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qemu/qemu-seccomp.c

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Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch] (v8) Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> --- v1: - I added a syscall struct using priority levels as described in the libseccomp man page. The priority numbers are based to the frequency they appear in a sample strace from a regular qemu guest run under libvirt. Libseccomp generates linear BPF code to filter system calls, those rules are read one after another. The priority system places the most common rules first in order to reduce the overhead when processing them. v1 -> v2: - Fixed some style issues - Removed code from vl.c and created qemu-seccomp.[ch] - Now using ARRAY_SIZE macro - Added more syscalls without priority/frequency set yet v2 -> v3: - Adding copyright and license information - Replacing seccomp_whitelist_count just by ARRAY_SIZE - Adding header protection to qemu-seccomp.h - Moving QemuSeccompSyscall definition to qemu-seccomp.c - Negative return from seccomp_start is fatal now. - Adding open() and execve() to the whitelis v3 -> v4: - Tests revealed a bigger set of syscalls. - seccomp_start() now has an argument to set the mode according to the configure option trap or kill. v4 -> v5: - Tests on x86_64 required a new specific set of system calls. - libseccomp release 1.0.0: part of the API have changed in this last release, had to adapt to the new function signatures.
2012-08-14 21:44:06 +00:00
/*
* QEMU seccomp mode 2 support with libseccomp
*
* Copyright IBM, Corp. 2012
*
* Authors:
* Eduardo Otubo <eotubo@br.ibm.com>
*
* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2. See
* the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
*
* Contributions after 2012-01-13 are licensed under the terms of the
* GNU GPL, version 2 or (at your option) any later version.
*/
all: Clean up includes Clean up includes so that osdep.h is included first and headers which it implies are not included manually. This commit was created with scripts/clean-includes. Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Message-id: 1454089805-5470-16-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2016-01-29 17:50:05 +00:00
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch] (v8) Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> --- v1: - I added a syscall struct using priority levels as described in the libseccomp man page. The priority numbers are based to the frequency they appear in a sample strace from a regular qemu guest run under libvirt. Libseccomp generates linear BPF code to filter system calls, those rules are read one after another. The priority system places the most common rules first in order to reduce the overhead when processing them. v1 -> v2: - Fixed some style issues - Removed code from vl.c and created qemu-seccomp.[ch] - Now using ARRAY_SIZE macro - Added more syscalls without priority/frequency set yet v2 -> v3: - Adding copyright and license information - Replacing seccomp_whitelist_count just by ARRAY_SIZE - Adding header protection to qemu-seccomp.h - Moving QemuSeccompSyscall definition to qemu-seccomp.c - Negative return from seccomp_start is fatal now. - Adding open() and execve() to the whitelis v3 -> v4: - Tests revealed a bigger set of syscalls. - seccomp_start() now has an argument to set the mode according to the configure option trap or kill. v4 -> v5: - Tests on x86_64 required a new specific set of system calls. - libseccomp release 1.0.0: part of the API have changed in this last release, had to adapt to the new function signatures.
2012-08-14 21:44:06 +00:00
#include <seccomp.h>
softmmu: move include files to include/sysemu/ Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2012-12-17 17:20:04 +00:00
#include "sysemu/seccomp.h"
Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch] (v8) Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> --- v1: - I added a syscall struct using priority levels as described in the libseccomp man page. The priority numbers are based to the frequency they appear in a sample strace from a regular qemu guest run under libvirt. Libseccomp generates linear BPF code to filter system calls, those rules are read one after another. The priority system places the most common rules first in order to reduce the overhead when processing them. v1 -> v2: - Fixed some style issues - Removed code from vl.c and created qemu-seccomp.[ch] - Now using ARRAY_SIZE macro - Added more syscalls without priority/frequency set yet v2 -> v3: - Adding copyright and license information - Replacing seccomp_whitelist_count just by ARRAY_SIZE - Adding header protection to qemu-seccomp.h - Moving QemuSeccompSyscall definition to qemu-seccomp.c - Negative return from seccomp_start is fatal now. - Adding open() and execve() to the whitelis v3 -> v4: - Tests revealed a bigger set of syscalls. - seccomp_start() now has an argument to set the mode according to the configure option trap or kill. v4 -> v5: - Tests on x86_64 required a new specific set of system calls. - libseccomp release 1.0.0: part of the API have changed in this last release, had to adapt to the new function signatures.
2012-08-14 21:44:06 +00:00
seccomp: Whitelist cacheflush since 2.2.0 not 2.2.3 The cacheflush system call (found on MIPS and ARM) has been included in the libseccomp header since 2.2.0, so include it back to that version. Previously it was only enabled since 2.2.3 since that is when it was enabled properly for ARM. This will allow seccomp support to be enabled for MIPS back to libseccomp 2.2.0. Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Reviewed-By: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eduardo Otubo <eduardo.otubo@profitbricks.com>
2016-04-08 13:16:33 +00:00
/* For some architectures (notably ARM) cacheflush is not supported until
* libseccomp 2.2.3, but configure enforces that we are using a more recent
* version on those hosts, so it is OK for this check to be less strict.
