Stephen Smalley bbaca6c2e7 [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes ... Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across execve). So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as below. Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing, as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over them. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>		2007-02-14 08:10:00 -08:00
..
keys	[PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h	2007-02-14 08:09:54 -08:00
selinux	[PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes	2007-02-14 08:10:00 -08:00
capability.c
commoncap.c
dummy.c
inode.c	[PATCH] mark struct file_operations const 9	2007-02-12 09:48:46 -08:00
Kconfig
Makefile
root_plug.c
security.c	[PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h	2007-02-14 08:09:54 -08:00