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1986 commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Jussi Maki | aeea1b86f9 |
bpf, devmap: Exclude XDP broadcast to master device
If the ingress device is bond slave, do not broadcast back through it or the bond master. Signed-off-by: Jussi Maki <joamaki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210731055738.16820-5-joamaki@gmail.com |
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Johan Almbladh | b61a28cf11 |
bpf: Fix off-by-one in tail call count limiting
Before, the interpreter allowed up to MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT + 1 tail calls. Now precisely MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT is allowed, which is in line with the behavior of the x86 JITs. Signed-off-by: Johan Almbladh <johan.almbladh@anyfinetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210728164741.350370-1-johan.almbladh@anyfinetworks.com |
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Jakub Kicinski | d39e8b92c3 |
Merge https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Andrii Nakryiko says: ==================== bpf-next 2021-07-30 We've added 64 non-merge commits during the last 15 day(s) which contain a total of 83 files changed, 5027 insertions(+), 1808 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) BTF-guided binary data dumping libbpf API, from Alan. 2) Internal factoring out of libbpf CO-RE relocation logic, from Alexei. 3) Ambient BPF run context and cgroup storage cleanup, from Andrii. 4) Few small API additions for libbpf 1.0 effort, from Evgeniy and Hengqi. 5) bpf_program__attach_kprobe_opts() fixes in libbpf, from Jiri. 6) bpf_{get,set}sockopt() support in BPF iterators, from Martin. 7) BPF map pinning improvements in libbpf, from Martynas. 8) Improved module BTF support in libbpf and bpftool, from Quentin. 9) Bpftool cleanups and documentation improvements, from Quentin. 10) Libbpf improvements for supporting CO-RE on old kernels, from Shuyi. 11) Increased maximum cgroup storage size, from Stanislav. 12) Small fixes and improvements to BPF tests and samples, from various folks. * https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (64 commits) tools: bpftool: Complete metrics list in "bpftool prog profile" doc tools: bpftool: Document and add bash completion for -L, -B options selftests/bpf: Update bpftool's consistency script for checking options tools: bpftool: Update and synchronise option list in doc and help msg tools: bpftool: Complete and synchronise attach or map types selftests/bpf: Check consistency between bpftool source, doc, completion tools: bpftool: Slightly ease bash completion updates unix_bpf: Fix a potential deadlock in unix_dgram_bpf_recvmsg() libbpf: Add btf__load_vmlinux_btf/btf__load_module_btf tools: bpftool: Support dumping split BTF by id libbpf: Add split BTF support for btf__load_from_kernel_by_id() tools: Replace btf__get_from_id() with btf__load_from_kernel_by_id() tools: Free BTF objects at various locations libbpf: Rename btf__get_from_id() as btf__load_from_kernel_by_id() libbpf: Rename btf__load() as btf__load_into_kernel() libbpf: Return non-null error on failures in libbpf_find_prog_btf_id() bpf: Emit better log message if bpf_iter ctx arg btf_id == 0 tools/resolve_btfids: Emit warnings and patch zero id for missing symbols bpf: Increase supported cgroup storage value size libbpf: Fix race when pinning maps in parallel ... ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210730225606.1897330-1-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
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Jakub Kicinski | d2e11fd2b7 |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Conflicting commits, all resolutions pretty trivial: drivers/bus/mhi/pci_generic.c |
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Yonghong Song | d36216429f |
bpf: Emit better log message if bpf_iter ctx arg btf_id == 0
To avoid kernel build failure due to some missing .BTF-ids referenced functions/types, the patch ([1]) tries to fill btf_id 0 for these types. In bpf verifier, for percpu variable and helper returning btf_id cases, verifier already emitted proper warning with something like verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); verbose(env, "invalid return type %d of func %s#%d\n", fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); But this is not the case for bpf_iter context arguments. I hacked resolve_btfids to encode btf_id 0 for struct task_struct. With `./test_progs -n 7/5`, I got, 0: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) func 'bpf_iter_task' arg0 has btf_id 29739 type STRUCT 'bpf_iter_meta' ; struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq; 1: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r2 +0) ; struct task_struct *task = ctx->task; 2: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r1 +8) ; if (task == (void *)0) { 3: (55) if r7 != 0x0 goto pc+11 ... ; BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%8d %8d\n", task->tgid, task->pid); 26: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r7 +1372) Type '(anon)' is not a struct Basically, verifier will return btf_id 0 for task_struct. Later on, when the code tries to access task->tgid, the verifier correctly complains the type is '(anon)' and it is not a struct. Users still need to backtrace to find out what is going on. Let us catch the invalid btf_id 0 earlier and provide better message indicating btf_id is wrong. The new error message looks like below: R1 type=ctx expected=fp ; struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq; 0: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) func 'bpf_iter_task' arg0 has btf_id 29739 type STRUCT 'bpf_iter_meta' ; struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq; 1: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r2 +0) ; struct task_struct *task = ctx->task; 2: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r1 +8) invalid btf_id for context argument offset 8 invalid bpf_context access off=8 size=8 [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210727132532.2473636-1-hengqi.chen@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210728183025.1461750-1-yhs@fb.com |
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Daniel Borkmann | 2039f26f3a |
bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation
Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5: A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed. |
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Daniel Borkmann | f5e81d1117 |
bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction for mitigating Spectre v4
In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction /either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to /no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already. This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence' instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4 since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs. The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers. Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
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Stanislav Fomichev | 33b57e0cc7 |
bpf: Increase supported cgroup storage value size
Current max cgroup storage value size is 4k (PAGE_SIZE). The other local storages accept up to 64k (BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE). Let's align max cgroup value size with the other storages. For percpu, the max is 32k (PCPU_MIN_UNIT_SIZE) because percpu allocator is not happy about larger values. netcnt test is extended to exercise those maximum values (non-percpu max size is close to, but not real max). v4: * remove inner union (Andrii Nakryiko) * keep net_cnt on the stack (Andrii Nakryiko) v3: * refine SIZEOF_BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_ELEM comment (Yonghong Song) * anonymous struct in percpu_net_cnt & net_cnt (Yonghong Song) * reorder free (Yonghong Song) v2: * cap max_value_size instead of BUILD_BUG_ON (Martin KaFai Lau) Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210727222335.4029096-1-sdf@google.com |
