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nspawn: make nspawn work without privileges

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This commit is contained in:
Lennart Poettering 2023-12-12 11:00:19 +01:00
parent 046a1487db
commit 0af7e29434
6 changed files with 520 additions and 242 deletions
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24
man/systemd-nspawn.xml
View file

@ -118,6 +118,28 @@
keeps track of running containers, and provides programming interfaces to interact with them.</para>
</refsect1>
<refsect1>
<title>Unprivileged Operation</title>
<para><command>systemd-nspawn</command> may be invoked with or without privileges. The full functionality
is currently only available when invoked with privileges. When invoked without privileges, various
limitations apply, including, but not limited to:</para>
<itemizedlist>
<listitem><para>Only disk image based containers are supported (i.e. <option>--image=</option>).
Directory based ones (i.e. <option>--directory=</option>) are not supported.</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>Machine registration via <option>--machine=</option> is not supported.</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>Only <option>--private-network</option> and <option>--network-veth</option> networking modes are supported.</para></listitem>
</itemizedlist>
<para>When running in unprivileged mode, some needed functionality is provided via
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-mountfsd.service</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry>
and
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-nsresourced.service</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry></para>
</refsect1>
<refsect1>
<title>Options</title>
@ -1910,6 +1932,8 @@ After=sys-subsystem-net-devices-ens1.device</programlisting>
<member><citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd.slice</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum></citerefentry></member>
<member><citerefentry><refentrytitle>machinectl</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry></member>
<member><citerefentry><refentrytitle>importctl</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry></member>
<member><citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-mountfsd.service</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry></member>
<member><citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-nsresourced.service</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry></member>
<member><citerefentry project='url'><refentrytitle url='https://btrfs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/btrfs.html'>btrfs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry></member>
</simplelist></para>
</refsect1>

87
src/nspawn/nspawn-cgroup.c
View file

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include "mountpoint-util.h"
#include "nspawn-cgroup.h"
#include "nspawn-mount.h"
#include "nsresource.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "rm-rf.h"
#include "string-util.h"
@ -46,38 +47,6 @@ static int chown_cgroup_path(const char *path, uid_t uid_shift) {
return 0;
}
int chown_cgroup(pid_t pid, CGroupUnified unified_requested, uid_t uid_shift) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *fs = NULL;
int r;
r = cg_pid_get_path(NULL, pid, &path);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get container cgroup path: %m");
r = cg_get_path(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, path, NULL, &fs);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get file system path for container cgroup: %m");
r = chown_cgroup_path(fs, uid_shift);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to chown() cgroup %s: %m", fs);
if (unified_requested == CGROUP_UNIFIED_SYSTEMD || (unified_requested == CGROUP_UNIFIED_NONE && cg_unified_controller(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER) > 0)) {
_cleanup_free_ char *lfs = NULL;
/* Always propagate access rights from unified to legacy controller */
r = cg_get_path(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_LEGACY, path, NULL, &lfs);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get file system path for container cgroup: %m");
r = chown_cgroup_path(lfs, uid_shift);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to chown() cgroup %s: %m", lfs);
}
return 0;
}
int sync_cgroup(pid_t pid, CGroupUnified unified_requested, uid_t uid_shift) {
_cleanup_free_ char *cgroup = NULL;
char tree[] = "/tmp/unifiedXXXXXX", pid_string[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(pid) + 1];
@ -142,7 +111,14 @@ finish:
return r;
}
int create_subcgroup(pid_t pid, bool keep_unit, CGroupUnified unified_requested) {
int create_subcgroup(
pid_t pid,
bool keep_unit,
CGroupUnified unified_requested,
uid_t uid_shift,
int userns_fd,
bool privileged) {
_cleanup_free_ char *cgroup = NULL, *payload = NULL;
CGroupMask supported;
char *e;
@ -185,13 +161,54 @@ int create_subcgroup(pid_t pid, bool keep_unit, CGroupUnified unified_requested)
if (!payload)
return log_oom();
r = cg_create_and_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, payload, pid);
if (privileged)
r = cg_create_and_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, payload, pid);
else
r = cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, payload);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create %s subcgroup: %m", payload);
if (privileged) {
_cleanup_free_ char *fs = NULL;
r = cg_get_path(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, payload, NULL, &fs);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get file system path for container cgroup: %m");
r = chown_cgroup_path(fs, uid_shift);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to chown() cgroup %s: %m", fs);
} else if (userns_fd >= 0) {
_cleanup_close_ int cgroup_fd = -EBADF;
