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KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE
To support TDX, KVM is enhanced to operate with #VE. For TDX, KVM uses the suppress #VE bit in EPT entries selectively, in order to be able to trap non-present conditions. However, #VE isn't used for VMX and it's a bug if it happens. To be defensive and test that VMX case isn't broken introduce an option ept_violation_ve_test and when it's set, BUG the vm. Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com> Message-Id: <d6db6ba836605c0412e166359ba5c46a63c22f86.1705965635.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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@ -95,6 +95,19 @@ config KVM_INTEL
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To compile this as a module, choose M here: the module
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will be called kvm-intel.
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config KVM_INTEL_PROVE_VE
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bool "Check that guests do not receive #VE exceptions"
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default KVM_PROVE_MMU || DEBUG_KERNEL
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depends on KVM_INTEL
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help
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Checks that KVM's page table management code will not incorrectly
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let guests receive a virtualization exception. Virtualization
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exceptions will be trapped by the hypervisor rather than injected
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in the guest.
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If unsure, say N.
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config X86_SGX_KVM
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bool "Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) Virtualization"
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depends on X86_SGX && KVM_INTEL
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@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static inline bool is_nm_fault(u32 intr_info)
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return is_exception_n(intr_info, NM_VECTOR);
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}
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static inline bool is_ve_fault(u32 intr_info)
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{
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return is_exception_n(intr_info, VE_VECTOR);
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}
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/* Undocumented: icebp/int1 */
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static inline bool is_icebp(u32 intr_info)
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{
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@ -869,6 +869,12 @@ void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
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(1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
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/*
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* #VE isn't used for VMX. To test against unexpected changes
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* related to #VE for VMX, intercept unexpected #VE and warn on it.
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*/
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_PROVE_VE))
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eb |= 1u << VE_VECTOR;
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/*
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* Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
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* trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
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@ -2602,6 +2608,9 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
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&_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control))
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return -EIO;
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}
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if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_PROVE_VE))
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_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
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#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
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if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
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SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
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@ -2626,6 +2635,7 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
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return -EIO;
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vmx_cap->ept = 0;
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_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
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}
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if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) &&
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vmx_cap->vpid) {
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@ -4588,6 +4598,7 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
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exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
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if (!enable_ept) {
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exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
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exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
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enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
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}
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if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
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@ -4711,8 +4722,12 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
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exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_exec_control(vmx));
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if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
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if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
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secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
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if (vmx->ve_info)
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vmcs_write64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS,
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__pa(vmx->ve_info));
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}
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if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
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tertiary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_tertiary_exec_control(vmx));
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@ -5200,6 +5215,9 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info))
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return handle_ud(vcpu);
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if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_ve_fault(intr_info), vcpu->kvm))
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return -EIO;
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error_code = 0;
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if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
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error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
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@ -6409,8 +6427,22 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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pr_err("Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\n",
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vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));
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if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {
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pr_err("VE info address = 0x%016llx\n",
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vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS));
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struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info = vmx->ve_info;
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u64 ve_info_pa = vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS);
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/*
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* If KVM is dumping the VMCS, then something has gone wrong
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* already. Derefencing an address from the VMCS, which could
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* very well be corrupted, is a terrible idea. The virtual
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* address is known so use it.
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*/
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pr_err("VE info address = 0x%016llx%s\n", ve_info_pa,
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ve_info_pa == __pa(ve_info) ? "" : "(corrupted!)");
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pr_err("ve_info: 0x%08x 0x%08x 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%04x\n",
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ve_info->exit_reason, ve_info->delivery,
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ve_info->exit_qualification,
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ve_info->guest_linear_address,
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ve_info->guest_physical_address, ve_info->eptp_index);
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}
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}
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@ -7466,6 +7498,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
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nested_vmx_free_vcpu(vcpu);
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free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
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free_page((unsigned long)vmx->ve_info);
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}
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int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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@ -7559,6 +7592,20 @@ int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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goto free_vmcs;
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}
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err = -ENOMEM;
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if (vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {
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struct page *page;
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*vmx->ve_info) > PAGE_SIZE);
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/* ve_info must be page aligned. */
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page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
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if (!page)
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goto free_vmcs;
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vmx->ve_info = page_to_virt(page);
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}
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if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu))
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WRITE_ONCE(to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm)->pid_table[vcpu->vcpu_id],
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__pa(&vmx->pi_desc) | PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID);
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@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
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DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
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DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
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} shadow_msr_intercept;
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/* ve_info must be page aligned. */
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struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info;
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};
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struct kvm_vmx {
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@ -574,7 +577,8 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
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SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC | \
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SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION | \
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SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING | \
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SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
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SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING | \
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SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE)
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#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL 0
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#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL \
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