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mm/secretmem: make it on by default
Following the discussion about direct map fragmentaion at LSF/MM [1], it appears that direct map fragmentation has a negligible effect on kernel data accesses. Since the only reason that warranted secretmem to be disabled by default was concern about performance regression caused by the direct map fragmentation, it makes perfect sense to lift this restriction and make secretmem enabled. secretmem obeys RLIMIT_MEMBLOCK and as such it is not expected to cause large fragmentation of the direct map or meaningfull increase in page tables allocated during split of the large mappings in the direct map. The secretmem.enable parameter is retained to allow system administrators to disable secretmem at boot. Switch the default setting of secretmem.enable parameter to 1. Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/931406/ [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230515083400.3563974-1-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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#define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK (0x0)
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#define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK
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static bool secretmem_enable __ro_after_init;
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static bool secretmem_enable __ro_after_init = 1;
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module_param_named(enable, secretmem_enable, bool, 0400);
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MODULE_PARM_DESC(secretmem_enable,
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"Enable secretmem and memfd_secret(2) system call");
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