2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Serving QEMU block devices via NBD
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2012 Red Hat, Inc.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Author: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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|
|
|
*
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|
* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
|
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|
|
* later. See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
|
|
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|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-29 17:50:05 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
|
2012-12-17 17:20:04 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "sysemu/blockdev.h"
|
2014-11-18 11:21:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "sysemu/block-backend.h"
|
2013-02-05 16:06:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "hw/block/block.h"
|
2018-02-01 11:18:31 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "qapi/error.h"
|
2020-09-24 15:26:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "qapi/qapi-commands-block-export.h"
|
2012-12-17 17:19:44 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "block/nbd.h"
|
2016-02-10 18:41:03 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "io/channel-socket.h"
|
2017-12-18 10:16:42 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "io/net-listener.h"
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct NBDServerData {
|
2017-12-18 10:16:42 +00:00
|
|
|
QIONetListener *listener;
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
|
nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command
As with the previous patch to qemu-nbd, the nbd-server-start QMP command
also needs to be able to specify authorization when enabling TLS encryption.
First the client must create a QAuthZ object instance using the
'object-add' command:
{
'execute': 'object-add',
'arguments': {
'qom-type': 'authz-list',
'id': 'authz0',
'parameters': {
'policy': 'deny',
'rules': [
{
'match': '*CN=fred',
'policy': 'allow'
}
]
}
}
}
They can then reference this in the new 'tls-authz' parameter when
executing the 'nbd-server-start' command:
{
'execute': 'nbd-server-start',
'arguments': {
'addr': {
'type': 'inet',
'host': '127.0.0.1',
'port': '9000'
},
'tls-creds': 'tls0',
'tls-authz': 'authz0'
}
}
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190227162035.18543-3-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2019-02-27 16:20:34 +00:00
|
|
|
char *tlsauthz;
|
2020-09-24 15:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t max_connections;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t connections;
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
} NBDServerData;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static NBDServerData *nbd_server;
|
2020-09-24 15:26:57 +00:00
|
|
|
static bool is_qemu_nbd;
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
static void nbd_update_server_watch(NBDServerData *s);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:26:57 +00:00
|
|
|
void nbd_server_is_qemu_nbd(bool value)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
is_qemu_nbd = value;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
nbd: Fix regression on resiliency to port scan
Back in qemu 2.5, qemu-nbd was immune to port probes (a transient
server would not quit, regardless of how many probe connections
came and went, until a connection actually negotiated). But we
broke that in commit ee7d7aa when removing the return value to
nbd_client_new(), although that patch also introduced a bug causing
an assertion failure on a client that fails negotiation. We then
made it worse during refactoring in commit 1a6245a (a segfault
before we could even assert); the (masked) assertion was cleaned
up in d3780c2 (still in 2.6), and just recently we finally fixed
the segfault ("nbd: Fully intialize client in case of failed
negotiation"). But that still means that ever since we added
TLS support to qemu-nbd, we have been vulnerable to an ill-timed
port-scan being able to cause a denial of service by taking down
qemu-nbd before a real client has a chance to connect.
Since negotiation is now handled asynchronously via coroutines,
we no longer have a synchronous point of return by re-adding a
return value to nbd_client_new(). So this patch instead wires
things up to pass the negotiation status through the close_fn
callback function.
Simple test across two terminals:
$ qemu-nbd -f raw -p 30001 file
$ nmap 127.0.0.1 -p 30001 && \
qemu-io -c 'r 0 512' -f raw nbd://localhost:30001
Note that this patch does not change what constitutes successful
negotiation (thus, a client must enter transmission phase before
that client can be considered as a reason to terminate the server
when the connection ends). Perhaps we may want to tweak things
in a later patch to also treat a client that uses NBD_OPT_ABORT
as being a 'successful' negotiation (the client correctly talked
the NBD protocol, and informed us it was not going to use our
export after all), but that's a discussion for another day.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1451614
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170608222617.20376-1-eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-08 22:26:17 +00:00
|
|
|
static void nbd_blockdev_client_closed(NBDClient *client, bool ignored)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nbd_client_put(client);
|
2020-09-24 15:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
assert(nbd_server->connections > 0);
|
|
|
|
nbd_server->connections--;
|
|
|
|
nbd_update_server_watch(nbd_server);
|
nbd: Fix regression on resiliency to port scan
Back in qemu 2.5, qemu-nbd was immune to port probes (a transient
server would not quit, regardless of how many probe connections
came and went, until a connection actually negotiated). But we
broke that in commit ee7d7aa when removing the return value to
nbd_client_new(), although that patch also introduced a bug causing
an assertion failure on a client that fails negotiation. We then
made it worse during refactoring in commit 1a6245a (a segfault
before we could even assert); the (masked) assertion was cleaned
up in d3780c2 (still in 2.6), and just recently we finally fixed
the segfault ("nbd: Fully intialize client in case of failed
negotiation"). But that still means that ever since we added
TLS support to qemu-nbd, we have been vulnerable to an ill-timed
port-scan being able to cause a denial of service by taking down
qemu-nbd before a real client has a chance to connect.
