BPF just-in-time compiler depended on CONFIG_MODULES because it used
module_alloc() to allocate memory for the generated code.
Since code allocations are now implemented with execmem, drop dependency of
CONFIG_BPF_JIT on CONFIG_MODULES and make it select CONFIG_EXECMEM.
Suggested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Currently, if a Kconfig option depends on TASKS_RCU, it conditionally does
"select TASKS_RCU if PREEMPTION". This works, but requires any change in
this enablement logic to be replicated across all such "select" clauses.
A new NEED_TASKS_RCU Kconfig option has been created to allow this
enablement logic to be in one place in kernel/rcu/Kconfig.
Therefore, make BPF select the new NEED_TASKS_RCU Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
'config BPF' exists in both init/Kconfig and kernel/bpf/Kconfig.
Commit b24abcff91 ("bpf, kconfig: Add consolidated menu entry for bpf
with core options") added the second one to kernel/bpf/Kconfig instead
of moving the existing one.
Merge them together.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240204075634.32969-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
This work refactors and adds a lightweight extension ("tcx") to the tc BPF
ingress and egress data path side for allowing BPF program management based
on fds via bpf() syscall through the newly added generic multi-prog API.
The main goal behind this work which we also presented at LPC [0] last year
and a recent update at LSF/MM/BPF this year [3] is to support long-awaited
BPF link functionality for tc BPF programs, which allows for a model of safe
ownership and program detachment.
Given the rise in tc BPF users in cloud native environments, this becomes
necessary to avoid hard to debug incidents either through stale leftover
programs or 3rd party applications accidentally stepping on each others toes.
As a recap, a BPF link represents the attachment of a BPF program to a BPF
hook point. The BPF link holds a single reference to keep BPF program alive.
Moreover, hook points do not reference a BPF link, only the application's
fd or pinning does. A BPF link holds meta-data specific to attachment and
implements operations for link creation, (atomic) BPF program update,
detachment and introspection. The motivation for BPF links for tc BPF programs
is multi-fold, for example:
- From Meta: "It's especially important for applications that are deployed
fleet-wide and that don't "control" hosts they are deployed to. If such
application crashes and no one notices and does anything about that, BPF
program will keep running draining resources or even just, say, dropping
packets. We at FB had outages due to such permanent BPF attachment
semantics. With fd-based BPF link we are getting a framework, which allows
safe, auto-detachable behavior by default, unless application explicitly
opts in by pinning the BPF link." [1]
- From Cilium-side the tc BPF programs we attach to host-facing veth devices
and phys devices build the core datapath for Kubernetes Pods, and they
implement forwarding, load-balancing, policy, EDT-management, etc, within
BPF. Currently there is no concept of 'safe' ownership, e.g. we've recently
experienced hard-to-debug issues in a user's staging environment where
another Kubernetes application using tc BPF attached to the same prio/handle
of cls_bpf, accidentally wiping all Cilium-based BPF programs from underneath
it. The goal is to establish a clear/safe ownership model via links which
cannot accidentally be overridden. [0,2]
BPF links for tc can co-exist with non-link attachments, and the semantics are
in line also with XDP links: BPF links cannot replace other BPF links, BPF
links cannot replace non-BPF links, non-BPF links cannot replace BPF links and
lastly only non-BPF links can replace non-BPF links. In case of Cilium, this
would solve mentioned issue of safe ownership model as 3rd party applications
would not be able to accidentally wipe Cilium programs, even if they are not
BPF link aware.
Earlier attempts [4] have tried to integrate BPF links into core tc machinery
to solve cls_bpf, which has been intrusive to the generic tc kernel API with
extensions only specific to cls_bpf and suboptimal/complex since cls_bpf could
be wiped from the qdisc also. Locking a tc BPF program in place this way, is
getting into layering hacks given the two object models are vastly different.
We instead implemented the tcx (tc 'express') layer which is an fd-based tc BPF
attach API, so that the BPF link implementation blends in naturally similar to
other link types which are fd-based and without the need for changing core tc
internal APIs. BPF programs for tc can then be successively migrated from classic
cls_bpf to the new tc BPF link without needing to change the program's source
code, just the BPF loader mechanics for attaching is sufficient.
For the current tc framework, there is no change in behavior with this change
and neither does this change touch on tc core kernel APIs. The gist of this
patch is that the ingress and egress hook have a lightweight, qdisc-less
extension for BPF to attach its tc BPF programs, in other words, a minimal
entry point for tc BPF. The name tcx has been suggested from discussion of
earlier revisions of this work as a good fit, and to more easily differ between
the classic cls_bpf attachment and the fd-based one.
