- Better machine check handling for HV KVM
- Ability to support guests with threads=2, 4 or 8 on POWER9
- Fix for a race that could cause delayed recognition of signals
- Fix for a bug where POWER9 guests could sleep with interrupts pending.
ARM:
- VCPU request overhaul
- allow timer and PMU to have their interrupt number selected from userspace
- workaround for Cavium erratum 30115
- handling of memory poisonning
- the usual crop of fixes and cleanups
s390:
- initial machine check forwarding
- migration support for the CMMA page hinting information
- cleanups and fixes
x86:
- nested VMX bugfixes and improvements
- more reliable NMI window detection on AMD
- APIC timer optimizations
Generic:
- VCPU request overhaul + documentation of common code patterns
- kvm_stat improvements
There is a small conflict in arch/s390 due to an arch-wide field rename.
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"PPC:
- Better machine check handling for HV KVM
- Ability to support guests with threads=2, 4 or 8 on POWER9
- Fix for a race that could cause delayed recognition of signals
- Fix for a bug where POWER9 guests could sleep with interrupts pending.
ARM:
- VCPU request overhaul
- allow timer and PMU to have their interrupt number selected from userspace
- workaround for Cavium erratum 30115
- handling of memory poisonning
- the usual crop of fixes and cleanups
s390:
- initial machine check forwarding
- migration support for the CMMA page hinting information
- cleanups and fixes
x86:
- nested VMX bugfixes and improvements
- more reliable NMI window detection on AMD
- APIC timer optimizations
Generic:
- VCPU request overhaul + documentation of common code patterns
- kvm_stat improvements"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (124 commits)
Update my email address
kvm: vmx: allow host to access guest MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS
x86: kvm: mmu: use ept a/d in vmcs02 iff used in vmcs12
kvm: x86: mmu: allow A/D bits to be disabled in an mmu
x86: kvm: mmu: make spte mmio mask more explicit
x86: kvm: mmu: dead code thanks to access tracking
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Fix typo in XICS-on-XIVE state saving code
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Close race with testing for signals on guest entry
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Simplify dynamic micro-threading code
KVM: x86: remove ignored type attribute
KVM: LAPIC: Fix lapic timer injection delay
KVM: lapic: reorganize restart_apic_timer
KVM: lapic: reorganize start_hv_timer
kvm: nVMX: Check memory operand to INVVPID
KVM: s390: Inject machine check into the nested guest
KVM: s390: Inject machine check into the guest
tools/kvm_stat: add new interactive command 'b'
tools/kvm_stat: add new command line switch '-i'
tools/kvm_stat: fix error on interactive command 'g'
KVM: SVM: suppress unnecessary NMI singlestep on GIF=0 and nested exit
...
It's easier for host applications, such as QEMU, if they can always
access guest MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS in VMCS, even though MPX is disabled in
guest cpuid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haozhong Zhang <haozhong.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Continued work to add support for 5-level paging provided by future
Intel CPUs. In particular we switch the x86 GUP code to the generic
implementation. (Kirill A. Shutemov)
- Continued work to add PCID CPU support to native kernels as well.
In this round most of the focus is on reworking/refreshing the TLB
flush infrastructure for the upcoming PCID changes. (Andy
Lutomirski)"
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (34 commits)
x86/mm: Delete a big outdated comment about TLB flushing
x86/mm: Don't reenter flush_tlb_func_common()
x86/KASLR: Fix detection 32/64 bit bootloaders for 5-level paging
x86/ftrace: Exclude functions in head64.c from function-tracing
x86/mmap, ASLR: Do not treat unlimited-stack tasks as legacy mmap
x86/mm: Remove reset_lazy_tlbstate()
x86/ldt: Simplify the LDT switching logic
x86/boot/64: Put __startup_64() into .head.text
x86/mm: Add support for 5-level paging for KASLR
x86/mm: Make kernel_physical_mapping_init() support 5-level paging
x86/mm: Add sync_global_pgds() for configuration with 5-level paging
x86/boot/64: Add support of additional page table level during early boot
x86/boot/64: Rename init_level4_pgt and early_level4_pgt
x86/boot/64: Rewrite startup_64() in C
x86/boot/compressed: Enable 5-level paging during decompression stage
x86/boot/efi: Define __KERNEL32_CS GDT on 64-bit configurations
x86/boot/efi: Fix __KERNEL_CS definition of GDT entry on 64-bit configurations
x86/boot/efi: Cleanup initialization of GDT entries
x86/asm: Fix comment in return_from_SYSCALL_64()
x86/mm/gup: Switch GUP to the generic get_user_page_fast() implementation
...
