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powerpc/rtas: block error injection when locked down

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The error injection facility on pseries VMs allows corruption of
arbitrary guest memory, potentially enabling a sufficiently privileged
user to disable lockdown or perform other modifications of the running
kernel via the rtas syscall.

Block the PAPR error injection facility from being opened or called
when locked down.

Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM)
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220926131643.146502-3-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
This commit is contained in:
Nathan Lynch 2022-09-26 08:16:43 -05:00 committed by Michael Ellerman
parent 99df7a2810
commit b8f3e48834
3 changed files with 26 additions and 1 deletions
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25
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
View file

@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
#include <linux/of_fdt.h>
@ -463,6 +464,9 @@ void rtas_call_unlocked(struct rtas_args *args, int token, int nargs, int nret,
va_end(list);
}
static int ibm_open_errinjct_token;
static int ibm_errinjct_token;
int rtas_call(int token, int nargs, int nret, int *outputs, ...)
{
va_list list;
@ -475,6 +479,16 @@ int rtas_call(int token, int nargs, int nret, int *outputs, ...)
if (!rtas.entry || token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
return -1;
if (token == ibm_open_errinjct_token || token == ibm_errinjct_token) {
/*
* It would be nicer to not discard the error value
* from security_locked_down(), but callers expect an
* RTAS status, not an errno.
*/
if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION))
return -1;
}
if ((mfmsr() & (MSR_IR|MSR_DR)) != (MSR_IR|MSR_DR)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return -1;
@ -1173,6 +1187,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(rtas, struct rtas_args __user *, uargs)
if (block_rtas_call(token, nargs, &args))
return -EINVAL;
if (token == ibm_open_errinjct_token || token == ibm_errinjct_token) {
int err;
err = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION);
if (err)
return err;
}
/* Need to handle ibm,suspend_me call specially */
if (token == rtas_token("ibm,suspend-me")) {
@ -1271,7 +1293,8 @@ void __init rtas_initialize(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_RTAS_ERROR_LOGGING
rtas_last_error_token = rtas_token("rtas-last-error");
#endif
ibm_open_errinjct_token = rtas_token("ibm,open-errinjct");
ibm_errinjct_token = rtas_token("ibm,errinjct");
rtas_syscall_filter_init();
}

1
include/linux/security.h
View file

@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR,
LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER,
LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL,
LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION,
LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,

1
security/security.c
View file

@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection",
[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",