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Martin KaFai Lau | 3cee6fb8e6 |
bpf: tcp: Support bpf_(get|set)sockopt in bpf tcp iter
This patch allows bpf tcp iter to call bpf_(get|set)sockopt. To allow a specific bpf iter (tcp here) to call a set of helpers, get_func_proto function pointer is added to bpf_iter_reg. The bpf iter is a tracing prog which currently requires CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so this patch does not impose other capability checks for bpf_(get|set)sockopt. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210701200619.1036715-1-kafai@fb.com |
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David S. Miller | 5af84df962 |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Conflicts are simple overlapping changes. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
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Colin Ian King | 724f17b7d4 |
bpf: Remove redundant intiialization of variable stype
The variable stype is being initialized with a value that is never read, it is being updated later on. The assignment is redundant and can be removed. Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210721115630.109279-1-colin.king@canonical.com |
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Andrii Nakryiko | c7603cfa04 |
bpf: Add ambient BPF runtime context stored in current
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Daniel Borkmann | e042aa532c |
bpf: Fix pointer arithmetic mask tightening under state pruning
In |
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Daniel Borkmann | 59089a189e |
bpf: Remove superfluous aux sanitation on subprog rejection
Follow-up to
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David S. Miller | 82a1ffe57e |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Alexei Starovoitov says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2021-07-15 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. We've added 45 non-merge commits during the last 15 day(s) which contain a total of 52 files changed, 3122 insertions(+), 384 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) Introduce bpf timers, from Alexei. 2) Add sockmap support for unix datagram socket, from Cong. 3) Fix potential memleak and UAF in the verifier, from He. 4) Add bpf_get_func_ip helper, from Jiri. 5) Improvements to generic XDP mode, from Kumar. 6) Support for passing xdp_md to XDP programs in bpf_prog_run, from Zvi. =================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
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Cong Wang | 17edea21b3 |
sock_map: Relax config dependency to CONFIG_NET
Currently sock_map still has Kconfig dependency on CONFIG_INET, but there is no actual functional dependency on it after we introduce ->psock_update_sk_prot(). We have to extend it to CONFIG_NET now as we are going to support AF_UNIX. Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210704190252.11866-2-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com |
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Jiri Olsa | 9ffd9f3ff7 |
bpf: Add bpf_get_func_ip helper for kprobe programs
Adding bpf_get_func_ip helper for BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE programs, so it's now possible to call bpf_get_func_ip from both kprobe and kretprobe programs. Taking the caller's address from 'struct kprobe::addr', which is defined for both kprobe and kretprobe. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210714094400.396467-5-jolsa@kernel.org |
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Jiri Olsa | 9b99edcae5 |
bpf: Add bpf_get_func_ip helper for tracing programs
Adding bpf_get_func_ip helper for BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING programs, specifically for all trampoline attach types. The trampoline's caller IP address is stored in (ctx - 8) address. so there's no reason to actually call the helper, but rather fixup the call instruction and return [ctx - 8] value directly. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210714094400.396467-4-jolsa@kernel.org |
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Jiri Olsa | 1e37392ccc |
bpf: Enable BPF_TRAMP_F_IP_ARG for trampolines with call_get_func_ip
Enabling BPF_TRAMP_F_IP_ARG for trampolines that actually need it. The BPF_TRAMP_F_IP_ARG adds extra 3 instructions to trampoline code and is used only by programs with bpf_get_func_ip helper, which is added in following patch and sets call_get_func_ip bit. This patch ensures that BPF_TRAMP_F_IP_ARG flag is used only for trampolines that have programs with call_get_func_ip set. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210714094400.396467-3-jolsa@kernel.org |
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Alexei Starovoitov | 7ddc80a476 |
bpf: Teach stack depth check about async callbacks.
Teach max stack depth checking algorithm about async callbacks that don't increase bpf program stack size. Also add sanity check that bpf_tail_call didn't sneak into async cb. It's impossible, since PTR_TO_CTX is not available in async cb, hence the program cannot contain bpf_tail_call(ctx,...); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210715005417.78572-10-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com |
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Alexei Starovoitov | bfc6bb74e4 |
bpf: Implement verifier support for validation of async callbacks.
bpf_for_each_map_elem() and bpf_timer_set_callback() helpers are relying on PTR_TO_FUNC infra in the verifier to validate addresses to subprograms and pass them into the helpers as function callbacks. In case of bpf_for_each_map_elem() the callback is invoked synchronously and the verifier treats it as a normal subprogram call by adding another bpf_func_state and new frame in __check_func_call(). bpf_timer_set_callback() doesn't invoke the callback directly. The subprogram will be called asynchronously from bpf_timer_cb(). Teach the verifier to validate such async callbacks as special kind of jump by pushing verifier state into stack and let pop_stack() process it. Special care needs to be taken during state pruning. The call insn doing bpf_timer_set_callback has to be a prune_point. Otherwise short timer callbacks might not have prune points in front of bpf_timer_set_callback() which means is_state_visited() will be called after this call insn is processed in __check_func_call(). Which means that another async_cb state will be pushed to be walked later and the verifier will eventually hit BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ limit. Since push_async_cb() looks like another push_stack() branch the infinite loop detection will trigger false positive. To recognize this case mark such states as in_async_callback_fn. To distinguish infinite loop in async callback vs the same callback called with different arguments for different map and timer add async_entry_cnt to bpf_func_state. Enforce return zero from async callbacks. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210715005417.78572-9-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com |
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Alexei Starovoitov | 86fc6ee6e2 |
bpf: Relax verifier recursion check.
In the following bpf subprogram: static int timer_cb(void *map, void *key, void *value) { bpf_timer_set_callback(.., timer_cb); } the 'timer_cb' is a pointer to a function. ld_imm64 insn is used to carry this pointer. bpf_pseudo_func() returns true for such ld_imm64 insn. Unlike bpf_for_each_map_elem() the bpf_timer_set_callback() is asynchronous. Relax control flow check to allow such "recursion" that is seen as an infinite loop by check_cfg(). The distinction between bpf_for_each_map_elem() the bpf_timer_set_callback() is done in the follow up patch. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210715005417.78572-8-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com |
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Alexei Starovoitov | 40ec00abf1 |
bpf: Remember BTF of inner maps.
