Kernel: Don't assert on PT_PEEK with kernelspace address

We were casting the address to Userspace<T> without validating it first
which is no good and will trap an assertion soon after.

Let's catch this sooner with an ASSERT in the Userspace<T> constructor
and update the PT_PEEK and PT_POKE handlers to avoid it.

Fixes #4505.
This commit is contained in:
Andreas Kling 2020-12-23 14:42:22 +01:00
parent c25cf5fb56
commit eaa63fdda5
2 changed files with 10 additions and 9 deletions

View file

@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#pragma once
#include <AK/Assertions.h>
#include <AK/StdLibExtras.h>
#include <AK/Types.h>
@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ public:
Userspace(FlatPtr ptr)
: m_ptr(ptr)
{
ASSERT(m_ptr < 0xc0000000);
}
FlatPtr ptr() const { return m_ptr; }

View file

@ -129,21 +129,20 @@ KResultOr<u32> handle_syscall(const Kernel::Syscall::SC_ptrace_params& params, P
Kernel::Syscall::SC_ptrace_peek_params peek_params;
if (!copy_from_user(&peek_params, reinterpret_cast<Kernel::Syscall::SC_ptrace_peek_params*>(params.addr)))
return -EFAULT;
// read validation is done inside 'peek_user_data'
auto result = peer->process().peek_user_data((FlatPtr)peek_params.address);
if (result.is_error())
if (!is_user_address(VirtualAddress { peek_params.address }))
return -EFAULT;
auto result = peer->process().peek_user_data(Userspace<const u32*> { (FlatPtr)peek_params.address });
if (result.is_error())
return result.error();
if (!copy_to_user(peek_params.out_data, &result.value()))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case PT_POKE: {
Userspace<u32*> addr = reinterpret_cast<FlatPtr>(params.addr);
// write validation is done inside 'poke_user_data'
return peer->process().poke_user_data(addr, params.data);
}
case PT_POKE:
if (!is_user_address(VirtualAddress { params.addr }))
return -EFAULT;
return peer->process().poke_user_data(Userspace<u32*> { (FlatPtr)params.addr }, params.data);
default:
return -EINVAL;