Since negotiation is now handled asynchronously via coroutines,
we no longer have a synchronous point of return by re-adding a
return value to nbd_client_new(). So this patch instead wires
things up to pass the negotiation status through the close_fn
callback function.
Simple test across two terminals:
$ qemu-nbd -f raw -p 30001 file
$ nmap 127.0.0.1 -p 30001 && \
qemu-io -c 'r 0 512' -f raw nbd://localhost:30001
Note that this patch does not change what constitutes successful
negotiation (thus, a client must enter transmission phase before
that client can be considered as a reason to terminate the server
when the connection ends). Perhaps we may want to tweak things
in a later patch to also treat a client that uses NBD_OPT_ABORT
as being a 'successful' negotiation (the client correctly talked
the NBD protocol, and informed us it was not going to use our
export after all), but that's a discussion for another day.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1451614
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170608222617.20376-1-eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-08 22:26:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-12-18 10:16:42 +00:00
|
|
|
static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
|
|
|
|
gpointer opaque)
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-24 15:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_server->connections++;
|
|
|
|
nbd_update_server_watch(nbd_server);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-09-30 10:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(cioc), "nbd-server");
|
nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command
As with the previous patch to qemu-nbd, the nbd-server-start QMP command
also needs to be able to specify authorization when enabling TLS encryption.
First the client must create a QAuthZ object instance using the
'object-add' command:
{
'execute': 'object-add',
'arguments': {
'qom-type': 'authz-list',
'id': 'authz0',
'parameters': {
'policy': 'deny',
'rules': [
{
'match': '*CN=fred',
'policy': 'allow'
}
]
}
}
}
They can then reference this in the new 'tls-authz' parameter when
executing the 'nbd-server-start' command:
{
'execute': 'nbd-server-start',
'arguments': {
'addr': {
'type': 'inet',
'host': '127.0.0.1',
'port': '9000'
},
'tls-creds': 'tls0',
'tls-authz': 'authz0'
}
}
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190227162035.18543-3-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2019-02-27 16:20:34 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_client_new(cioc, nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz,
|
nbd: Fix regression on resiliency to port scan
Back in qemu 2.5, qemu-nbd was immune to port probes (a transient
server would not quit, regardless of how many probe connections
came and went, until a connection actually negotiated). But we
broke that in commit ee7d7aa when removing the return value to
nbd_client_new(), although that patch also introduced a bug causing
an assertion failure on a client that fails negotiation. We then
made it worse during refactoring in commit 1a6245a (a segfault
before we could even assert); the (masked) assertion was cleaned
up in d3780c2 (still in 2.6), and just recently we finally fixed
the segfault ("nbd: Fully intialize client in case of failed
negotiation"). But that still means that ever since we added
TLS support to qemu-nbd, we have been vulnerable to an ill-timed
port-scan being able to cause a denial of service by taking down
qemu-nbd before a real client has a chance to connect.
Since negotiation is now handled asynchronously via coroutines,
we no longer have a synchronous point of return by re-adding a
return value to nbd_client_new(). So this patch instead wires
things up to pass the negotiation status through the close_fn
callback function.
