2.1.5, and 4.2.1.11.
*/
if (strcmp(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier,
szOID_ANY_CERT_POLICY))
{
FIXME("unsupported policy %s\n",
policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier);
*errorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS;
}
}
}
static void CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
{
int i, j;
for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
{
CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
if ((policies = CRYPT_GetPolicies(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext)))
{
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
{
DWORD errorStatus = 0;
CRYPT_CheckPolicies(policies,
chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo, &errorStatus);
if (errorStatus)
{
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
errorStatus;
CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
&chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
}
}
LocalFree(policies);
}
}
}
static LPWSTR name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
{
DWORD len = cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, NULL, 0);
LPWSTR str = NULL;
if (len)
{
str = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
if (str)
cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, str, len);
}
return str;
}
static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *entry)
{
LPWSTR str;
switch (entry->dwAltNameChoice)
{
case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME:
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n",
debugstr_a(entry->u.pOtherName->pszObjId));
break;
case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n",
debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszRfc822Name));
break;
case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n",
debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszDNSName));
break;
case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
str = name_value_to_str(&entry->u.DirectoryName);
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str));
CryptMemFree(str);
break;
case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszURL));
break;
case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n",
entry->u.IPAddress.cbData);
break;
case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID:
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n",
debugstr_a(entry->u.pszRegisteredID));
break;
default:
TRACE_(chain)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry->dwAltNameChoice);
}
}
static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type, const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
{
CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *name;
DWORD size;
TRACE_(chain)("%s:\n", type);
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
{
DWORD i;
TRACE_(chain)("%d alt name entries:\n", name->cAltEntry);
for (i = 0; i < name->cAltEntry; i++)
dump_alt_name_entry(&name->rgAltEntry[i]);
LocalFree(name);
}
}
static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
{
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
DWORD size = 0;
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
NULL, &info, &size))
{
TRACE_(chain)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info->SubjectType.pbData[0]);
TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
info->fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", info->dwPathLenConstraint);
LocalFree(info);
}
}
static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
{
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
0, NULL, &constraints, &size))
{
TRACE_(chain)("basic constraints:\n");
TRACE_(chain)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints.fCA ? "" : "not");
TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
constraints.fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", constraints.dwPathLenConstraint);
}
}
static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
{
CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
{
#define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \
if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
if (usage.cbData)
{
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE);
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE);
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE);
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE);
}
#undef trace_usage_bit
if (usage.cbData > 1 && usage.pbData[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE)
TRACE_(chain)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n");
}
}
static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE *subtree)
{
dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree->Base);
TRACE_(chain)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n",
subtree->dwMinimum, subtree->fMaximum, subtree->dwMaximum);
}
static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
{
CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
DWORD size;
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &nameConstraints,
&size))
{
DWORD i;
TRACE_(chain)("%d permitted subtrees:\n",
nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree);
for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i]);
TRACE_(chain)("%d excluded subtrees:\n",
nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree);
for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i]);
LocalFree(nameConstraints);
}
}
static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
{
CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
DWORD size;
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
&policies, &size))
{
DWORD i, j;
TRACE_(chain)("%d policies:\n", policies->cPolicyInfo);
for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
{
TRACE_(chain)("policy identifier: %s\n",
debugstr_a(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier));
TRACE_(chain)("%d policy qualifiers:\n",
policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier);
for (j = 0; j < policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier; j++)
TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_a(
policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].rgPolicyQualifier[j].
pszPolicyQualifierId));
}
LocalFree(policies);
}
}
static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
{
CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
DWORD size;
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
&usage, &size))
{
DWORD i;
TRACE_(chain)("%d usages:\n", usage->cUsageIdentifier);
for (i = 0; i < usage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
LocalFree(usage);
}
}
static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
{
CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
{
#define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \
if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
if (usage.cbData)
{
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE);
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE);
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE);
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE);
trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE);
}
#undef trace_cert_type_bit
}
}
static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
{
TRACE_(chain)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext->pszObjId),
ext->fCritical ? "" : "not ");
if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext);
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME))
dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext);
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
dump_basic_constraints(ext);
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
dump_key_usage(ext);
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext);
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2))
dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext);
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
dump_basic_constraints2(ext);
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
dump_name_constraints(ext);
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
dump_cert_policies(ext);
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext);
else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE))
dump_netscape_cert_type(ext);
}
static LPCSTR filetime_to_str(const FILETIME *time)
{
char date[80];
char dateFmt[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */
SYSTEMTIME sysTime;
if (!time) return "(null)";
GetLocaleInfoA(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE, dateFmt,
sizeof(dateFmt) / sizeof(dateFmt[0]));
FileTimeToSystemTime(time, &sysTime);
GetDateFormatA(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, 0, &sysTime, dateFmt, date,
sizeof(date) / sizeof(date[0]));
return wine_dbg_sprintf("%s", date);
}
static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
{
LPWSTR name = NULL;
DWORD len, i;
TRACE_(chain)("%p: version %d\n", cert, cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, NULL, 0);
name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
if (name)
{
CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, name, len);
TRACE_(chain)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
CryptMemFree(name);
}
len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
NULL, 0);
name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
if (name)
{
CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
name, len);
TRACE_(chain)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
CryptMemFree(name);
}
TRACE_(chain)("valid from %s to %s\n",
filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotBefore),
filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotAfter));
TRACE_(chain)("%d extensions\n", cert->pCertInfo->cExtension);
for (i = 0; i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
dump_extension(&cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i]);
}
static BOOL CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, BOOL isRoot, BOOL isCA, DWORD index)
{
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
BOOL ret;
BYTE usageBits = 0;
ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
if (ext)
{
CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType, X509_BITS,
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
&usage, &size);
if (!ret)
return FALSE;
else if (usage.cbData > 2)
{
/* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2
* bytes are needed to encode all known usages.
