Kernel: Ensure that an unveil node with no permission is never accepted

Otherwise nodes inheriting from root may still be accessed with
`access(..., F_OK)`.
Also adds a test case to TestKernelUnveil about this behaviour.
This commit is contained in:
Ali Mohammad Pur 2021-05-30 00:05:55 +04:30 committed by Andreas Kling
parent 8ce015742d
commit 90de1ded55
2 changed files with 5 additions and 1 deletions

View file

@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ KResult VFS::validate_path_against_process_veil(StringView path, int options)
return EINVAL;
auto* unveiled_path = find_matching_unveiled_path(path);
if (!unveiled_path) {
if (!unveiled_path || unveiled_path->permissions() == UnveilAccess::None) {
dbgln("Rejecting path '{}' since it hasn't been unveiled.", path);
dump_backtrace();
return ENOENT;

View file

@ -52,4 +52,8 @@ TEST_CASE(test_failures)
res = unveil("/bin", "w");
if (res >= 0)
FAIL("unveil permitted after unveil state locked");
res = access("/bin/id", F_OK);
if (res == 0)
FAIL("access(..., F_OK) permitted after locked veil without relevant unveil");
}