bpf: Refactor RCU enforcement in the verifier.

bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() are only available in clang compiled kernels. Lack
of such key mechanism makes it impossible for sleepable bpf programs to use RCU
pointers.

Allow bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() in GCC compiled kernels (though GCC doesn't
support btf_type_tag yet) and allowlist certain field dereferences in important
data structures like tast_struct, cgroup, socket that are used by sleepable
programs either as RCU pointer or full trusted pointer (which is valid outside
of RCU CS). Use BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU and BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED macros for such
tagging. They will be removed once GCC supports btf_type_tag.

With that refactor check_ptr_to_btf_access(). Make it strict in enforcing
PTR_TRUSTED and PTR_UNTRUSTED while deprecating old PTR_TO_BTF_ID without
modifier flags. There is a chance that this strict enforcement might break
existing programs (especially on GCC compiled kernels), but this cleanup has to
start sooner than later. Note PTR_TO_CTX access still yields old deprecated
PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Once it's converted to strict PTR_TRUSTED or PTR_UNTRUSTED the
kfuncs and helpers will be able to default to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS. KF_RCU will
remain as a weaker version of KF_TRUSTED_ARGS where obj refcnt could be 0.

Adjust rcu_read_lock selftest to run on gcc and clang compiled kernels.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230303041446.3630-7-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
This commit is contained in:
Alexei Starovoitov 2023-03-02 20:14:46 -08:00 committed by Daniel Borkmann
parent 0047d8343f
commit 6fcd486b3a
12 changed files with 173 additions and 110 deletions

View file

@ -2279,7 +2279,7 @@ struct bpf_core_ctx {
bool btf_nested_type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off);
int off, const char *suffix);
bool btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
const struct btf *reg_btf, u32 reg_id,

View file

@ -537,7 +537,6 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {
bool bypass_spec_v1;
bool bypass_spec_v4;
bool seen_direct_write;
bool rcu_tag_supported;
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
const struct bpf_line_info *prev_linfo;
struct bpf_verifier_log log;

View file

@ -6163,6 +6163,7 @@ static int btf_struct_walk(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const struct btf *btf,
const char *tname, *mname, *tag_value;
u32 vlen, elem_id, mid;
*flag = 0;
again:
tname = __btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) {
@ -6329,6 +6330,15 @@ static int btf_struct_walk(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const struct btf *btf,
* of this field or inside of this struct
*/
if (btf_type_is_struct(mtype)) {
if (BTF_INFO_KIND(mtype->info) == BTF_KIND_UNION &&
btf_type_vlen(mtype) != 1)
/*
* walking unions yields untrusted pointers
* with exception of __bpf_md_ptr and other
* unions with a single member
*/
*flag |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
/* our field must be inside that union or struct */
t = mtype;
@ -6373,7 +6383,7 @@ static int btf_struct_walk(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const struct btf *btf,
stype = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, mtype->type, &id);
if (btf_type_is_struct(stype)) {
*next_btf_id = id;
*flag = tmp_flag;
*flag |= tmp_flag;
return WALK_PTR;
}
}
@ -8357,7 +8367,7 @@ int bpf_core_apply(struct bpf_core_ctx *ctx, const struct bpf_core_relo *relo,
bool btf_nested_type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off)
int off, const char *suffix)
{
struct btf *btf = reg->btf;
const struct btf_type *walk_type, *safe_type;
@ -8374,7 +8384,7 @@ bool btf_nested_type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, walk_type->name_off);
ret = snprintf(safe_tname, sizeof(safe_tname), "%s__safe_fields", tname);
ret = snprintf(safe_tname, sizeof(safe_tname), "%s%s", tname, suffix);
if (ret < 0)
return false;