For the ingress and egress tcx points, the device holds a cache-friendly array
with program pointers which is separated from control plane (slow-path) data.
Earlier versions of this work used priority to determine ordering and expression
of dependencies similar as with classic tc, but it was challenged that for
something more future-proof a better user experience is required. Hence this
resulted in the design and development of the generic attach/detach/query API
for multi-progs. See prior patch with its discussion on the API design. tcx is
the first user and later we plan to integrate also others, for example, one
candidate is multi-prog support for XDP which would benefit and have the same
'look and feel' from API perspective.
The goal with tcx is to have maximum compatibility to existing tc BPF programs,
so they don't need to be rewritten specifically. Compatibility to call into
classic tcf_classify() is also provided in order to allow successive migration
or both to cleanly co-exist where needed given its all one logical tc layer and
the tcx plus classic tc cls/act build one logical overall processing pipeline.
tcx supports the simplified return codes TCX_NEXT which is non-terminating (go
to next program) and terminating ones with TCX_PASS, TCX_DROP, TCX_REDIRECT.
The fd-based API is behind a static key, so that when unused the code is also
not entered. The struct tcx_entry's program array is currently static, but
could be made dynamic if necessary at a point in future. The a/b pair swap
design has been chosen so that for detachment there are no allocations which
otherwise could fail.
The work has been tested with tc-testing selftest suite which all passes, as
well as the tc BPF tests from the BPF CI, and also with Cilium's L4LB.
Thanks also to Nikolay Aleksandrov and Martin Lau for in-depth early reviews
of this work.
[0] https://lpc.events/event/16/contributions/1353/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzbokCJN33Nw_kg82sO=xppXnKWEncGTWCTB9vGCmLB6pw@mail.gmail.com
[2] https://colocatedeventseu2023.sched.com/event/1Jo6O/tales-from-an-ebpf-programs-murder-mystery-hemanth-malla-guillaume-fournier-datadog
[3] http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2023_material/tcx_meta_netdev_borkmann.pdf
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210604063116.234316-1-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719140858.13224-3-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently, any kernel built with CONFIG_PREEMPTION=y also gets
CONFIG_TASKS_RCU=y, which is not helpful to people trying to build
preemptible kernels of minimal size.
Because CONFIG_TASKS_RCU=y is needed only in kernels doing tracing of
one form or another, this commit moves from TASKS_RCU deciding when it
should be enabled to the tracing Kconfig options explicitly selecting it.
This allows building preemptible kernels without TASKS_RCU, if desired.
This commit also updates the SRCU-N and TREE09 rcutorture scenarios
in order to avoid Kconfig errors that would otherwise result from
CONFIG_TASKS_RCU being selected without its CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT dependency
being met.
[ paulmck: Apply BPF_SYSCALL feedback from Andrii Nakryiko. ]
Reported-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Zhouyi Zhou <zhouzhouyi@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
This adds support for running XDP programs through BPF_PROG_RUN in a mode
that enables live packet processing of the resulting frames. Previous uses
of BPF_PROG_RUN for XDP returned the XDP program return code and the
modified packet data to userspace, which is useful for unit testing of XDP
programs.
The existing BPF_PROG_RUN for XDP allows userspace to set the ingress
ifindex and RXQ number as part of the context object being passed to the
kernel. This patch reuses that code, but adds a new mode with different
semantics, which can be selected with the new BPF_F_TEST_XDP_LIVE_FRAMES
flag.
When running BPF_PROG_RUN in this mode, the XDP program return codes will
be honoured: returning XDP_PASS will result in the frame being injected
into the networking stack as if it came from the selected networking
interface, while returning XDP_TX and XDP_REDIRECT will result in the frame
being transmitted out that interface. XDP_TX is translated into an
XDP_REDIRECT operation to the same interface, since the real XDP_TX action
is only possible from within the network drivers themselves, not from the
process context where BPF_PROG_RUN is executed.
Internally, this new mode of operation creates a page pool instance while
setting up the test run, and feeds pages from that into the XDP program.
The setup cost of this is amortised over the number of repetitions
specified by userspace.
To support the performance testing use case, we further optimise the setup
step so that all pages in the pool are pre-initialised with the packet
data, and pre-computed context and xdp_frame objects stored at the start of
each page. This makes it possible to entirely avoid touching the page
content on each XDP program invocation, and enables sending up to 9
Mpps/core on my test box.
