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Kernel: Decrease the amount of address space offset randomization
This is basically unchanged since the beginning of 2020, which is a year before we had proper ASLR. Now that we have a proper ASLR implementation, we can turn this down a bit, as it is no longer our only protection against predictable dynamic loader addresses, and it actually obstructs the default loading address of x86_64 quite frequently.
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@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ErrorOr<NonnullOwnPtr<AddressSpace>> AddressSpace::try_create(AddressSpace const
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return parent->m_region_tree.total_range();
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constexpr FlatPtr userspace_range_base = USER_RANGE_BASE;
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FlatPtr const userspace_range_ceiling = USER_RANGE_CEILING;
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size_t random_offset = (get_fast_random<u8>() % 32 * MiB) & PAGE_MASK;
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size_t random_offset = (get_fast_random<u8>() % 2 * MiB) & PAGE_MASK;
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FlatPtr base = userspace_range_base + random_offset;
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return VirtualRange(VirtualAddress { base }, userspace_range_ceiling - base);
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}();
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