cgroup_fd = cg_path_open(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, payload);
if (cgroup_fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(cgroup_fd, "Failed to open cgroup %s: %m", payload);
r = cg_fd_attach(cgroup_fd, pid);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add process " PID_FMT " to cgroup %s: %m", pid, payload);
r = nsresource_add_cgroup(userns_fd, cgroup_fd);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add cgroup %s to userns: %m", payload);
}
if (unified_requested == CGROUP_UNIFIED_SYSTEMD || (unified_requested == CGROUP_UNIFIED_NONE && cg_unified_controller(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER) > 0)) {
_cleanup_free_ char *lfs = NULL;
/* Always propagate access rights from unified to legacy controller */
r = cg_get_path(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_LEGACY, payload, NULL, &lfs);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get file system path for container cgroup: %m");
r = chown_cgroup_path(lfs, uid_shift);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to chown() cgroup %s: %m", lfs);
}
if (keep_unit) {
_cleanup_free_ char *supervisor = NULL;
supervisor = path_join(cgroup, "supervisor");
if (!supervisor)
return log_oom();

3
src/nspawn/nspawn-cgroup.h
View file

@ -6,9 +6,8 @@
#include "cgroup-util.h"
int chown_cgroup(pid_t pid, CGroupUnified unified_requested, uid_t uid_shift);
int sync_cgroup(pid_t pid, CGroupUnified unified_requested, uid_t uid_shift);
int create_subcgroup(pid_t pid, bool keep_unit, CGroupUnified unified_requested);
int create_subcgroup(pid_t pid, bool keep_unit, CGroupUnified unified_requested, uid_t uid_shift, int userns_fd, bool privileged);
int mount_cgroups(const char *dest, CGroupUnified unified_requested, bool userns, uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range, const char *selinux_apifs_context, bool use_cgns);
int mount_systemd_cgroup_writable(const char *dest, CGroupUnified unified_requested);

70
src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c
View file

@ -444,22 +444,38 @@ int tmpfs_patch_options(
}
int mount_sysfs(const char *dest, MountSettingsMask mount_settings) {
const char *full, *top;
int r;
_cleanup_free_ char *top = NULL, *full = NULL;;
unsigned long extra_flags = 0;
int r;
top = prefix_roota(dest, "/sys");
r = path_is_fs_type(top, SYSFS_MAGIC);
top = path_join(dest, "/sys");
if (!top)
return log_oom();
r = path_is_mount_point(top);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine filesystem type of %s: %m", top);
/* /sys might already be mounted as sysfs by the outer child in the
* !netns case. In this case, it's all good. Don't touch it because we
* don't have the right to do so, see https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/1555.
*/
if (r > 0)
return 0;
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine if '%s' is a mountpoint: %m", top);
if (r == 0) {
/* If this is not a mount point yet, then mount a tmpfs there */
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_ERR, "tmpfs", top, "tmpfs", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, "mode=0555" TMPFS_LIMITS_SYS);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else {
r = path_is_fs_type(top, SYSFS_MAGIC);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine filesystem type of %s: %m", top);
full = prefix_roota(top, "/full");
/* /sys/ might already be mounted as sysfs by the outer child in the !netns case. In this case, it's
* all good. Don't touch it because we don't have the right to do so, see
* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/1555.
*/
if (r > 0)
return 0;
}
full = path_join(top, "/full");
if (!full)
return log_oom();
(void) mkdir(full, 0755);
@ -501,10 +517,11 @@ int mount_sysfs(const char *dest, MountSettingsMask mount_settings) {
if (rmdir(full) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to remove %s: %m", full);
/* Create mountpoint for cgroups. Otherwise we are not allowed since we
* remount /sys read-only.
*/
const char *x = prefix_roota(top, "/fs/cgroup");
/* Create mountpoint for cgroups. Otherwise we are not allowed since we remount /sys/ read-only. */
_cleanup_free_ char *x = path_join(top, "/fs/cgroup");
if (!x)
return log_oom();
(void) mkdir_p(x, 0755);
return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_ERR, NULL, top, NULL,
@ -541,7 +558,7 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
} MountPoint;
static const MountPoint mount_table[] = {
/* First we list inner child mounts (i.e. mounts applied *after* entering user namespacing) */
/* First we list inner child mounts (i.e. mounts applied *after* entering user namespacing when we are privileged) */
{ "proc", "/proc", "proc", NULL, PROC_DEFAULT_MOUNT_FLAGS,
MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_MKDIR|MOUNT_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS }, /* we follow symlinks here since not following them requires /proc/ already being mounted, which we don't have here. */
@ -575,15 +592,15 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
{ "mqueue", "/dev/mqueue", "mqueue", NULL, MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_MKDIR },
/* Then we list outer child mounts (i.e. mounts applied *before* entering user namespacing) */
/* Then we list outer child mounts (i.e. mounts applied *before* entering user namespacing when we are privileged) */
{ "tmpfs", "/tmp", "tmpfs", "mode=01777" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS, MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_APPLY_TMPFS_TMP|MOUNT_MKDIR },
{ "tmpfs", "/sys", "tmpfs", "mode=0555" TMPFS_LIMITS_SYS, MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_NETNS|MOUNT_MKDIR },
MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_NETNS|MOUNT_MKDIR|MOUNT_PRIVILEGED },
{ "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", NULL, SYS_DEFAULT_MOUNT_FLAGS,
MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO|MOUNT_MKDIR }, /* skipped if above was mounted */
MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO|MOUNT_MKDIR|MOUNT_PRIVILEGED }, /* skipped if above was mounted */
{ "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", NULL, MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_MKDIR }, /* skipped if above was mounted */
MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_MKDIR|MOUNT_PRIVILEGED }, /* skipped if above was mounted */
{ "tmpfs", "/dev", "tmpfs", "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_PRIVATE_DEV, MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME,
MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_MKDIR },
{ "tmpfs", "/dev/shm", "tmpfs", "mode=01777" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS, MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
@ -604,11 +621,11 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_IN_USERNS },
#if HAVE_SELINUX
{ "/sys/fs/selinux", "/sys/fs/selinux", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND,
MOUNT_MKDIR }, /* Bind mount first (mkdir/chown the mount point in case /sys/ is mounted as minimal skeleton tmpfs) */
MOUNT_MKDIR|MOUNT_PRIVILEGED }, /* Bind mount first (mkdir/chown the mount point in case /sys/ is mounted as minimal skeleton tmpfs) */
{ NULL, "/sys/fs/selinux", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_REMOUNT,
0 }, /* Then, make it r/o (don't mkdir/chown the mount point here, the previous entry already did that) */
MOUNT_PRIVILEGED }, /* Then, make it r/o (don't mkdir/chown the mount point here, the previous entry already did that) */
{ NULL, "/sys/fs/selinux", NULL, NULL, MS_PRIVATE,
0 }, /* Turn off propagation (we only want that for the mount propagation tunnel dir) */
MOUNT_PRIVILEGED }, /* Turn off propagation (we only want that for the mount propagation tunnel dir) */
#endif
};
@ -617,6 +634,7 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
bool ro = FLAGS_SET(mount_settings, MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO);
bool in_userns = FLAGS_SET(mount_settings, MOUNT_IN_USERNS);
bool tmpfs_tmp = FLAGS_SET(mount_settings, MOUNT_APPLY_TMPFS_TMP);
bool privileged = FLAGS_SET(mount_settings, MOUNT_PRIVILEGED);
int r;
for (size_t k = 0; k < ELEMENTSOF(mount_table); k++) {
@ -624,6 +642,10 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
bool fatal = FLAGS_SET(mount_table[k].mount_settings, MOUNT_FATAL);
const char *o;
/* If we are not privileged but the entry is marked as privileged and to be mounted outside the user namespace, then skip it */
if (!privileged && FLAGS_SET(mount_table[k].mount_settings, MOUNT_PRIVILEGED) && !FLAGS_SET(mount_table[k].mount_settings, MOUNT_IN_USERNS))
continue;
if (in_userns != FLAGS_SET(mount_table[k].mount_settings, MOUNT_IN_USERNS))
continue;

1
src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.h
View file

@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ typedef enum MountSettingsMask {
MOUNT_TOUCH = 1 << 9, /* if set, touch file to mount over first */
MOUNT_PREFIX_ROOT = 1 << 10,/* if set, prefix the source path with the container's root directory */
MOUNT_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS = 1 << 11,/* if set, we'll follow symlinks for the mount target */
MOUNT_PRIVILEGED = 1 << 12,/* if set, we'll only mount this in in the outer child if we are running in privileged mode */
} MountSettingsMask;
typedef enum CustomMountType {

577
src/nspawn/nspawn.c
View file

@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
#include "nspawn-stub-pid1.h"
#include "nspawn-util.h"
#include "nspawn.h"
#include "nsresource.h"
#include "nulstr-util.h"
#include "os-util.h"
#include "pager.h"
@ -237,6 +238,7 @@ static char *arg_settings_filename = NULL;
static Architecture arg_architecture = _ARCHITECTURE_INVALID;
static ImagePolicy *arg_image_policy = NULL;
static char *arg_background = NULL;
static bool arg_privileged = false;
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_directory, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_template, freep);
@ -518,6 +520,12 @@ static int detect_unified_cgroup_hierarchy_from_environment(void) {
static int detect_unified_cgroup_hierarchy_from_image(const char *directory) {
int r;
if (!arg_privileged) {
/* We only support the unified mode when running unprivileged */
arg_unified_cgroup_hierarchy = CGROUP_UNIFIED_ALL;
return 0;
}
/* Let's inherit the mode to use from the host system, but let's take into consideration what systemd
* in the image actually supports. */
r = cg_all_unified();
@ -619,7 +627,6 @@ static int parse_mount_settings_env(void) {
e = getenv("SYSTEMD_NSPAWN_API_VFS_WRITABLE");
if (streq_ptr(e, "network"))
arg_mount_settings |= MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_NETNS;
else if (e) {
r = parse_boolean(e);
if (r < 0)
@ -1653,6 +1660,21 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
static int verify_arguments(void) {
int r;
SET_FLAG(arg_mount_settings, MOUNT_PRIVILEGED, arg_privileged);
if (!arg_privileged) {
/* machined is not accessible to unpriv clients */
if (arg_register) {
log_notice("Automatically implying --register=no, since machined is not accessible to unprivileged clients.");
arg_register = false;
}
if (!arg_private_network) {
log_notice("Automatically implying --private-network, since mounting /sys/ in an unprivileged user namespaces requires network namespacing.");
arg_private_network = true;
}
}
if (arg_start_mode == START_PID2 && arg_unified_cgroup_hierarchy == CGROUP_UNIFIED_UNKNOWN) {
/* If we are running the stub init in the container, we don't need to look at what the init
* in the container supports, because we are not using it. Let's immediately pick the right
@ -2692,6 +2714,9 @@ static int reset_audit_loginuid(void) {
if ((arg_clone_ns_flags & CLONE_NEWPID) == 0)
return 0;
if (!arg_privileged)
return 0;
r = read_one_line_file("/proc/self/loginuid", &p);
if (r == -ENOENT)