Because the data pages are recycled by the page pool, and the test runner
doesn't re-initialise them for each run, subsequent invocations of the XDP
program will see the packet data in the state it was after the last time it
ran on that particular page. This means that an XDP program that modifies
the packet before redirecting it has to be careful about which assumptions
it makes about the packet content, but that is only an issue for the most
naively written programs.
Enabling the new flag is only allowed when not setting ctx_out and data_out
in the test specification, since using it means frames will be redirected
somewhere else, so they can't be returned.
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220309105346.100053-2-toke@redhat.com
When CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is enabled, /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
is permanently set to 1 and setting any other value than that will return
failure.
Add the above description in the help text of config BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON, and
then we can distinguish between BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON and BPF_JIT_DEFAULT_ON.
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1645523826-18149-2-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
Disabling unprivileged BPF would help prevent unprivileged users from
creating certain conditions required for potential speculative execution
side-channel attacks on unmitigated affected hardware.
A deep dive on such attacks and current mitigations is available here [0].
Sync with what many distros are currently applying already, and disable
unprivileged BPF by default. An admin can enable this at runtime, if
necessary, as described in 08389d8882 ("bpf: Add kconfig knob for
disabling unpriv bpf by default").
[0] "BPF and Spectre: Mitigating transient execution attacks", Daniel Borkmann, eBPF Summit '21
https://ebpf.io/summit-2021-slides/eBPF_Summit_2021-Keynote-Daniel_Borkmann-BPF_and_Spectre.pdf
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0ace9ce3f97656d5f62d11093ad7ee81190c3c25.1635535215.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Currently sock_map still has Kconfig dependency on CONFIG_INET,
but there is no actual functional dependency on it after we
introduce ->psock_update_sk_prot().
We have to extend it to CONFIG_NET now as we are going to
support AF_UNIX.
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210704190252.11866-2-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Randy reported a randconfig build error recently on i386:
ld: arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.o: in function `do_jit':
bpf_jit_comp32.c:(.text+0x28c9): undefined reference to `__bpf_call_base'
ld: arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.o: in function `bpf_int_jit_compile':
bpf_jit_comp32.c:(.text+0x3694): undefined reference to `bpf_jit_blind_constants'
ld: bpf_jit_comp32.c:(.text+0x3719): undefined reference to `bpf_jit_binary_free'
ld: bpf_jit_comp32.c:(.text+0x3745): undefined reference to `bpf_jit_binary_alloc'
ld: bpf_jit_comp32.c:(.text+0x37d3): undefined reference to `bpf_jit_prog_release_other'
[...]
The cause was that b24abcff91 ("bpf, kconfig: Add consolidated menu entry for
bpf with core options") moved BPF_JIT from net/Kconfig into kernel/bpf/Kconfig
and previously BPF_JIT was guarded by a 'if NET'. However, there is no actual
dependency on NET, it's just that menuconfig NET selects BPF. And the latter in
turn causes kernel/bpf/core.o to be built which contains above symbols. Randy's
randconfig didn't have NET set, and BPF wasn't either, but BPF_JIT otoh was.
Detangle this by making BPF_JIT depend on BPF instead. arm64 was the only arch
that pulled in its JIT in net/ via obj-$(CONFIG_NET), all others unconditionally
pull this dir in via obj-y. Do the same since CONFIG_NET guard there is really
useless as we compiled the JIT via obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_JIT) += bpf_jit_comp.o anyway.
Fixes: b24abcff91 ("bpf, kconfig: Add consolidated menu entry for bpf with core options")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Add a kconfig knob which allows for unprivileged bpf to be disabled by default.
If set, the knob sets /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled to value of 2.
This still allows a transition of 2 -> {0,1} through an admin. Similarly,
this also still keeps 1 -> {1} behavior intact, so that once set to permanently
disabled, it cannot be undone aside from a reboot.
We've also added extra2 with max of 2 for the procfs handler, so that an admin
still has a chance to toggle between 0 <-> 2.
Either way, as an additional alternative, applications can make use of CAP_BPF
that we added a while ago.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/74ec548079189e4e4dffaeb42b8987bb3c852eee.1620765074.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
Right now, all core BPF related options are scattered in different Kconfig
locations mainly due to historic reasons. Moving forward, lets add a proper
subsystem entry under ...
General setup --->
BPF subsystem --->
... in order to have all knobs in a single location and thus ease BPF related
configuration. Networking related bits such as sockmap are out of scope for
the general setup and therefore better suited to remain in net/Kconfig.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f23f58765a4d59244ebd8037da7b6a6b2fb58446.1620765074.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
