According to the m68k semihosting spec:
"The instruction used to trigger a semihosting request depends on the
m68k processor variant. On ColdFire, "halt" is used; on other processors
(which don't implement "halt"), "bkpt #0" may be used."
Add support for non-CodeFire processors by matching BKPT #0 instructions.
Signed-off-by: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com>
[rth: Use semihosting_test()]
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Replace EXCP_HALT_INSN by EXCP_SEMIHOSTING. Perform the pre-
and post-insn tests during translate, leaving only the actual
semihosting operation for the exception.
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Instead of using d0 (the semihost function number), use d1 (the
provide exit status).
Signed-off-by: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20230802161914.395443-2-keithp@keithp.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
The Nios II target is deprecated since v8.2 in commit 9997771bc1
("target/nios2: Deprecate the Nios II architecture").
Remove:
- Buildsys / CI infra
- User emulation
- System emulation (10m50-ghrd & nios2-generic-nommu machines)
- Tests
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Message-Id: <20240327144806.11319-3-philmd@linaro.org>
The various Intel CPU manuals claim that SGDT and SIDT can write either 24-bits
or 32-bits depending upon the operand size, but this is incorrect. Not only do
the Intel CPU manuals give contradictory information between processor
revisions, but this information doesn't even match real-life behaviour.
In fact, tests on real hardware show that the CPU always writes 32-bits for SGDT
and SIDT, and this behaviour is required for at least OS/2 Warp and WFW 3.11 with
Win32s to function correctly. Remove the masking applied due to the operand size
for SGDT and SIDT so that the TCG behaviour matches the behaviour on real
hardware.
Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2198
--
MCA: Whilst I don't have a copy of OS/2 Warp handy, I've confirmed that this
patch fixes the issue in WFW 3.11 with Win32s. For more technical information I
highly recommend the excellent write-up at
https://www.os2museum.com/wp/sgdtsidt-fiction-and-reality/.
Message-ID: <20240419195147.434894-1-mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Currently, the difference between warn_report_once() and
error_report_once() is the former has the "warning:" prefix, while the
latter does not have a similar level prefix.
At the meantime, considering that there is no error handling logic here,
and the purpose of error_report_once() is only to prompt the user with
an abnormal message, there is no need to use an error-level message here,
and instead we can just use a warning.
Therefore, downgrade the message in error_report_once() to warning, and
merge it into the previous warn_report_once().
Signed-off-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240327103951.3853425-4-zhao1.liu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The difference between error_printf() and error_report() is the latter
may contain more information, such as the name of the program
("qemu-system-x86_64").
Thus its variant error_report_once() and warn_report()'s variant
warn_report_once() can be used here to print the information only once
without a static local variable "ht_warned".
Signed-off-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240327103951.3853425-3-zhao1.liu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use warn_report_once() to get rid of the static local variable "warned".
Signed-off-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240327103951.3853425-2-zhao1.liu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Newer 9.1 machine types will default to using the KVM_SEV_INIT2 API for
creating SEV/SEV-ES going forward. However, this API results in guest
measurement changes which are generally not expected for users of these
older guest types and can cause disruption if they switch to a newer
QEMU/kernel version. Avoid this by continuing to use the older
KVM_SEV_INIT/KVM_SEV_ES_INIT APIs for older machine types.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240409230743.962513-4-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
QEMU will currently automatically make use of the KVM_SEV_INIT2 API for
initializing SEV and SEV-ES guests verses the older
KVM_SEV_INIT/KVM_SEV_ES_INIT interfaces.
However, the older interfaces will silently avoid sync'ing FPU/XSAVE
state to the VMSA prior to encryption, thus relying on behavior and
measurements that assume the related fields to be allow zero.
With KVM_SEV_INIT2, this state is now synced into the VMSA, resulting in
measurements changes and, theoretically, behaviorial changes, though the
latter are unlikely to be seen in practice.