return 0;
@ -2721,6 +2746,11 @@ static int mount_tunnel_dig(const char *root) {
const char *p, *q;
int r;
if (!arg_privileged) {
log_debug("Not digging mount tunnel, because running unprivileged.");
return 0;
}
(void) mkdir_p("/run/systemd/nspawn/", 0755);
(void) mkdir_p("/run/systemd/nspawn/propagate", 0600);
p = strjoina("/run/systemd/nspawn/propagate/", arg_machine);
@ -2749,6 +2779,11 @@ static int mount_tunnel_dig(const char *root) {
static int mount_tunnel_open(void) {
int r;
if (!arg_privileged) {
log_debug("Not opening up mount tunnel, because running unprivileged.");
return 0;
}
r = mount_follow_verbose(LOG_ERR, NULL, NSPAWN_MOUNT_TUNNEL, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@ -3270,20 +3305,32 @@ static int inner_child(
return r;
if (!arg_network_namespace_path && arg_private_network) {
r = unshare(CLONE_NEWNET);
_cleanup_close_ int netns_fd = -EBADF;
if (arg_privileged) {
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare network namespace: %m");
}
netns_fd = namespace_open_by_type(NAMESPACE_NET);
if (netns_fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(netns_fd, "Failed to open newly allocate network namespace: %m");
r = send_one_fd(fd_inner_socket, netns_fd, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare network namespace: %m");
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to send network namespace to supervisor: %m");
/* Tell the parent that it can setup network interfaces. */
(void) barrier_place(barrier); /* #3 */
}
r = mount_sysfs(NULL, arg_mount_settings);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (arg_privileged) {
r = mount_sysfs(NULL, arg_mount_settings);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
/* Wait until we are cgroup-ified, so that we
* can mount the right cgroup path writable */
/* Wait until we are cgroup-ified, so that we can mount the right cgroup path writable */
if (!barrier_place_and_sync(barrier)) /* #4 */
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH),
"Parent died too early");
@ -3584,11 +3631,11 @@ static int inner_child(
return log_error_errno(errno, "execv(%s) failed: %m", exec_target);
}
static int setup_notify_child(void) {
static int setup_notify_child(const void *directory) {
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
static const union sockaddr_union sa = {
_cleanup_free_ char *j = NULL;
union sockaddr_union sa = {
.un.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
.un.sun_path = NSPAWN_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PATH,
};
int r;
@ -3596,7 +3643,17 @@ static int setup_notify_child(void) {
if (fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to allocate notification socket: %m");
(void) mkdir_parents(NSPAWN_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PATH, 0755);
if (directory) {
j = path_join(directory, NSPAWN_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PATH);
if (!j)
return log_oom();
}
r = sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa.un, j ?: NSPAWN_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PATH);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set AF_UNIX path to %s: %m", j ?: NSPAWN_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PATH);
(void) mkdir_parents(sa.un.sun_path, 0755);
(void) sockaddr_un_unlink(&sa.un);
WITH_UMASK(0577) { /* only set "w" bit, which is all that's necessary for connecting from the container */
@ -3605,7 +3662,7 @@ static int setup_notify_child(void) {
return log_error_errno(errno, "bind(" NSPAWN_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PATH ") failed: %m");
}
r = userns_lchown(NSPAWN_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PATH, 0, 0);
r = userns_lchown(sa.un.sun_path, 0, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to chown " NSPAWN_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PATH ": %m");
@ -3621,6 +3678,11 @@ static int setup_unix_export_dir_outside(char **ret) {
assert(ret);
if (!arg_privileged) {
log_debug("Not digging socket tunnel, because running unprivileged.");
return 0;
}
_cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
p = path_join("/run/systemd/nspawn/unix-export", arg_machine);
if (!p)
@ -3672,6 +3734,10 @@ static int setup_unix_export_host_inside(const char *directory, const char *unix
int r;
assert(directory);
if (!arg_privileged)
return 0;
assert(unix_export_path);
r = make_run_host(directory);
@ -3714,10 +3780,16 @@ static int setup_unix_export_host_inside(const char *directory, const char *unix
static DissectImageFlags determine_dissect_image_flags(void) {
return
DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT |
DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT |
DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK |
DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT |
DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP |
DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES |
DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES |
(arg_read_only ? DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY : DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK|DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS) |
DISSECT_IMAGE_ALLOW_USERSPACE_VERITY;
DISSECT_IMAGE_ALLOW_USERSPACE_VERITY |
(arg_console_mode == CONSOLE_INTERACTIVE ? DISSECT_IMAGE_ALLOW_INTERACTIVE_AUTH : 0);
}
static int outer_child(
@ -4093,47 +4165,59 @@ static int outer_child(
return r;
}
/* Mark everything as shared so our mounts get propagated down. This is required to make new bind
* mounts available in systemd services inside the container that create a new mount namespace. See
* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/3860 Further submounts (such as /dev) done after this
* will inherit the shared propagation mode.
*
* IMPORTANT: Do not overmount the root directory anymore from now on to enable moving the root
* directory mount to root later on.
* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/3847#issuecomment-562735251
*/
r = mount_switch_root(directory, MS_SHARED);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to move root directory: %m");
/* We have different codepaths here for privileged and non-privileged mode. In privileged mode we'll
* now switch into the target directory, and then do the final setup from there. If a user namespace
* is then allocated for the container, the root mount and everything else will be out of reach for
* it. For unprivileged containers we cannot do that however, since we couldn't mount a sysfs and
* procfs then anymore, since that only works if there's an unobstructed instance currently
* visible. Hence there we do it the other way round: we first allocate a new set set of namespaces
* (and fork for it) for which we then mount sysfs/procfs, and only then switch root. */
/* We finished setting up the rootfs which is a shared mount. The mount tunnel needs to be a
* dependent mount otherwise we can't MS_MOVE mounts that were propagated from the host into
* the container. */
r = mount_tunnel_open();
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (arg_privileged) {
/* Mark everything as shared so our mounts get propagated down. This is required to make new
* bind mounts available in systemd services inside the container that create a new mount
* namespace. See https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/3860 Further submounts (such as
* /dev/) done after this will inherit the shared propagation mode.
*
* IMPORTANT: Do not overmount the root directory anymore from now on to enable moving the root
* directory mount to root later on.
* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/3847#issuecomment-562735251
*/
r = mount_switch_root(directory, MS_SHARED);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to move root directory: %m");
if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO) {
/* In order to mount procfs and sysfs in an unprivileged container the kernel
* requires that a fully visible instance is already present in the target mount
* namespace. Mount one here so the inner child can mount its own instances. Later
* we umount the temporary instances created here before we actually exec the
* payload. Since the rootfs is shared the umount will propagate into the container.
* Note, the inner child wouldn't be able to unmount the instances on its own since
* it doesn't own the originating mount namespace. IOW, the outer child needs to do
* this. */
r = pin_fully_visible_fs();
/* We finished setting up the rootfs which is a shared mount. The mount tunnel needs to be a
* dependent mount otherwise we can't MS_MOVE mounts that were propagated from the host into
* the container. */
r = mount_tunnel_open();
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
fd = setup_notify_child();
if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO) {
/* In order to mount procfs and sysfs in an unprivileged container the kernel
* requires that a fully visible instance is already present in the target mount
* namespace. Mount one here so the inner child can mount its own instances. Later
* we umount the temporary instances created here before we actually exec the
* payload. Since the rootfs is shared the umount will propagate into the container.
* Note, the inner child wouldn't be able to unmount the instances on its own since
* it doesn't own the originating mount namespace. IOW, the outer child needs to do
* this. */
r = pin_fully_visible_fs();
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
fd = setup_notify_child(NULL);
} else
fd = setup_notify_child(directory);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
pid = raw_clone(SIGCHLD|CLONE_NEWNS|
arg_clone_ns_flags |
(arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO ? CLONE_NEWUSER : 0));
(arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO ? CLONE_NEWUSER : 0) |
((arg_private_network && !arg_privileged) ? CLONE_NEWNET : 0));
if (pid < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fork inner child: %m");
if (pid == 0) {
@ -4152,6 +4236,26 @@ static int outer_child(
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to join network namespace: %m");
}
if (!arg_privileged) {
/* In unprivileged operation, sysfs + procfs are special, we'll have to mount them
* inside the inner namespaces, but before we switch root. Hence do so here. */
_cleanup_free_ char *j = path_join(directory, "/proc");
if (!j)
return log_oom();
r = mount_follow_verbose(LOG_ERR, "proc", j, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = mount_sysfs(directory, arg_mount_settings);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = mount_switch_root(directory, MS_SHARED);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to move root directory: %m");
}
r = inner_child(barrier, fd_inner_socket, fds, os_release_pairs);
if (r < 0)
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
@ -4433,6 +4537,9 @@ static int nspawn_dispatch_notify_fd(sd_event_source *source, int fd, uint32_t r
static int setup_notify_parent(sd_event *event, int fd, pid_t *inner_child_pid, sd_event_source **notify_event_source) {
int r;
if (fd < 0)
return 0;
r = sd_event_add_io(event, notify_event_source, fd, EPOLLIN, nspawn_dispatch_notify_fd, inner_child_pid);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate notify event source: %m");
@ -4812,26 +4919,28 @@ static int load_settings(void) {
return 0;
/* We first look in the admin's directories in /etc and /run */
FOREACH_STRING(i, "/etc/systemd/nspawn", "/run/systemd/nspawn") {
_cleanup_free_ char *j = NULL;
if (arg_privileged) {
FOREACH_STRING(i, "/etc/systemd/nspawn", "/run/systemd/nspawn") {
_cleanup_free_ char *j = NULL;
j = path_join(i, arg_settings_filename);
if (!j)
return log_oom();
j = path_join(i, arg_settings_filename);
if (!j)
return log_oom();
f = fopen(j, "re");
if (f) {
p = TAKE_PTR(j);
f = fopen(j, "re");
if (f) {
p = TAKE_PTR(j);
/* By default, we trust configuration from /etc and /run */
if (arg_settings_trusted < 0)
arg_settings_trusted = true;
/* By default, we trust configuration from /etc and /run */
if (arg_settings_trusted < 0)
arg_settings_trusted = true;
break;
break;
}
if (errno != ENOENT)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open %s: %m", j);
}
if (errno != ENOENT)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open %s: %m", j);
}
if (!f) {
@ -4891,10 +5000,14 @@ static int load_oci_bundle(void) {
static int run_container(
DissectedImage *dissected_image,
int userns_fd,
FDSet *fds,
char veth_name[IFNAMSIZ], bool *veth_created,
char veth_name[IFNAMSIZ],
bool *veth_created,
struct ExposeArgs *expose_args,
int *master, pid_t *pid, int *ret) {
int *master,
pid_t *pid,
int *ret) {
static const struct sigaction sa = {
.sa_handler = nop_signal_handler,
@ -4979,11 +5092,44 @@ static int run_container(
"Path %s doesn't refer to a network namespace, refusing.", arg_network_namespace_path);
}
*pid = raw_clone(SIGCHLD|CLONE_NEWNS);
if (*pid < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "clone() failed%s: %m",
errno == EINVAL ?