*/
seccomp: add cacheflush to whitelist cacheflush is an arm-specific syscall that qemu built for arm uses. Add it to the whitelist, but only if we're linking with a recent enough libseccomp. Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
2015-11-02 22:53:26 +00:00
#if SCMP_VER_MAJOR >= 3
#define HAVE_CACHEFLUSH
seccomp: Whitelist cacheflush since 2.2.0 not 2.2.3 The cacheflush system call (found on MIPS and ARM) has been included in the libseccomp header since 2.2.0, so include it back to that version. Previously it was only enabled since 2.2.3 since that is when it was enabled properly for ARM. This will allow seccomp support to be enabled for MIPS back to libseccomp 2.2.0. Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Reviewed-By: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eduardo Otubo <eduardo.otubo@profitbricks.com>
2016-04-08 13:16:33 +00:00
#elif SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR >= 2
seccomp: add cacheflush to whitelist cacheflush is an arm-specific syscall that qemu built for arm uses. Add it to the whitelist, but only if we're linking with a recent enough libseccomp. Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
2015-11-02 22:53:26 +00:00
#define HAVE_CACHEFLUSH
#endif
Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch] (v8) Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> --- v1: - I added a syscall struct using priority levels as described in the libseccomp man page. The priority numbers are based to the frequency they appear in a sample strace from a regular qemu guest run under libvirt. Libseccomp generates linear BPF code to filter system calls, those rules are read one after another. The priority system places the most common rules first in order to reduce the overhead when processing them. v1 -> v2: - Fixed some style issues - Removed code from vl.c and created qemu-seccomp.[ch] - Now using ARRAY_SIZE macro - Added more syscalls without priority/frequency set yet v2 -> v3: - Adding copyright and license information - Replacing seccomp_whitelist_count just by ARRAY_SIZE - Adding header protection to qemu-seccomp.h - Moving QemuSeccompSyscall definition to qemu-seccomp.c - Negative return from seccomp_start is fatal now. - Adding open() and execve() to the whitelis v3 -> v4: - Tests revealed a bigger set of syscalls. - seccomp_start() now has an argument to set the mode according to the configure option trap or kill. v4 -> v5: - Tests on x86_64 required a new specific set of system calls. - libseccomp release 1.0.0: part of the API have changed in this last release, had to adapt to the new function signatures.
2012-08-14 21:44:06 +00:00
struct QemuSeccompSyscall {
int32_t num;
seccomp: changing from whitelist to blacklist This patch changes the default behavior of the seccomp filter from whitelist to blacklist. By default now all system calls are allowed and a small black list of definitely forbidden ones was created. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
2017-02-28 20:13:12 +00:00
uint8_t set;
Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch] (v8) Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> --- v1: - I added a syscall struct using priority levels as described in the libseccomp man page. The priority numbers are based to the frequency they appear in a sample strace from a regular qemu guest run under libvirt. Libseccomp generates linear BPF code to filter system calls, those rules are read one after another. The priority system places the most common rules first in order to reduce the overhead when processing them. v1 -> v2: - Fixed some style issues - Removed code from vl.c and created qemu-seccomp.[ch] - Now using ARRAY_SIZE macro - Added more syscalls without priority/frequency set yet v2 -> v3: - Adding copyright and license information - Replacing seccomp_whitelist_count just by ARRAY_SIZE - Adding header protection to qemu-seccomp.h - Moving QemuSeccompSyscall definition to qemu-seccomp.c - Negative return from seccomp_start is fatal now. - Adding open() and execve() to the whitelis v3 -> v4: - Tests revealed a bigger set of syscalls. - seccomp_start() now has an argument to set the mode according to the configure option trap or kill. v4 -> v5: - Tests on x86_64 required a new specific set of system calls. - libseccomp release 1.0.0: part of the API have changed in this last release, had to adapt to the new function signatures.