*/
return FALSE;
}
else
{
/* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign
* bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the
* key usage bits.
*/
usageBits = usage.pbData[usage.cbData - 1];
}
}
if (isCA)
{
if (!ext)
{
/* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage)
* here. Quoting the RFC:
* "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that
* contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures
* on other public key certificates or CRLs."
* MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage
* extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have
* extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so
* perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3
* certs without key usage extensions. Because some CAs, e.g.
* Certum, also do not include key usage extensions in their
* intermediate certificates, we are forced to accept V3
* certificates without key usage extensions as well.
*/
ret = TRUE;
}
else
{
if (!(usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
{
WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n");
ret = FALSE;
}
else
ret = TRUE;
}
}
else
{
if (ext && (usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
{
WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n");
ret = FALSE;
}
else
ret = TRUE;
}
return ret;
}
static BOOL CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
{
BOOL ret = TRUE;
DWORD i;
for (i = 0; ret && i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
{
if (cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].fCritical)
{
LPCSTR oid = cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].pszObjId;
if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
ret = TRUE;
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
ret = TRUE;
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
ret = TRUE;
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
ret = TRUE;
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
ret = TRUE;
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
ret = TRUE;
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
ret = TRUE;
else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
ret = TRUE;
else
{
FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n",
debugstr_a(oid));
ret = FALSE;
}
}
}
return ret;
}
static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
{
BOOL ret = TRUE;
/* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */
switch (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion)
{
case CERT_V1:
/* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280,
* section 4.1.2.8:
* "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
* 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1."
*/
if (cert->pCertInfo->IssuerUniqueId.cbData ||
cert->pCertInfo->SubjectUniqueId.cbData)
ret = FALSE;
/* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
* "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
*/
if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
ret = FALSE;
break;
case CERT_V2:
/* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
* "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
*/
if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
ret = FALSE;
break;
case CERT_V3:
/* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */
break;
default:
WARN_(chain)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
ret = FALSE;
}
return ret;
}
static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, LPFILETIME time)
{
PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
int i;
BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated = FALSE;
CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints = { FALSE, FALSE, 0 };
TRACE_(chain)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n",
chain->cElement, filetime_to_str(time));
for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
BOOL isRoot;
if (TRACE_ON(chain))
dump_element(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
if (i == chain->cElement - 1)
isRoot = CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
else
isRoot = FALSE;
if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
{
/* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their
* contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code.
*/
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION;
}
if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time,
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo) != 0)
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID;
if (i != 0)
{
/* Check the signature of the cert this issued */
if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING,
CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT,
(void *)chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->pCertContext,
CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT,
(void *)chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, 0, NULL))
chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
/* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining
* CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid.
*/
if (pathLengthConstraintViolated)
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine,
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, i - 1, isRoot,
&pathLengthConstraintViolated))
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint &&
constraints.dwPathLenConstraint)
{
/* This one's valid - decrement max length */
constraints.dwPathLenConstraint--;
}
}
else
{
/* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */
if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, FALSE))
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
}
if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine, chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext,
isRoot, constraints.fCA, i))
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain))
{
/* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints
* are violated, because the chain is infinitely long.