Simple test across two terminals:
$ qemu-nbd -f raw -p 30001 file
$ nmap 127.0.0.1 -p 30001 && \
qemu-io -c 'r 0 512' -f raw nbd://localhost:30001
Note that this patch does not change what constitutes successful
negotiation (thus, a client must enter transmission phase before
that client can be considered as a reason to terminate the server
when the connection ends). Perhaps we may want to tweak things
in a later patch to also treat a client that uses NBD_OPT_ABORT
as being a 'successful' negotiation (the client correctly talked
the NBD protocol, and informed us it was not going to use our
export after all), but that's a discussion for another day.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1451614
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170608222617.20376-1-eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-08 22:26:17 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_blockdev_client_closed);
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
static void nbd_update_server_watch(NBDServerData *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!s->max_connections || s->connections < s->max_connections) {
|
|
|
|
qio_net_listener_set_client_func(s->listener, nbd_accept, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
qio_net_listener_set_client_func(s->listener, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void nbd_server_free(NBDServerData *server)
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!server) {
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-18 10:16:42 +00:00
|
|
|
qio_net_listener_disconnect(server->listener);
|
|
|
|
object_unref(OBJECT(server->listener));
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if (server->tlscreds) {
|
|
|
|
object_unref(OBJECT(server->tlscreds));
|
|
|
|
}
|
nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command
As with the previous patch to qemu-nbd, the nbd-server-start QMP command
also needs to be able to specify authorization when enabling TLS encryption.
First the client must create a QAuthZ object instance using the
'object-add' command:
{
'execute': 'object-add',
'arguments': {
'qom-type': 'authz-list',
'id': 'authz0',
'parameters': {
'policy': 'deny',
'rules': [
{
'match': '*CN=fred',
'policy': 'allow'
}
]
}
}
}
They can then reference this in the new 'tls-authz' parameter when
executing the 'nbd-server-start' command:
{
'execute': 'nbd-server-start',
'arguments': {
'addr': {
'type': 'inet',
'host': '127.0.0.1',
'port': '9000'
},
'tls-creds': 'tls0',
'tls-authz': 'authz0'
}
}
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190227162035.18543-3-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2019-02-27 16:20:34 +00:00
|
|
|
g_free(server->tlsauthz);
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
g_free(server);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static QCryptoTLSCreds *nbd_get_tls_creds(const char *id, Error **errp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Object *obj;
|
|
|
|
QCryptoTLSCreds *creds;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
obj = object_resolve_path_component(
|
|
|
|
object_get_objects_root(), id);
|
|
|
|
if (!obj) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "No TLS credentials with id '%s'",
|
|
|
|
id);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
creds = (QCryptoTLSCreds *)
|
|
|
|
object_dynamic_cast(obj, TYPE_QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS);
|
|
|
|
if (!creds) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Object with id '%s' is not TLS credentials",
|
|
|
|
id);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (creds->endpoint != QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS_ENDPOINT_SERVER) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp,
|
|
|
|
"Expecting TLS credentials with a server endpoint");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
object_ref(obj);
|
|
|
|
return creds;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-26 07:36:41 +00:00
|
|
|
void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
|
2020-09-24 15:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *tls_authz, uint32_t max_connections,
|
|
|
|
Error **errp)
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (nbd_server) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "NBD server already running");
|
2016-02-10 18:41:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-02-10 18:41:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_server = g_new0(NBDServerData, 1);
|
2020-09-24 15:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_server->max_connections = max_connections;
|
2017-12-18 10:16:42 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_server->listener = qio_net_listener_new();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
qio_net_listener_set_name(nbd_server->listener,
|
|
|
|
"nbd-listener");
|
|
|
|
|
2019-08-19 16:08:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (qio_net_listener_open_sync(nbd_server->listener, addr, 1, errp) < 0) {
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-26 07:36:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tls_creds) {
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_server->tlscreds = nbd_get_tls_creds(tls_creds, errp);
|
|
|
|
if (!nbd_server->tlscreds) {
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-26 07:36:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TODO SOCKET_ADDRESS_TYPE_FD where fd has AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
|
|
|
|
if (addr->type != SOCKET_ADDRESS_TYPE_INET) {
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "TLS is only supported with IPv4/IPv6");
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command
As with the previous patch to qemu-nbd, the nbd-server-start QMP command
also needs to be able to specify authorization when enabling TLS encryption.