To allow a smooth transition to the newer interface, while still
providing a mechanism to maintain backward compatibility with VMs
created using the older interfaces, provide a new command-line
parameter:
-object sev-guest,legacy-vm-type=true,...
and have it default to false.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240409230743.962513-2-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Implement support for the KVM_X86_SEV_VM and KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM virtual
machine types, and the KVM_SEV_INIT2 function of KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP.
These replace the KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT functions, and have
several advantages:
- sharing the initialization sequence with SEV-SNP and TDX
- allowing arguments including the set of desired VMSA features
- protection against invalid use of KVM_GET/SET_* ioctls for guests
with encrypted state
If the KVM_X86_SEV_VM and KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM types are not supported,
fall back to KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT (which use the
default x86 VM type).
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM is introducing a new API to create confidential guests, which
will be used by TDX and SEV-SNP but is also available for SEV and
SEV-ES. The API uses the VM type argument to KVM_CREATE_VM to
identify which confidential computing technology to use.
Since there are no other expected uses of VM types, delegate
mc->kvm_type() for x86 boards to the confidential-guest-support
object pointed to by ms->cgs.
For example, if a sev-guest object is specified to confidential-guest-support,
like,
qemu -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,...
it will check if a VM type KVM_X86_SEV_VM or KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM
is supported, and if so use them together with the KVM_SEV_INIT2
function of the KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl. If not, it will fall back to
KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT.
This is a preparatory work towards TDX and SEV-SNP support, but it
will also enable support for VMSA features such as DebugSwap, which
are only available via KVM_SEV_INIT2.
Co-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Introduce a common superclass for x86 confidential guest implementations.
It will extend ConfidentialGuestSupportClass with a method that provides
the VM type to be passed to KVM_CREATE_VM.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Board reset requires writing a fresh CPU state. As far as KVM is
concerned, the only thing that blocks reset is that CPU state is
encrypted; therefore, kvm_cpus_are_resettable() can simply check
if that is the case.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
So far, KVM has allowed KVM_GET/SET_* ioctls to execute even if the
guest state is encrypted, in which case they do nothing. For the new
API using VM types, instead, the ioctls will fail which is a safer and
more robust approach.
The new API will be the only one available for SEV-SNP and TDX, but it
is also usable for SEV and SEV-ES. In preparation for that, require
architecture-specific KVM code to communicate the point at which guest
state is protected (which must be after kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_init(),
though that might change in the future in order to suppor migration).
From that point, skip reading registers so that cpu->vcpu_dirty is
never true: if it ever becomes true, kvm_arch_put_registers() will
fail miserably.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use unified confidential_guest_kvm_init() for consistency with
other architectures.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20240229060038.606591-1-xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use confidential_guest_kvm_init() instead of calling SEV
specific sev_kvm_init(). This allows the introduction of multiple
confidential-guest-support subclasses for different x86 vendors.
As a bonus, stubs are not needed anymore since there is no
direct call from target/i386/kvm/kvm.c to SEV code.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20240229060038.606591-1-xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) is a CPU side-channel vulnerability
that may expose stale register value. CPUs that set RFDS_NO bit in MSR
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicate that they are not vulnerable to RFDS.
Similarly, RFDS_CLEAR indicates that CPU is affected by RFDS, and has
the microcode to help mitigate RFDS.
