linux/security/apparmor/lsm.c
Joel Granados 74560bb368 lsm: remove the now superfluous sentinel element from ctl_table array
This commit comes at the tail end of a greater effort to remove the
empty elements at the end of the ctl_table arrays (sentinels) which will
reduce the overall build time size of the kernel and run time memory
bloat by ~64 bytes per sentinel (further information Link :
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZO5Yx5JFogGi%2FcBo@bombadil.infradead.org/)

Remove the sentinel from all files under security/ that register a
sysctl table.

Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> # loadpin & yama
Tested-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-04-15 15:00:00 -04:00

2283 lines
59 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
* Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
*/
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <linux/zstd.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/capability.h"
#include "include/cred.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/ipc.h"
#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/label.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/policy_ns.h"
#include "include/procattr.h"
#include "include/mount.h"
#include "include/secid.h"
/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
int apparmor_initialized;
union aa_buffer {
struct list_head list;
DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, buffer);
};
struct aa_local_cache {
unsigned int hold;
unsigned int count;
struct list_head head;
};
#define RESERVE_COUNT 2
static int reserve_count = RESERVE_COUNT;
static int buffer_count;
static LIST_HEAD(aa_global_buffers);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(aa_buffers_lock);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_local_cache, aa_local_buffers);
/*
* LSM hook functions
*/
/*
* put the associated labels
*/
static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
aa_put_label(cred_label(cred));
set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
}
/*
* allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
*/
static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
return 0;
}
/*
* prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block
*/
static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
return 0;
}
/*
* transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
*/
static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
}
static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
{
aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task));
}
static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long clone_flags)
{
struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task);
aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current));
return 0;
}
static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
const struct cred *cred;
int error;
cred = get_task_cred(child);
tracee = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */
tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, cred, tracee,
(mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
: AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
__end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
put_cred(cred);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
const struct cred *cred;
int error;
tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
cred = get_task_cred(parent);
tracer = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */
error = aa_may_ptrace(cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee,
AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
put_cred(cred);
__end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
return error;
}
/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
static int apparmor_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
struct aa_label *label;
const struct cred *cred;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(target);
label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
/*
* cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
* initialize effective and permitted.
*/
if (!unconfined(label)) {
struct aa_profile *profile;
struct label_it i;
label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
struct aa_ruleset *rules;
if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
continue;
rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
*effective = cap_intersect(*effective,
rules->caps.allow);
*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted,
rules->caps.allow);
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
aa_put_label(label);
return 0;
}
static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
if (!unconfined(label))
error = aa_capable(cred, label, cap, opts);
aa_put_label(label);
return error;
}
/**
* common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
* @op: operation being checked
* @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
* @mask: requested permissions mask
* @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
struct path_cond *cond)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label))
error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, 0, mask,
cond);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
/**
* common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond
* @op: operation being checked
* @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
* @mask: requested permissions mask
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
{
vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(path->mnt),
d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
struct path_cond cond = {
vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
};
if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry))
return 0;
return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
}
/**
* common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
* @op: operation being checked
* @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
* @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
* @mask: requested permissions mask
* @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
struct path_cond *cond)
{
struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
}
/**
* common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
* @op: operation being checked
* @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
* @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
* @mask: requested permission mask
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct path_cond cond = { };
vfsuid_t vfsuid;
if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
return 0;
vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(dir->mnt), inode);
cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
}
/**
* common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
* @op: operation being checked
* @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
* @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
* @mask: request permission mask
* @mode: created file mode
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
{
struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry))
return 0;
return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
}
static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
}
static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
umode_t mode)
{
return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
S_IFDIR);
}
static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
}
static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
{
return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
}
static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
{
return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR);
}
static int apparmor_file_truncate(struct file *file)
{
return apparmor_path_truncate(&file->f_path);
}
static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *old_name)
{
return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
S_IFLNK);
}
static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
return 0;
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label))
error = aa_path_link(current_cred(), label, old_dentry, new_dir,
new_dentry);
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
const unsigned int flags)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
return 0;
if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !path_mediated_fs(new_dentry))
return 0;
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label)) {
struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(old_dir->mnt);
vfsuid_t vfsuid;
struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
.dentry = old_dentry };
struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
.dentry = new_dentry };
struct path_cond cond = {
.mode = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
};
vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
struct path_cond cond_exchange = {
.mode = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_mode,
};
vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
label, &new_path, 0,
MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
&cond_exchange);
if (!error)
error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
label, &old_path,
0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond_exchange);
}
if (!error)
error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
label, &old_path, 0,
MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
&cond);
if (!error)
error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
label, &new_path,
0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
}
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
{
return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
}
static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
{
return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
}
static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR);
}
static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
{
struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file);
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
return 0;
/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
* Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
* implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
* actually execute the image.