EPT A/D was enabled in the vmcs02 EPTP regardless of the vmcs12's EPTP
value. The problem is that enabling A/D changes the behavior of L2's
x86 page table walks as seen by L1. With A/D enabled, x86 page table
walks are always treated as EPT writes.
Commit ae1e2d1082 ("kvm: nVMX: support EPT accessed/dirty bits",
2017-03-30) tried to work around this problem by clearing the write
bit in the exit qualification for EPT violations triggered by page
walks. However, that fixup introduced the opposite bug: page-table walks
that actually set x86 A/D bits were *missing* the write bit in the exit
qualification.
This patch fixes the problem by disabling EPT A/D in the shadow MMU
when EPT A/D is disabled in vmcs12's EPTP.
Signed-off-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Adds the plumbing to disable A/D bits in the MMU based on a new role
bit, ad_disabled. When A/D is disabled, the MMU operates as though A/D
aren't available (i.e., using access tracking faults instead).
To avoid SP -> kvm_mmu_page.role.ad_disabled lookups all over the
place, A/D disablement is now stored in the SPTE. This state is stored
in the SPTE by tweaking the use of SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK for access
tracking. Rather than just setting SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK when an
access-tracking SPTE is non-present, we now always set
SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK for access-tracking SPTEs.
Signed-off-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
[Use role.ad_disabled even for direct (non-shadow) EPT page tables. Add
documentation and a few MMU_WARN_ONs. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Specify both a mask (i.e., bits to consider) and a value (i.e.,
pattern of bits that indicates a special PTE) for mmio SPTEs. On
Intel, this lets us pack even more information into the
(SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK | EPT_VMX_RWX_MASK) mask we use for access
tracking liberating all (SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK | (non-misconfigured-RWX))
values.
Signed-off-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The MMU always has hardware A bits or access tracking support, thus
it's unnecessary to handle the scenario where we have neither.
Signed-off-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The macro insn_fetch marks the 'type' argument as having a specified
alignment. Type attributes can only be applied to structs, unions, or
enums, but insn_fetch is only ever invoked with integral types, so Clang
produces 19 -Wignored-attributes warnings for this source file.
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
- vcpu request overhaul
- allow timer and PMU to have their interrupt number
selected from userspace
- workaround for Cavium erratum 30115
- handling of memory poisonning
- the usual crop of fixes and cleanups
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Merge tag 'kvmarm-for-4.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/ARM updates for 4.13
- vcpu request overhaul
- allow timer and PMU to have their interrupt number
selected from userspace
- workaround for Cavium erratum 30115
- handling of memory poisonning
- the usual crop of fixes and cleanups
Conflicts:
arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h
In preparation for an objtool rewrite which will have broader checks,
whitelist functions and files which cause problems because they do
unusual things with the stack.
These whitelists serve as a TODO list for which functions and files
don't yet have undwarf unwinder coverage. Eventually most of the
whitelists can be removed in favor of manual CFI hint annotations or
objtool improvements.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7f934a5d707a574bda33ea282e9478e627fb1829.1498659915.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
If the TSC deadline timer is programmed really close to the deadline or
even in the past, the computation in vmx_set_hv_timer will program the
absolute target tsc value to vmcs preemption timer field w/ delta == 0,
then plays a vmentry and an upcoming vmx preemption timer fire vmexit
dance, the lapic timer injection is delayed due to this duration. Actually
the lapic timer which is emulated by hrtimer can handle this correctly.
