linux/arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c
Kevin Loughlin 0f4a1e8098 x86/sev: Skip ROM range scans and validation for SEV-SNP guests
SEV-SNP requires encrypted memory to be validated before access.
Because the ROM memory range is not part of the e820 table, it is not
pre-validated by the BIOS. Therefore, if a SEV-SNP guest kernel wishes
to access this range, the guest must first validate the range.

The current SEV-SNP code does indeed scan the ROM range during early
boot and thus attempts to validate the ROM range in probe_roms().
However, this behavior is neither sufficient nor necessary for the
following reasons:

* With regards to sufficiency, if EFI_CONFIG_TABLES are not enabled and
  CONFIG_DMI_SCAN_MACHINE_NON_EFI_FALLBACK is set, the kernel will
  attempt to access the memory at SMBIOS_ENTRY_POINT_SCAN_START (which
  falls in the ROM range) prior to validation.

  For example, Project Oak Stage 0 provides a minimal guest firmware
  that currently meets these configuration conditions, meaning guests
  booting atop Oak Stage 0 firmware encounter a problematic call chain
  during dmi_setup() -> dmi_scan_machine() that results in a crash
  during boot if SEV-SNP is enabled.

* With regards to necessity, SEV-SNP guests generally read garbage
  (which changes across boots) from the ROM range, meaning these scans
  are unnecessary. The guest reads garbage because the legacy ROM range
  is unencrypted data but is accessed via an encrypted PMD during early
  boot (where the PMD is marked as encrypted due to potentially mapping
  actually-encrypted data in other PMD-contained ranges).

In one exceptional case, EISA probing treats the ROM range as
unencrypted data, which is inconsistent with other probing.

Continuing to allow SEV-SNP guests to use garbage and to inconsistently
classify ROM range encryption status can trigger undesirable behavior.
For instance, if garbage bytes appear to be a valid signature, memory
may be unnecessarily reserved for the ROM range. Future code or other
use cases may result in more problematic (arbitrary) behavior that
should be avoided.

While one solution would be to overhaul the early PMD mapping to always
treat the ROM region of the PMD as unencrypted, SEV-SNP guests do not
currently rely on data from the ROM region during early boot (and even
if they did, they would be mostly relying on garbage data anyways).

As a simpler solution, skip the ROM range scans (and the otherwise-
necessary range validation) during SEV-SNP guest early boot. The
potential SEV-SNP guest crash due to lack of ROM range validation is
thus avoided by simply not accessing the ROM range.

In most cases, skip the scans by overriding problematic x86_init
functions during sme_early_init() to SNP-safe variants, which can be
likened to x86_init overrides done for other platforms (ex: Xen); such
overrides also avoid the spread of cc_platform_has() checks throughout
the tree.

In the exceptional EISA case, still use cc_platform_has() for the
simplest change, given (1) checks for guest type (ex: Xen domain status)
are already performed here, and (2) these checks occur in a subsys
initcall instead of an x86_init function.

  [ bp: Massage commit message, remove "we"s. ]

Fixes: 9704c07bf9 ("x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active")
Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313121546.2964854-1-kevinloughlin@google.com
2024-03-26 15:22:35 +01:00