2012-08-14 21:44:06 +00:00
};
seccomp: changing from whitelist to blacklist This patch changes the default behavior of the seccomp filter from whitelist to blacklist. By default now all system calls are allowed and a small black list of definitely forbidden ones was created. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
2017-02-28 20:13:12 +00:00
static const struct QemuSeccompSyscall blacklist[] = {
/* default set of syscalls to blacklist */
{ SCMP_SYS(reboot), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(swapon), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(swapoff), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(syslog), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(mount), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(umount), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(kexec_load), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(afs_syscall), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(break), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(ftime), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(getpmsg), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(gtty), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(lock), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(mpx), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(prof), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(profil), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(putpmsg), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(security), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(stty), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(tuxcall), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(ulimit), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
{ SCMP_SYS(vserver), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT },
seccomp: add obsolete argument to command line This patch introduces the argument [,obsolete=allow] to the `-sandbox on' option. It allows Qemu to run safely on old system that still relies on old system calls. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
2017-03-01 22:17:29 +00:00
/* obsolete */
{ SCMP_SYS(readdir), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE },
{ SCMP_SYS(_sysctl), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE },
{ SCMP_SYS(bdflush), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE },
{ SCMP_SYS(create_module), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE },
{ SCMP_SYS(get_kernel_syms), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE },
{ SCMP_SYS(query_module), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE },
{ SCMP_SYS(sgetmask), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE },
{ SCMP_SYS(ssetmask), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE },
{ SCMP_SYS(sysfs), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE },
{ SCMP_SYS(uselib), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE },
{ SCMP_SYS(ustat), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE },
seccomp: add elevateprivileges argument to command line This patch introduces the new argument [,elevateprivileges=allow|deny|children] to the `-sandbox on'. It allows or denies Qemu process to elevate its privileges by blacklisting all set*uid|gid system calls. The 'children' option will let forks and execves run unprivileged. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
2017-03-13 21:13:27 +00:00
/* privileged */
{ SCMP_SYS(setuid), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
{ SCMP_SYS(setgid), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
{ SCMP_SYS(setpgid), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
{ SCMP_SYS(setsid), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
{ SCMP_SYS(setreuid), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
{ SCMP_SYS(setregid), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
{ SCMP_SYS(setresuid), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
{ SCMP_SYS(setresgid), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
{ SCMP_SYS(setfsuid), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
{ SCMP_SYS(setfsgid), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch] (v8) Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> --- v1: - I added a syscall struct using priority levels as described in the libseccomp man page. The priority numbers are based to the frequency they appear in a sample strace from a regular qemu guest run under libvirt. Libseccomp generates linear BPF code to filter system calls, those rules are read one after another. The priority system places the most common rules first in order to reduce the overhead when processing them. v1 -> v2: - Fixed some style issues - Removed code from vl.c and created qemu-seccomp.[ch] - Now using ARRAY_SIZE macro - Added more syscalls without priority/frequency set yet v2 -> v3: - Adding copyright and license information - Replacing seccomp_whitelist_count just by ARRAY_SIZE - Adding header protection to qemu-seccomp.h - Moving QemuSeccompSyscall definition to qemu-seccomp.c - Negative return from seccomp_start is fatal now. - Adding open() and execve() to the whitelis v3 -> v4: - Tests revealed a bigger set of syscalls. - seccomp_start() now has an argument to set the mode according to the configure option trap or kill. v4 -> v5: - Tests on x86_64 required a new specific set of system calls. - libseccomp release 1.0.0: part of the API have changed in this last release, had to adapt to the new function signatures.
2012-08-14 21:44:06 +00:00
};
seccomp: add obsolete argument to command line This patch introduces the argument [,obsolete=allow] to the `-sandbox on' option. It allows Qemu to run safely on old system that still relies on old system calls. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
2017-03-01 22:17:29 +00:00
int seccomp_start(uint32_t seccomp_opts)
Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch] (v8) Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> --- v1: - I added a syscall struct using priority levels as described in the libseccomp man page. The priority numbers are based to the frequency they appear in a sample strace from a regular qemu guest run under libvirt. Libseccomp generates linear BPF code to filter system calls, those rules are read one after another. The priority system places the most common rules first in order to reduce the overhead when processing them. v1 -> v2: - Fixed some style issues - Removed code from vl.c and created qemu-seccomp.[ch] - Now using ARRAY_SIZE macro - Added more syscalls without priority/frequency set yet v2 -> v3: - Adding copyright and license information - Replacing seccomp_whitelist_count just by ARRAY_SIZE - Adding header protection to qemu-seccomp.h - Moving QemuSeccompSyscall definition to qemu-seccomp.c - Negative return from seccomp_start is fatal now. - Adding open() and execve() to the whitelis v3 -> v4: - Tests revealed a bigger set of syscalls. - seccomp_start() now has an argument to set the mode according to the configure option trap or kill. v4 -> v5: - Tests on x86_64 required a new specific set of system calls. - libseccomp release 1.0.0: part of the API have changed in this last release, had to adapt to the new function signatures.