This patch fixes it by firing the lapic timer and injecting a timer interrupt
immediately during the next vmentry if the TSC deadline timer is programmed
really close to the deadline or even in the past. This saves ~300 cycles on
the tsc_deadline_timer test of apic.flat.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Move the code to cancel the hv timer into the caller, just before
it starts the hrtimer. Check availability of the hv timer in
start_hv_timer.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
There are many cases in which the hv timer must be canceled. Split out
a new function to avoid duplication.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The memory operand fetched for INVVPID is 128 bits. Bits 63:16 are
reserved and must be zero. Otherwise, the instruction fails with
VMfail(Invalid operand to INVEPT/INVVPID). If the INVVPID_TYPE is 0
(individual address invalidation), then bits 127:64 must be in
canonical form, or the instruction fails with VMfail(Invalid operand
to INVEPT/INVVPID).
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
enable_nmi_window is supposed to be a no-op if we know that we'll see
a VM exit by the time the NMI window opens. This commit adds two more
cases:
* We intercept stgi so we don't need to singlestep on GIF=0.
* We emulate nested vmexit so we don't need to singlestep when nested
VM exit is required.
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Singlestepping is enabled by setting the TF flag and care must be
taken to not let the guest see (and reuse at an inconvenient time)
the modified rflag value. One such case is event injection, as part
of which flags are pushed on the stack and restored later on iret.
This commit disables singlestepping when we're about to inject an
event and forces an immediate exit for us to re-evaluate the NMI
related state.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
These flags are used internally by SVM so it's cleaner to not leak
them to callers of svm_get_rflags. This is similar to how the TF
flag is handled on KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP by kvm_get_rflags and
kvm_set_rflags.
Without this change, the flags may propagate from host VMCB to nested
VMCB or vice versa while singlestepping over a nested VM enter/exit,
and then get stuck in inappropriate places.
Example: NMI singlestepping is enabled while running L1 guest. The
instruction to step over is VMRUN and nested vmrun emulation stashes
rflags to hsave->save.rflags. Then if singlestepping is disabled
while still in L2, TF/RF will be cleared from the nested VMCB but the
next nested VM exit will restore them from hsave->save.rflags and
cause an unexpected DB exception.
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Nested hypervisor should not see singlestep VM exits if singlestepping
was enabled internally by KVM. Windows is particularly sensitive to this
and known to bluescreen on unexpected VM exits.
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Just moving the code to a new helper in preparation for following
commits.
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
TF is handled a bit differently for syscall and sysret, compared
to the other instructions: TF is checked after the instruction completes,
so that the OS can disable #DB at a syscall by adding TF to FMASK.
When the sysret is executed the #DB is taken "as if" the syscall insn
just completed.
KVM emulates syscall so that it can trap 32-bit syscall on Intel processors.
Fix the behavior, otherwise you could get #DB on a user stack which is not
nice. This does not affect Linux guests, as they use an IST or task gate
for #DB.
This fixes CVE-2017-7518.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The kernel has several code paths that read CR3. Most of them assume that
CR3 contains the PGD's physical address, whereas some of them awkwardly
use PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK to mask off low bits.
Add explicit mask macros for CR3 and convert all of the CR3 readers.
This will keep them from breaking when PCID is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/883f8fb121f4616c1c1427ad87350bb2f5ffeca1.1497288170.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
INFO: task gnome-terminal-:1734 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Not tainted 4.12.0-rc4+ #8
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
gnome-terminal- D 0 1734 1015 0x00000000
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x3cd/0xb30
schedule+0x40/0x90
kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1cc/0x270
? __vfs_read+0x37/0x150
? prepare_to_swait+0x22/0x70
do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
? do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
async_page_fault+0x28/0x30
This is triggered by running both win7 and win2016 on L1 KVM simultaneously,
and then gives stress to memory on L1, I can observed this hang on L1 when
at least ~70% swap area is occupied on L0.