Make RFDS_CLEAR and RFDS_NO bits available to guests.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Message-ID: <9a38877857392b5c2deae7e7db1b170d15510314.1710341348.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
According to table 1-2 in Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions and
Future Features (rev 051) [1], SierraForest has the following new features
which have already been virtualized:
- CMPCCXADD CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX[bit 7]
- AVX-IFMA CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX[bit 23]
- AVX-VNNI-INT8 CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EDX[bit 4]
- AVX-NE-CONVERT CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EDX[bit 5]
Add above features to new CPU model SierraForest. Comparing with GraniteRapids
CPU model, SierraForest bare-metal removes the following features:
- HLE CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EBX[bit 4]
- RTM CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EBX[bit 11]
- AVX512F CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EBX[bit 16]
- AVX512DQ CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EBX[bit 17]
- AVX512_IFMA CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EBX[bit 21]
- AVX512CD CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EBX[bit 28]
- AVX512BW CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EBX[bit 30]
- AVX512VL CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EBX[bit 31]
- AVX512_VBMI CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 1]
- AVX512_VBMI2 CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 6]
- AVX512_VNNI CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 11]
- AVX512_BITALG CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 12]
- AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 14]
- LA57 CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 16]
- TSXLDTRK CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 16]
- AMX-BF16 CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 22]
- AVX512_FP16 CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 23]
- AMX-TILE CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 24]
- AMX-INT8 CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 25]
- AVX512_BF16 CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX[bit 5]
- fast zero-length MOVSB CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX[bit 10]
- fast short CMPSB, SCASB CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX[bit 12]
- AMX-FP16 CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX[bit 21]
- PREFETCHI CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EDX[bit 14]
- XFD CPUID.(EAX=0xD,ECX=1):EAX[bit 4]
- EPT_PAGE_WALK_LENGTH_5 VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP(0x48c)[bit 7]
Add all features of GraniteRapids CPU model except above features to
SierraForest CPU model.
SierraForest doesn’t support TSX and RTM but supports TAA_NO. When RTM is
not enabled in host, KVM will not report TAA_NO. So, just don't include
TAA_NO in SierraForest CPU model.
[1] https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368
Reviewed-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tao Su <tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240320021044.508263-1-tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When start L2 guest with both L1/L2 using Icelake-Server-v3 or above,
QEMU reports below warning:
"warning: host doesn't support requested feature: MSR(10AH).taa-no [bit 8]"
Reason is QEMU Icelake-Server-v3 has TSX feature disabled but enables taa-no
bit. It's meaningless that TSX isn't supported but still claim TSX is secure.
So L1 KVM doesn't expose taa-no to L2 if TSX is unsupported, then starting L2
triggers the warning.
Fix it by introducing a new version Icelake-Server-v7 which has both TSX
and taa-no features. Then guest can use TSX securely when it see taa-no.
This matches the production Icelake which supports TSX and isn't susceptible
to TSX Async Abort (TAA) vulnerabilities, a.k.a, taa-no.
Ideally, TSX should have being enabled together with taa-no since v3, but for
compatibility, we'd better to add v7 to enable it.
Fixes: d965dc3559 ("target/i386: Add ARCH_CAPABILITIES related bits into Icelake-Server CPU model")
Tested-by: Xiangfei Ma <xiangfeix.ma@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240320093138.80267-2-zhenzhong.duan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Move the architectural (for lack of a better term) CPUID leaf generation
to a separate helper so that the generation code can be reused by TDX,
which needs to generate a canonical VM-scoped configuration.
For now this is just a cleanup, so keep the function static.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240229063726.610065-23-xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Query kvm for supported guest physical address bits, in cpuid
function 80000008, eax[23:16]. Usually this is identical to host
physical address bits. With NPT or EPT being used this might be
restricted to 48 (max 4-level paging address space size) even if
the host cpu supports more physical address bits.
When set pass this to the guest, using cpuid too. Guest firmware
can use this to figure how big the usable guest physical address
space is, so PCI bar mapping are actually reachable.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240318155336.156197-2-kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Allows to set guest-phys-bits (cpuid leaf 80000008, eax[23:16])
via -cpu $model,guest-phys-bits=$nr.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240318155336.156197-3-kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To keep the multiple update check, replace insn_start
with insn_start_updated.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
When aborting translation of the current insn, restore the
previous value of insn_start.
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jørgen Hansen <Jorgen.Hansen@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
To keep the multiple update check, replace insn_start
with insn_start_updated.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
To keep the multiple update check, replace insn_start
with insn_start_updated.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Add helpers for reading/writing the 68881 FPSR register so that
changes in floating point exception state can be seen by the
application.
Call these helpers in pre_load/post_load hooks to synchronize
exception state.