First the client must create a QAuthZ object instance using the
'object-add' command:
{
'execute': 'object-add',
'arguments': {
'qom-type': 'authz-list',
'id': 'authz0',
'parameters': {
'policy': 'deny',
'rules': [
{
'match': '*CN=fred',
'policy': 'allow'
}
]
}
}
}
They can then reference this in the new 'tls-authz' parameter when
executing the 'nbd-server-start' command:
{
'execute': 'nbd-server-start',
'arguments': {
'addr': {
'type': 'inet',
'host': '127.0.0.1',
'port': '9000'
},
'tls-creds': 'tls0',
'tls-authz': 'authz0'
}
}
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190227162035.18543-3-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2019-02-27 16:20:34 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_server->tlsauthz = g_strdup(tls_authz);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_update_server_watch(nbd_server);
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
nbd_server_free(nbd_server);
|
|
|
|
nbd_server = NULL;
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-24 14:29:57 +00:00
|
|
|
void nbd_server_start_options(NbdServerOptions *arg, Error **errp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-24 15:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_server_start(arg->addr, arg->tls_creds, arg->tls_authz,
|
|
|
|
arg->max_connections, errp);
|
2020-02-24 14:29:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-26 07:36:41 +00:00
|
|
|
void qmp_nbd_server_start(SocketAddressLegacy *addr,
|
|
|
|
bool has_tls_creds, const char *tls_creds,
|
nbd: allow authorization with nbd-server-start QMP command
As with the previous patch to qemu-nbd, the nbd-server-start QMP command
also needs to be able to specify authorization when enabling TLS encryption.
First the client must create a QAuthZ object instance using the
'object-add' command:
{
'execute': 'object-add',
'arguments': {
'qom-type': 'authz-list',
'id': 'authz0',
'parameters': {
'policy': 'deny',
'rules': [
{
'match': '*CN=fred',
'policy': 'allow'
}
]
}
}
}
They can then reference this in the new 'tls-authz' parameter when
executing the 'nbd-server-start' command:
{
'execute': 'nbd-server-start',
'arguments': {
'addr': {
'type': 'inet',
'host': '127.0.0.1',
'port': '9000'
},
'tls-creds': 'tls0',
'tls-authz': 'authz0'
}
}
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190227162035.18543-3-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2019-02-27 16:20:34 +00:00
|
|
|
bool has_tls_authz, const char *tls_authz,
|
2020-09-24 15:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
bool has_max_connections, uint32_t max_connections,
|
2017-04-26 07:36:41 +00:00
|
|
|
Error **errp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SocketAddress *addr_flat = socket_address_flatten(addr);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_server_start(addr_flat, tls_creds, tls_authz, max_connections, errp);
|
2017-04-26 07:36:41 +00:00
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr_flat);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
int nbd_export_create(BlockExport *exp, BlockExportOptions *exp_args,
|
|
|
|
Error **errp)
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-24 15:26:50 +00:00
|
|
|
BlockExportOptionsNbd *arg = &exp_args->u.nbd;
|
2016-07-06 12:15:51 +00:00
|
|
|
BlockDriverState *bs = NULL;
|
2019-09-17 02:39:17 +00:00
|
|
|
AioContext *aio_context;
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:26:50 +00:00
|
|
|
assert(exp_args->type == BLOCK_EXPORT_TYPE_NBD);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:26:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!nbd_server && !is_qemu_nbd) {
|
2012-11-12 13:25:17 +00:00
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "NBD server not running");
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2012-11-12 13:25:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-24 14:29:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!arg->has_name) {
|
2020-09-24 15:27:01 +00:00
|
|
|
arg->name = exp_args->node_name;
|
2018-01-19 13:57:15 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-24 14:29:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (strlen(arg->name) > NBD_MAX_STRING_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "export name '%s' too long", arg->name);
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2019-11-14 02:46:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-24 14:29:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (arg->description && strlen(arg->description) > NBD_MAX_STRING_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "description '%s' too long", arg->description);
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2019-11-14 02:46:35 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-24 14:29:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nbd_export_find(arg->name)) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "NBD server already has export named '%s'", arg->name);
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EEXIST;
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:27:01 +00:00
|
|
|
bs = bdrv_lookup_bs(NULL, exp_args->node_name, errp);
|
2016-07-06 12:15:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!bs) {
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return -ENOENT;
|
2014-05-18 10:50:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-17 02:39:17 +00:00
|
|
|
aio_context = bdrv_get_aio_context(bs);
|
|
|
|
aio_context_acquire(aio_context);
|
2019-01-17 19:36:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-02-24 14:29:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!arg->has_writable) {
|
|
|
|
arg->writable = false;
|
2012-11-04 11:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-24 15:26:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (bdrv_is_read_only(bs) && arg->writable) {
