linux/security/selinux
David Howells 5cd9c58fbe security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()
Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.

__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags.  This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.

This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:

 (1) security_ptrace_may_access().  This passes judgement on whether one
     process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
     PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
     current is the parent.

 (2) security_ptrace_traceme().  This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
     and takes only a pointer to the parent process.  current is the child.

     In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
     the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
     This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().

Of the places that were using __capable():

 (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
     process.  All of these now use has_capability().

 (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
     whether the parent was allowed to trace any process.  As mentioned above,
     these have been split.  For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
     used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.

 (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().

 (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
     after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
     switched and capable() is used instead.

 (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
     receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.

 (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
     whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.

I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-14 22:59:43 +10:00
..
include Revert "SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if present" 2008-07-15 18:32:49 +10:00
ss Revert "SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if present" 2008-07-15 18:32:49 +10:00
avc.c Audit: standardize string audit interfaces 2008-04-28 06:19:22 -04:00
exports.c SELinux: remove redundant exports 2008-04-19 09:52:36 +10:00
hooks.c security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() 2008-08-14 22:59:43 +10:00
Kconfig selinux: introduce permissive types 2008-04-18 20:26:11 +10:00
Makefile SELinux: Add network port SID cache 2008-04-18 20:26:16 +10:00
netif.c SELinux fixups needed for preemptable RCU from -rt 2008-04-22 15:37:23 +10:00
netlabel.c SELinux: netlabel.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups 2008-04-21 19:05:04 +10:00
netlink.c SELinux: netlink.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups 2008-04-21 19:05:05 +10:00
netnode.c SELinux: keep the code clean formating and syntax 2008-07-14 15:01:36 +10:00
netport.c SELinux: keep the code clean formating and syntax 2008-07-14 15:01:36 +10:00
nlmsgtab.c SELinux: nlmsgtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups 2008-04-21 19:05:07 +10:00
selinuxfs.c SELinux: more user friendly unknown handling printk 2008-07-14 15:02:00 +10:00
xfrm.c Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6 2008-04-21 16:01:40 -07:00