This is due to async pf was injected to L2 which should be injected to L1,
L2 guest starts receiving pagefault w/ bogus %cr2(apf token from the host
actually), and L1 guest starts accumulating tasks stuck in D state in
kvm_async_pf_task_wait() since missing PAGE_READY async_pfs.
This patch fixes the hang by doing async pf when executing L1 guest.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
If "i" is the last element in the vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[] array, it
potentially can be exploited the vulnerability. this will out-of-bounds
read and write. Luckily, the effect is small:
/* when no next entry is found, the current entry[i] is reselected */
for (j = i + 1; ; j = (j + 1) % nent) {
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *ej = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[j];
if (ej->function == e->function) {
It reads ej->maxphyaddr, which is user controlled. However...
ej->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT;
After cpuid_entries there is
int maxphyaddr;
struct x86_emulate_ctxt emulate_ctxt; /* 16-byte aligned */
So we have:
- cpuid_entries at offset 1B50 (6992)
- maxphyaddr at offset 27D0 (6992 + 3200 = 10192)
- padding at 27D4...27DF
- emulate_ctxt at 27E0
And it writes in the padding. Pfew, writing the ops field of emulate_ctxt
would have been much worse.
This patch fixes it by modding the index to avoid the out-of-bounds
access. Worst case, i == j and ej->function == e->function,
the loop can bail out.
Reported-by: Moguofang <moguofang@huawei.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Guofang Mo <moguofang@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The guest-linear address field is set for VM exits due to attempts to
execute LMSW with a memory operand and VM exits due to attempts to
execute INS or OUTS for which the relevant segment is usable,
regardless of whether or not EPT is in use.
Fixes: 119a9c01a5 ("KVM: nVMX: pass valid guest linear-address to the L1")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The XSS-exiting bitmap is a VMCS control field that does not change
while the CPU is in non-root mode. Transferring the unchanged value
from vmcs02 to vmcs12 is unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Bits 11:2 must be zero and the linear addess in bits 63:12 must be
canonical. Otherwise, WRMSR(BNDCFGS) should raise #GP.
Fixes: 0dd376e709 ("KVM: x86: add MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS to msrs_to_save")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The BNDCFGS MSR should only be exposed to the guest if the guest
supports MPX. (cf. the TSC_AUX MSR and RDTSCP.)
Fixes: 0dd376e709 ("KVM: x86: add MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS to msrs_to_save")
Change-Id: I3ad7c01bda616715137ceac878f3fa7e66b6b387
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The MSR permission bitmaps are shared by all VMs. However, some VMs
may not be configured to support MPX, even when the host does. If the
host supports VMX and the guest does not, we should intercept accesses
to the BNDCFGS MSR, so that we can synthesize a #GP
fault. Furthermore, if the host does not support MPX and the
"ignore_msrs" kvm kernel parameter is set, then we should intercept
accesses to the BNDCFGS MSR, so that we can skip over the rdmsr/wrmsr
without raising a #GP fault.
Fixes: da8999d318 ("KVM: x86: Intel MPX vmx and msr handle")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2840 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:10966 nested_vmx_vmexit+0xdcd/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
CPU: 3 PID: 2840 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G OE 4.12.0-rc3+ #23
RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0xdcd/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
Call Trace:
? kvm_check_async_pf_completion+0xef/0x120 [kvm]
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x79/0x80
vmx_queue_exception+0x104/0x160 [kvm_intel]
? vmx_queue_exception+0x104/0x160 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1171/0x1ce0 [kvm]
? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x47/0x240 [kvm]
? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x62/0x240 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? __fget+0xf3/0x210
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
? __fget+0x114/0x210
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x81/0x220
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
This is triggered occasionally by running both win7 and win2016 in L2, in
addition, EPT is disabled on both L1 and L2. It can't be reproduced easily.