BTF is required for 'struct bpf_timer' to be recognized inside map value. The bpf timers are supported inside inner maps. Remember 'struct btf *' in inner_map_meta to make it available to the verifier in the sequence: struct bpf_map *inner_map = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&outer_map, ...); if (inner_map) timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&inner_map, ...); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210715005417.78572-7-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com |
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Alexei Starovoitov | 3e8ce29850 |
bpf: Prevent pointer mismatch in bpf_timer_init.
bpf_timer_init() arguments are: 1. pointer to a timer (which is embedded in map element). 2. pointer to a map. Make sure that pointer to a timer actually belongs to that map. Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject: inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1) inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2) if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) { timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1); if (timer) // mismatch would have been allowed bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2); } Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210715005417.78572-6-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com |
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Alexei Starovoitov | 68134668c1 |
bpf: Add map side support for bpf timers.
Restrict bpf timers to array, hash (both preallocated and kmalloced), and lru map types. The per-cpu maps with timers don't make sense, since 'struct bpf_timer' is a part of map value. bpf timers in per-cpu maps would mean that the number of timers depends on number of possible cpus and timers would not be accessible from all cpus. lpm map support can be added in the future. The timers in inner maps are supported. The bpf_map_update/delete_elem() helpers and sys_bpf commands cancel and free bpf_timer in a given map element. Similar to 'struct bpf_spin_lock' BTF is required and it is used to validate that map element indeed contains 'struct bpf_timer'. Make check_and_init_map_value() init both bpf_spin_lock and bpf_timer when map element data is reused in preallocated htab and lru maps. Teach copy_map_value() to support both bpf_spin_lock and bpf_timer in a single map element. There could be one of each, but not more than one. Due to 'one bpf_timer in one element' restriction do not support timers in global data, since global data is a map of single element, but from bpf program side it's seen as many global variables and restriction of single global timer would be odd. The sys_bpf map_freeze and sys_mmap syscalls are not allowed on maps with timers, since user space could have corrupted mmap element and crashed the kernel. The maps with timers cannot be readonly. Due to these restrictions search for bpf_timer in datasec BTF in case it was placed in the global data to report clear error. The previous patch allowed 'struct bpf_timer' as a first field in a map element only. Relax this restriction. Refactor lru map to s/bpf_lru_push_free/htab_lru_push_free/ to cancel and free the timer when lru map deletes an element as a part of it eviction algorithm. Make sure that bpf program cannot access 'struct bpf_timer' via direct load/store. The timer operation are done through helpers only. This is similar to 'struct bpf_spin_lock'. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210715005417.78572-5-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com |
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Alexei Starovoitov | b00628b1c7 |
bpf: Introduce bpf timers.
Introduce 'struct bpf_timer { __u64 :64; __u64 :64; };' that can be embedded in hash/array/lru maps as a regular field and helpers to operate on it: // Initialize the timer. // First 4 bits of 'flags' specify clockid. // Only CLOCK_MONOTONIC, CLOCK_REALTIME, CLOCK_BOOTTIME are allowed. long bpf_timer_init(struct bpf_timer *timer, struct bpf_map *map, int flags); // Configure the timer to call 'callback_fn' static function. long bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn); // Arm the timer to expire 'nsec' nanoseconds from the current time. long bpf_timer_start(struct bpf_timer *timer, u64 nsec, u64 flags); // Cancel the timer and wait for callback_fn to finish if it was running. long bpf_timer_cancel(struct bpf_timer *timer); Here is how BPF program might look like: struct map_elem { int counter; struct bpf_timer timer; }; struct { __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH); __uint(max_entries, 1000); __type(key, int); __type(value, struct map_elem); } hmap SEC(".maps"); static int timer_cb(void *map, int *key, struct map_elem *val); /* val points to particular map element that contains bpf_timer. */ SEC("fentry/bpf_fentry_test1") int BPF_PROG(test1, int a) { struct map_elem *val; int key = 0; val = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&hmap, &key); if (val) { bpf_timer_init(&val->timer, &hmap, CLOCK_REALTIME); bpf_timer_set_callback(&val->timer, timer_cb); bpf_timer_start(&val->timer, 1000 /* call timer_cb2 in 1 usec */, 0); } } This patch adds helper implementations that rely on hrtimers to call bpf functions as timers expire. The following patches add necessary safety checks. Only programs with CAP_BPF are allowed to use bpf_timer. The amount of timers used by the program is constrained by the memcg recorded at map creation time. The bpf_timer_init() helper needs explicit 'map' argument because inner maps are dynamic and not known at load time. While the bpf_timer_set_callback() is receiving hidden 'aux->prog' argument supplied by the verifier. The prog pointer is needed to do refcnting of bpf program to make sure that program doesn't get freed while the timer is armed. This approach relies on "user refcnt" scheme used in prog_array that stores bpf programs for bpf_tail_call. The bpf_timer_set_callback() will increment the prog refcnt which is paired with bpf_timer_cancel() that will drop the prog refcnt. The ops->map_release_uref is responsible for cancelling the timers and dropping prog refcnt when user space reference to a map reaches zero. This uref approach is done to make sure that Ctrl-C of user space process will not leave timers running forever unless the user space explicitly pinned a map that contained timers in bpffs. bpf_timer_init() and bpf_timer_set_callback() will return -EPERM if map doesn't have user references (is not held by open file descriptor from user space and not pinned in bpffs). The bpf_map_delete_elem() and bpf_map_update_elem() operations cancel and free the timer if given map element had it allocated. "bpftool map update" command can be used to cancel timers. The 'struct bpf_timer' is explicitly __attribute__((aligned(8))) because '__u64 :64' has 1 byte alignment of 8 byte padding. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210715005417.78572-4-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com |
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Alexei Starovoitov | c1b3fed319 |
bpf: Factor out bpf_spin_lock into helpers.
Move ____bpf_spin_lock/unlock into helpers to make it more clear that quadruple underscore bpf_spin_lock/unlock are irqsave/restore variants. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210715005417.78572-3-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com |
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Alexei Starovoitov | d809e134be |
bpf: Prepare bpf_prog_put() to be called from irq context.
