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bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode

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bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
has been locked down in confidentiality mode.

Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells 2019-08-19 17:17:59 -07:00 committed by James Morris
parent a94549dd87
commit 9d1f8be5cf
3 changed files with 12 additions and 0 deletions
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1
include/linux/security.h
View file

@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
LOCKDOWN_KCORE, LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
LOCKDOWN_KPROBES, LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
}; };

10
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
View file

@ -139,8 +139,13 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr)
{ {
int ret; int ret;
ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) if (unlikely(ret < 0))
out:
memset(dst, 0, size); memset(dst, 0, size);
return ret; return ret;
@ -566,6 +571,10 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
{ {
int ret; int ret;
ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
/* /*
* The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire * The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire
* buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing
@ -577,6 +586,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
*/ */
ret = strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); ret = strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) if (unlikely(ret < 0))
out:
memset(dst, 0, size); memset(dst, 0, size);
return ret; return ret;

1
security/lockdown/lockdown.c
View file

@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
}; };