- Make retbleed mitigations 64-bit only (32-bit will need a bit more

work if even needed, at all).
 
 - Prevent return thunks patching of the LKDTM modules as it is not needed there
 
 - Avoid writing the SPEC_CTRL MSR on every kernel entry on eIBRS parts
 
 - Enhance error output of apply_returns() when it fails to patch a return thunk
 
 - A sparse fix to the sev-guest module
 
 - Protect EFI fw calls by issuing an IBPB on AMD
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Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.19_rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
 "A couple more retbleed fallout fixes.

  It looks like their urgency is decreasing so it seems like we've
  managed to catch whatever snafus the limited -rc testing has exposed.
  Maybe we're getting ready... :)

   - Make retbleed mitigations 64-bit only (32-bit will need a bit more
     work if even needed, at all).

   - Prevent return thunks patching of the LKDTM modules as it is not
     needed there

   - Avoid writing the SPEC_CTRL MSR on every kernel entry on eIBRS
     parts

   - Enhance error output of apply_returns() when it fails to patch a
     return thunk

   - A sparse fix to the sev-guest module

   - Protect EFI fw calls by issuing an IBPB on AMD"

* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.19_rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/speculation: Make all RETbleed mitigations 64-bit only
  lkdtm: Disable return thunks in rodata.c
  x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS parts
  x86/alternative: Report missing return thunk details
  virt: sev-guest: Pass the appropriate argument type to iounmap()
  x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls

arch/x86/Kconfig

@@ -2474,7 +2474,7 @@ config RETHUNK
 	bool "Enable return-thunks"
 	depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
 	select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
-	default y
+	default y if X86_64
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard
 	  against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation.
@@ -2483,21 +2483,21 @@ config RETHUNK
 
 config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64
 	default y
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
 
 config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
 	default y
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
 
 config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
 	default y
 	help
 	  Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation.

arch/x86/Makefile

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ RETHUNK_CFLAGS		:= -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
 RETPOLINE_CFLAGS	+= $(RETHUNK_CFLAGS)
 endif
 
+export RETHUNK_CFLAGS
 export RETPOLINE_CFLAGS
 export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS
 

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	(11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK		(11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
 #define X86_FEATURE_UNRET		(11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */
+#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW		(11*32+16) /* "" Use IBPB during runtime firmware calls */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI		(12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */

arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h

@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ do {									\
 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			\
 			      spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS,	\
 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
+	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB,		\
+			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW);			\
 } while (0)
 
 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()			\

arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c

@@ -555,7 +555,9 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end)
 			dest = addr + insn.length + insn.immediate.value;
 
 		if (__static_call_fixup(addr, op, dest) ||
-		    WARN_ON_ONCE(dest != &__x86_return_thunk))
+		    WARN_ONCE(dest != &__x86_return_thunk,
+			      "missing return thunk: %pS-%pS: %*ph",
+			      addr, dest, 5, addr))
 			continue;
 
 		DPRINTK("return thunk at: %pS (%px) len: %d to: %pS",

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -975,6 +975,7 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
 #define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
 #define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
 #define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG "WARNING: IBRS mitigation selected on Enhanced IBRS CPU, this may cause unnecessary performance loss\n"
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
 void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
@@ -1415,6 +1416,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 
 	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED))
+			pr_warn(SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG);
 		break;
 
 	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
@@ -1516,7 +1519,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	 * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
 	 * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
 	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
+	    (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
+	     boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) {
+
+		if (retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB) {
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW);
+			pr_info("Enabling Speculation Barrier for firmware calls\n");
+		}
+
+	} else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
 		pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
 	}

drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile

@@ -13,10 +13,13 @@ lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= cfi.o
 lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= fortify.o
 lkdtm-$(CONFIG_PPC_64S_HASH_MMU)	+= powerpc.o
 
-KASAN_SANITIZE_rodata.o		:= n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o	:= n
-KCOV_INSTRUMENT_rodata.o	:= n
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_rodata.o		+= $(CC_FLAGS_LTO)
+
+KASAN_SANITIZE_rodata.o			:= n
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_rodata.o			:= n
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_rodata.o		:= n
+OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_rodata.o	:= y
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_rodata.o			+= $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(RETHUNK_CFLAGS)
 
 OBJCOPYFLAGS :=
 OBJCOPYFLAGS_rodata_objcopy.o	:= \

drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c

@@ -632,16 +632,19 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
 	struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev;
 	struct miscdevice *misc;
+	void __iomem *mapping;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!dev->platform_data)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	data = (struct sev_guest_platform_data *)dev->platform_data;
-	layout = (__force void *)ioremap_encrypted(data->secrets_gpa, PAGE_SIZE);
-	if (!layout)
+	mapping = ioremap_encrypted(data->secrets_gpa, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (!mapping)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	layout = (__force void *)mapping;
+
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!snp_dev)
@@ -706,7 +709,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 e_free_request:
 	free_shared_pages(snp_dev->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
 e_unmap:
-	iounmap(layout);
+	iounmap(mapping);
 	return ret;
 }