Daniel Borkmann 801c6058d1 bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation ... The current implemented mechanisms to mitigate data disclosure under speculation mainly address stack and map value oob access from the speculative domain. However, Piotr discovered that uninitialized BPF stack is not protected yet, and thus old data from the kernel stack, potentially including addresses of kernel structures, could still be extracted from that 512 bytes large window. The BPF stack is special compared to map values since it's not zero initialized for every program invocation, whereas map values /are/ zero initialized upon their initial allocation and thus cannot leak any prior data in either domain. In the non-speculative domain, the verifier ensures that every stack slot read must have a prior stack slot write by the BPF program to avoid such data leaking issue. However, this is not enough: for example, when the pointer arithmetic operation moves the stack pointer from the last valid stack offset to the first valid offset, the sanitation logic allows for any intermediate offsets during speculative execution, which could then be used to extract any restricted stack content via side-channel. Given for unprivileged stack pointer arithmetic the use of unknown but bounded scalars is generally forbidden, we can simply turn the register-based arithmetic operation into an immediate-based arithmetic operation without the need for masking. This also gives the benefit of reducing the needed instructions for the operation. Given after the work in 7fedb63a83 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask"), the aux->alu_limit already holds the final immediate value for the offset register with the known scalar. Thus, a simple mov of the immediate to AX register with using AX as the source for the original instruction is sufficient and possible now in this case. Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>		2021-05-03 11:56:23 +02:00
..
preload
arraymap.c	bpf: Add batched ops support for percpu array	2021-04-28 01:17:45 +02:00
bpf_inode_storage.c
bpf_iter.c
bpf_local_storage.c
bpf_lru_list.c
bpf_lru_list.h
bpf_lsm.c	Networking changes for 5.13.	2021-04-29 11:57:23 -07:00
bpf_struct_ops.c
bpf_struct_ops_types.h
bpf_task_storage.c
btf.c
cgroup.c
core.c
cpumap.c
devmap.c
disasm.c
disasm.h
dispatcher.c
hashtab.c
helpers.c
inode.c
local_storage.c
lpm_trie.c
Makefile
map_in_map.c
map_in_map.h
map_iter.c
net_namespace.c
offload.c
percpu_freelist.c
percpu_freelist.h
prog_iter.c
queue_stack_maps.c
reuseport_array.c
ringbuf.c
stackmap.c
syscall.c
sysfs_btf.c
task_iter.c
tnum.c
trampoline.c
verifier.c	bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation	2021-05-03 11:56:23 +02:00