271 lines
6.3 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/mmzone.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/console.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/edd.h>
#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/pfn.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <asm/probe_roms.h>
#include <asm/pci-direct.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/mmzone.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/setup_arch.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
static struct resource system_rom_resource = {
.name = "System ROM",
.start = 0xf0000,
.end = 0xfffff,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_READONLY | IORESOURCE_MEM
};
static struct resource extension_rom_resource = {
.name = "Extension ROM",
.start = 0xe0000,
.end = 0xeffff,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_READONLY | IORESOURCE_MEM
};
static struct resource adapter_rom_resources[] = { {
.name = "Adapter ROM",
.start = 0xc8000,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_READONLY | IORESOURCE_MEM
}, {
.name = "Adapter ROM",
.start = 0,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_READONLY | IORESOURCE_MEM
}, {
.name = "Adapter ROM",
.start = 0,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_READONLY | IORESOURCE_MEM
}, {
.name = "Adapter ROM",
.start = 0,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_READONLY | IORESOURCE_MEM
}, {
.name = "Adapter ROM",
.start = 0,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_READONLY | IORESOURCE_MEM
}, {
.name = "Adapter ROM",
.start = 0,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_READONLY | IORESOURCE_MEM
} };
static struct resource video_rom_resource = {
.name = "Video ROM",
.start = 0xc0000,
.end = 0xc7fff,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_READONLY | IORESOURCE_MEM
};
/* does this oprom support the given pci device, or any of the devices
* that the driver supports?
*/
static bool match_id(struct pci_dev *pdev, unsigned short vendor, unsigned short device)
{
struct pci_driver *drv = to_pci_driver(pdev->dev.driver);
const struct pci_device_id *id;
if (pdev->vendor == vendor && pdev->device == device)
return true;
for (id = drv ? drv->id_table : NULL; id && id->vendor; id++)
if (id->vendor == vendor && id->device == device)
break;
return id && id->vendor;
}
static bool probe_list(struct pci_dev *pdev, unsigned short vendor,
const void *rom_list)
{
unsigned short device;
do {
if (get_kernel_nofault(device, rom_list) != 0)
device = 0;
if (device && match_id(pdev, vendor, device))
break;
rom_list += 2;
} while (device);
return !!device;
}
static struct resource *find_oprom(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct resource *oprom = NULL;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(adapter_rom_resources); i++) {
struct resource *res = &adapter_rom_resources[i];
unsigned short offset, vendor, device, list, rev;
const void *rom;
if (res->end == 0)
break;
rom = isa_bus_to_virt(res->start);
if (get_kernel_nofault(offset, rom + 0x18) != 0)
continue;
if (get_kernel_nofault(vendor, rom + offset + 0x4) != 0)
continue;
if (get_kernel_nofault(device, rom + offset + 0x6) != 0)
continue;
if (match_id(pdev, vendor, device)) {
oprom = res;
break;
}
if (get_kernel_nofault(list, rom + offset + 0x8) == 0 &&
get_kernel_nofault(rev, rom + offset + 0xc) == 0 &&
rev >= 3 && list &&
probe_list(pdev, vendor, rom + offset + list)) {
oprom = res;
break;
}
}
return oprom;
}
void __iomem *pci_map_biosrom(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct resource *oprom = find_oprom(pdev);
if (!oprom)
return NULL;
return ioremap(oprom->start, resource_size(oprom));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_map_biosrom);
void pci_unmap_biosrom(void __iomem *image)
{
iounmap(image);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_unmap_biosrom);
size_t pci_biosrom_size(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct resource *oprom = find_oprom(pdev);
return oprom ? resource_size(oprom) : 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_biosrom_size);
#define ROMSIGNATURE 0xaa55
static int __init romsignature(const unsigned char *rom)
{
const unsigned short * const ptr = (const unsigned short *)rom;
unsigned short sig;
return get_kernel_nofault(sig, ptr) == 0 && sig == ROMSIGNATURE;
}
static int __init romchecksum(const unsigned char *rom, unsigned long length)
{
unsigned char sum, c;
for (sum = 0; length && get_kernel_nofault(c, rom++) == 0; length--)
sum += c;
return !length && !sum;
}
void __init probe_roms(void)
{
unsigned long start, length, upper;
const unsigned char *rom;
unsigned char c;
int i;
/* video rom */
upper = adapter_rom_resources[0].start;
for (start = video_rom_resource.start; start < upper; start += 2048) {
rom = isa_bus_to_virt(start);
if (!romsignature(rom))
continue;
video_rom_resource.start = start;
if (get_kernel_nofault(c, rom + 2) != 0)
continue;
/* 0 < length <= 0x7f * 512, historically */
length = c * 512;
/* if checksum okay, trust length byte */
if (length && romchecksum(rom, length))
video_rom_resource.end = start + length - 1;
request_resource(&iomem_resource, &video_rom_resource);
break;
}
start = (video_rom_resource.end + 1 + 2047) & ~2047UL;
if (start < upper)
start = upper;
/* system rom */
request_resource(&iomem_resource, &system_rom_resource);
upper = system_rom_resource.start;
/* check for extension rom (ignore length byte!) */
rom = isa_bus_to_virt(extension_rom_resource.start);
if (romsignature(rom)) {
length = resource_size(&extension_rom_resource);
if (romchecksum(rom, length)) {
request_resource(&iomem_resource, &extension_rom_resource);
upper = extension_rom_resource.start;
}
}
/* check for adapter roms on 2k boundaries */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(adapter_rom_resources) && start < upper; start += 2048) {
rom = isa_bus_to_virt(start);
if (!romsignature(rom))
continue;
if (get_kernel_nofault(c, rom + 2) != 0)
continue;
/* 0 < length <= 0x7f * 512, historically */
length = c * 512;
/* but accept any length that fits if checksum okay */
if (!length || start + length > upper || !romchecksum(rom, length))
continue;
adapter_rom_resources[i].start = start;
adapter_rom_resources[i].end = start + length - 1;
request_resource(&iomem_resource, &adapter_rom_resources[i]);
start = adapter_rom_resources[i++].end & ~2047UL;
}
}