", do you have namespace support enabled in your kernel? (You need UTS, IPC, PID and NET namespacing built in)" : "");
if (arg_privileged) {
assert(userns_fd < 0);
/* If we have no user namespace then we'll clone and create a new mount namepsace right-away. */
*pid = raw_clone(SIGCHLD|CLONE_NEWNS);
if (*pid < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "clone() failed%s: %m",
errno == EINVAL ?
", do you have namespace support enabled in your kernel? (You need UTS, IPC, PID and NET namespacing built in)" : "");
} else {
assert(userns_fd >= 0);
/* If we have a user namespace then we'll clone() first, and then join the user namespace,
* and then open the mount namespace, so that it is owned by the user namespace */
*pid = raw_clone(SIGCHLD);
if (*pid < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "clone() failed: %m");
if (*pid == 0) {
if (setns(userns_fd, CLONE_NEWUSER) < 0) {
log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to join allocate user namespace: %m");
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
r = reset_uid_gid();
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to reset UID/GID to root: %m");
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) {
log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare file system namespace: %m");
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
}
if (*pid == 0) {
/* The outer child only has a file system namespace. */
@ -5120,19 +5266,13 @@ static int run_container(
/* Wait until the child has unshared its network namespace. */
if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier)) /* #3 */
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "Child died too early");
}
if (child_netns_fd < 0) {
/* Make sure we have an open file descriptor to the child's network
* namespace so it stays alive even if the child exits. */
r = namespace_open(*pid,
/* ret_pidns_fd = */ NULL,
/* ret_mntns_fd = */ NULL,
&child_netns_fd,
/* ret_userns_fd = */ NULL,
/* ret_root_fd = */ NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to open child network namespace: %m");
/* Make sure we have an open file descriptor to the child's network namespace so it
* stays alive even if the child exits. */
assert(child_netns_fd < 0);
child_netns_fd = receive_one_fd(fd_inner_socket_pair[0], 0);
if (child_netns_fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to receive child network namespace: %m");
}
r = move_network_interfaces(child_netns_fd, arg_network_interfaces);
@ -5140,12 +5280,29 @@ static int run_container(
return r;
if (arg_network_veth) {
r = setup_veth(arg_machine, *pid, veth_name,
arg_network_bridge || arg_network_zone, &arg_network_provided_mac);
if (r < 0)
return r;
else if (r > 0)
ifi = r;
if (arg_privileged) {
r = setup_veth(arg_machine, *pid, veth_name,
arg_network_bridge || arg_network_zone, &arg_network_provided_mac);
if (r < 0)
return r;
else if (r > 0)
ifi = r;
} else {
_cleanup_free_ char *host_ifname = NULL;
r = nsresource_add_netif(userns_fd, child_netns_fd, /* namespace_ifname= */ NULL, &host_ifname, /* ret_namespace_ifname= */ NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add network interface to container: %m");
ifi = if_nametoindex(host_ifname);
if (ifi == 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to resolve interface '%s': %m", host_ifname);
if (strlen(host_ifname) >= IFNAMSIZ)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Host interface name too long?");
strcpy(veth_name, host_ifname);
}
if (arg_network_bridge) {
/* Add the interface to a bridge */
@ -5184,9 +5341,12 @@ static int run_container(
}
if (arg_register || !arg_keep_unit) {
r = sd_bus_default_system(&bus);
if (arg_privileged)
r = sd_bus_default_system(&bus);
else
r = sd_bus_default_user(&bus);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to open system bus: %m");
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to open bus: %m");
r = sd_bus_set_close_on_exit(bus, false);
if (r < 0)
@ -5247,7 +5407,13 @@ static int run_container(
} else if (arg_slice || arg_property)
log_notice("Machine and scope registration turned off, --slice= and --property= settings will have no effect.");
r = create_subcgroup(*pid, arg_keep_unit, arg_unified_cgroup_hierarchy);
r = create_subcgroup(
*pid,
arg_keep_unit,
arg_unified_cgroup_hierarchy,
arg_uid_shift,
userns_fd,
arg_privileged);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@ -5255,14 +5421,8 @@ static int run_container(
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = chown_cgroup(*pid, arg_unified_cgroup_hierarchy, arg_uid_shift);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Notify the child that the parent is ready with all
* its setup (including cgroup-ification), and that
* the child can now hand over control to the code to
* run inside the container. */
/* Notify the child that the parent is ready with all its setup (including cgroup-ification), and
* that the child can now hand over control to the code to run inside the container. */
(void) barrier_place(&barrier); /* #4 */
/* Block SIGCHLD here, before notifying child.