Currently bpf_prog_put() is called from the task context only. With addition of bpf timers the timer related helpers will start calling bpf_prog_put() from irq-saved region and in rare cases might drop the refcnt to zero. To address this case, first, convert bpf_prog_free_id() to be irq-save (this is similar to bpf_map_free_id), and, second, defer non irq appropriate calls into work queue. For example: bpf_audit_prog() is calling kmalloc and wake_up_interruptible, bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all()->bpf_ksym_del()->spin_unlock_bh(). They are not safe with irqs disabled. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210715005417.78572-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com |
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He Fengqing | 75f0fc7b48 |
bpf: Fix potential memleak and UAF in the verifier.
In bpf_patch_insn_data(), we first use the bpf_patch_insn_single() to
insert new instructions, then use adjust_insn_aux_data() to adjust
insn_aux_data. If the old env->prog have no enough room for new inserted
instructions, we use bpf_prog_realloc to construct new_prog and free the
old env->prog.
There have two errors here. First, if adjust_insn_aux_data() return
ENOMEM, we should free the new_prog. Second, if adjust_insn_aux_data()
return ENOMEM, bpf_patch_insn_data() will return NULL, and env->prog has
been freed in bpf_prog_realloc, but we will use it in bpf_check().
So in this patch, we make the adjust_insn_aux_data() never fails. In
bpf_patch_insn_data(), we first pre-malloc memory for the new
insn_aux_data, then call bpf_patch_insn_single() to insert new
instructions, at last call adjust_insn_aux_data() to adjust
insn_aux_data.
Fixes:
|
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Daniel Borkmann | 5dd0a6b858 |
bpf: Fix tail_call_reachable rejection for interpreter when jit failed
During testing of |
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John Fastabend | f263a81451 |
bpf: Track subprog poke descriptors correctly and fix use-after-free
Subprograms are calling map_poke_track(), but on program release there is no hook to call map_poke_untrack(). However, on program release, the aux memory (and poke descriptor table) is freed even though we still have a reference to it in the element list of the map aux data. When we run map_poke_run(), we then end up accessing free'd memory, triggering KASAN in prog_array_map_poke_run(): [...] [ 402.824689] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e [ 402.824698] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881905a7940 by task hubble-fgs/4337 [ 402.824705] CPU: 1 PID: 4337 Comm: hubble-fgs Tainted: G I 5.12.0+ #399 [ 402.824715] Call Trace: [ 402.824719] dump_stack+0x93/0xc2 [ 402.824727] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x140 [ 402.824736] ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e [ 402.824740] ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e [ 402.824744] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 [ 402.824752] ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e [ 402.824757] prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e [ 402.824765] bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem+0x124/0x1a0 [...] The elements concerned are walked as follows: for (i = 0; i < elem->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { poke = &elem->aux->poke_tab[i]; [...] The access to size_poke_tab is a 4 byte read, verified by checking offsets in the KASAN dump: [ 402.825004] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881905a7800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 [ 402.825008] The buggy address is located 320 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff8881905a7800, ffff8881905a7c00) The pahole output of bpf_prog_aux: struct bpf_prog_aux { [...] /* --- cacheline 5 boundary (320 bytes) --- */ u32 size_poke_tab; /* 320 4 */ [...] In general, subprograms do not necessarily manage their own data structures. For example, BTF func_info and linfo are just pointers to the main program structure. This allows reference counting and cleanup to be done on the latter which simplifies their management a bit. The aux->poke_tab struct, however, did not follow this logic. The initial proposed fix for this use-after-free bug further embedded poke data tracking into the subprogram with proper reference counting. However, Daniel and Alexei questioned why we were treating these objects special; I agree, its unnecessary. The fix here removes the per subprogram poke table allocation and map tracking and instead simply points the aux->poke_tab pointer at the main programs poke table. This way, map tracking is simplified to the main program and we do not need to manage them per subprogram. This also means, bpf_prog_free_deferred(), which unwinds the program reference counting and kfrees objects, needs to ensure that we don't try to double free the poke_tab when free'ing the subprog structures. This is easily solved by NULL'ing the poke_tab pointer. The second detail is to ensure that per subprogram JIT logic only does fixups on poke_tab[] entries it owns. To do this, we add a pointer in the poke structure to point at the subprogram value so JITs can easily check while walking the poke_tab structure if the current entry belongs to the current program. The aux pointer is stable and therefore suitable for such comparison. On the jit_subprogs() error path, we omit cleaning up the poke->aux field because these are only ever referenced from the JIT side, but on error we will never make it to the JIT, so its fine to leave them dangling. Removing these pointers would complicate the error path for no reason. However, we do need to untrack all poke descriptors from the main program as otherwise they could race with the freeing of JIT memory from the subprograms. Lastly, |
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Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi | 2ea5eabaf0 |
bpf: devmap: Implement devmap prog execution for generic XDP
This lifts the restriction on running devmap BPF progs in generic redirect mode. To match native XDP behavior, it is invoked right before generic_xdp_tx is called, and only supports XDP_PASS/XDP_ABORTED/ XDP_DROP actions. We also return 0 even if devmap program drops the packet, as semantically redirect has already succeeded and the devmap prog is the last point before TX of the packet to device where it can deliver a verdict on the packet. This also means it must take care of freeing the skb, as xdp_do_generic_redirect callers only do that in case an error is returned. Since devmap entry prog is supported, remove the check in generic_xdp_install entirely. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210702111825.491065-5-memxor@gmail.com |
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Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi | 11941f8a85 |
bpf: cpumap: Implement generic cpumap
This change implements CPUMAP redirect support for generic XDP programs. The idea is to reuse the cpu map entry's queue that is used to push native xdp frames for redirecting skb to a different CPU. This will match native XDP behavior (in that RPS is invoked again for packet reinjected into networking stack). To be able to determine whether the incoming skb is from the driver or cpumap, we reuse skb->redirected bit that skips generic XDP processing when it is set. To always make use of this, CONFIG_NET_REDIRECT guard on it has been lifted and it is always available. >From the redirect side, we add the skb to ptr_ring with its lowest bit set to 1. This should be safe as skb is not 1-byte aligned. This allows kthread to discern between xdp_frames and sk_buff. On consumption of the ptr_ring item, the lowest bit is unset. In the end, the skb is simply added to the list that kthread is anyway going to maintain for xdp_frames converted to skb, and then received again by using netif_receive_skb_list. Bulking optimization for generic cpumap is left as an exercise for a future patch for now. Since cpumap entry progs are now supported, also remove check in generic_xdp_install for the cpumap. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210702111825.491065-4-memxor@gmail.com |
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Toke Høiland-Jørgensen | 0fc4dcc13f |
bpf, devmap: Convert remaining READ_ONCE() to rcu_dereference_check()
There were a couple of READ_ONCE()-invocations left-over by the devmap
RCU conversion. Convert these to rcu_dereference_check() as well to avoid
complaints from sparse.
