linux/mm/page_poison.c
Andrey Konovalov aa1ef4d7b3 kasan, mm: reset tags when accessing metadata
Kernel allocator code accesses metadata for slab objects, that may lie
out-of-bounds of the object itself, or be accessed when an object is
freed.  Such accesses trigger tag faults and lead to false-positive
reports with hardware tag-based KASAN.

Software KASAN modes disable instrumentation for allocator code via
KASAN_SANITIZE Makefile macro, and rely on kasan_enable/disable_current()
annotations which are used to ignore KASAN reports.

With hardware tag-based KASAN neither of those options are available, as
it doesn't use compiler instrumetation, no tag faults are ignored, and MTE
is disabled after the first one.

Instead, reset tags when accessing metadata (currently only for SLUB).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a0f3cefbc49f34c843b664110842de4db28179d0.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 12:55:08 -08:00

102 lines
2.3 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/page_ext.h>
#include <linux/poison.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/kasan.h>
bool _page_poisoning_enabled_early;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(_page_poisoning_enabled_early);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(_page_poisoning_enabled);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(_page_poisoning_enabled);
static int __init early_page_poison_param(char *buf)
{
return kstrtobool(buf, &_page_poisoning_enabled_early);
}
early_param("page_poison", early_page_poison_param);
static void poison_page(struct page *page)
{
void *addr = kmap_atomic(page);
/* KASAN still think the page is in-use, so skip it. */
kasan_disable_current();
memset(kasan_reset_tag(addr), PAGE_POISON, PAGE_SIZE);
kasan_enable_current();
kunmap_atomic(addr);
}
void __kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int n)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
poison_page(page + i);
}
static bool single_bit_flip(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
{
unsigned char error = a ^ b;
return error && !(error & (error - 1));
}
static void check_poison_mem(unsigned char *mem, size_t bytes)
{
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(ratelimit, 5 * HZ, 10);
unsigned char *start;
unsigned char *end;
start = memchr_inv(mem, PAGE_POISON, bytes);
if (!start)
return;
for (end = mem + bytes - 1; end > start; end--) {
if (*end != PAGE_POISON)
break;
}
if (!__ratelimit(&ratelimit))
return;
else if (start == end && single_bit_flip(*start, PAGE_POISON))
pr_err("pagealloc: single bit error\n");
else
pr_err("pagealloc: memory corruption\n");
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, start,
end - start + 1, 1);
dump_stack();
}
static void unpoison_page(struct page *page)
{
void *addr;
addr = kmap_atomic(page);
/*
* Page poisoning when enabled poisons each and every page
* that is freed to buddy. Thus no extra check is done to
* see if a page was poisoned.
*/
check_poison_mem(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
kunmap_atomic(addr);
}
void __kernel_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, int n)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
unpoison_page(page + i);
}
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
void __kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable)
{
/* This function does nothing, all work is done via poison pages */
}
#endif