From 7e40781cc8b767dd6530910ae12d75978d7d68e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Udip Pant Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 16:20:00 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: verifier: Use target program's type for access verifications This patch adds changes in verifier to make decisions such as granting of read / write access or enforcement of return code status based on the program type of the target program while using dynamic program extension (of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT). The BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT type can be used to extend types such as XDP, SKB and others. Since the BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT program type on itself is just a placeholder for those, we need this extended check for those extended programs to actually work with proper access, while using this option. Specifically, it introduces following changes: - may_access_direct_pkt_data: allow access to packet data based on the target prog - check_return_code: enforce return code based on the target prog (currently, this check is skipped for EXT program) - check_ld_abs: check for 'may_access_skb' based on the target prog - check_map_prog_compatibility: enforce the map compatibility check based on the target prog - may_update_sockmap: allow sockmap update based on the target prog Some other occurrences of prog->type is left as it without replacing with the 'resolved' type: - do_check_common() and check_attach_btf_id(): already have specific logic to handle the EXT prog type - jit_subprogs() and bpf_check(): Not changed for jit compilation or while inferring env->ops Next few patches in this series include selftests for some of these cases. Signed-off-by: Udip Pant Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825232003.2877030-2-udippant@fb.com --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 7e5908b83ec7..8a097a85d01b 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2625,11 +2625,19 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff +static enum bpf_prog_type resolve_prog_type(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + return prog->aux->linked_prog ? prog->aux->linked_prog->type + : prog->type; +} + static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, enum bpf_access_type t) { - switch (env->prog->type) { + enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); + + switch (prog_type) { /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: @@ -4186,7 +4194,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) { enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; - enum bpf_prog_type type = env->prog->type; + enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem) return false; @@ -7376,7 +7384,7 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); int i, err; - if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) { + if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -7464,11 +7472,12 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; struct bpf_reg_state *reg; struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); + enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); int err; /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ - if ((env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS || - env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) && + if ((prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS || + prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) && !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) return 0; @@ -7487,7 +7496,7 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return -EACCES; } - switch (env->prog->type) { + switch (prog_type) { case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || @@ -9243,6 +9252,7 @@ static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog) { + enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); /* * Validate that trace type programs use preallocated hash maps. * @@ -9260,8 +9270,8 @@ static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * now, but warnings are emitted so developers are made aware of * the unsafety and can fix their programs before this is enforced. */ - if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog->type) && !is_preallocated_map(map)) { - if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) { + if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type) && !is_preallocated_map(map)) { + if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) { verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -9273,8 +9283,8 @@ static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, verbose(env, "trace type programs with run-time allocated hash maps are unsafe. Switch to preallocated hash maps.\n"); } - if ((is_tracing_prog_type(prog->type) || - prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) && + if ((is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type) || + prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) && map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); return -EINVAL; @@ -9986,7 +9996,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; - } else if (env->prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { + } else if (resolve_prog_type(env->prog) != BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { verbose(env, "Writes through BTF pointers are not allowed\n"); return -EINVAL; }