Fixes:
|
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Jakub Kicinski | b6df00789e |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Trivial conflict in net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c. Duplicate fix in tools/testing/selftests/net/devlink_port_split.py - take the net-next version. skmsg, and L4 bpf - keep the bpf code but remove the flags and err params. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
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David S. Miller | e1289cfb63 |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2021-06-28 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. We've added 37 non-merge commits during the last 12 day(s) which contain a total of 56 files changed, 394 insertions(+), 380 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) XDP driver RCU cleanups, from Toke Høiland-Jørgensen and Paul E. McKenney. 2) Fix bpf_skb_change_proto() IPv4/v6 GSO handling, from Maciej Żenczykowski. 3) Fix false positive kmemleak report for BPF ringbuf alloc, from Rustam Kovhaev. 4) Fix x86 JIT's extable offset calculation for PROBE_LDX NULL, from Ravi Bangoria. 5) Enable libbpf fallback probing with tracing under RHEL7, from Jonathan Edwards. 6) Clean up x86 JIT to remove unused cnt tracking from EMIT macro, from Jiri Olsa. 7) Netlink cleanups for libbpf to please Coverity, from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi. 8) Allow to retrieve ancestor cgroup id in tracing programs, from Namhyung Kim. 9) Fix lirc BPF program query to use user-provided prog_cnt, from Sean Young. 10) Add initial libbpf doc including generated kdoc for its API, from Grant Seltzer. 11) Make xdp_rxq_info_unreg_mem_model() more robust, from Jakub Kicinski. 12) Fix up bpfilter startup log-level to info level, from Gary Lin. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
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Rustam Kovhaev | ccff81e1d0 |
bpf: Fix false positive kmemleak report in bpf_ringbuf_area_alloc()
kmemleak scans struct page, but it does not scan the page content. If we allocate some memory with kmalloc(), then allocate page with alloc_page(), and if we put kmalloc pointer somewhere inside that page, kmemleak will report kmalloc pointer as a false positive. We can instruct kmemleak to scan the memory area by calling kmemleak_alloc() and kmemleak_free(), but part of struct bpf_ringbuf is mmaped to user space, and if struct bpf_ringbuf changes we would have to revisit and review size argument in kmemleak_alloc(), because we do not want kmemleak to scan the user space memory. Let's simplify things and use kmemleak_not_leak() here. For posterity, also adding additional prior analysis from Andrii: I think either kmemleak or syzbot are misreporting this. I've added a bunch of printks around all allocations performed by BPF ringbuf. [...] On repro side I get these two warnings: [vmuser@archvm bpf]$ sudo ./repro BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88810d538c00 (size 64): comm "repro", pid 2140, jiffies 4294692933 (age 14.540s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 af 19 04 00 ea ff ff c0 ae 19 04 00 ea ff ff ................ 80 ae 19 04 00 ea ff ff c0 29 2e 04 00 ea ff ff .........)...... backtrace: [<0000000077bfbfbd>] __bpf_map_area_alloc+0x31/0xc0 [<00000000587fa522>] ringbuf_map_alloc.cold.4+0x48/0x218 [<0000000044d49e96>] __do_sys_bpf+0x359/0x1d90 [<00000000f601d565>] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 [<0000000043d3112a>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88810d538c80 (size 64): comm "repro", pid 2143, jiffies 4294699025 (age 8.448s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 80 aa 19 04 00 ea ff ff 00 ab 19 04 00 ea ff ff ................ c0 ab 19 04 00 ea ff ff 80 44 28 04 00 ea ff ff .........D(..... backtrace: [<0000000077bfbfbd>] __bpf_map_area_alloc+0x31/0xc0 [<00000000587fa522>] ringbuf_map_alloc.cold.4+0x48/0x218 [<0000000044d49e96>] __do_sys_bpf+0x359/0x1d90 [<00000000f601d565>] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 [<0000000043d3112a>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Note that both reported leaks (ffff88810d538c80 and ffff88810d538c00) correspond to pages array bpf_ringbuf is allocating and tracking properly internally. Note also that syzbot repro doesn't close FD of created BPF ringbufs, and even when ./repro itself exits with error, there are still two forked processes hanging around in my system. So clearly ringbuf maps are alive at that point. So reporting any memory leak looks weird at that point, because that memory is being used by active referenced BPF ringbuf. It's also a question why repro doesn't clean up its forks. But if I do a `pkill repro`, I do see that all the allocated memory is /properly/ cleaned up [and the] "leaks" are deallocated properly. BTW, if I add close() right after bpf() syscall in syzbot repro, I see that everything is immediately deallocated, like designed. And no memory leak is reported. So I don't think the problem is anywhere in bpf_ringbuf code, rather in the leak detection and/or repro itself. Reported-by: syzbot+5d895828587f49e7fe9b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com> [ Daniel: also included analysis from Andrii to the commit log ] Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: syzbot+5d895828587f49e7fe9b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzYk+dqs+jwu6VKXP-RttcTEGFe+ySTGWT9CRNkagDiJVA@mail.gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YNTAqiE7CWJhOK2M@nuc10 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210615101515.GC26027@arm.com Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5d895828587f49e7fe9b Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210626181156.1873604-1-rkovhaev@gmail.com |
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Toke Høiland-Jørgensen | 782347b6bc |
xdp: Add proper __rcu annotations to redirect map entries
