This ensures that both mutable and immutable access to the protected
data of a process is serialized.
Note that there may still be multiple TOCTOU issues around this, as we
have a bunch of convenience accessors that make it easy to introduce
them. We'll need to audit those as well.
This matches out general macro use, and specifically other verification
macros like VERIFY(), VERIFY_NOT_REACHED(), VERIFY_INTERRUPTS_ENABLED(),
and VERIFY_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED().
Previously we would crash the process immediately when a promise
violation was found during a syscall. This is error prone, as we
don't unwind the stack. This means that in certain cases we can
leak resources, like an OwnPtr / RefPtr tracked on the stack. Or
even leak a lock acquired in a ScopeLockLocker.
To remedy this situation we move the promise violation handling to
the syscall handler, right before we return to user space. This
allows the code to follow the normal unwind path, and grantees
there is no longer any cleanup that needs to occur.
The Process::require_promise() and Process::require_no_promises()
functions were modified to return ErrorOr<void> so we enforce that
the errors are always propagated by the caller.
This change lays the foundation for making the require_promise return
an error hand handling the process abort outside of the syscall
implementations, to avoid cases where we would leak resources.
It also has the advantage that it makes removes a gs pointer read
to look up the current thread, then process for every syscall. We
can instead go through the Process this pointer in most cases.
We now use AK::Error and AK::ErrorOr<T> in both kernel and userspace!
This was a slightly tedious refactoring that took a long time, so it's
not unlikely that some bugs crept in.
Nevertheless, it does pass basic functionality testing, and it's just
real nice to finally see the same pattern in all contexts. :^)
The compiler can re-order the structure (class) members if that's
necessary, so if we make Process to inherit from ProcFSExposedComponent,
even if the declaration is to inherit first from ProcessBase, then from
ProcFSExposedComponent and last from Weakable<Process>, the members of
class ProcFSExposedComponent (including the Ref-counted parts) are the
first members of the Process class.
This problem made it impossible to safely use the current toggling
method with the write-protection bit on the ProcessBase members, so
instead of inheriting from it, we make its members the last ones in the
Process class so we can safely locate and modify the corresponding page
write protection bit of these values.
We make sure that the Process class doesn't expand beyond 8192 bytes and
the protected values are always aligned on a page boundary.
Before we start disabling acquisition of the big process lock for
specific syscalls, make sure to document and assert that all the
lock is held during all syscalls.
The Process::Handler type has KResultOr<FlatPtr> as its return type.
Using a different return type with an equally-sized template parameter
sort of works but breaks once that condition is no longer true, e.g.
for KResultOr<int> on x86_64.
Ideally the syscall handlers would also take FlatPtrs as their args
so we can get rid of the reinterpret_cast for the function pointer
but I didn't quite feel like cleaning that up as well.
SPDX License Identifiers are a more compact / standardized
way of representing file license information.
See: https://spdx.dev/resources/use/#identifiers
This was done with the `ambr` search and replace tool.
ambr --no-parent-ignore --key-from-file --rep-from-file key.txt rep.txt *
This is something I've been meaning to do for a long time, and here we
finally go. This patch moves all sys$foo functions out of Process.cpp
and into files in Kernel/Syscalls/.
It's not exactly one syscall per file (although it could be, but I got
a bit tired of the repetitive work here..)
This makes hacking on individual syscalls a lot less painful since you
don't have to rebuild nearly as much code every time. I'm also hopeful
that this makes it easier to understand individual syscalls. :^)