Signed-off-by: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20230803035231.429697-1-keithp@keithp.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
CHECK_NOT_DELAY_SLOT is correctly applied to the branch-related
instructions, but not to the PC-relative mov* instructions.
I verified the existence of an illegal slot exception on a SH7091 when
any of these instructions are attempted inside a delay slot.
This also matches the behavior described in the SH-4 ISA manual.
Signed-off-by: Zack Buhman <zack@buhman.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20240407150705.5965-1-zack@buhman.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewd-by: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
The saturation arithmetic logic in helper_macw is not correct.
I tested and verified this behavior on a SH7091.
Reviewd-by: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Zack Buhman <zack@buhman.org>
Message-Id: <20240405233802.29128-3-zack@buhman.org>
[rth: Reformat helper_macw, add a test case.]
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
The saturation arithmetic logic in helper_macl is not correct.
I tested and verified this behavior on a SH7091.
Signed-off-by: Zack Buhman <zack@buhman.org>
Message-Id: <20240404162641.27528-2-zack@buhman.org>
[rth: Reformat helper_macl, add a test case.]
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Allow host access to the entire 64-bit accumulator.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
The contents of IIAOQ depend on PSW_W.
Follow the text in "Interruption Instruction Address Queues",
pages 2-13 through 2-15.
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Fixes: b10700d826 ("target/hppa: Update IIAOQ, IIASQ for pa2.0")
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
When we do an AT address translation operation, the page table walk
is supposed to be performed in the context of the EL we're doing the
walk for, so for instance an AT S1E2R walk is done for EL2. In the
pseudocode an EL is passed to AArch64.AT(), which calls
SecurityStateAtEL() to find the security state that we should be
doing the walk with.
In ats_write64() we get this wrong, instead using the current
security space always. This is fine for AT operations performed from
EL1 and EL2, because there the current security state and the
security state for the lower EL are the same. But for AT operations
performed from EL3, the current security state is always either
Secure or Root, whereas we want to use the security state defined by
SCR_EL3.{NS,NSE} for the walk. This affects not just guests using
FEAT_RME but also ones where EL3 is Secure state and the EL3 code
is trying to do an AT for a NonSecure EL2 or EL1.
Use arm_security_space_below_el3() to get the SecuritySpace to
pass to do_ats_write() for all AT operations except the
AT S1E3* operations.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: e1ee56ec23 ("target/arm: Pass security space rather than flag for AT instructions")
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2250
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240405180232.3570066-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
EL2 accesses to CNTPOFF_EL2 should only ever trap to EL3 if EL3 is
present, as described by the reference manual (for MRS):
/* ... */
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
if Halted() && HaveEL(EL3) && /*...*/ then
UNDEFINED;
elsif HaveEL(EL3) && SCR_EL3.ECVEn == '0' then
/* ... */
else
X[t, 64] = CNTPOFF_EL2;
However, the existing implementation of gt_cntpoff_access() always
returns CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3 for EL2 accesses with SCR_EL3.ECVEn unset. In
pseudo-code terminology, this corresponds to assuming that HaveEL(EL3)
is always true, which is wrong. As a result, QEMU panics in
access_check_cp_reg() when started without EL3 and running EL2 code
accessing the register (e.g. any recent KVM booting a guest).
Therefore, add the HaveEL(EL3) check to gt_cntpoff_access().
Fixes: 2808d3b38a ("target/arm: Implement FEAT_ECV CNTPOFF_EL2 handling")
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Message-id: m3al6amhdkmsiy2f62w72ufth6dzn45xg5cz6xljceyibphnf4@ezmmpwk4tnhl
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
See previous commit and commit 9de9fa5cf2 ("Avoid using inlined
functions with external linkage") for rationale.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20240313184954.42513-3-philmd@linaro.org>
Unify with other init_excp_FOO() in the same file.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20240313213339.82071-5-philmd@linaro.org>
The HSTR_EL2 register allows the hypervisor to trap AArch32 EL1 and
EL0 accesses to cp15 registers. We incorrectly implemented this so
they trap to EL1 when we detect the need for a HSTR trap at code
generation time. (The check in access_check_cp_reg() which we do at
runtime to catch traps from EL0 is correctly routing them to EL2.)