Commit 0b6ac343fc (KVM: nVMX: Correct handling of exception injection) mentioned
that "KVM wants to inject page-faults which it got to the guest. This function
assumes it is called with the exit reason in vmcs02 being a #PF exception".
Commit e011c663 (KVM: nVMX: Check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to
L2) allows to check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to L2. However,
there is no guarantee the exit reason is exception currently, when there is an
external interrupt occurred on host, maybe a time interrupt for host which should
not be injected to guest, and somewhere queues an exception, then the function
nested_vmx_check_exception() will be called and the vmexit emulation codes will
try to emulate the "Acknowledge interrupt on exit" behavior, the warning is
triggered.
Reusing the exit reason from the L2->L0 vmexit is wrong in this case,
the reason must always be EXCEPTION_NMI when injecting an exception into
L1 as a nested vmexit.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Fixes: e011c663b9 ("KVM: nVMX: Check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to L2")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
When PCID is enabled, CR3's PCID bits can change during context
switches, so KVM won't be able to treat CR3 as a per-mm constant any
more.
I structured this like the existing CR4 handling. Under ordinary
circumstances (PCID disabled or if the current PCID and the value
that's already in the VMCS match), then we won't do an extra VMCS
write, and we'll never do an extra direct CR3 read. The overhead
should be minimal.
I disallowed using the new helper in non-atomic context because
PCID support will cause CR3 to stop being constant in non-atomic
process context.
(Frankly, it also scares me a bit that KVM ever treated CR3 as
constant, but it looks like it was okay before.)
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
A first step in vcpu->requests encapsulation. Additionally, we now
use READ_ONCE() when accessing vcpu->requests, which ensures we
always load vcpu->requests when it's accessed. This is important as
other threads can change it any time. Also, READ_ONCE() documents
that vcpu->requests is used with other threads, likely requiring
memory barriers, which it does.
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
[ Documented the new use of READ_ONCE() and converted another check
in arch/mips/kvm/vz.c ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
em_fxstor previously called fxstor_fixup. Both created instances of
struct fxregs_state on the stack, which triggered the warning:
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:4018:12: warning: stack frame size of 1080 bytes
in function
'em_fxrstor' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
static int em_fxrstor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
^
with CONFIG_FRAME_WARN set to 1024.
This patch does the fixup in em_fxstor now, avoiding one additional
struct fxregs_state, and now fxstor_fixup can be removed as it has no
other call sites.
Further, the calculation for offsets into xmm_space can be shared
between em_fxstor and em_fxsave.
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers@gmail.com>
[Clean up calculation of offsets and fix it for 64-bit mode. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This should have been indented one more character over and it should use
tabs.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
I moved the || to the line before. Also I replaced some spaces with a
tab on the "return 0;" line. It looks OK in the diff but originally
that line was only indented 7 spaces.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
When spin_lock_irqsave() deadlock occurs inside the guest, vcpu threads,
other than the lock-holding one, would enter into S state because of
pvspinlock. Then inject NMI via libvirt API "inject-nmi", the NMI could
not be injected into vm.
The reason is:
1 It sets nmi_queued to 1 when calling ioctl KVM_NMI in qemu, and sets
cpu->kvm_vcpu_dirty to true in do_inject_external_nmi() meanwhile.
2 It sets nmi_queued to 0 in process_nmi(), before entering guest, because
cpu->kvm_vcpu_dirty is true.
It's not enough just to check nmi_queued to decide whether to stay in
vcpu_block() or not. NMI should be injected immediately at any situation.
Add checking nmi_pending, and testing KVM_REQ_NMI replaces nmi_queued
in vm_vcpu_has_events().
Do the same change for SMIs.
Signed-off-by: Zhuang Yanying <ann.zhuangyanying@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This is a fix for the problem [1], where VMCB.CPL was set to 0 and interrupt
was taken on userspace stack. The root cause lies in the specific AMD CPU
behaviour which manifests itself as unusable segment attributes on SYSRET.