*/
pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN |
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
}
/* Check whether every critical extension is supported */
if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION |
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT;
CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
&chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
}
CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain);
CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(chain);
if (CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement->pCertContext))
{
rootElement->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED | CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine->hRoot, rootElement);
}
CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &rootElement->TrustStatus);
}
static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_GetIssuer(HCERTSTORE store, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject,
PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer, DWORD *infoStatus)
{
PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = NULL;
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
DWORD size;
*infoStatus = 0;
if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
{
CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
BOOL ret;
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
&info, &size);
if (ret)
{
CERT_ID id;
if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
{
id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer, &info->CertIssuer,
sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
&info->CertSerialNumber, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
prevIssuer);
if (issuer)
{
TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by issuer/serial number\n");
*infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
}
}
else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
{
id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
prevIssuer);
if (issuer)
{
TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
*infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
}
}
LocalFree(info);
}
}
else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
{
CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
BOOL ret;
ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
&info, &size);
if (ret)
{
CERT_ID id;
if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
{
PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
DWORD i;
for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
== CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
directoryName =
&info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
if (directoryName)
{
id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer,
&directoryName->u.DirectoryName, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
&info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
prevIssuer);
if (issuer)
{
TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by directory name\n");
*infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
}
}
else
FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
}
else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
{
id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
prevIssuer);
if (issuer)
{
TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
*infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
}
}
LocalFree(info);
}
}
else
{
issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME,
&subject->pCertInfo->Issuer, prevIssuer);
TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by name\n");
*infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
}
return issuer;
}
/* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain,
* until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found.
*/
static BOOL CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
HCERTSTORE world, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
{
BOOL ret = TRUE;
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
while (ret && !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain) &&
!CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert))
{
PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(world, cert, NULL,
&chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
if (issuer)
{
ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, issuer,
chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
/* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to
* close the enumeration that found it
*/
CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer);
cert = issuer;
}
else
{
TRACE_(chain)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n");
chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
break;
}
}
return ret;
}
static LPCSTR debugstr_filetime(LPFILETIME pTime)
{
if (!pTime)
return "(nil)";
return wine_dbg_sprintf("%p (%s)", pTime, filetime_to_str(pTime));
}
static BOOL CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
HCERTSTORE world, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime,
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *ppChain)
{
BOOL ret = FALSE;
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain;
TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %s)\n", engine, world, cert, debugstr_filetime(pTime));
chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
if (chain)
{
memset(chain, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
chain->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, cert, 0);
if (ret)
{
ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, world, chain);
if (ret)
CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine, chain, pTime);
}
if (!ret)
{
CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain);
chain = NULL;
}
*ppChain = chain;
}
return ret;
}
static BOOL CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
PCertificateChain *ppChain)
{
PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain = NULL;
HCERTSTORE world;
BOOL ret;
world = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
CertAddStoreToCollection(world, engine->hWorld, 0, 0);
if (hAdditionalStore)
CertAddStoreToCollection(world, hAdditionalStore, 0, 0);
/* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't
* supported yet.
*/
if ((ret = CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine, world, cert, pTime,
&simpleChain)))
{
PCertificateChain chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
if (chain)
{
chain->ref = 1;
chain->world = world;
chain->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
chain->context.TrustStatus = simpleChain->TrustStatus;
chain->context.cChain = 1;
chain->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
chain->context.rgpChain[0] = simpleChain;
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
chain->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
chain->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
}
else
ret = FALSE;
*ppChain = chain;
}
return ret;
}
/* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */
static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(
const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain, DWORD iElement)
{
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
if (copy)
{
memset(copy, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
copy->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
copy->rgpElement =
CryptMemAlloc((iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
if (copy->rgpElement)
{
DWORD i;
BOOL ret = TRUE;
memset(copy->rgpElement, 0,
(iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
for (i = 0; ret && i <= iElement; i++)
{
PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element =
CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
if (element)
{
*element = *chain->rgpElement[i];
element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
/* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get
* rechecked after the new chain is done.
*/
memset(&element->TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
copy->rgpElement[copy->cElement++] = element;
}
else
ret = FALSE;
}
if (!ret)
{
for (i = 0; i <= iElement; i++)
CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement[i]);
CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement);
CryptMemFree(copy);
copy = NULL;
}
}
else
{
CryptMemFree(copy);
copy = NULL;
}
}
return copy;
}
static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(PCertificateChain chain)
{
DWORD i;
for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
CertFreeCertificateChain(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]);
CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext);
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
}
static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(PCertificateChain chain)
{
DWORD i;
CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain->context.rgpChain[i]);
CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpChain);
CertCloseStore(chain->world, 0);
CryptMemFree(chain);
}
/* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of
* simple chain iChain.
*/
static PCertificateChain CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(PCertificateChain chain,
DWORD iChain, DWORD iElement)
{
PCertificateChain copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
if (copy)
{
copy->ref = 1;
copy->world = CertDuplicateStore(chain->world);
copy->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
/* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get
* rechecked after the new chain is done.