@ -5428,7 +5588,7 @@ static int run_container(
fd_kmsg_fifo = safe_close(fd_kmsg_fifo);
if (arg_private_network) {
if (arg_private_network && arg_privileged) {
r = move_back_network_interfaces(child_netns_fd, arg_network_interfaces);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@ -5569,6 +5729,10 @@ static int cant_be_in_netns(void) {
if (r == -ENOENT || ERRNO_IS_NEG_DISCONNECT(r))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"Sorry, but --image= requires access to the host's /run/ hierarchy, since we need access to udev.");
if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) {
log_debug_errno(r, "Can't connect to udev control socket, assuming we are in same netns.");
return 0;
}
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to connect socket to udev control socket: %m");
@ -5587,7 +5751,7 @@ static int cant_be_in_netns(void) {
static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
bool remove_directory = false, remove_image = false, veth_created = false, remove_tmprootdir = false;
_cleanup_close_ int master = -EBADF;
_cleanup_close_ int master = -EBADF, userns_fd = -EBADF;
_cleanup_fdset_free_ FDSet *fds = NULL;
int r, n_fd_passed, ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
char veth_name[IFNAMSIZ] = "";
@ -5602,17 +5766,12 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
log_parse_environment();
log_open();
arg_privileged = getuid() == 0;
r = parse_argv(argc, argv);
if (r <= 0)
goto finish;
if (geteuid() != 0) {
r = log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM),
argc >= 2 ? "Need to be root." :
"Need to be root (and some arguments are usually required).\nHint: try --help");
goto finish;
}
r = cant_be_in_netns();
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
@ -5643,7 +5802,7 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (!arg_private_network && arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO && arg_uid_shift > 0)
arg_caps_retain &= ~(UINT64_C(1) << CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE);
r = cg_unified();
r = cg_unified(); /* initialize cache early */
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether the unified cgroups hierarchy is used: %m");
goto finish;
@ -5664,6 +5823,16 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
/* Reapply environment settings. */
(void) detect_unified_cgroup_hierarchy_from_environment();
if (!arg_privileged) {
r = cg_all_unified();
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine if we are in unified cgroupv2 mode: %m");
goto finish;
}
if (r == 0)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Unprivileged operation only supported in unified cgroupv2 mode.");
}
/* Ignore SIGPIPE here, because we use splice() on the ptyfwd stuff and that will generate SIGPIPE if
* the result is closed. Note that the container payload child will reset signal mask+handler anyway,
* so just turning this off here means we only turn it off in nspawn itself, not any children. */
@ -5683,9 +5852,21 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
* the child. Functions like copy_devnodes() change the umask temporarily. */
umask(0022);
if (arg_console_mode < 0)
arg_console_mode = isatty(STDIN_FILENO) && isatty(STDOUT_FILENO) ?
CONSOLE_INTERACTIVE : CONSOLE_READ_ONLY;
if (arg_console_mode == CONSOLE_PIPE) /* if we pass STDERR on to the container, don't add our own logs into it too */
arg_quiet = true;
if (arg_directory) {
assert(!arg_image);
if (!arg_privileged) {
r = log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Invoking container from plain directory tree is currently not supported if called without privileges.");
goto finish;
}
/* Safety precaution: let's not allow running images from the live host OS image, as long as
* /var from the host will propagate into container dynamically (because bad things happen if
* two systems write to the same /var). Let's allow it for the special cases where /var is
@ -5722,7 +5903,11 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
/* We take an exclusive lock on this image, since it's our private, ephemeral copy
* only owned by us and no one else. */
r = image_path_lock(np, LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB, &tree_global_lock, &tree_local_lock);
r = image_path_lock(
np,
LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB,
arg_privileged ? &tree_global_lock : NULL,
&tree_local_lock);
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to lock %s: %m", np);
goto finish;
@ -5754,7 +5939,11 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
r = image_path_lock(arg_directory, (arg_read_only ? LOCK_SH : LOCK_EX) | LOCK_NB, &tree_global_lock, &tree_local_lock);
r = image_path_lock(
arg_directory,
(arg_read_only ? LOCK_SH : LOCK_EX) | LOCK_NB,
arg_privileged ? &tree_global_lock : NULL,
&tree_local_lock);
if (r == -EBUSY) {
log_error_errno(r, "Directory tree %s is currently busy.", arg_directory);
goto finish;
@ -5846,15 +6035,12 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
} else {
DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags =
DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT |
DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT |
DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK |
DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT |
DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES |
DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES;
determine_dissect_image_flags();
assert(arg_image);
assert(!arg_template);
r = chase_and_update(&arg_image, 0);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
@ -5869,7 +6055,11 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
}
/* Always take an exclusive lock on our own ephemeral copy. */
r = image_path_lock(np, LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB, &tree_global_lock, &tree_local_lock);
r = image_path_lock(
np,
LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB,
arg_privileged ? &tree_global_lock : NULL,
&tree_local_lock);
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create image lock: %m");
goto finish;
@ -5894,7 +6084,11 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
free_and_replace(arg_image, np);
remove_image = true;