*
* Illogically, FMODE_EXEC is in f_flags, not f_mode.
*/
if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) {
fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
return 0;
}
label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred);
if (!unconfined(label)) {
struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
vfsuid_t vfsuid;
struct path_cond cond = {
.mode = inode->i_mode,
};
vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, file->f_cred,
label, &file->f_path, 0,
aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
}
aa_put_label(label);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return 0;
}
static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
{
struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
if (ctx)
aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
}
static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask,
bool in_atomic)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
/* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry)
return -EACCES;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, mask, in_atomic);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file)
{
return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file),
false);
}
static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask, false);
}
static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
{
u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
mask |= MAY_WRITE;
return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask, false);
}
static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags, bool in_atomic)
{
int mask = 0;
if (!file || !file_ctx(file))
return 0;
if (prot & PROT_READ)
mask |= MAY_READ;
/*
* Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
* write back to the files
*/
if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
mask |= MAY_WRITE;
if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
return common_file_perm(op, file, mask, in_atomic);
}
static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
{
return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0,
false);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
static const char *audit_uring_mask(u32 mask)
{
if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL)
return "sqpoll";
if (mask & AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED)
return "override_creds";
return "";
}
static void audit_uring_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va);
if (ad->request & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " requested=\"%s\"",
audit_uring_mask(ad->request));
if (ad->denied & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " denied=\"%s\"",
audit_uring_mask(ad->denied));
}
}
if (ad->uring.target) {
audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=");
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label),
ad->uring.target,
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
}
static int profile_uring(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
struct aa_label *new, int cap,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
unsigned int state;
struct aa_ruleset *rules;
int error = 0;
AA_BUG(!profile);
rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list);
state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_IO_URING);
if (state) {
struct aa_perms perms = { };
if (new) {
aa_label_match(profile, rules, new, state,
false, request, &perms);
} else {
perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
}
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
error = aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
audit_uring_cb);
}
return error;
}
/**
* apparmor_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
* @new: the target creds
*
* Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
* to service an io_uring operation.
*/
static int apparmor_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
struct aa_label *label;
int error;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING,
OP_URING_OVERRIDE);
ad.uring.target = cred_label(new);
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED,
cred_label(new), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad));
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
/**
* apparmor_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
*
* Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
* kernel polling thread.
*/
static int apparmor_uring_sqpoll(void)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
struct aa_label *label;
int error;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING,
OP_URING_SQPOLL);
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL,
NULL, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad));
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
/* Discard magic */
if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label)) {
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags,
data);
else if (flags & MS_BIND)
error = aa_bind_mount(current_cred(), label, path,
dev_name, flags);
else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
MS_UNBINDABLE))
error = aa_mount_change_type(current_cred(), label,
path, flags);
else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
error = aa_move_mount_old(current_cred(), label, path,
dev_name);
else
error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name,
path, type, flags, data);
}
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
const struct path *to_path)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label))
error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, from_path,
to_path);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label))
error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
const struct path *new_path)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (!unconfined(label))
error = aa_pivotroot(current_cred(), label, old_path, new_path);
aa_put_label(label);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *lx,
u32 *size, u32 flags)
{
int error = -ENOENT;
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct aa_label *label = NULL;
char *value = NULL;
switch (attr) {
case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(current_cred()));
break;
case LSM_ATTR_PREV:
if (ctx->previous)
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
break;
case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
if (ctx->onexec)
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
break;
default:
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
if (label) {
error = aa_getprocattr(label, &value, false);
if (error > 0)
error = lsm_fill_user_ctx(lx, size, value, error,
LSM_ID_APPARMOR, 0);
kfree(value);
}
aa_put_label(label);
if (error < 0)
return error;
return 1;
}
static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name,
char **value)
{
int error = -ENOENT;
/* released below */
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct aa_label *label = NULL;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous)
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
else
error = -EINVAL;
if (label)
error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, true);
aa_put_label(label);
put_cred(cred);
return error;
}
static int do_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size)
{
char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE,
OP_SETPROCATTR);
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
/* null terminate */
largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!args)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(args, value, size);
args[size] = '\0';
}
error = -EINVAL;
args = strim(args);
command = strsep(&args, " ");
if (!args)
goto out;
args = skip_spaces(args);
if (!*args)
goto out;
arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) {
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
AA_CHANGE_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) {
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK);
} else
goto fail;
} else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) {
if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC);
else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0)
error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC |
AA_CHANGE_STACK));
else
goto fail;
} else
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
goto fail;
if (!error)
error = size;
out:
kfree(largs);
return error;
fail:
ad.subj_label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT)
ad.info = "current";
else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC)
ad.info = "exec";
else
ad.info = "invalid";