*/
memset(&copy->context.TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
copy->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
copy->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
copy->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
copy->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
copy->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(
(iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
if (copy->context.rgpChain)
{
BOOL ret = TRUE;
DWORD i;
memset(copy->context.rgpChain, 0,
(iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
if (iChain)
{
for (i = 0; ret && iChain && i < iChain - 1; i++)
{
copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1);
if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
ret = FALSE;
}
}
else
i = 0;
if (ret)
{
copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
iElement);
if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
ret = FALSE;
}
if (!ret)
{
CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy);
copy = NULL;
}
else
copy->context.cChain = iChain + 1;
}
else
{
CryptMemFree(copy);
copy = NULL;
}
}
return copy;
}
static PCertificateChain CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(
HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
PCertificateChain chain)
{
PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
PCertificateChain alternate;
TRACE("(%p, %s, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, debugstr_filetime(pTime),
hAdditionalStore, chain);
/* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent
* order of alternate creation:
*/
if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
chain = (PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext - 1];
/* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */
if (chain->context.cChain <= 1 && chain->context.rgpChain[0]->cElement <= 1)
alternate = NULL;
else
{
DWORD i, j, infoStatus;
PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer = NULL;
alternate = NULL;
for (i = 0; !alternateIssuer && i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
for (j = 0; !alternateIssuer &&
j < chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1; j++)
{
PCCERT_CONTEXT subject =
chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext);
alternateIssuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(prevIssuer->hCertStore,
subject, prevIssuer, &infoStatus);
}
if (alternateIssuer)
{
i--;
j--;
alternate = CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain, i, j);
if (alternate)
{
BOOL ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine,
alternate->context.rgpChain[i], alternateIssuer, infoStatus);
/* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it
* to close the enumeration that found it
*/
CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer);
if (ret)
{
ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, alternate->world,
alternate->context.rgpChain[i]);
if (ret)
CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine,
alternate->context.rgpChain[i], pTime);
CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate->context.TrustStatus,
&alternate->context.rgpChain[i]->TrustStatus);
}
if (!ret)
{
CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate);
alternate = NULL;
}
}
}
}
TRACE("%p\n", alternate);
return alternate;
}
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1
#define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \
CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \
CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \
CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
#define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \
(TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits)
static DWORD CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain *chain)
{
DWORD quality = CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST;
if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT))
quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT;
if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN))
quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN;
if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED))
quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID;
if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID))
quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID;
return quality;
}
/* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality"
* alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other
* chains as lower quality chains of it.
*/
static PCertificateChain CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(
PCertificateChain chain)
{
DWORD i;
/* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an
* alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate
* has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower
* quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the
* lower quality contexts.
*/
for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
{
PCertificateChain alternate =
(PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i];
if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain))
{
alternate->context.cLowerQualityChainContext =
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext;
alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext;
alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i] =
(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
chain = alternate;
}
}
return chain;
}
static BOOL CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(PCertificateChain chain,
const CertificateChain *alternate)
{
BOOL ret;
if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
CryptMemRealloc(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext,
(chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext + 1) *
sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
else
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
if (chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext)
{
chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext++] =
(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)alternate;
ret = TRUE;
}
else
ret = FALSE;
return ret;
}
static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT *chain, DWORD i)
{
DWORD j, iElement;
PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = NULL;
for (j = 0, iElement = 0; !element && j < chain->cChain; j++)
{
if (iElement + chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement < i)
iElement += chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement;
else
element = chain->rgpChain[j]->rgpElement[i - iElement];
}
return element;
}
typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS {
DWORD cbSize;
CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage;
} CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS, *PCERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS;
static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara, DWORD chainFlags)
{
DWORD cContext;
if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT)
cContext = 1;
else if ((chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN) ||
(chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT))
{
DWORD i;
for (i = 0, cContext = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
{
if (i < chain->cChain - 1 ||
chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN)
cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement;
else
cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1;
}
}
else
cContext = 0;
if (cContext)
{
DWORD i, j, iContext, revocationFlags;
CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara = { sizeof(revocationPara), 0 };
CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus =
{ sizeof(revocationStatus), 0 };
BOOL ret;
revocationFlags = CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG;
if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY)
revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION;
if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT)
revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG;
revocationPara.pftTimeToUse = pTime;
if (hAdditionalStore)
{
revocationPara.cCertStore = 1;
revocationPara.rgCertStore = &hAdditionalStore;
revocationPara.hCrlStore = hAdditionalStore;
}
if (pChainPara->cbSize == sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
{
revocationPara.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout =
pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
revocationPara.fCheckFreshnessTime =
pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime;
revocationPara.dwFreshnessTime =
pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime;
}
for (i = 0, iContext = 0; iContext < cContext && i < chain->cChain; i++)
{
for (j = 0; iContext < cContext &&
j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++, iContext++)
{
PCCERT_CONTEXT certToCheck =
chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
if (j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1)
revocationPara.pIssuerCert =
chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext;
else
revocationPara.pIssuerCert = NULL;
ret = CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE, 1, (void **)&certToCheck,
revocationFlags, &revocationPara, &revocationStatus);
if (!ret)
{
PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
chain, iContext);
DWORD error;
switch (revocationStatus.dwError)
{
case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL:
case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE:
/* If the revocation status is unknown, it's assumed
* to be offline too.