} else {
r = image_path_lock(arg_image, (arg_read_only ? LOCK_SH : LOCK_EX) | LOCK_NB, &tree_global_lock, &tree_local_lock);
r = image_path_lock(
arg_image,
(arg_read_only ? LOCK_SH : LOCK_EX) | LOCK_NB,
arg_privileged ? &tree_global_lock : NULL,
&tree_local_lock);
if (r == -EBUSY) {
log_error_errno(r, "Disk image %s is currently busy.", arg_image);
goto finish;
@ -5929,57 +6123,81 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
goto finish;
}
r = loop_device_make_by_path(
arg_image,
arg_read_only ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR,
/* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX,
FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
LOCK_SH,
&loop);
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set up loopback block device: %m");
goto finish;
if (arg_privileged) {
r = loop_device_make_by_path(
arg_image,
arg_read_only ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR,
/* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX,
FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
LOCK_SH,
&loop);
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set up loopback block device: %m");
goto finish;
}
r = dissect_loop_device_and_warn(
loop,
&arg_verity_settings,
/* mount_options=*/ NULL,
arg_image_policy ?: &image_policy_container,
dissect_image_flags,
&dissected_image);
if (r == -ENOPKG) {
/* dissected_image_and_warn() already printed a brief error message. Extend on that with more details */
log_notice("Note that the disk image needs to\n"
" a) either contain only a single MBR partition of type 0x83 that is marked bootable\n"
" b) or contain a single GPT partition of type 0FC63DAF-8483-4772-8E79-3D69D8477DE4\n"
" c) or follow https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/discoverable_partitions_specification\n"
" d) or contain a file system without a partition table\n"
"in order to be bootable with systemd-nspawn.");
goto finish;
}
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
dissected_image,
loop->fd,
&arg_verity_settings);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
if (dissected_image->has_verity && !arg_verity_settings.root_hash && !dissected_image->has_verity_sig)
log_notice("Note: image %s contains verity information, but no root hash specified and no embedded "
"root hash signature found! Proceeding without integrity checking.", arg_image);
r = dissected_image_decrypt_interactively(
dissected_image,
NULL,
&arg_verity_settings,
dissect_image_flags);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
} else {
_cleanup_free_ char *userns_name = strjoin("nspawn-", arg_machine);
if (!userns_name) {
r = log_oom();
goto finish;
}
/* if we are unprivileged, let's allocate a 64K userns first */
userns_fd = nsresource_allocate_userns(userns_name, UINT64_C(0x10000));
if (userns_fd < 0) {
r = log_error_errno(userns_fd, "Failed to allocate user namespace with 64K users: %m");
goto finish;
}
r = mountfsd_mount_image(
arg_image,
userns_fd,
arg_image_policy,
dissect_image_flags,
&dissected_image);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
}
r = dissect_loop_device_and_warn(
loop,
&arg_verity_settings,
/* mount_options=*/ NULL,
arg_image_policy ?: &image_policy_container,
dissect_image_flags,
&dissected_image);
if (r == -ENOPKG) {
/* dissected_image_and_warn() already printed a brief error message. Extend on that with more details */
log_notice("Note that the disk image needs to\n"
" a) either contain only a single MBR partition of type 0x83 that is marked bootable\n"
" b) or contain a single GPT partition of type 0FC63DAF-8483-4772-8E79-3D69D8477DE4\n"
" c) or follow https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/discoverable_partitions_specification\n"
" d) or contain a file system without a partition table\n"
"in order to be bootable with systemd-nspawn.");
goto finish;
}
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
dissected_image,
loop->fd,
&arg_verity_settings);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
if (dissected_image->has_verity && !arg_verity_settings.root_hash && !dissected_image->has_verity_sig)
log_notice("Note: image %s contains verity information, but no root hash specified and no embedded "
"root hash signature found! Proceeding without integrity checking.", arg_image);
r = dissected_image_decrypt_interactively(
dissected_image,
NULL,
&arg_verity_settings,
0);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
/* Now that we mounted the image, let's try to remove it again, if it is ephemeral */
if (remove_image && unlink(arg_image) >= 0)
remove_image = false;
@ -5992,13 +6210,6 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
if (arg_console_mode < 0)
arg_console_mode = isatty(STDIN_FILENO) && isatty(STDOUT_FILENO) ?
CONSOLE_INTERACTIVE : CONSOLE_READ_ONLY;
if (arg_console_mode == CONSOLE_PIPE) /* if we pass STDERR on to the container, don't add our own logs into it too */
arg_quiet = true;
if (!arg_quiet) {
const char *t = arg_image ?: arg_directory;
_cleanup_free_ char *u = NULL;
@ -6029,11 +6240,13 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
expose_args.fw_ctx = fw_ctx;
}
for (;;) {
r = run_container(dissected_image,
fds,
veth_name, &veth_created,
&expose_args, &master,
&pid, &ret);
r = run_container(
dissected_image,
userns_fd,
fds,
veth_name, &veth_created,
&expose_args, &master,
&pid, &ret);
if (r <= 0)
break;
}
@ -6075,7 +6288,7 @@ finish:
log_debug_errno(errno, "Can't remove temporary root directory '%s', ignoring: %m", tmprootdir);
}
if (arg_machine) {
if (arg_machine && arg_privileged) {
const char *p;
p = strjoina("/run/systemd/nspawn/propagate/", arg_machine);
@ -6089,9 +6302,11 @@ finish:
expose_port_flush(&fw_ctx, arg_expose_ports, AF_INET, &expose_args.address4);
expose_port_flush(&fw_ctx, arg_expose_ports, AF_INET6, &expose_args.address6);
if (veth_created)
(void) remove_veth_links(veth_name, arg_network_veth_extra);
(void) remove_bridge(arg_network_zone);
if (arg_privileged) {
if (veth_created)
(void) remove_veth_links(veth_name, arg_network_veth_extra);
(void) remove_bridge(arg_network_zone);
}
custom_mount_free_all(arg_custom_mounts, arg_n_custom_mounts);
expose_port_free_all(arg_expose_ports);