ad.error = error = -EINVAL;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &ad, NULL);
end_current_label_crit_section(ad.subj_label);
goto out;
}
static int apparmor_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
u32 size, u32 flags)
{
int rc;
if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT && attr != LSM_ATTR_EXEC)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
rc = do_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len);
if (rc > 0)
return 0;
return rc;
}
static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
if (attr)
return do_setattr(attr, value, size);
return -EINVAL;
}
/**
* apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
* @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
*/
static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred);
/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
(unconfined(new_label)))
return;
aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
/* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
__aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label);
}
/**
* apparmor_bprm_committed_creds() - do cleanup after new creds committed
* @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
*/
static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
/* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
return;
}
static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
{
struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
*secid = label->secid;
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
}
static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
*secid = label->secid;
aa_put_label(label);
}
static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
int error = 0;
if (!unconfined(label))
error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task,
resource, new_rlim);
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
const struct cred *tc;
struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
int error;
tc = get_task_cred(target);
tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(tc);
if (cred) {
/*
* Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
*/
cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
error = aa_may_signal(cred, cl, tc, tl, sig);
aa_put_label(cl);
} else {
cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), cl, tc, tl, sig);
__end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
}
aa_put_label(tl);
put_cred(tc);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
{
struct aa_label *label;
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_NS,
OP_USERNS_CREATE);
ad.subj_cred = current_cred();
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label)) {
error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
aa_profile_ns_perm(profile, &ad,
AA_USERNS_CREATE));
}
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
sk->sk_security = ctx;
return 0;
}
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
sk->sk_security = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
kfree(ctx);
}
/**
* apparmor_sk_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
* @sk: sock to have security cloned
* @newsk: sock getting clone
*/
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
if (new->label)
aa_put_label(new->label);
new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
if (new->peer)
aa_put_label(new->peer);
new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
}
static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
error = af_select(family,
create_perm(label, family, type, protocol),
aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label,
OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE,
family, type, protocol));
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
* @sock: socket that is being setup
* @family: family of socket being created
* @type: type of the socket
* @ptotocol: protocol of the socket
* @kern: socket is a special kernel socket
*
* Note:
* - kernel sockets labeled kernel_t used to use unconfined
* - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
* sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
* sock_graft.
*/
static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
struct aa_label *label;
if (kern) {
label = aa_get_label(kernel_t);
} else
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
}
aa_put_label(label);
return 0;
}
static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(!address);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk));
}
static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(!address);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk));
}
static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
listen_perm(sock, backlog),
aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk));
}
/*
* Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
* has not been done.
*/
static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(!newsock);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
accept_perm(sock, newsock),
aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk));
}
static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(!msg);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size),
aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
}
static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
}
static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
{
return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
}
/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
sock_perm(op, request, sock),
aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
}
static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
{
return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
}
static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
{
return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
}
/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
int level, int optname)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname),
aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
}
static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
int optname)
{
return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
level, optname);
}
static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
int optname)
{
return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
level, optname);
}
static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
/**
* apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
* @sk: sk to associate @skb with
* @skb: skb to check for perms
*
* Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
*
* dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
* to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb()
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE,
skb->secmark, sk);
}
#endif
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
* @sock: socket that we are trying to get the peer context of
* @optval: output - buffer to copy peer name to
* @optlen: output - size of copied name in @optval
* @len: size of @optval buffer
* Returns: 0 on success, -errno of failure
*
* Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
unsigned int len)
{
char *name = NULL;
int slen, error = 0;
struct aa_label *label;
struct aa_label *peer;
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
error = PTR_ERR(peer);
goto done;
}
slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
/* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
if (slen < 0) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
if (slen > len) {
error = -ERANGE;
goto done_len;
}
if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, name, slen))
error = -EFAULT;
done_len:
if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen)))
error = -EFAULT;
done:
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
kfree(name);
return error;
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
* @sock: the peer socket
* @skb: packet data
* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
*
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
{
/* TODO: requires secid support */
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
* @sk: child sock
* @parent: parent socket
*
* Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
* just set sk security information off of current creating process label
* Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
* instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
* socket is shared by different tasks.
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT,
skb->secmark, sk);
}
#endif
/*
* The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_label.
