linux/security/apparmor/task.c
John Johansen 9fcf78cca1 apparmor: update domain transitions that are subsets of confinement at nnp
Domain transition so far have been largely blocked by no new privs,
unless the transition has been provably a subset of the previous
confinement. There was a couple problems with the previous
implementations,

- transitions that weren't explicitly a stack but resulted in a subset
  of confinement were disallowed

- confinement subsets were only calculated from the previous
  confinement instead of the confinement being enforced at the time of
  no new privs, so transitions would have to get progressively
  tighter.

Fix this by detecting and storing a reference to the task's
confinement at the "time" no new privs is set. This reference is then
used to determine whether a transition is a subsystem of the
confinement at the time no new privs was set.

Unfortunately the implementation is less than ideal in that we have to
detect no new privs after the fact when a task attempts a domain
transition. This is adequate for the currently but will not work in a
stacking situation where no new privs could be conceivably be set in
both the "host" and in the container.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-02-09 11:30:01 -08:00

184 lines
4.3 KiB
C

/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor task related definitions and mediation
*
* Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*
* TODO
* If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old
* cred or task context but instead creates a new one. Ideally the task
* should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
*/
#include "include/cred.h"
#include "include/task.h"
/**
* aa_get_task_label - Get another task's label
* @task: task to query (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: counted reference to @task's label
*/
struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct aa_label *p;
rcu_read_lock();
p = aa_get_newest_label(__aa_task_raw_label(task));
rcu_read_unlock();
return p;
}
/**
* aa_replace_current_label - replace the current tasks label
* @label: new label (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: 0 or error on failure
*/
int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
{
struct aa_label *old = aa_current_raw_label();
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct cred *new;
AA_BUG(!label);
if (old == label)
return 0;
if (current_cred() != current_real_cred())
return -EBUSY;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
if (ctx->nnp && label_is_stale(ctx->nnp)) {
struct aa_label *tmp = ctx->nnp;
ctx->nnp = aa_get_newest_label(tmp);
aa_put_label(tmp);
}
if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(old) != labels_ns(label)))
/*
* if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace
* clear out context state
*/
aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
/*
* be careful switching cred label, when racing replacement it
* is possible that the cred labels's->proxy->label is the reference
* keeping @label valid, so make sure to get its reference before
* dropping the reference on the cred's label
*/
aa_get_label(label);
aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
cred_label(new) = label;
commit_creds(new);
return 0;
}
/**
* aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec
* @label: system label to set at exec (MAYBE NULL to clear value)
* @stack: whether stacking should be done
* Returns: 0 or error on failure
*/
int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack)
{
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
aa_get_label(label);
aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
ctx->onexec = label;
ctx->token = stack;
return 0;
}
/**
* aa_set_current_hat - set the current tasks hat
* @label: label to set as the current hat (NOT NULL)
* @token: token value that must be specified to change from the hat
*
* Do switch of tasks hat. If the task is currently in a hat
* validate the token to match.
*
* Returns: 0 or error on failure
*/
int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
{
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct cred *new;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
AA_BUG(!label);
if (!ctx->previous) {
/* transfer refcount */
ctx->previous = cred_label(new);
ctx->token = token;
} else if (ctx->token == token) {
aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
} else {
/* previous_profile && ctx->token != token */
abort_creds(new);
return -EACCES;
}
cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(label);
/* clear exec on switching context */
aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
ctx->onexec = NULL;
commit_creds(new);
return 0;
}
/**
* aa_restore_previous_label - exit from hat context restoring previous label
* @token: the token that must be matched to exit hat context
*
* Attempt to return out of a hat to the previous label. The token
* must match the stored token value.
*
* Returns: 0 or error of failure
*/
int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
{
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct cred *new;
if (ctx->token != token)
return -EACCES;
/* ignore restores when there is no saved label */
if (!ctx->previous)
return 0;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
AA_BUG(!cred_label(new));
/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
commit_creds(new);
return 0;
}