The corresponding work around for the kernel is the following:
61f01dd941 ("x86_64, asm: Work around AMD SYSRET SS descriptor attribute issue")
In other turn virtualization side treated unusable segment incorrectly and
restored CPL from SS attributes, which were zeroed out few lines above.
In current patch it is assured only that P bit is cleared in VMCB.save state
and segment attributes are not zeroed out if segment is not presented or is
unusable, therefore CPL can be safely restored from DPL field.
This is only one part of the fix, since QEMU side should be fixed accordingly
not to zero out attributes on its side. Corresponding patch will follow.
[1] Message id: CAJrWOzD6Xq==b-zYCDdFLgSRMPM-NkNuTSDFEtX=7MreT45i7Q@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Roman Pen <roman.penyaev@profitbricks.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Sennikovskii <mikhail.sennikovskii@profitbricks.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim KrÄmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Commit 19bca6ab75 ("KVM: SVM: Fix cross vendor migration issue with
unusable bit") added checking type when setting unusable.
So unusable can be set if present is 0 OR type is 0.
According to the AMD processor manual, long mode ignores the type value
in segment descriptor. And type can be 0 if it is read-only data segment.
Therefore type value is not related to unusable flag.
This patch is based on linux-next v4.12.0-rc3.
Signed-off-by: Gioh Kim <gi-oh.kim@profitbricks.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() will return 0 if userspace is
single-stepping the guest.
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() uses return status convention of exit
handler: 0 means "exit to userspace" and 1 means "continue vm entries".
The problem is that nested_vmx_check_vmptr() return status means
something else: 0 is ok, 1 is error.
This means we would continue executing after a failure. Static checker
noticed it because vmptr was not initialized.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 6affcbedca ("KVM: x86: Add kvm_skip_emulated_instruction and use it.")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Intel SDM says, that at most one LAPIC should be configured with ExtINT
delivery. KVM configures all LAPICs this way. This causes pic_unlock()
to kick the first available vCPU from the internal KVM data structures.
If this vCPU is not the BSP, but some not-yet-booted AP, the BSP may
never realize that there is an interrupt.
Fix that by enabling ExtINT delivery only for the BSP.
This allows booting a Linux guest without a TSC in the above situation.
Otherwise the BSP gets stuck in calibrate_delay_converge().
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The decision whether or not to exit from L2 to L1 on an lmsw instruction is
based on bogus values: instead of using the information encoded within the
exit qualification, it uses the data also used for the mov-to-cr
instruction, which boils down to using whatever is in %eax at that point.
Use the correct values instead.
Without this fix, an L1 may not get notified when a 32-bit Linux L2
switches its secondary CPUs to protected mode; the L1 is only notified on
the next modification of CR0. This short time window poses a problem, when
there is some other reason to exit to L1 in between. Then, L2 will be
resumed in real mode and chaos ensues.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Preemption can occur during cancel preemption timer, and there will be
inconsistent status in lapic, vmx and vmcs field.
CPU0 CPU1
preemption timer vmexit
handle_preemption_timer(vCPU0)
kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer
vmx_cancel_hv_timer
vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = -1
vmcs_clear_bits
/* hv_timer_in_use still true */
sched_out
sched_in
kvm_arch_vcpu_load
vmx_set_hv_timer
write vmx->hv_deadline_tsc
vmcs_set_bits
/* back in kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer */
hv_timer_in_use = false
...
vmx_vcpu_run
vmx_arm_hv_run
write preemption timer deadline
spurious preemption timer vmexit
handle_preemption_timer(vCPU0)
kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer
WARN_ON(!apic->lapic_timer.hv_timer_in_use);
This can be reproduced sporadically during boot of L2 on a
preemptible L1, causing a splat on L1.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1952 at arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1529 kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer+0xb5/0xd0 [kvm]
CPU: 3 PID: 1952 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc1+ #24 RIP: 0010:kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer+0xb5/0xd0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
handle_preemption_timer+0xe/0x20 [kvm_intel]
vmx_handle_exit+0xc9/0x15f0 [kvm_intel]
? lock_acquire+0xdb/0x250
? lock_acquire+0xdb/0x250
? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xdf3/0x1ce0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xe55/0x1ce0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? __fget+0xf3/0x210
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
? __fget+0x114/0x210
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x8f/0x750
? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
This patch fixes it by disabling preemption while cancelling
preemption timer. This way cancel_hv_timer is atomic with
respect to kvm_arch_vcpu_load.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
get_msr() of MSR_EFER is currently always going to succeed, but static
checker doesn't see that far.