2012-08-14 21:44:06 +00:00
{
int rc = 0;
unsigned int i = 0;
scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
seccomp: changing from whitelist to blacklist This patch changes the default behavior of the seccomp filter from whitelist to blacklist. By default now all system calls are allowed and a small black list of definitely forbidden ones was created. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
2017-02-28 20:13:12 +00:00
ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch] (v8) Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> --- v1: - I added a syscall struct using priority levels as described in the libseccomp man page. The priority numbers are based to the frequency they appear in a sample strace from a regular qemu guest run under libvirt. Libseccomp generates linear BPF code to filter system calls, those rules are read one after another. The priority system places the most common rules first in order to reduce the overhead when processing them. v1 -> v2: - Fixed some style issues - Removed code from vl.c and created qemu-seccomp.[ch] - Now using ARRAY_SIZE macro - Added more syscalls without priority/frequency set yet v2 -> v3: - Adding copyright and license information - Replacing seccomp_whitelist_count just by ARRAY_SIZE - Adding header protection to qemu-seccomp.h - Moving QemuSeccompSyscall definition to qemu-seccomp.c - Negative return from seccomp_start is fatal now. - Adding open() and execve() to the whitelis v3 -> v4: - Tests revealed a bigger set of syscalls. - seccomp_start() now has an argument to set the mode according to the configure option trap or kill. v4 -> v5: - Tests on x86_64 required a new specific set of system calls. - libseccomp release 1.0.0: part of the API have changed in this last release, had to adapt to the new function signatures.
2012-08-14 21:44:06 +00:00
if (ctx == NULL) {
seccomp: exit if seccomp_init() fails This fixes a bug where we weren't exiting if seccomp_init() failed. Signed-off-by: Corey Bryant <coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-18 16:48:11 +00:00
rc = -1;
Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch] (v8) Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> --- v1: - I added a syscall struct using priority levels as described in the libseccomp man page. The priority numbers are based to the frequency they appear in a sample strace from a regular qemu guest run under libvirt. Libseccomp generates linear BPF code to filter system calls, those rules are read one after another. The priority system places the most common rules first in order to reduce the overhead when processing them. v1 -> v2: - Fixed some style issues - Removed code from vl.c and created qemu-seccomp.[ch] - Now using ARRAY_SIZE macro - Added more syscalls without priority/frequency set yet v2 -> v3: - Adding copyright and license information - Replacing seccomp_whitelist_count just by ARRAY_SIZE - Adding header protection to qemu-seccomp.h - Moving QemuSeccompSyscall definition to qemu-seccomp.c - Negative return from seccomp_start is fatal now. - Adding open() and execve() to the whitelis v3 -> v4: - Tests revealed a bigger set of syscalls. - seccomp_start() now has an argument to set the mode according to the configure option trap or kill. v4 -> v5: - Tests on x86_64 required a new specific set of system calls. - libseccomp release 1.0.0: part of the API have changed in this last release, had to adapt to the new function signatures.
2012-08-14 21:44:06 +00:00
goto seccomp_return;
}
seccomp: changing from whitelist to blacklist This patch changes the default behavior of the seccomp filter from whitelist to blacklist. By default now all system calls are allowed and a small black list of definitely forbidden ones was created. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
2017-02-28 20:13:12 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(blacklist); i++) {
seccomp: add obsolete argument to command line This patch introduces the argument [,obsolete=allow] to the `-sandbox on' option. It allows Qemu to run safely on old system that still relies on old system calls. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
2017-03-01 22:17:29 +00:00
if (!(seccomp_opts & blacklist[i].set)) {
continue;
}
seccomp: changing from whitelist to blacklist This patch changes the default behavior of the seccomp filter from whitelist to blacklist. By default now all system calls are allowed and a small black list of definitely forbidden ones was created. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
2017-02-28 20:13:12 +00:00
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_KILL, blacklist[i].num, 0);
Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch] (v8) Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> --- v1: - I added a syscall struct using priority levels as described in the libseccomp man page. The priority numbers are based to the frequency they appear in a sample strace from a regular qemu guest run under libvirt. Libseccomp generates linear BPF code to filter system calls, those rules are read one after another. The priority system places the most common rules first in order to reduce the overhead when processing them. v1 -> v2: - Fixed some style issues - Removed code from vl.c and created qemu-seccomp.[ch] - Now using ARRAY_SIZE macro - Added more syscalls without priority/frequency set yet v2 -> v3: - Adding copyright and license information - Replacing seccomp_whitelist_count just by ARRAY_SIZE - Adding header protection to qemu-seccomp.h - Moving QemuSeccompSyscall definition to qemu-seccomp.c - Negative return from seccomp_start is fatal now. - Adding open() and execve() to the whitelis v3 -> v4: - Tests revealed a bigger set of syscalls. - seccomp_start() now has an argument to set the mode according to the configure option trap or kill. v4 -> v5: - Tests on x86_64 required a new specific set of system calls. - libseccomp release 1.0.0: part of the API have changed in this last release, had to adapt to the new function signatures.
2012-08-14 21:44:06 +00:00
if (rc < 0) {
goto seccomp_return;
}
}
rc = seccomp_load(ctx);
seccomp_return:
seccomp_release(ctx);
return rc;
}
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