View file

@ -427,26 +427,26 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_create, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RET_NULL)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_release, KF_RELEASE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_acquire, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_kptr_get, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_KPTR_GET | KF_RET_NULL)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_first, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_first_zero, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_set_cpu, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_test_cpu, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_setall, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_clear, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_and, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_or, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_xor, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_equal, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_intersects, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_subset, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_empty, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_full, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_copy, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_any, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_any_and, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_first, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_first_zero, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_set_cpu, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_clear_cpu, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_test_cpu, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_test_and_set_cpu, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_setall, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_clear, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_and, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_or, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_xor, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_equal, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_intersects, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_subset, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_empty, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_full, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_copy, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_any, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cpumask_any_and, KF_RCU)
BTF_SET8_END(cpumask_kfunc_btf_ids)
static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set cpumask_kfunc_set = {

View file

@ -5073,29 +5073,76 @@ static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val)
return 0;
}
#define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_fields)
#define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu)
#define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted)
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(struct task_struct) {
/*
* Allow list few fields as RCU trusted or full trusted.
* This logic doesn't allow mix tagging and will be removed once GCC supports
* btf_type_tag.
*/
/* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and never NULL */
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct) {
const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr;
struct css_set __rcu *cgroups;
struct task_struct __rcu *real_parent;
struct task_struct *group_leader;
};
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(struct css_set) {
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set) {
struct cgroup *dfl_cgrp;
};
static bool nested_ptr_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off)
/* full trusted: these fields are trusted even outside of RCU CS and never NULL */
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta) {
__bpf_md_ptr(struct seq_file *, seq);
};
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task) {
__bpf_md_ptr(struct bpf_iter_meta *, meta);
__bpf_md_ptr(struct task_struct *, task);
};
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm) {
struct file *file;
};
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file) {
struct inode *f_inode;
};
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry) {
/* no negative dentry-s in places where bpf can see it */
struct inode *d_inode;
};
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket) {
struct sock *sk;
};
static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off)
{
/* If its parent is not trusted, it can't regain its trusted status. */
if (!is_trusted_reg(reg))
return false;
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(struct task_struct));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(struct css_set));
return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, off, "__safe_rcu");
}
return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, off);
static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off)
{
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket));
return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, off, "__safe_trusted");
}
static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
@ -5181,49 +5228,58 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it
* also inherit the untrusted flag.
*/
if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED)
flag |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
if (ret != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
/* just mark; */
/* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no
* longer trusted, unless the field being accessed has explicitly been
* marked as inheriting its parent's state of trust.
*
* An RCU-protected pointer can also be deemed trusted if we are in an
* RCU read region. This case is handled below.
*/
if (nested_ptr_is_trusted(env, reg, off)) {
flag |= PTR_TRUSTED;
/*
* task->cgroups is trusted. It provides a stronger guarantee
* than __rcu tag on 'cgroups' field in 'struct task_struct'.
* Clear MEM_RCU in such case.
} else if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED) {
/* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it
* also inherit the untrusted flag.
*/
flag &= ~MEM_RCU;
flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED;
} else if (is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg)) {
/* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no
* longer trusted, unless the field being accessed has explicitly been
* marked as inheriting its parent's state of trust (either full or RCU).
* For example:
* 'cgroups' pointer is untrusted if task->cgroups dereference
* happened in a sleepable program outside of bpf_rcu_read_lock()
* section. In a non-sleepable program it's trusted while in RCU CS (aka MEM_RCU).
* Note bpf_rcu_read_unlock() converts MEM_RCU pointers to PTR_UNTRUSTED.
*
* A regular RCU-protected pointer with __rcu tag can also be deemed
* trusted if we are in an RCU CS. Such pointer can be NULL.
*/
if (type_is_trusted(env, reg, off)) {
flag |= PTR_TRUSTED;
} else if (in_rcu_cs(env) && !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
if (type_is_rcu(env, reg, off)) {
/* ignore __rcu tag and mark it MEM_RCU */
flag |= MEM_RCU;
} else if (flag & MEM_RCU) {
/* __rcu tagged pointers can be NULL */
flag |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
} else if (flag & (MEM_PERCPU | MEM_USER)) {
/* keep as-is */
} else {
/* walking unknown pointers yields untrusted pointer */
flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED;
}
} else {
/*
* If not in RCU CS or MEM_RCU pointer can be NULL then
* aggressively mark as untrusted otherwise such
* pointers will be plain PTR_TO_BTF_ID without flags
* and will be allowed to be passed into helpers for
* compat reasons.
*/
flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED;
}
} else {
/* Old compat. Deprecated */
flag &= ~PTR_TRUSTED;
}
if (flag & MEM_RCU) {
/* Mark value register as MEM_RCU only if it is protected by
* bpf_rcu_read_lock() and the ptr reg is rcu or trusted. MEM_RCU
* itself can already indicate trustedness inside the rcu
* read lock region. Also mark rcu pointer as PTR_MAYBE_NULL since
* it could be null in some cases.
*/
if (in_rcu_cs(env) && (is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg)))
flag |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
else
flag &= ~MEM_RCU;
} else if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) {
/* ptr (reg) is marked as MEM_RCU, but the struct field is not tagged
* with __rcu. Mark the flag as PTR_UNTRUSTED conservatively.
*/
flag |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
}
if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag);
@ -10049,10 +10105,6 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta);
rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta);
if ((rcu_lock || rcu_unlock) && !env->rcu_tag_supported) {
verbose(env, "no vmlinux btf rcu tag support for kfunc %s\n", func_name);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) {
struct bpf_func_state *state;
@ -14911,8 +14963,22 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
* src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
* Reject it.
*/
verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
return -EINVAL;
if (base_type(src_reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID &&
base_type(*prev_src_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
/*
* Have to support a use case when one path through
* the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another
* is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate
* BPF_PROBE_MEM.
*/
*prev_src_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
} else {
verbose(env,
"The same insn cannot be used with different pointers: %s",
reg_type_str(env, src_reg_type));
verbose(env, " != %s\n", reg_type_str(env, *prev_src_type));
return -EINVAL;
}
}
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
@ -17984,8 +18050,6 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr)
env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();
env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable();
env->rcu_tag_supported = btf_vmlinux &&
btf_find_by_name_kind(btf_vmlinux, "rcu", BTF_KIND_TYPE_TAG) > 0;
if (is_priv)
env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ;