XDP_REDIRECT works by a three-step process: the bpf_redirect() and bpf_redirect_map() helpers will lookup the target of the redirect and store it (along with some other metadata) in a per-CPU struct bpf_redirect_info. Next, when the program returns the XDP_REDIRECT return code, the driver will call xdp_do_redirect() which will use the information thus stored to actually enqueue the frame into a bulk queue structure (that differs slightly by map type, but shares the same principle). Finally, before exiting its NAPI poll loop, the driver will call xdp_do_flush(), which will flush all the different bulk queues, thus completing the redirect. Pointers to the map entries will be kept around for this whole sequence of steps, protected by RCU. However, there is no top-level rcu_read_lock() in the core code; instead drivers add their own rcu_read_lock() around the XDP portions of the code, but somewhat inconsistently as Martin discovered[0]. However, things still work because everything happens inside a single NAPI poll sequence, which means it's between a pair of calls to local_bh_disable()/local_bh_enable(). So Paul suggested[1] that we could document this intention by using rcu_dereference_check() with rcu_read_lock_bh_held() as a second parameter, thus allowing sparse and lockdep to verify that everything is done correctly. This patch does just that: we add an __rcu annotation to the map entry pointers and remove the various comments explaining the NAPI poll assurance strewn through devmap.c in favour of a longer explanation in filter.c. The goal is to have one coherent documentation of the entire flow, and rely on the RCU annotations as a "standard" way of communicating the flow in the map code (which can additionally be understood by sparse and lockdep). The RCU annotation replacements result in a fairly straight-forward replacement where READ_ONCE() becomes rcu_dereference_check(), WRITE_ONCE() becomes rcu_assign_pointer() and xchg() and cmpxchg() gets wrapped in the proper constructs to cast the pointer back and forth between __rcu and __kernel address space (for the benefit of sparse). The one complication is that xskmap has a few constructions where double-pointers are passed back and forth; these simply all gain __rcu annotations, and only the final reference/dereference to the inner-most pointer gets changed. With this, everything can be run through sparse without eliciting complaints, and lockdep can verify correctness even without the use of rcu_read_lock() in the drivers. Subsequent patches will clean these up from the drivers. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210415173551.7ma4slcbqeyiba2r@kafai-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com/ [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210419165837.GA975577@paulmck-ThinkPad-P17-Gen-1/ Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210624160609.292325-6-toke@redhat.com |
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Toke Høiland-Jørgensen | 694cea395f |
bpf: Allow RCU-protected lookups to happen from bh context
XDP programs are called from a NAPI poll context, which means the RCU reference liveness is ensured by local_bh_disable(). Add rcu_read_lock_bh_held() as a condition to the RCU checks for map lookups so lockdep understands that the dereferences are safe from inside *either* an rcu_read_lock() section *or* a local_bh_disable() section. While both bh_disabled and rcu_read_lock() provide RCU protection, they are semantically distinct, so we need both conditions to prevent lockdep complaints. This change is done in preparation for removing the redundant rcu_read_lock()s from drivers. Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210624160609.292325-5-toke@redhat.com |
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John Fastabend | 7506d211b9 |
bpf: Fix null ptr deref with mixed tail calls and subprogs
The sub-programs prog->aux->poke_tab[] is populated in jit_subprogs() and
then used when emitting 'BPF_JMP|BPF_TAIL_CALL' insn->code from the
individual JITs. The poke_tab[] to use is stored in the insn->imm by
the code adding it to that array slot. The JIT then uses imm to find the
right entry for an individual instruction. In the x86 bpf_jit_comp.c
this is done by calling emit_bpf_tail_call_direct with the poke_tab[]
of the imm value.
However, we observed the below null-ptr-deref when mixing tail call
programs with subprog programs. For this to happen we just need to
mix bpf-2-bpf calls and tailcalls with some extra calls or instructions
that would be patched later by one of the fixup routines. So whats
happening?
Before the fixup_call_args() -- where the jit op is done -- various
code patching is done by do_misc_fixups(). This may increase the
insn count, for example when we patch map_lookup_up using map_gen_lookup
hook. This does two things. First, it means the instruction index,
insn_idx field, of a tail call instruction will move by a 'delta'.
In verifier code,
struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = {
.reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL,
.tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state),
.tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux),
.insn_idx = i + delta,
};
Then subprog start values subprog_info[i].start will be updated
with the delta and any poke descriptor index will also be updated
with the delta in adjust_poke_desc(). If we look at the adjust
subprog starts though we see its only adjusted when the delta
occurs before the new instructions,
/* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */
for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off)
continue;
Earlier subprograms are not changed because their start values
are not moved. But, adjust_poke_desc() does the offset + delta
indiscriminately. The result is poke descriptors are potentially
corrupted.
Then in jit_subprogs() we only populate the poke_tab[]
when the above insn_idx is less than the next subprogram start. From
above we corrupted our insn_idx so we might incorrectly assume a
poke descriptor is not used in a subprogram omitting it from the
subprogram. And finally when the jit runs it does the deref of poke_tab
when emitting the instruction and crashes with below. Because earlier
step omitted the poke descriptor.
The fix is straight forward with above context. Simply move same logic
from adjust_subprog_starts() into adjust_poke_descs() and only adjust
insn_idx when needed.
[ 82.396354] bpf_testmod: version magic '5.12.0-rc2alu+ SMP preempt mod_unload ' should be '5.12.0+ SMP preempt mod_unload '
[ 82.623001] loop10: detected capacity change from 0 to 8
[ 88.487424] ==================================================================
[ 88.487438] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in do_jit+0x184a/0x3290
[ 88.487455] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000008 by task test_progs/5295
[ 88.487471] CPU: 7 PID: 5295 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G I 5.12.0+ #386
[ 88.487483] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019
[ 88.487490] Call Trace:
[ 88.487498] dump_stack+0x93/0xc2
[ 88.487515] kasan_report.cold+0x5f/0xd8
[ 88.487530] ? do_jit+0x184a/0x3290
[ 88.487542] do_jit+0x184a/0x3290
...
[ 88.487709] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x248/0x810
...
[ 88.487765] bpf_check+0x3718/0x5140
...
[ 88.487920] bpf_prog_load+0xa22/0xf10
Fixes:
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Bui Quang Minh | 7dd5d437c2 |
bpf: Fix integer overflow in argument calculation for bpf_map_area_alloc
In 32-bit architecture, the result of sizeof() is a 32-bit integer so the expression becomes the multiplication between 2 32-bit integer which can potentially leads to integer overflow. As a result, bpf_map_area_alloc() allocates less memory than needed. Fix this by casting 1 operand to u64. Fixes: |
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Maciej Żenczykowski | 5dec6d96d1 |
bpf: Fix regression on BPF_OBJ_GET with non-O_RDWR flags
This reverts commit |
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Jakub Kicinski | adc2e56ebe |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Trivial conflicts in net/can/isotp.c and tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.sh scaled_ppm_to_ppb() was moved from drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c to include/linux/ptp_clock_kernel.h in -next so re-apply the fix there. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
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David S. Miller | a52171ae7b |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2021-06-17 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. We've added 50 non-merge commits during the last 25 day(s) which contain a total of 148 files changed, 4779 insertions(+), 1248 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) BPF infrastructure to migrate TCP child sockets from a listener to another in the same reuseport group/map, from Kuniyuki Iwashima. 2) Add a provably sound, faster and more precise algorithm for tnum_mul() as noted in https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.05398, from Harishankar Vishwanathan. 3) Streamline error reporting changes in libbpf as planned out in the 'libbpf: the road to v1.0' effort, from Andrii Nakryiko. 4) Add broadcast support to xdp_redirect_map(), from Hangbin Liu. 5) Extends bpf_map_lookup_and_delete_elem() functionality to 4 more map types, that is, {LRU_,PERCPU_,LRU_PERCPU_,}HASH, from Denis Salopek. 6) Support new LLVM relocations in libbpf to make them more linker friendly, also add a doc to describe the BPF backend relocations, from Yonghong Song. 7) Silence long standing KUBSAN complaints on register-based shifts in interpreter, from Daniel Borkmann and Eric Biggers. 8) Add dummy PT_REGS macros in libbpf to fail BPF program compilation when target arch cannot be determined, from Lorenz Bauer. 9) Extend AF_XDP to support large umems with 1M+ pages, from Magnus Karlsson. 10) Fix two minor libbpf tc BPF API issues, from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi. 11) Move libbpf BPF_SEQ_PRINTF/BPF_SNPRINTF macros that can be used by BPF programs to bpf_helpers.h header, from Florent Revest. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
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Daniel Borkmann | 28131e9d93 |
bpf: Fix up register-based shifts in interpreter to silence KUBSAN
syzbot reported a shift-out-of-bounds that KUBSAN observed in the interpreter: [...] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in kernel/bpf/core.c:1420:2 shift exponent 255 is too large for 64-bit type 'long long unsigned int' CPU: 1 PID: 11097 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327 ___bpf_prog_run.cold+0x19/0x56c kernel/bpf/core.c:1420 __bpf_prog_run32+0x8f/0xd0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1735 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:644 [inline] bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu include/linux/filter.h:624 [inline] bpf_prog_run_clear_cb include/linux/filter.h:755 [inline] run_filter+0x1a1/0x470 net/packet/af_packet.c:2031 packet_rcv+0x313/0x13e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:2104 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x7c2/0xa90 net/core/dev.c:2387 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3588 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xad/0x920 net/core/dev.c:3609 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2121/0x2e00 net/core/dev.c:4182 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2116 [inline] __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2141 [inline] __bpf_redirect+0x548/0xc80 net/core/filter.c:2164 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2448 [inline] bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core/filter.c:2420 ___bpf_prog_run+0x34e1/0x77d0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1523 __bpf_prog_run512+0x99/0xe0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1737 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:644 [inline] bpf_test_run+0x3ed/0xc50 net/bpf/test_run.c:50 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xabc/0x1c50 net/bpf/test_run.c:582 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3127 [inline] __do_sys_bpf+0x1ea9/0x4f00 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4406 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [...] Generally speaking, KUBSAN reports from the kernel should be fixed. However, in case of BPF, this particular report caused concerns since the large shift is not wrong from BPF point of view, just undefined. In the verifier, K-based shifts that are >= {64,32} (depending on the bitwidth of the instruction) are already rejected. The register-based cases were not given their content might not be known at verification time. Ideas such as verifier instruction rewrite with an additional AND instruction for the source register were brought up, but regularly rejected due to the additional runtime overhead they incur. As Edward Cree rightly put it: Shifts by more than insn bitness are legal in the BPF ISA; they are implementation-defined behaviour [of the underlying architecture], rather than UB, and have been made legal for performance reasons. Each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF shift operations to machine instructions which produce implementation-defined results in such a case; the resulting contents of the register may be arbitrary but program behaviour as a whole remains defined. Guard checks in the fast path (i.e. affecting JITted code) will thus not be accepted. The case of division by zero is not truly analogous here, as division instructions on many of the JIT-targeted architectures will raise a machine exception / fault on division by zero, whereas (to the best of my knowledge) none will do so on an out-of-bounds shift. Given the KUBSAN report only affects the BPF interpreter, but not JITs, one solution is to add the ANDs with 63 or 31 into ___bpf_prog_run(). That would make the shifts defined, and thus shuts up KUBSAN, and the compiler would optimize out the AND on any CPU that interprets the shift amounts modulo the width anyway (e.g., confirmed from disassembly that on x86-64 and arm64 the generated interpreter code is the same before and after this fix). The BPF interpreter is slow path, and most likely compiled out anyway as distros select BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON to avoid speculative execution of BPF instructions by the interpreter. Given the main argument was to avoid sacrificing performance, the fact that the AND is optimized away from compiler for mainstream archs helps as well as a solution moving forward. Also add a comment on LSH/RSH/ARSH translation for JIT authors to provide guidance when they see the ___bpf_prog_run() interpreter code and use it as a model for a new JIT backend. Reported-by: syzbot+bed360704c521841c85d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Kurt Manucredo <fuzzybritches0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Tested-by: syzbot+bed360704c521841c85d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000008f912605bd30d5d7@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/bac16d8d-c174-bdc4-91bd-bfa62b410190@gmail.com |
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Shuyi Cheng | 712b78c697 |
bpf: Fix typo in kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
Fix s/sleeable/sleepable/ typo in a comment. Signed-off-by: Shuyi Cheng <chengshuyi@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1623809076-97907-1-git-send-email-chengshuyi@linux.alibaba.com |
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Kuniyuki Iwashima | d5e4ddaeb6 |
bpf: Support socket migration by eBPF.
