linux/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c
Herbert Xu 57ead1bf1c crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - Rewrite skcipher walker loop
An often overlooked aspect of the skcipher walker API is that an
error is not just indicated by a non-zero return value, but by the
fact that walk->nbytes is zero.

Thus it is an error to call skcipher_walk_done after getting back
walk->nbytes == 0 from the previous interaction with the walker.

This is because when walk->nbytes is zero the walker is left in
an undefined state and any further calls to it may try to free
uninitialised stack memory.

The arm64 ccm code has to deal with zero-length messages, and
it needs to process data even when walk->nbytes == 0 is returned.
It doesn't have this bug because there is an explicit check for
walk->nbytes != 0 prior to the skcipher_walk_done call.

However, the loop is still sufficiently different from the usual
layout and it appears to have been copied into other code which
then ended up with this bug.  This patch rewrites it to follow the
usual convention of checking walk->nbytes.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2023-02-10 17:20:19 +08:00

296 lines
7.2 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* aes-ccm-glue.c - AES-CCM transform for ARMv8 with Crypto Extensions
*
* Copyright (C) 2013 - 2017 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
*/
#include <asm/neon.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include "aes-ce-setkey.h"
static int num_rounds(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx)
{
/*
* # of rounds specified by AES:
* 128 bit key 10 rounds
* 192 bit key 12 rounds
* 256 bit key 14 rounds
* => n byte key => 6 + (n/4) rounds
*/
return 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
}
asmlinkage u32 ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes,
u32 macp, u32 const rk[], u32 rounds);
asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 cbytes,
u32 const rk[], u32 rounds, u8 mac[],
u8 ctr[]);
asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 cbytes,
u32 const rk[], u32 rounds, u8 mac[],
u8 ctr[]);
asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_final(u8 mac[], u8 const ctr[], u32 const rk[],
u32 rounds);
static int ccm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
return ce_aes_expandkey(ctx, in_key, key_len);
}
static int ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
{
if ((authsize & 1) || authsize < 4)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static int ccm_init_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 maciv[], u32 msglen)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
__be32 *n = (__be32 *)&maciv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 8];
u32 l = req->iv[0] + 1;
/* verify that CCM dimension 'L' is set correctly in the IV */
if (l < 2 || l > 8)
return -EINVAL;
/* verify that msglen can in fact be represented in L bytes */
if (l < 4 && msglen >> (8 * l))
return -EOVERFLOW;
/*
* Even if the CCM spec allows L values of up to 8, the Linux cryptoapi
* uses a u32 type to represent msglen so the top 4 bytes are always 0.
*/
n[0] = 0;
n[1] = cpu_to_be32(msglen);
memcpy(maciv, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - l);
/*
* Meaning of byte 0 according to CCM spec (RFC 3610/NIST 800-38C)
* - bits 0..2 : max # of bytes required to represent msglen, minus 1
* (already set by caller)
* - bits 3..5 : size of auth tag (1 => 4 bytes, 2 => 6 bytes, etc)
* - bit 6 : indicates presence of authenticate-only data
*/
maciv[0] |= (crypto_aead_authsize(aead) - 2) << 2;
if (req->assoclen)
maciv[0] |= 0x40;
memset(&req->iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - l], 0, l);
return 0;
}
static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[])
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
struct __packed { __be16 l; __be32 h; u16 len; } ltag;
struct scatter_walk walk;
u32 len = req->assoclen;
u32 macp = 0;
/* prepend the AAD with a length tag */
if (len < 0xff00) {
ltag.l = cpu_to_be16(len);
ltag.len = 2;
} else {
ltag.l = cpu_to_be16(0xfffe);
put_unaligned_be32(len, &ltag.h);
ltag.len = 6;
}
macp = ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, (u8 *)&ltag, ltag.len, macp,
ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx));
scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->src);
do {
u32 n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len);
u8 *p;
if (!n) {
scatterwalk_start(&walk, sg_next(walk.sg));
n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len);
}
n = min_t(u32, n, SZ_4K); /* yield NEON at least every 4k */
p = scatterwalk_map(&walk);
macp = ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, p, n, macp, ctx->key_enc,
num_rounds(ctx));
if (len / SZ_4K > (len - n) / SZ_4K) {
kernel_neon_end();
kernel_neon_begin();
}
len -= n;
scatterwalk_unmap(p);
scatterwalk_advance(&walk, n);
scatterwalk_done(&walk, 0, len);
} while (len);
}
static int ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
struct skcipher_walk walk;
u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u32 len = req->cryptlen;
int err;
err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len);
if (err)
return err;
/* preserve the original iv for the final round */
memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, false);
kernel_neon_begin();
if (req->assoclen)
ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac);
while (walk.nbytes) {
u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
bool final = walk.nbytes == walk.total;
if (final)
tail = 0;
ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc,
num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv);
if (!final)
kernel_neon_end();
err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail);
if (!final)
kernel_neon_begin();
}
ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx));
kernel_neon_end();
/* copy authtag to end of dst */
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(mac, req->dst, req->assoclen + req->cryptlen,
crypto_aead_authsize(aead), 1);
return err;
}
static int ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
struct skcipher_walk walk;
u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u32 len = req->cryptlen - authsize;
int err;
err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len);
if (err)
return err;
/* preserve the original iv for the final round */
memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, false);
kernel_neon_begin();
if (req->assoclen)
ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac);
while (walk.nbytes) {
u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
bool final = walk.nbytes == walk.total;
if (final)
tail = 0;
ce_aes_ccm_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc,
num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv);
if (!final)
kernel_neon_end();
err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail);
if (!final)
kernel_neon_begin();
}
ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx));
kernel_neon_end();
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
/* compare calculated auth tag with the stored one */
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(buf, req->src,
req->assoclen + req->cryptlen - authsize,
authsize, 0);
if (crypto_memneq(mac, buf, authsize))
return -EBADMSG;
return 0;
}
static struct aead_alg ccm_aes_alg = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "ccm(aes)",
.cra_driver_name = "ccm-aes-ce",
.cra_priority = 300,
.cra_blocksize = 1,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
},
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.setkey = ccm_setkey,
.setauthsize = ccm_setauthsize,
.encrypt = ccm_encrypt,
.decrypt = ccm_decrypt,
};
static int __init aes_mod_init(void)
{
if (!cpu_have_named_feature(AES))
return -ENODEV;
return crypto_register_aead(&ccm_aes_alg);
}
static void __exit aes_mod_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_aead(&ccm_aes_alg);
}
module_init(aes_mod_init);
module_exit(aes_mod_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Synchronous AES in CCM mode using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ccm(aes)");