*/
error = CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN |
CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
break;
case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
error = CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
break;
case CRYPT_E_REVOKED:
error = CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED;
break;
default:
WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus.dwError);
error = 0;
}
if (element)
{
/* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */
element->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
}
chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
}
}
}
}
}
static void CRYPT_CheckUsages(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
{
if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS) &&
pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
{
PCCERT_CONTEXT endCert;
PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
BOOL validForUsage;
/* A chain, if created, always includes the end certificate */
endCert = chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
/* The extended key usage extension specifies how a certificate's
* public key may be used. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12:
* "This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
* certified public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the
* basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension."
* If the extension is present, it only satisfies the requested usage
* if that usage is included in the extension:
* "If the extension is present, then the certificate MUST only be used
* for one of the purposes indicated."
* There is also the special anyExtendedKeyUsage OID, but it doesn't
* have to be respected:
* "Applications that require the presence of a particular purpose
* MAY reject certificates that include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID
* but not the particular OID expected for the application."
* For now, I'm being more conservative and ignoring the presence of
* the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID.
*/
if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
endCert->pCertInfo->cExtension, endCert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
{
const CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *requestedUsage =
&pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage;
CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
DWORD size;
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
{
if (pChainPara->RequestedUsage.dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND)
{
DWORD i, j;
/* For AND matches, all usages must be present */
validForUsage = TRUE;
for (i = 0; validForUsage &&
i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
{
BOOL match = FALSE;
for (j = 0; !match && j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
match = !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
if (!match)
validForUsage = FALSE;
}
}
else
{
DWORD i, j;
/* For OR matches, any matching usage suffices */
validForUsage = FALSE;
for (i = 0; !validForUsage &&
i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
{
for (j = 0; !validForUsage &&
j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
validForUsage =
!strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
}
}
LocalFree(usage);
}
else
validForUsage = FALSE;
}
else
{
/* If the extension isn't present, any interpretation is valid:
* "Certificate using applications MAY require that the extended
* key usage extension be present and that a particular purpose
* be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to
* that application."
* Not all web sites include the extended key usage extension, so
* accept chains without it.
*/
TRACE_(chain)("requested usage from certificate with no usages\n");
validForUsage = TRUE;
}
if (!validForUsage)
{
chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
}
}
if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA) &&
pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
FIXME("unimplemented for RequestedIssuancePolicy\n");
}
static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH *usageMatch)
{
if (usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
{
DWORD i;
TRACE_(chain)("%s: %s\n", name,
usageMatch->dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND ? "AND" : "OR");
for (i = 0; i < usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier; i++)
TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usageMatch->Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
}
}
static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
{
TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->cbSize);
if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS))
dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara->RequestedUsage);
if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
{
dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy",
&pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy);
TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout);
TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime);
TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime);
}
}
BOOL WINAPI CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara, DWORD dwFlags, LPVOID pvReserved,
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT* ppChainContext)
{
BOOL ret;
PCertificateChain chain = NULL;
TRACE("(%p, %p, %s, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pCertContext,
debugstr_filetime(pTime), hAdditionalStore, pChainPara, dwFlags,
pvReserved, ppChainContext);
if (ppChainContext)
*ppChainContext = NULL;
if (!pChainPara)
{
SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
return FALSE;
}
if (!pCertContext->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId)
{
SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
return FALSE;
}
if (!hChainEngine)
hChainEngine = CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine();
if (TRACE_ON(chain))
dump_chain_para(pChainPara);
/* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */
ret = CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(hChainEngine, pCertContext, pTime,
hAdditionalStore, &chain);
if (ret)
{
PCertificateChain alternate = NULL;
PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain;
do {
alternate = CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(hChainEngine,
pTime, hAdditionalStore, chain);
/* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of
* chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation.
* The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end.