View file

@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static void test_cgroup_iter_sleepable(int cgroup_fd, __u64 cgroup_id)
cgrp_ls_sleepable__destroy(skel);
}
static void test_no_rcu_lock(__u64 cgroup_id)
static void test_yes_rcu_lock(__u64 cgroup_id)
{
struct cgrp_ls_sleepable *skel;
int err;
@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void test_no_rcu_lock(__u64 cgroup_id)
skel->bss->target_pid = syscall(SYS_gettid);
bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.no_rcu_lock, true);
bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.yes_rcu_lock, true);
err = cgrp_ls_sleepable__load(skel);
if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "skel_load"))
goto out;
@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static void test_no_rcu_lock(__u64 cgroup_id)
cgrp_ls_sleepable__destroy(skel);
}
static void test_rcu_lock(void)
static void test_no_rcu_lock(void)
{
struct cgrp_ls_sleepable *skel;
int err;
@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static void test_rcu_lock(void)
if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_open"))
return;
bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.yes_rcu_lock, true);
bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.no_rcu_lock, true);
err = cgrp_ls_sleepable__load(skel);
ASSERT_ERR(err, "skel_load");
@ -256,10 +256,10 @@ void test_cgrp_local_storage(void)
test_negative();
if (test__start_subtest("cgroup_iter_sleepable"))
test_cgroup_iter_sleepable(cgroup_fd, cgroup_id);
if (test__start_subtest("yes_rcu_lock"))
test_yes_rcu_lock(cgroup_id);
if (test__start_subtest("no_rcu_lock"))
test_no_rcu_lock(cgroup_id);
if (test__start_subtest("rcu_lock"))
test_rcu_lock();
test_no_rcu_lock();
close(cgroup_fd);
}