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
2020-09-24 15:26:53 +00:00
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Cannot export read-only node as writable");
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2012-11-04 11:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:26:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!exp_args->has_writethrough) {
|
|
|
|
exp_args->writethrough = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = nbd_export_new(exp, bs, arg->name, arg->description, arg->bitmap,
|
2020-02-24 14:29:58 +00:00
|
|
|
!arg->writable, !arg->writable,
|
2020-09-24 15:26:56 +00:00
|
|
|
exp_args->writethrough, errp);
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
2019-09-17 02:39:17 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2015-02-25 18:08:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
2019-09-17 02:39:17 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
aio_context_release(aio_context);
|
2020-09-24 15:27:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2020-09-24 15:26:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:27:01 +00:00
|
|
|
void qmp_nbd_server_add(NbdServerAddOptions *arg, Error **errp)
|
2020-09-24 15:26:50 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-24 15:26:53 +00:00
|
|
|
BlockExport *export;
|
|
|
|
BlockDriverState *bs;
|
|
|
|
BlockBackend *on_eject_blk;
|
2020-09-24 15:27:01 +00:00
|
|
|
BlockExportOptions *export_opts;
|
2020-09-24 15:26:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bs = bdrv_lookup_bs(arg->device, arg->device, errp);
|
|
|
|
if (!bs) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:27:01 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* block-export-add would default to the node-name, but we may have to use
|
|
|
|
* the device name as a default here for compatibility.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!arg->has_name) {
|
|
|
|
arg->name = arg->device;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
export_opts = g_new(BlockExportOptions, 1);
|
|
|
|
*export_opts = (BlockExportOptions) {
|
|
|
|
.type = BLOCK_EXPORT_TYPE_NBD,
|
2020-09-24 15:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
.id = g_strdup(arg->name),
|
2020-09-24 15:27:01 +00:00
|
|
|
.node_name = g_strdup(bdrv_get_node_name(bs)),
|
|
|
|
.u.nbd = {
|
|
|
|
.has_name = true,
|
|
|
|
.name = g_strdup(arg->name),
|
|
|
|
.has_description = arg->has_description,
|
|
|
|
.description = g_strdup(arg->description),
|
|
|
|
.has_writable = arg->has_writable,
|
|
|
|
.writable = arg->writable,
|
|
|
|
.has_bitmap = arg->has_bitmap,
|
|
|
|
.bitmap = g_strdup(arg->bitmap),
|
|
|
|
},
|
2020-09-24 15:26:50 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
2020-09-24 15:26:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* nbd-server-add doesn't complain when a read-only device should be
|
|
|
|
* exported as writable, but simply downgrades it. This is an error with
|
|
|
|
* block-export-add.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (bdrv_is_read_only(bs)) {
|
2020-09-24 15:27:01 +00:00
|
|
|
export_opts->u.nbd.has_writable = true;
|
|
|
|
export_opts->u.nbd.writable = false;
|
2020-09-24 15:26:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:27:01 +00:00
|
|
|
export = blk_exp_add(export_opts, errp);
|
2020-09-24 15:26:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!export) {
|
2020-09-24 15:27:01 +00:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2020-09-24 15:26:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* nbd-server-add removes the export when the named BlockBackend used for
|
|
|
|
* @device goes away.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
on_eject_blk = blk_by_name(arg->device);
|
|
|
|
if (on_eject_blk) {
|
|
|
|
nbd_export_set_on_eject_blk(export, on_eject_blk);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-24 15:27:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_BlockExportOptions(export_opts);
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-19 13:57:16 +00:00
|
|
|
void qmp_nbd_server_remove(const char *name,
|
|
|
|
bool has_mode, NbdServerRemoveMode mode,
|
|
|
|
Error **errp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
NBDExport *exp;
|
2019-09-17 02:39:17 +00:00
|
|
|
AioContext *aio_context;
|
2018-01-19 13:57:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!nbd_server) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "NBD server not running");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
exp = nbd_export_find(name);
|
|
|
|
if (exp == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Export '%s' is not found", name);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!has_mode) {
|
|
|
|
mode = NBD_SERVER_REMOVE_MODE_SAFE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-17 02:39:17 +00:00
|
|
|
aio_context = nbd_export_aio_context(exp);
|
|
|
|
aio_context_acquire(aio_context);
|
2018-01-19 13:57:16 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_export_remove(exp, mode, errp);
|
2019-09-17 02:39:17 +00:00
|
|
|
aio_context_release(aio_context);
|
2018-01-19 13:57:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
void qmp_nbd_server_stop(Error **errp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-01-11 19:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!nbd_server) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "NBD server not running");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 15:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
blk_exp_close_all_type(BLOCK_EXPORT_TYPE_NBD);
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-10 18:41:14 +00:00
|
|
|
nbd_server_free(nbd_server);
|
|
|
|
nbd_server = NULL;
|
2012-08-22 14:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|