Use the correct target EL when generating the code to take the trap.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2226
Fixes: 049edada5e ("target/arm: Make HSTR_EL2 traps take priority over UNDEF-at-EL1")
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240325133116.2075362-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
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Merge tag 'pull-ppc-for-9.0-3-20240331' of https://gitlab.com/npiggin/qemu into staging
Various fixes for recent regressions and new code.
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# gpg: Signature made Sun 31 Mar 2024 08:30:11 BST
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* tag 'pull-ppc-for-9.0-3-20240331' of https://gitlab.com/npiggin/qemu:
tests/avocado: ppc_hv_tests.py set alpine time before setup-alpine
tests/avocado: Fix ppc_hv_tests.py xorriso dependency guard
target/ppc: Do not clear MSR[ME] on MCE interrupts to supervisor
target/ppc: Fix GDB register indexing on secondary CPUs
target/ppc: Restore [H]DEXCR to 64-bits
target/ppc/mmu-radix64: Use correct string format in walk_tree()
hw/ppc/spapr: Include missing 'sysemu/tcg.h' header
spapr: nested: use bitwise NOT operator for flags check
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Hardware clears the MSR[ME] bit when delivering a machine check
interrupt, so that is what QEMU does.
The spapr environment runs in supervisor mode though, and receives
machine check interrupts after they are processed by the hypervisor,
and MSR[ME] must always be enabled in supervisor mode (otherwise it
could checkstop the system). So MSR[ME] must not be cleared when
delivering machine checks to the supervisor.
The fix to prevent supervisor mode from modifying MSR[ME] also
prevented it from re-enabling the incorrectly cleared MSR[ME] bit
when returning from handling the interrupt. Before that fix, the
problem was not very noticable with well-behaved code. So the
Fixes tag is not strictly correct, but practically they go together.
Found by kvm-unit-tests machine check tests (not yet upstream).
Fixes: 678b6f1af7 ("target/ppc: Prevent supervisor from modifying MSR[ME]")
Reviewed-by: Harsh Prateek Bora <harshpb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
The GDB server protocol assigns an arbitrary numbering of the SPRs.
We track this correspondence on each SPR with gdb_id, using it to
resolve any SPR requests GDB makes.
Early on we generate an XML representation of the SPRs to give GDB,
including this numbering. However the XML is cached globally, and we
skip setting the SPR gdb_id values on subsequent threads if we detect
it is cached. This causes QEMU to fail to resolve SPR requests against
secondary CPUs because it cannot find the matching gdb_id value on that
thread's SPRs.
This is a minimal fix to first assign the gdb_id values, then return
early if the XML is cached. Otherwise we generate the XML using the
now already initialised gdb_id values.
Fixes: 1b53948ff8 ("target/ppc: Use GDBFeature for dynamic XML")
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
The DEXCR emulation was recently changed to a 32-bit register, possibly
because it does have a 32-bit read-only view. It is a full 64-bit
SPR though, so use the corresponding 64-bit write functions.
Fixes: fbda88f7ab ("target/ppc: Fix width of some 32-bit SPRs")
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
'mask', 'nlb' and 'base_addr' are all uin64_t types.
Use the corresponding PRIx64 format.
Fixes: d2066bc50d ("target/ppc: Check page dir/table base alignment")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Along this path we have already skipped the insn to be
nullified, so the subsequent insn should be executed.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
The 32-bit PA-7300LC (PCX-L2) CPU and the 64-bit PA8700 (PCX-W2) CPU
use different diag instructions to save or restore the CPU registers
to/from the shadow registers.
Implement those per-CPU architecture diag instructions to fix those
parts of the HP ODE testcases (L2DIAG and WDIAG, section 1) which test
the shadow registers.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
[rth: Use decodetree to distinguish cases]
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