*/
struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_label *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
};
static const struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid = {
.name = "apparmor",
.id = LSM_ID_APPARMOR,
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, apparmor_move_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, apparmor_file_truncate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, apparmor_getselfattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, apparmor_setselfattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create),
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free),
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx),
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, apparmor_uring_override_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, apparmor_uring_sqpoll),
#endif
};
/*
* AppArmor sysfs module parameters
*/
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
.set = param_set_aabool,
.get = param_get_aabool
};
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
.set = param_set_aauint,
.get = param_get_aauint
};
static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val,
const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer,
const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aacompressionlevel param_check_int
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aacompressionlevel = {
.set = param_set_aacompressionlevel,
.get = param_get_aacompressionlevel
};
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
.set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
.get = param_get_aalockpolicy
};
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
* We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
*/
/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
&aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
#endif
/* whether policy exactly as loaded is retained for debug and checkpointing */
bool aa_g_export_binary = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
module_param_named(export_binary, aa_g_export_binary, aabool, 0600);
#endif
/* policy loaddata compression level */
int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = AA_DEFAULT_CLEVEL;
module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level,
aacompressionlevel, 0400);
/* Debug mode */
bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Audit mode */
enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
&aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
* provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
*/
bool aa_g_audit_header = true;
module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* lock out loading/removal of policy
* TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
* load policy, if lock_policy is set
*/
bool aa_g_lock_policy;
module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Syscall logging mode */
bool aa_g_logsyscall;
module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
* on the loaded policy is done.
* DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
* that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
*/
bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD);
module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aaintbool param_check_int
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = {
.set = param_set_aaintbool,
.get = param_get_aaintbool
};
/* Boot time disable flag */
static int apparmor_enabled __ro_after_init = 1;
module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444);
static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enabled;
int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
if (!error)
apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int error;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
/* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */
if (apparmor_initialized)
return -EPERM;
error = param_set_uint(val, kp);
aa_g_path_max = max_t(uint32_t, aa_g_path_max, sizeof(union aa_buffer));
pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max);
return error;
}
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
}
/* Can only be set before AppArmor is initialized (i.e. on boot cmdline). */
static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
struct kernel_param kp_local;
bool value;
int error;
if (apparmor_initialized)
return -EPERM;
/* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
kp_local.arg = &value;
error = param_set_bool(val, &kp_local);
if (!error)
*((int *)kp->arg) = *((bool *)kp_local.arg);
return error;
}
/*
* To avoid changing /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled from Y/N to
* 1/0, this converts the "int that is actually bool" back to bool for
* display in the /sys filesystem, while keeping it "int" for the LSM
* infrastructure.
*/
static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
struct kernel_param kp_local;
bool value;
/* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
kp_local.arg = &value;
return param_get_bool(buffer, &kp_local);
}
static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val,
const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int error;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (apparmor_initialized)
return -EPERM;
error = param_set_int(val, kp);
aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = clamp(aa_g_rawdata_compression_level,
AA_MIN_CLEVEL, AA_MAX_CLEVEL);
pr_info("AppArmor: policy rawdata compression level set to %d\n",
aa_g_rawdata_compression_level);
return error;
}
static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer,
const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
return param_get_int(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
}
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int i;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (!val)
return -EINVAL;
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
i = match_string(audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, val);
if (i < 0)
return -EINVAL;
aa_g_audit = i;
return 0;
}
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
}
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int i;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (!val)
return -EINVAL;
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
i = match_string(aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX,
val);
if (i < 0)
return -EINVAL;
aa_g_profile_mode = i;
return 0;
}
char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic)
{
union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
struct aa_local_cache *cache;
bool try_again = true;
gfp_t flags = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN);
/* use per cpu cached buffers first */
cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
if (!list_empty(&cache->head)) {
aa_buf = list_first_entry(&cache->head, union aa_buffer, list);
list_del(&aa_buf->list);
cache->hold--;
cache->count--;
put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
return &aa_buf->buffer[0];
}
put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
if (!spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) {
cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
cache->hold += 1;
put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
} else {
cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
}
retry:
if (buffer_count > reserve_count ||
(in_atomic && !list_empty(&aa_global_buffers))) {
aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer,
list);
list_del(&aa_buf->list);
buffer_count--;
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
return aa_buf->buffer;
}
if (in_atomic) {
/*
* out of reserve buffers and in atomic context so increase
* how many buffers to keep in reserve
*/
reserve_count++;
flags = GFP_ATOMIC;
}
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