This patch introduces a new bpf_attach_type for BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT
to check if the attached eBPF program is capable of migrating sockets. When
the eBPF program is attached, we run it for socket migration if the
expected_attach_type is BPF_SK_REUSEPORT_SELECT_OR_MIGRATE or
net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req is enabled.
Currently, the expected_attach_type is not enforced for the
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT type of program. Thus, this commit follows the
earlier idea in the commit
|
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Daniel Borkmann | 9183671af6 |
bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches
The verifier only enumerates valid control-flow paths and skips paths that
are unreachable in the non-speculative domain. And so it can miss issues
under speculative execution on mispredicted branches.
For example, a type confusion has been demonstrated with the following
crafted program:
// r0 = pointer to a map array entry
// r6 = pointer to readable stack slot
// r9 = scalar controlled by attacker
1: r0 = *(u64 *)(r0) // cache miss
2: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 4
3: r6 = r9
4: if r0 != 0x1 goto line 6
5: r9 = *(u8 *)(r6)
6: // leak r9
Since line 3 runs iff r0 == 0 and line 5 runs iff r0 == 1, the verifier
concludes that the pointer dereference on line 5 is safe. But: if the
attacker trains both the branches to fall-through, such that the following
is speculatively executed ...
r6 = r9
r9 = *(u8 *)(r6)
// leak r9
... then the program will dereference an attacker-controlled value and could
leak its content under speculative execution via side-channel. This requires
to mistrain the branch predictor, which can be rather tricky, because the
branches are mutually exclusive. However such training can be done at
congruent addresses in user space using different branches that are not
mutually exclusive. That is, by training branches in user space ...
A: if r0 != 0x0 goto line C
B: ...
C: if r0 != 0x0 goto line D
D: ...
... such that addresses A and C collide to the same CPU branch prediction
entries in the PHT (pattern history table) as those of the BPF program's
lines 2 and 4, respectively. A non-privileged attacker could simply brute
force such collisions in the PHT until observing the attack succeeding.
Alternative methods to mistrain the branch predictor are also possible that
avoid brute forcing the collisions in the PHT. A reliable attack has been
demonstrated, for example, using the following crafted program:
// r0 = pointer to a [control] map array entry
// r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0), training/attack phase
// r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 8), oob address
// [...]
// r0 = pointer to a [data] map array entry
1: if r7 == 0x3 goto line 3
2: r8 = r0
// crafted sequence of conditional jumps to separate the conditional
// branch in line 193 from the current execution flow
3: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 5
4: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
5: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 7
6: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
[...]
187: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 189
188: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
// load any slowly-loaded value (due to cache miss in phase 3) ...
189: r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0x1200)
// ... and turn it into known zero for verifier, while preserving slowly-
// loaded dependency when executing:
190: r3 &= 1
191: r3 &= 2
// speculatively bypassed phase dependency
192: r7 += r3
193: if r7 == 0x3 goto exit
194: r4 = *(u8 *)(r8 + 0)
// leak r4
As can be seen, in training phase (phase != 0x3), the condition in line 1
turns into false and therefore r8 with the oob address is overridden with
the valid map value address, which in line 194 we can read out without
issues. However, in attack phase, line 2 is skipped, and due to the cache
miss in line 189 where the map value is (zeroed and later) added to the
phase register, the condition in line 193 takes the fall-through path due
to prior branch predictor training, where under speculation, it'll load the
byte at oob address r8 (unknown scalar type at that point) which could then
be leaked via side-channel.
One way to mitigate these is to 'branch off' an unreachable path, meaning,
the current verification path keeps following the is_branch_taken() path
and we push the other branch to the verification stack. Given this is
unreachable from the non-speculative domain, this branch's vstate is
explicitly marked as speculative. This is needed for two reasons: i) if
this path is solely seen from speculative execution, then we later on still
want the dead code elimination to kick in in order to sanitize these
instructions with jmp-1s, and ii) to ensure that paths walked in the
non-speculative domain are not pruned from earlier walks of paths walked in
the speculative domain. Additionally, for robustness, we mark the registers
which have been part of the conditional as unknown in the speculative path
given there should be no assumptions made on their content.
The fix in here mitigates type confusion attacks described earlier due to
i) all code paths in the BPF program being explored and ii) existing
verifier logic already ensuring that given memory access instruction
references one specific data structure.
An alternative to this fix that has also been looked at in this scope was to
mark aux->alu_state at the jump instruction with a BPF_JMP_TAKEN state as
well as direction encoding (always-goto, always-fallthrough, unknown), such
that mixing of different always-* directions themselves as well as mixing of
always-* with unknown directions would cause a program rejection by the
verifier, e.g. programs with constructs like 'if ([...]) { x = 0; } else
{ x = 1; }' with subsequent 'if (x == 1) { [...] }'. For unprivileged, this
would result in only single direction always-* taken paths, and unknown taken
paths being allowed, such that the former could be patched from a conditional
jump to an unconditional jump (ja). Compared to this approach here, it would
have two downsides: i) valid programs that otherwise are not performing any
pointer arithmetic, etc, would potentially be rejected/broken, and ii) we are
required to turn off path pruning for unprivileged, where both can be avoided
in this work through pushing the invalid branch to the verification stack.
The issue was originally discovered by Adam and Ofek, and later independently
discovered and reported as a result of Benedict and Piotr's research work.
Fixes:
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Daniel Borkmann | fe9a5ca7e3 |
bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative path verification
... in such circumstances, we do not want to mark the instruction as seen given the goal is still to jmp-1 rewrite/sanitize dead code, if it is not reachable from the non-speculative path verification. We do however want to verify it for safety regardless. With the patch as-is all the insns that have been marked as seen before the patch will also be marked as seen after the patch (just with a potentially different non-zero count). An upcoming patch will also verify paths that are unreachable in the non-speculative domain, hence this extension is needed. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
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Daniel Borkmann | d203b0fd86 |
bpf: Inherit expanded/patched seen count from old aux data
Instead of relying on current env->pass_cnt, use the seen count from the old aux data in adjust_insn_aux_data(), and expand it to the new range of patched instructions. This change is valid given we always expand 1:n with n>=1, so what applies to the old/original instruction needs to apply for the replacement as well. Not relying on env->pass_cnt is a prerequisite for a later change where we want to avoid marking an instruction seen when verified under speculative execution path. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |