Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation
on AMD Processors" whitepaper.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Update the doc with the new fun.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to
refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space
randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two
four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also
point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within
the same sentence.
Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to
the config that provides that.
Fixes: 6e88559470 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Merge tag 'kernel.sys.v5.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull prctl updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains the missing prctl uapi pieces for PR_SCHED_CORE.
In order to activate core scheduling the caller is expected to specify
the scope of the new core scheduling domain.
For example, passing 2 in the 4th argument of
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE, <pid>, 2, 0);
would indicate that the new core scheduling domain encompasses all
tasks in the process group of <pid>. Specifying 0 would only create a
core scheduling domain for the thread identified by <pid> and 2 would
encompass the whole thread-group of <pid>.
Note, the values 0, 1, and 2 correspond to PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID,
and PIDTYPE_PGID. A first version tried to expose those values
directly to which I objected because:
- PIDTYPE_* is an enum that is kernel internal which we should not
expose to userspace directly.
- PIDTYPE_* indicates what a given struct pid is used for it doesn't
express a scope.
But what the 4th argument of PR_SCHED_CORE prctl() expresses is the
scope of the operation, i.e. the scope of the core scheduling domain
at creation time. So Eugene's patch now simply introduces three new
defines PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD, PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP,
and PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP. They simply express what
happens.
This has been on the mailing list for quite a while with all relevant
scheduler folks Cced. I announced multiple times that I'd pick this up
if I don't see or her anyone else doing it. None of this touches
proper scheduler code but only concerns uapi so I think this is fine.
With core scheduling being quite common now for vm managers (e.g.
moving individual vcpu threads into their own core scheduling domain)
and container managers (e.g. moving the init process into its own core
scheduling domain and letting all created children inherit it) having
to rely on raw numbers passed as the 4th argument in prctl() is a bit
annoying and everyone is starting to come up with their own defines"
* tag 'kernel.sys.v5.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
uapi/linux/prctl: provide macro definitions for the PR_SCHED_CORE type argument
This would need updating to make prctl be the new default, but it's
simpler to delete it and refer to the dup.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201105001406.13005-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Switch the kernel default of SSBD and STIBP to the ones with
CONFIG_SECCOMP=n (i.e. spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl
spectre_v2_user=prctl) even if CONFIG_SECCOMP=y.
Several motivations listed below:
- If SMT is enabled the seccomp jail can still attack the rest of the
system even with spectre_v2_user=seccomp by using MDS-HT (except on
XEON PHI where MDS can be tamed with SMT left enabled, but that's a
special case). Setting STIBP become a very expensive window dressing
after MDS-HT was discovered.
- The seccomp jail cannot attack the kernel with spectre-v2-HT
regardless (even if STIBP is not set), but with MDS-HT the seccomp
jail can attack the kernel too.
- With spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl the seccomp jail can attack the
other userland (guest or host mode) using spectre-v2-HT, but the
userland attack is already mitigated by both ASLR and pid namespaces
for host userland and through virt isolation with libkrun or
kata. (if something if somebody is worried about spectre-v2-HT it's
best to mount proc with hidepid=2,gid=proc on workstations where not
all apps may run under container runtimes, rather than slowing down
all seccomp jails, but the best is to add pid namespaces to the
seccomp jail). As opposed MDS-HT is not mitigated and the seccomp
jail can still attack all other host and guest userland if SMT is
enabled even with spec_store_bypass_disable=seccomp.
- If full security is required then MDS-HT must also be mitigated with
nosmt and then spectre_v2_user=prctl and spectre_v2_user=seccomp
would become identical.
- Setting spectre_v2_user=seccomp is overall lower priority than to
setting javascript.options.wasm false in about:config to protect
against remote wasm MDS-HT, instead of worrying about Spectre-v2-HT
and STIBP which again is already statistically well mitigated by
other means in userland and it's fully mitigated in kernel with
retpolines (unlike the wasm assist call with MDS-HT).
- SSBD is needed to prevent reading the JIT memory and the primary
user being the OpenJDK. However the primary user of SSBD wouldn't be
covered by spec_store_bypass_disable=seccomp because it doesn't use
seccomp and the primary user also explicitly declined to set
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL+PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS despite it easily
could. In fact it would need to set it only when the sandboxing
mechanism is enabled for javaws applets, but it still declined it by
declaring security within the same user address space as an
untenable objective for their JIT, even in the sandboxing case where
performance would be a lesser concern (for the record: I kind of
disagree in not setting PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS in the sandbox case and
I prefer to run javaws through a wrapper that sets
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS if I need). In turn it can be inferred that
even if the primary user of SSBD would use seccomp, they would
invoke it with SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW by now.
- runc/crun already set SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW by default, k8s
and podman have a default json seccomp allowlist that cannot be
slowed down, so for the #1 seccomp user this change is already a
noop.
- systemd/sshd or other apps that use seccomp, if they really need
STIBP or SSBD, they need to explicitly set the
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL by now. The stibp/ssbd seccomp blind
catch-all approach was done probably initially with a wishful
thinking objective to pretend to have a peace of mind that it could
magically fix it all. That was wishful thinking before MDS-HT was
discovered, but after MDS-HT has been discovered it become just
window dressing.
- For qemu "-sandbox" seccomp jail it wouldn't make sense to set STIBP
or SSBD. SSBD doesn't help with KVM because there's no JIT (if it's
needed with TCG it should be an opt-in with
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL+PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS and it shouldn't
slowdown KVM for nothing). For qemu+KVM STIBP would be even more
window dressing than it is for all other apps, because in the
qemu+KVM case there's not only the MDS attack to worry about with
SMT enabled. Even after disabling SMT, there's still a theoretical
spectre-v2 attack possible within the same thread context from guest
mode to host ring3 that the host kernel retpoline mitigation has no
theoretical chance to mitigate. On some kernels a
ibrs-always/ibrs-retpoline opt-in model is provided that will
enabled IBRS in the qemu host ring3 userland which fixes this
theoretical concern. Only after enabling IBRS in the host userland
it would then make sense to proceed and worry about STIBP and an
attack on the other host userland, but then again SMT would need to
be disabled for full security anyway, so that would render STIBP
again a noop.
- last but not the least: the lack of "spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl
spectre_v2_user=prctl" means the moment a guest boots and
sshd/systemd runs, the guest kernel will write to SPEC_CTRL MSR
which will make the guest vmexit forever slower, forcing KVM to
issue a very slow rdmsr instruction at every vmexit. So the end
result is that SPEC_CTRL MSR is only available in GCE. Most other
public cloud providers don't expose SPEC_CTRL, which means that not
only STIBP/SSBD isn't available, but IBPB isn't available either
(which would cause no overhead to the guest or the hypervisor
because it's write only and requires no reading during vmexit). So
the current default already net loss in security (missing IBPB)
which means most public cloud providers cannot achieve a fully
secure guest with nosmt (and nosmt is enough to fully mitigate
MDS-HT). It also means GCE and is unfairly penalized in performance
because it provides the option to enable full security in the guest
as an opt-in (i.e. nosmt and IBPB). So this change will allow all
cloud providers to expose SPEC_CTRL without incurring into any
hypervisor slowdown and at the same time it will remove the unfair
penalization of GCE performance for doing the right thing and it'll
allow to get full security with nosmt with IBPB being available (and
STIBP becoming meaningless).
Example to put things in prospective: the STIBP enabled in seccomp has
never been about protecting apps using seccomp like sshd from an
attack from a malicious userland, but to the contrary it has always
been about protecting the system from an attack from sshd, after a
successful remote network exploit against sshd. In fact initially it
wasn't obvious STIBP would work both ways (STIBP was about preventing
the task that runs with STIBP to be attacked with spectre-v2-HT, but
accidentally in the STIBP case it also prevents the attack in the
other direction). In the hypothetical case that sshd has been remotely
exploited the last concern should be STIBP being set, because it'll be
still possible to obtain info even from the kernel by using MDS if
nosmt wasn't set (and if it was set, STIBP is a noop in the first
place). As opposed kernel cannot leak anything with spectre-v2 HT
because of retpolines and the userland is mitigated by ASLR already
and ideally PID namespaces too. If something it'd be worth checking if
sshd run the seccomp thread under pid namespaces too if available in
the running kernel. SSBD also would be a noop for sshd, since sshd
uses no JIT. If sshd prefers to keep doing the STIBP window dressing
exercise, it still can even after this change of defaults by opting-in
with PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH.
Ultimately setting SSBD and STIBP by default for all seccomp jails is
a bad sweet spot and bad default with more cons than pros that end up
reducing security in the public cloud (by giving an huge incentive to
not expose SPEC_CTRL which would be needed to get full security with
IBPB after setting nosmt in the guest) and by excessively hurting
performance to more secure apps using seccomp that end up having to
opt out with SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW.
The following is the verified result of the new default with SMT
enabled:
(gdb) print spectre_v2_user_stibp
$1 = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL
(gdb) print spectre_v2_user_ibpb
$2 = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL
(gdb) print ssb_mode
$3 = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201104235054.5678-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/AAA2EF2C-293D-4D5B-BFA6-FF655105CD84@redhat.com
Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c0722838-06f7-da6b-138f-e0f26362f16a@redhat.com
Commit 7ac592aa35 ("sched: prctl() core-scheduling interface")
made use of enum pid_type in prctl's arg4; this type and the associated
enumeration definitions are not exposed to userspace. Christian
has suggested to provide additional macro definitions that convey
the meaning of the type argument more in alignment with its actual
usage, and this patch does exactly that.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210825170613.GA3884@asgard.redhat.com
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Complements: 7ac592aa35 ("sched: prctl() core-scheduling interface")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
- A reworking of PDF generation to yield better results for documents
using CJK fonts in particular.
- A new set of translations into traditional Chinese, a dialect for which
I am assured there is a community of interested readers.
- A lot more regular Chinese translation work as well.
...plus the usual assortment of updates, fixes, typo tweaks, etc.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.15' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"Yet another set of documentation changes:
- A reworking of PDF generation to yield better results for documents
using CJK fonts in particular.
- A new set of translations into traditional Chinese, a dialect for
which I am assured there is a community of interested readers.
- A lot more regular Chinese translation work as well.
... plus the usual assortment of updates, fixes, typo tweaks, etc"
* tag 'docs-5.15' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (55 commits)
docs: sphinx-requirements: Move sphinx_rtd_theme to top
docs: pdfdocs: Enable language-specific font choice of zh_TW translations
docs: pdfdocs: Teach xeCJK about character classes of quotation marks
docs: pdfdocs: Permit AutoFakeSlant for CJK fonts
docs: pdfdocs: One-half spacing for CJK translations
docs: pdfdocs: Add conf.py local to translations for ascii-art alignment
docs: pdfdocs: Preserve inter-phrase space in Korean translations
docs: pdfdocs: Choose Serif font as CJK mainfont if possible
docs: pdfdocs: Add CJK-language-specific font settings
docs: pdfdocs: Refactor config for CJK document
scripts/kernel-doc: Override -Werror from KCFLAGS with KDOC_WERROR
docs/zh_CN: Add zh_CN/accounting/psi.rst
doc: align Italian translation
Documentation/features/vm: riscv supports THP now
docs/zh_CN: add infiniband user_verbs translation
docs/zh_CN: add infiniband user_mad translation
docs/zh_CN: add infiniband tag_matching translation
docs/zh_CN: add infiniband sysfs translation
docs/zh_CN: add infiniband opa_vnic translation
docs/zh_CN: add infiniband ipoib translation
...
Add documentation of l1d flushing, explain the need for the
feature and how it can be used.
Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108121056.21940-6-sblbir@amazon.com
Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of
making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered
untrusted".
Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai <Vineeth.Pillai@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joelaf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210721190250.26095-1-fmdefrancesco@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
- Some kernel-doc cleanups. That script is still regex onslaught from
hell, but it has gotten a little better.
- Improvements to the checkpatch docs, which are also used by the tool
itself.
- A major update to the pathname lookup documentation.
- Elimination of :doc: markup, since our automarkup magic can create
references from filenames without all the extra noise.
- The flurry of Chinese translation activity continues.
Plus, of course, the usual collection of updates, typo fixes, and warning
fixes.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.14' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"This was a reasonably active cycle for documentation; this includes:
- Some kernel-doc cleanups. That script is still regex onslaught from
hell, but it has gotten a little better.
- Improvements to the checkpatch docs, which are also used by the
tool itself.
- A major update to the pathname lookup documentation.
- Elimination of :doc: markup, since our automarkup magic can create
references from filenames without all the extra noise.
- The flurry of Chinese translation activity continues.
Plus, of course, the usual collection of updates, typo fixes, and
warning fixes"
* tag 'docs-5.14' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (115 commits)
docs: path-lookup: use bare function() rather than literals
docs: path-lookup: update symlink description
docs: path-lookup: update get_link() ->follow_link description
docs: path-lookup: update WALK_GET, WALK_PUT desc
docs: path-lookup: no get_link()
docs: path-lookup: update i_op->put_link and cookie description
docs: path-lookup: i_op->follow_link replaced with i_op->get_link
docs: path-lookup: Add macro name to symlink limit description
docs: path-lookup: remove filename_mountpoint
docs: path-lookup: update do_last() part
docs: path-lookup: update path_mountpoint() part
docs: path-lookup: update path_to_nameidata() part
docs: path-lookup: update follow_managed() part
docs: Makefile: Use CONFIG_SHELL not SHELL
docs: Take a little noise out of the build process
docs: x86: avoid using ReST :doc:`foo` markup
docs: virt: kvm: s390-pv-boot.rst: avoid using ReST :doc:`foo` markup
docs: userspace-api: landlock.rst: avoid using ReST :doc:`foo` markup
docs: trace: ftrace.rst: avoid using ReST :doc:`foo` markup
docs: trace: coresight: coresight.rst: avoid using ReST :doc:`foo` markup
...
Now that core scheduling is merged, update the documentation.
Co-developed-by: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Co-developed-by: Josh Don <joshdon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Don <joshdon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210603013136.370918-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
On systems that have virtualization disabled or unsupported, sysfs
mitigation for X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT is reported incorrectly as:
$ cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
KVM: Vulnerable
System is not vulnerable to DoS attack from a rogue guest when
virtualization is disabled or unsupported in the hardware. Change the
mitigation reporting for these cases.
Fixes: b8e8c8303f ("kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation")
Reported-by: Nelson Dsouza <nelson.dsouza@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0ba029932a816179b9d14a30db38f0f11ef1f166.1594925782.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
The lengths of underlines must match the titles to avoid build warnings.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross<mgross@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200615203645.11545-1-xypron.glpk@gmx.de
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull x86 srbds fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"The 9th episode of the dime novel "The performance killer" with the
subtitle "Slow Randomizing Boosts Denial of Service".
SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from
the random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New
microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of
RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten
before it is released for reuse. This is equivalent to a full bus
lock, which means that many threads running the RNG instructions in
parallel have the same effect as the same amount of threads issuing a
locked instruction targeting an address which requires locking of two
cachelines at once.
The mitigation support comes with the usual pile of unpleasant
ingredients:
- command line options
- sysfs file
- microcode checks
- a list of vulnerable CPUs identified by model and stepping this
time which requires stepping match support for the cpu match logic.
- the inevitable slowdown of affected CPUs"
* branch 'x86/srbds' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list
x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation
x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation
x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()
There are 4 IRQ documentation files under Documentation/*.txt.
Move them into a new directory (core-api/irq) and add a new
index file for it.
While here, use a title markup for the Debugging section of the
irq-domain.rst file.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2da7485c3718e1442e6b4c2dd66857b776e8899b.1588345503.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The virt_mechanism reference there points to a section
called elsewhere (Virtualization mitigation). Also, it is
not used anywere.
Besides that, it conflicts with a label with the same name
inside:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
Perhaps added due to some cut-and-paste?
Anyway, as this is not used, let's just get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/681c8e2916bf4943ac2277f181668bfbc5fdbc01.1583250595.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.
For example, with only the "mds=off" option:
vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable
The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.
Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.
Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.
[ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]
Fixes: 1b42f01741 ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.com
Add the initial ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation.
[ tglx: Add it to the index so it gets actually built. ]
Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Nelson D'Souza <nelson.dsouza@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Add the documenation for TSX Async Abort. Include the description of
the issue, how to check the mitigation state, control the mitigation,
guidance for system administrators.
[ bp: Add proper SPDX tags, touch ups by Josh and me. ]
Co-developed-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Add documentation to the Spectre document about the new swapgs variant of
Spectre v1.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
There are lots of documents that belong to the admin-guide but
are on random places (most under Documentation root dir).
Move them to the admin guide.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
- A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more
than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with other
trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on the wings
that, I think, will go to you directly later on.
- A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos, and one
on Spectre vulnerabilities.
- Various improvements to the build system, including automatic markup of
function() references because some people, for reasons I will never
understand, were of the opinion that :c:func:``function()`` is
unattractive and not fun to type.
- We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.
- Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull Documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"It's been a relatively busy cycle for docs:
- A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more
than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with
other trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on
the wings that, I think, will go to you directly later on.
- A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos,
and one on Spectre vulnerabilities.
- Various improvements to the build system, including automatic
markup of function() references because some people, for reasons I
will never understand, were of the opinion that
:c:func:``function()`` is unattractive and not fun to type.
- We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.
- Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc"
* tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (129 commits)
docs: automarkup.py: ignore exceptions when seeking for xrefs
docs: Move binderfs to admin-guide
Disable Sphinx SmartyPants in HTML output
doc: RCU callback locks need only _bh, not necessarily _irq
docs: format kernel-parameters -- as code
Doc : doc-guide : Fix a typo
platform: x86: get rid of a non-existent document
Add the RCU docs to the core-api manual
Documentation: RCU: Add TOC tree hooks
Documentation: RCU: Rename txt files to rst
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU UP systems to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU linked list to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU basic concepts to reST
docs: filesystems: Remove uneeded .rst extension on toctables
scripts/sphinx-pre-install: fix out-of-tree build
docs: zh_CN: submitting-drivers.rst: Remove a duplicated Documentation/
Documentation: PGP: update for newer HW devices
Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre
Documentation: platform: Delete x86-laptop-drivers.txt
docs: Note that :c:func: should no longer be used
...
Add documentation for Spectre vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms:
- Explain the problem and risks
- Document the mitigation mechanisms
- Document the command line controls
- Document the sysfs files
Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Convert the cgroup-v1 files to ReST format, in order to
allow a later addition to the admin-guide.
The conversion is actually:
- add blank lines and identation in order to identify paragraphs;
- fix tables markups;
- add some lists markups;
- mark literal blocks;
- adjust title markups.
At its new index.rst, let's add a :orphan: while this is not linked to
the main index.rst file, in order to avoid build warnings.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Adjust the last two rows in the table that display possible values when
MDS mitigation is enabled. They both were slightly innacurate.
In addition, convert the table of possible values and their descriptions
to a list-table. The simple table format uses the top border of equals
signs to determine cell width which resulted in the first column being
far too wide in comparison to the second column that contained the
majority of the text.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Updated the documentation for a new CVE-2019-11091 Microarchitectural Data
Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) which is a variant of
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS). MDS is a family of side channel
attacks on internal buffers in Intel CPUs.
MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from
memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural
structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by
MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS. There are no new code changes expected for MDSUM.
The existing mitigation for MDS applies to MDSUM as well.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Add the mds=full,nosmt cmdline option. This is like mds=full, but with
SMT disabled if the CPU is vulnerable.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the
side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level
entry. Should have done that right away.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