if (!in_atomic)
might_sleep();
aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, flags);
if (!aa_buf) {
if (try_again) {
try_again = false;
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
goto retry;
}
pr_warn_once("AppArmor: Failed to allocate a memory buffer.\n");
return NULL;
}
return aa_buf->buffer;
}
void aa_put_buffer(char *buf)
{
union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
struct aa_local_cache *cache;
if (!buf)
return;
aa_buf = container_of(buf, union aa_buffer, buffer[0]);
cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
if (!cache->hold) {
put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
if (spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) {
/* put back on global list */
list_add(&aa_buf->list, &aa_global_buffers);
buffer_count++;
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
return;
}
/* contention on global list, fallback to percpu */
cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
cache->hold += 1;
}
/* cache in percpu list */
list_add(&aa_buf->list, &cache->head);
cache->count++;
put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
}
/*
* AppArmor init functions
*/
/**
* set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
*
* TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
*/
static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
{
struct cred *cred = (__force struct cred *)current->real_cred;
set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));
return 0;
}
static void destroy_buffers(void)
{
union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
while (!list_empty(&aa_global_buffers)) {
aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer,
list);
list_del(&aa_buf->list);
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
kfree(aa_buf);
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
}
static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
{
union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
int i, num;
/*
* per cpu set of cached allocated buffers used to help reduce
* lock contention
*/
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).hold = 0;
per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).count = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).head);
}
/*
* A function may require two buffers at once. Usually the buffers are
* used for a short period of time and are shared. On UP kernel buffers
* two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more
* buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow.
* This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be
* disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high.
*/
if (num_online_cpus() > 1)
num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT;
else
num = 2 + RESERVE_COUNT;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL |
__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!aa_buf) {
destroy_buffers();
return -ENOMEM;
}
aa_put_buffer(aa_buf->buffer);
}
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
if (!aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
{
.procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
.data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0600,
.proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
},
#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
{
.procname = "apparmor_display_secid_mode",
.data = &apparmor_display_secid_mode,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0600,
.proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_unconfined",
.data = &aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0600,
.proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
},
};
static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
{
return register_sysctl("kernel", apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
}
#else
static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
struct sock *sk;
if (!skb->secmark)
return NF_ACCEPT;
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
skb->secmark, sk))
return NF_ACCEPT;
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
}
static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = {
{
.hook = apparmor_ip_postroute,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
.hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
{
.hook = apparmor_ip_postroute,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
.hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
#endif
};
static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net)
{
return nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
}
static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
{
nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
}
static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = {
.init = apparmor_nf_register,
.exit = apparmor_nf_unregister,
};
static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void)
{
int err;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return 0;
err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops);
if (err)
panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
return 0;
}
__initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init);
#endif
static char nulldfa_src[] = {
#include "nulldfa.in"
};
static struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;
static char stacksplitdfa_src[] = {
#include "stacksplitdfa.in"
};
struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
struct aa_policydb *nullpdb;
static int __init aa_setup_dfa_engine(void)
{
int error = -ENOMEM;
nullpdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nullpdb)
return -ENOMEM;
nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(nulldfa_src, sizeof(nulldfa_src),
TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
if (IS_ERR(nulldfa)) {
error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa);
goto fail;
}
nullpdb->dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
nullpdb->perms = kcalloc(2, sizeof(struct aa_perms), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nullpdb->perms)
goto fail;
nullpdb->size = 2;
stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(stacksplitdfa_src,
sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src),
TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
if (IS_ERR(stacksplitdfa)) {
error = PTR_ERR(stacksplitdfa);
goto fail;
}
return 0;
fail:
aa_put_pdb(nullpdb);
aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
nullpdb = NULL;
nulldfa = NULL;
stacksplitdfa = NULL;
return error;
}
static void __init aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void)
{
aa_put_dfa(stacksplitdfa);
aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
aa_put_pdb(nullpdb);
nullpdb = NULL;
stacksplitdfa = NULL;
nulldfa = NULL;
}
static int __init apparmor_init(void)
{
int error;
error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
if (error) {
AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
goto alloc_out;
}
error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
if (error) {
AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
goto alloc_out;
}
error = apparmor_init_sysctl();
if (error) {
AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n");
goto alloc_out;
}
error = alloc_buffers();
if (error) {
AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
goto alloc_out;
}
error = set_init_ctx();
if (error) {
AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
aa_free_root_ns();
goto buffers_out;
}
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
&apparmor_lsmid);
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
else
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
return error;
buffers_out:
destroy_buffers();
alloc_out:
aa_destroy_aafs();
aa_teardown_dfa_engine();
apparmor_enabled = false;
return error;
}
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
.init = apparmor_init,
};