Don't complicate stuff and just use 0 for the fallback -- it means that
the feature is not present.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Static analysis noticed that pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters can be 32
(INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC) and therefore cannot be used to shift 'int'.
I didn't add BUILD_BUG_ON for it as we have a better checker.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 25462f7f52 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Static checker noticed that base3 could be used uninitialized if the
segment was not present (useable). Random stack values probably would
not pass VMCS entry checks.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 1aa366163b ("KVM: x86 emulator: consolidate segment accessors")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Huawei folks reported a read out-of-bounds vulnerability in kvm pio emulation.
- "inb" instruction to access PIT Mod/Command register (ioport 0x43, write only,
a read should be ignored) in guest can get a random number.
- "rep insb" instruction to access PIT register port 0x43 can control memcpy()
in emulator_pio_in_emulated() to copy max 0x400 bytes but only read 1 bytes,
which will disclose the unimportant kernel memory in host but no crash.
The similar test program below can reproduce the read out-of-bounds vulnerability:
void hexdump(void *mem, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned int i, j;
for(i = 0; i < len + ((len % HEXDUMP_COLS) ? (HEXDUMP_COLS - len % HEXDUMP_COLS) : 0); i++)
{
/* print offset */
if(i % HEXDUMP_COLS == 0)
{
printf("0x%06x: ", i);
}
/* print hex data */
if(i < len)
{
printf("%02x ", 0xFF & ((char*)mem)[i]);
}
else /* end of block, just aligning for ASCII dump */
{
printf(" ");
}
/* print ASCII dump */
if(i % HEXDUMP_COLS == (HEXDUMP_COLS - 1))
{
for(j = i - (HEXDUMP_COLS - 1); j <= i; j++)
{
if(j >= len) /* end of block, not really printing */
{
putchar(' ');
}
else if(isprint(((char*)mem)[j])) /* printable char */
{
putchar(0xFF & ((char*)mem)[j]);
}
else /* other char */
{
putchar('.');
}
}
putchar('\n');
}
}
}
int main(void)
{
int i;
if (iopl(3))
{
err(1, "set iopl unsuccessfully\n");
return -1;
}
static char buf[0x40];
/* test ioport 0x40,0x41,0x42,0x43,0x44,0x45 */
memset(buf, 0xab, sizeof(buf));
asm volatile("push %rdi;");
asm volatile("mov %0, %%rdi;"::"q"(buf));
asm volatile ("mov $0x40, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x41, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x42, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x43, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x44, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x45, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("pop %rdi;");
hexdump(buf, 0x40);
printf("\n");
/* ins port 0x40 */
memset(buf, 0xab, sizeof(buf));
asm volatile("push %rdi;");
asm volatile("mov %0, %%rdi;"::"q"(buf));
asm volatile ("mov $0x20, %rcx;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x40, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("rep insb;");
asm volatile ("pop %rdi;");
hexdump(buf, 0x40);
printf("\n");
/* ins port 0x43 */
memset(buf, 0xab, sizeof(buf));
asm volatile("push %rdi;");
asm volatile("mov %0, %%rdi;"::"q"(buf));
asm volatile ("mov $0x20, %rcx;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x43, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("rep insb;");
asm volatile ("pop %rdi;");
hexdump(buf, 0x40);
printf("\n");
return 0;
}
The vcpu->arch.pio_data buffer is used by both in/out instrutions emulation
w/o clear after using which results in some random datas are left over in
the buffer. Guest reads port 0x43 will be ignored since it is write only,
however, the function kernel_pio() can't distigush this ignore from successfully
reads data from device's ioport. There is no new data fill the buffer from
port 0x43, however, emulator_pio_in_emulated() will copy the stale data in
the buffer to the guest unconditionally. This patch fixes it by clearing the
buffer before in instruction emulation to avoid to grant guest the stale data
in the buffer.