*/
if (alternate)
ret = CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain, alternate);
} while (ret && alternate);
chain = CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain);
if (!(dwFlags & CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS))
CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
pChain = (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain, pTime, hAdditionalStore,
pChainPara, dwFlags);
CRYPT_CheckUsages(pChain, pChainPara);
TRACE_(chain)("error status: %08x\n",
pChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus);
if (ppChainContext)
*ppChainContext = pChain;
else
CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain);
}
TRACE("returning %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertDuplicateCertificateChain(
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
{
PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext;
TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
if (chain)
InterlockedIncrement(&chain->ref);
return pChainContext;
}
VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
{
PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext;
TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
if (chain)
{
if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain->ref) == 0)
CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain);
}
}
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertFindChainInStore(HCERTSTORE store,
DWORD certEncodingType, DWORD findFlags, DWORD findType,
const void *findPara, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT prevChainContext)
{
FIXME("(%p, %08x, %08x, %d, %p, %p): stub\n", store, certEncodingType,
findFlags, findType, findPara, prevChainContext);
return NULL;
}
static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, DWORD error,
LONG *iChain, LONG *iElement)
{
DWORD i, j;
for (i = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
for (j = 0; j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++)
if (chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
error)
{
*iChain = i;
*iElement = j;
return;
}
}
static BOOL WINAPI verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
{
DWORD checks = 0;
if (pPolicyPara)
checks = pPolicyPara->dwFlags;
pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CHAINING;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC,
&pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
/* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
}
if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT &&
!(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_CA_FLAG))
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID)
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE &&
!(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE_FLAG))
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT &&
!(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT_FLAG))
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CRITICAL;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
return TRUE;
}
static BYTE msTestPubKey1[] = {
0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,
0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7,
0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f,
0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10,
0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
static BYTE msTestPubKey2[] = {
0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5,
0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8,
0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6,
0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18,
0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
static void dump_authenticode_extra_chain_policy_para(
AUTHENTICODE_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA *extraPara)
{
if (extraPara)
{
TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", extraPara->cbSize);
TRACE_(chain)("dwRegPolicySettings = %08x\n",
extraPara->dwRegPolicySettings);
TRACE_(chain)("pSignerInfo = %p\n", extraPara->pSignerInfo);
}
}
static BOOL WINAPI verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
{
BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
pPolicyStatus);
AUTHENTICODE_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA *extraPara = NULL;
if (pPolicyPara)
extraPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara;
if (TRACE_ON(chain))
dump_authenticode_extra_chain_policy_para(extraPara);
if (ret && pPolicyStatus->dwError == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT)
{
CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
BOOL isMSTestRoot = FALSE;
PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert =
pChainContext->rgpChain[pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex]->
rgpElement[pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex]->pCertContext;
DWORD i;
CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
{ sizeof(msTestPubKey1), msTestPubKey1 },
{ sizeof(msTestPubKey2), msTestPubKey2 },
};
/* Check whether the root is an MS test root */
for (i = 0; !isMSTestRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
i++)
{
msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
&failingCert->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
isMSTestRoot = TRUE;
}
if (isMSTestRoot)
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT;
}
return ret;
}
static BOOL WINAPI verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
{
pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
else
pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
return TRUE;
}
static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext,
LPCWSTR server_name)
{
BOOL matches = FALSE;
CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectName;
DWORD size;
TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
/* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the
* returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the
* encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if
* the encoded form of the name contains a NULL.
*/
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
&subjectName, &size))
{
DWORD i;
/* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist,
* in section 4.2.1.6:
* "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form,
* MAY be included."
* It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but both RFC 2818
* and RFC 2595 explicitly accept a certificate if any name matches.
*/
for (i = 0; !matches && i < subjectName->cAltEntry; i++)
{
if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice ==
CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME)
{
TRACE_(chain)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w(
subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName));
if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName[0] == '*')
{
LPCWSTR server_name_dot;
/* Matching a wildcard: a wildcard matches a single name
* component, which is terminated by a dot. RFC 1034
* doesn't define whether multiple wildcards are allowed,
* but I will assume that they are not until proven
* otherwise. RFC 1034 also states that 'the "*" label
* always matches at least one whole label and sometimes
* more, but always whole labels.' Native crypt32 does not
* match more than one label with a wildcard, so I do the
* same here. Thus, a wildcard only accepts the first
* label, then requires an exact match of the remaining
* string.
*/
server_name_dot = strchrW(server_name, '.');
if (server_name_dot)
{
if (!strcmpiW(server_name_dot,
subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName + 1))
matches = TRUE;
}
}
else if (!strcmpiW(server_name,
subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName))
matches = TRUE;
}
}
LocalFree(subjectName);
}
return matches;
}
static BOOL find_matching_domain_component(const CERT_NAME_INFO *name,
LPCWSTR component)
{
BOOL matches = FALSE;
DWORD i, j;
for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++)
for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT,
name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId))
{
const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr;
attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j];
/* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid
* a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component
* must match one domain component attribute's entire string
* value with a case-insensitive match.
*/
matches = !memicmpW(component, (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData,
attr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR));
}
return matches;
}
static BOOL match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component, DWORD allowed_len,
LPCWSTR server_component, DWORD server_len, BOOL allow_wildcards,
BOOL *see_wildcard)
{
LPCWSTR allowed_ptr, server_ptr;
BOOL matches = TRUE;
*see_wildcard = FALSE;
if (server_len < allowed_len)
{
WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too short for %s\n",
debugstr_wn(server_component, server_len),
debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
/* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain
* component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match.
*/
return FALSE;
}
for (allowed_ptr = allowed_component, server_ptr = server_component;
matches && allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len;
allowed_ptr++, server_ptr++)
{
if (*allowed_ptr == '*')
{
if (allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len - 1)
{
WARN_(chain)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n");
matches = FALSE;
}
else if (!allow_wildcards)
{
WARN_(chain)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n");
matches = FALSE;
}
else
{
/* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of
* the component also matches.
*/
*see_wildcard = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (matches)
matches = tolowerW(*allowed_ptr) == tolowerW(*server_ptr);
}
if (matches && server_ptr - server_component < server_len)
{
/* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component,
* the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'.
*/
matches = *allowed_ptr == '*';
}
return matches;
}
static BOOL match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name, const CERT_RDN_ATTR *nameAttr)
{
LPCWSTR allowed = (LPCWSTR)nameAttr->Value.pbData;
LPCWSTR allowed_component = allowed;
DWORD allowed_len = nameAttr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR);
LPCWSTR server_component = server_name;
DWORD server_len = strlenW(server_name);
BOOL matches = TRUE, allow_wildcards = TRUE;
TRACE_(chain)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
/* Remove trailing NULLs from the allowed name; while they shouldn't appear
* in a certificate in the first place, they sometimes do, and they should
* be ignored.
*/
while (allowed_len && allowed_component[allowed_len - 1] == 0)
allowed_len--;
/* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1:
* "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match
* any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g.,
* *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com
* but not bar.com."
*
* And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4:
* "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in
* the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com,
* foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com."
*
* There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is
* authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g.
* *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and
* www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com.
*/
do {
LPCWSTR allowed_dot, server_dot;
allowed_dot = memchrW(allowed_component, '.',
allowed_len - (allowed_component - allowed));
server_dot = memchrW(server_component, '.',
server_len - (server_component - server_name));
/* The number of components must match */
if ((!allowed_dot && server_dot) || (allowed_dot && !server_dot))
{
if (!allowed_dot)
WARN_(chain)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n",
debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
else
WARN_(chain)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n",
debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
matches = FALSE;
}
else
{
LPCWSTR allowed_end, server_end;
BOOL has_wildcard;
allowed_end = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot : allowed + allowed_len;
server_end = server_dot ? server_dot : server_name + server_len;
matches = match_domain_component(allowed_component,
allowed_end - allowed_component, server_component,
server_end - server_component, allow_wildcards, &has_wildcard);
/* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components
* may follow
*/
if (!has_wildcard)
allow_wildcards = FALSE;
if (matches)
{
allowed_component = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot + 1 : allowed_end;
server_component = server_dot ? server_dot + 1 : server_end;
}
}
} while (matches && allowed_component &&
allowed_component - allowed < allowed_len &&
server_component && server_component - server_name < server_len);
TRACE_(chain)("returning %d\n", matches);
return matches;
}
static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPCWSTR server_name)
{
BOOL matches = FALSE;
CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
DWORD size;
TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData,
CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
&name, &size))
{
/* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components,
* make sure all of them are present.
*/
if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, name))
{
LPCWSTR ptr = server_name;
do {
LPCWSTR dot = strchrW(ptr, '.'), end;
/* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */
WCHAR component[255];
DWORD len;
end = dot ? dot : ptr + strlenW(ptr);
len = end - ptr;
if (len >= sizeof(component) / sizeof(component[0]))
{
WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too long\n",
debugstr_wn(ptr, len));
matches = FALSE;
}
else
{
memcpy(component, ptr, len * sizeof(WCHAR));
component[len] = 0;
matches = find_matching_domain_component(name, component);
}
ptr = dot ? dot + 1 : end;
} while (matches && ptr && *ptr);
}
else
{
DWORD i, j;
/* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make
* make sure at least one common name matches. From RFC 2818,
* section 3.1:
* "If more than one identity of a given type is present in the
* certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any
* one of the set is considered acceptable.)"
*/
for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++)
for (j = 0; !matches && j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
{
PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j];
if (attr->pszObjId && !strcmp(szOID_COMMON_NAME,
attr->pszObjId))
matches = match_common_name(server_name, attr);
}
}
LocalFree(name);
}
return matches;
}
static void dump_ssl_extra_chain_policy_para(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara)
{
if (sslPara)
{
TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", sslPara->u.cbSize);
TRACE_(chain)("dwAuthType = %d\n", sslPara->dwAuthType);
TRACE_(chain)("fdwChecks = %08x\n", sslPara->fdwChecks);
TRACE_(chain)("pwszServerName = %s\n",
debugstr_w(sslPara->pwszServerName));
}
}
static BOOL WINAPI verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
{
HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara = NULL;
DWORD checks = 0;
if (pPolicyPara)
sslPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara;
if (TRACE_ON(chain))
dump_ssl_extra_chain_policy_para(sslPara);
if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData))
checks = sslPara->fdwChecks;
pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT &&
!(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CA))
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
/* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
}
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID &&
!(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_DATE_INVALID))
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE &&
!(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE))
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED && !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION))
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_REVOKED;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION &&
!(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION))
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT)
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CRITICAL;
find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
&pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
}
else
pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
/* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate
* matches if the chain is otherwise okay.
*/
if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError && pPolicyPara &&
pPolicyPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA))
{
if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData))
{
if (sslPara->dwAuthType == AUTHTYPE_SERVER &&
sslPara->pwszServerName &&
!(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_CN_INVALID))
{
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert;
PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt;
BOOL matches;
cert = pChainContext->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
altNameExt = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert->pCertInfo);
/* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains
* is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches
* it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject
* distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6:
* "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
* certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer
* alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS
* name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the
* domainComponent attribute."
*/
if (altNameExt)
matches = match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt,
sslPara->pwszServerName);
else
matches = match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert,
sslPara->pwszServerName);
if (!matches)
{
pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH;
pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = 0;
pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
}
}
}
}
return TRUE;
}
static BYTE msPubKey1[] = {
0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e,
0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d,
0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29,
0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16,
0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60,
0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5,
0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d,
0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61,
0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e,
0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94,
0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb,
0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a,
0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d,
0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb,
0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08,
0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43,
0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf,
0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
static BYTE msPubKey2[] = {
0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6,
0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25,
0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2,
0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54,
0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62,
0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a,
0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7,
0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84,
0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9,
0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91,
0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52,
0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80,
0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18,
0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07,
0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef,
0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0,
0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30,
0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
static BYTE msPubKey3[] = {
0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4,
0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7,
0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94,
0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04,
0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d,
0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09,
0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae,
0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7,
0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f,
0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94,
0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d,
0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05,
0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e,
0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d,
0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b,
0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67,
0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08,
0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5,
0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64,
0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38,
0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0,
0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9,
0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28,
0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc,
0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45,
0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde,
0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04,
0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89,
0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11,
0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32,
0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40,
0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41,
0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1,
0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5,
0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,
0x01 };
static BOOL WINAPI verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
{
BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
pPolicyStatus);
if (ret && !pPolicyStatus->dwError)
{
CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
BOOL isMSRoot = FALSE;
DWORD i;
CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
{ sizeof(msPubKey1), msPubKey1 },
{ sizeof(msPubKey2), msPubKey2 },
{ sizeof(msPubKey3), msPubKey3 },
};
PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain =
pChainContext->rgpChain[pChainContext->cChain -1 ];
PCCERT_CONTEXT root =
rootChain->rgpElement[rootChain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
for (i = 0; !isMSRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
i++)
{
msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
&root->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
isMSRoot = TRUE;
}
if (isMSRoot)
pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
}
return ret;
}
typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus);
static void dump_policy_para(PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA para)
{
if (para)
{
TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", para->cbSize);
TRACE_(chain)("dwFlags = %08x\n", para->dwFlags);
TRACE_(chain)("pvExtraPolicyPara = %p\n", para->pvExtraPolicyPara);
}
}
BOOL WINAPI CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
{
static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set = NULL;
BOOL ret = FALSE;
CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy = NULL;
HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc = NULL;
TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID), pChainContext,
pPolicyPara, pPolicyStatus);
if (TRACE_ON(chain))
dump_policy_para(pPolicyPara);
if (IS_INTOID(szPolicyOID))
{
switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID))
{
case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE):
verifyPolicy = verify_base_policy;
break;
case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE):
verifyPolicy = verify_authenticode_policy;
break;
case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL):
verifyPolicy = verify_ssl_policy;
break;
case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS):
verifyPolicy = verify_basic_constraints_policy;
break;
case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT):
verifyPolicy = verify_ms_root_policy;
break;
default:
FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID));
}
}
if (!verifyPolicy)
{
if (!set)
set = CryptInitOIDFunctionSet(
CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC, 0);
CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set, X509_ASN_ENCODING, szPolicyOID, 0,
(void **)&verifyPolicy, &hFunc);
}
if (verifyPolicy)
ret = verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
pPolicyStatus);
if (hFunc)
CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc, 0);
TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret, pPolicyStatus->dwError);
return ret;
}
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