View file

@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ static void test_success(void)
bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.get_cgroup_id, true);
bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.task_succ, true);
bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.no_lock, true);
bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.two_regions, true);
bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.non_sleepable_1, true);
bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.non_sleepable_2, true);
bpf_program__set_autoload(skel->progs.task_trusted_non_rcuptr, true);
err = rcu_read_lock__load(skel);
if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "skel_load"))
goto out;
@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ static void test_rcuptr_acquire(void)
static const char * const inproper_region_tests[] = {
"miss_lock",
"no_lock",
"miss_unlock",
"non_sleepable_rcu_mismatch",
"inproper_sleepable_helper",
@ -99,7 +100,6 @@ static void test_inproper_region(void)
}
static const char * const rcuptr_misuse_tests[] = {
"task_untrusted_non_rcuptr",
"task_untrusted_rcuptr",
"cross_rcu_region",
};
@ -128,17 +128,8 @@ static void test_rcuptr_misuse(void)
void test_rcu_read_lock(void)
{
struct btf *vmlinux_btf;
int cgroup_fd;
vmlinux_btf = btf__load_vmlinux_btf();
if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(vmlinux_btf, "could not load vmlinux BTF"))
return;
if (btf__find_by_name_kind(vmlinux_btf, "rcu", BTF_KIND_TYPE_TAG) < 0) {
test__skip();
goto out;
}
cgroup_fd = test__join_cgroup("/rcu_read_lock");
if (!ASSERT_GE(cgroup_fd, 0, "join_cgroup /rcu_read_lock"))
goto out;
@ -153,6 +144,5 @@ void test_rcu_read_lock(void)
if (test__start_subtest("negative_tests_rcuptr_misuse"))
test_rcuptr_misuse();
close(cgroup_fd);
out:
btf__free(vmlinux_btf);
out:;
}

View file

@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int no_rcu_lock(void *ctx)
if (task->pid != target_pid)
return 0;
/* ptr_to_btf_id semantics. should work. */
/* task->cgroups is untrusted in sleepable prog outside of RCU CS */
cgrp = task->cgroups->dfl_cgrp;
ptr = bpf_cgrp_storage_get(&map_a, cgrp, 0,
BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE);
@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int yes_rcu_lock(void *ctx)
bpf_rcu_read_lock();
cgrp = task->cgroups->dfl_cgrp;
/* cgrp is untrusted and cannot pass to bpf_cgrp_storage_get() helper. */
/* cgrp is trusted under RCU CS */
ptr = bpf_cgrp_storage_get(&map_a, cgrp, 0, BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE);
if (ptr)
cgroup_id = cgrp->kn->id;

View file

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_alloc_double_release, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flag
}
SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
__failure __msg("bpf_cpumask_acquire args#0 expected pointer to STRUCT bpf_cpumask")
__failure __msg("must be referenced")
int BPF_PROG(test_acquire_wrong_cpumask, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
{
struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;

View file

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
*/
SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask")
__failure __msg("R2 must be referenced or trusted")
__failure __msg("R2 must be")
int BPF_PROG(test_invalid_nested_user_cpus, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
{
bpf_cpumask_test_cpu(0, task->user_cpus_ptr);

View file

@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int no_lock(void *ctx)
{
struct task_struct *task, *real_parent;
/* no bpf_rcu_read_lock(), old code still works */
/* old style ptr_to_btf_id is not allowed in sleepable */
task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
real_parent = task->real_parent;
(void)bpf_task_storage_get(&map_a, real_parent, 0, 0);
@ -286,13 +286,13 @@ int nested_rcu_region(void *ctx)
}
SEC("?fentry.s/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_getpgid")
int task_untrusted_non_rcuptr(void *ctx)
int task_trusted_non_rcuptr(void *ctx)
{
struct task_struct *task, *group_leader;
task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
bpf_rcu_read_lock();
/* the pointer group_leader marked as untrusted */
/* the pointer group_leader is explicitly marked as trusted */
group_leader = task->real_parent->group_leader;
(void)bpf_task_storage_get(&map_a, group_leader, 0, 0);
bpf_rcu_read_unlock();

View file

@ -181,7 +181,7 @@
},
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "negative offset ptr_ ptr R1 off=-4 disallowed",
.errstr = "ptr R1 off=-4 disallowed",
},
{
"calls: invalid kfunc call: PTR_TO_BTF_ID with variable offset",