In addition, string I/O is not supported for in kernel device. So there is no
iteration to read ioport %RCX times for string I/O. The function kernel_pio()
just reads one round, and then copy the io size * %RCX to the guest unconditionally,
actually it copies the one round ioport data w/ other random datas which are left
over in the vcpu->arch.pio_data buffer to the guest. This patch fixes it by
introducing the string I/O support for in kernel device in order to grant the right
ioport datas to the guest.
Before the patch:
0x000000: fe 38 93 93 ff ff ab ab .8......
0x000008: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000010: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000018: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000000: f6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000008: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000010: 00 00 00 00 4d 51 30 30 ....MQ00
0x000018: 30 30 20 33 20 20 20 20 00 3
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000000: f6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000008: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000010: 00 00 00 00 4d 51 30 30 ....MQ00
0x000018: 30 30 20 33 20 20 20 20 00 3
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
After the patch:
0x000000: 1e 02 f8 00 ff ff ab ab ........
0x000008: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000010: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000018: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000000: d2 e2 d2 df d2 db d2 d7 ........
0x000008: d2 d3 d2 cf d2 cb d2 c7 ........
0x000010: d2 c4 d2 c0 d2 bc d2 b8 ........
0x000018: d2 b4 d2 b0 d2 ac d2 a8 ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000008: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000018: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
Reported-by: Moguofang <moguofang@huawei.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Moguofang <moguofang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: qemu-system-x86/2809
caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
CPU: 2 PID: 2809 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.11.0+ #13
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x99/0xce
check_preemption_disabled+0xf5/0x100
__this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
get_kvmclock_ns+0x6f/0x110 [kvm]
get_time_ref_counter+0x5d/0x80 [kvm]
kvm_hv_process_stimers+0x2a1/0x8a0 [kvm]
? kvm_hv_process_stimers+0x2a1/0x8a0 [kvm]
? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xac9/0x1ce0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5bf/0x1ce0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? __fget+0xf3/0x210
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
? __fget+0x114/0x210
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2
RIP: 0033:0x7f9d164ed357
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
This can be reproduced by run kvm-unit-tests/hyperv_stimer.flat w/
CONFIG_PREEMPT and CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT enabled.
Safe access to per-CPU data requires a couple of constraints, though: the
thread working with the data cannot be preempted and it cannot be migrated
while it manipulates per-CPU variables. If the thread is preempted, the
thread that replaces it could try to work with the same variables; migration
to another CPU could also cause confusion. However there is no preemption
disable when reads host per-CPU tsc rate to calculate the current kvmclock
timestamp.
This patch fixes it by utilizing get_cpu/put_cpu pair to guarantee both
__this_cpu_read() and rdtsc() are not preempted.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Smatch complains that we check cap the upper bound of "index" but don't
check for negatives. It's a false positive because "index" is never
negative. But it's also simple enough to make it unsigned which makes
the code easier to audit.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
This fixes the new ept_access_test_read_only and ept_access_test_read_write
testcases from vmx.flat.
The problem is that gpte_access moves bits around to switch from EPT
bit order (XWR) to ACC_*_MASK bit order (RWX). This results in an
incorrect exit qualification. To fix this, make pt_access and
pte_access operate on raw PTE values (only with NX flipped to mean
"can execute") and call gpte_access at the end of the walk. This
lets us use pte_access to compute the exit qualification with XWR
bit order.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
We can observe eptad kvm_intel module parameter is still Y
even if ept is disabled which is weird. This patch will
not enable EPT A/D feature if EPT feature is disabled.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
