linux/kernel/stackleak.c
Alexander Popov feee1b8c49 gcc-plugins/stackleak: Use asm instrumentation to avoid useless register saving
The kernel code instrumentation in stackleak gcc plugin works in two stages.
At first, stack tracking is added to GIMPLE representation of every function
(except some special cases). And later, when stack frame size info is
available, stack tracking is removed from the RTL representation of the
functions with small stack frame. There is an unwanted side-effect for these
functions: some of them do useless work with caller-saved registers.

As an example of such case, proc_sys_write without() instrumentation:
    55                      push   %rbp
    41 b8 01 00 00 00       mov    $0x1,%r8d
    48 89 e5                mov    %rsp,%rbp
    e8 11 ff ff ff          callq  ffffffff81284610 <proc_sys_call_handler>
    5d                      pop    %rbp
    c3                      retq
    0f 1f 44 00 00          nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
    66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00    nopw   %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
    00 00 00

proc_sys_write() with instrumentation:
    55                      push   %rbp
    48 89 e5                mov    %rsp,%rbp
    41 56                   push   %r14
    41 55                   push   %r13
    41 54                   push   %r12
    53                      push   %rbx
    49 89 f4                mov    %rsi,%r12
    48 89 fb                mov    %rdi,%rbx
    49 89 d5                mov    %rdx,%r13
    49 89 ce                mov    %rcx,%r14
    4c 89 f1                mov    %r14,%rcx
    4c 89 ea                mov    %r13,%rdx
    4c 89 e6                mov    %r12,%rsi
    48 89 df                mov    %rbx,%rdi
    41 b8 01 00 00 00       mov    $0x1,%r8d
    e8 f2 fe ff ff          callq  ffffffff81298e80 <proc_sys_call_handler>
    5b                      pop    %rbx
    41 5c                   pop    %r12
    41 5d                   pop    %r13
    41 5e                   pop    %r14
    5d                      pop    %rbp
    c3                      retq
    66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00    nopw   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
    00 00

Let's improve the instrumentation to avoid this:

1. Make stackleak_track_stack() save all register that it works with.
Use no_caller_saved_registers attribute for that function. This attribute
is available for x86_64 and i386 starting from gcc-7.

2. Insert calling stackleak_track_stack() in asm:
  asm volatile("call stackleak_track_stack" :: "r" (current_stack_pointer))
Here we use ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT trick from arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h.
The input constraint is taken into account during gcc shrink-wrapping
optimization. It is needed to be sure that stackleak_track_stack() call is
inserted after the prologue of the containing function, when the stack
frame is prepared.

This work is a deep reengineering of the idea described on grsecurity blog
  https://grsecurity.net/resolving_an_unfortunate_stackleak_interaction

Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200624123330.83226-5-alex.popov@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-24 07:48:28 -07:00

127 lines
3.6 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value
* before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature
* ported from grsecurity/PaX.
*
* Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
*
* STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
* reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
*/
#include <linux/stackleak.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass);
int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret = 0;
int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass);
int prev_state = state;
table->data = &state;
table->maxlen = sizeof(int);
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
state = !!state;
if (ret || !write || state == prev_state)
return ret;
if (state)
static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
else
static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n",
state ? "enabled" : "disabled");
return ret;
}
#define skip_erasing() static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass)
#else
#define skip_erasing() false
#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
asmlinkage void notrace stackleak_erase(void)
{
/* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
unsigned int poison_count = 0;
const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
if (skip_erasing())
return;
/* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
kstack_ptr = boundary;
/* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */
while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) {
if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON)
poison_count++;
else
poison_count = 0;
kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long);
}
/*
* One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
* should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y).
*/
if (kstack_ptr == boundary)
kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr;
#endif
/*
* Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from
* 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that
* the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison.
*/
if (on_thread_stack())
boundary = current_stack_pointer;
else
boundary = current_top_of_stack();
while (kstack_ptr < boundary) {
*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON;
kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
}
/* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64;
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(stackleak_erase);
void __used __no_caller_saved_registers notrace stackleak_track_stack(void)
{
unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer;
/*
* Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than
* STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in
* stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH);
/* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */
sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long));
if (sp < current->lowest_stack &&
sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
sizeof(unsigned long)) {
current->lowest_stack = sp;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack);