linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c

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/*
* Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
* Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
* Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Deutschland GmbH
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/ieee80211.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 08:04:11 +00:00
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <net/mac80211.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include "ieee80211_i.h"
#include "michael.h"
#include "tkip.h"
#include "aes_ccm.h"
#include "aes_cmac.h"
#include "aes_gmac.h"
#include "aes_gcm.h"
#include "wpa.h"
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
u8 *data, *key, *mic;
size_t data_len;
unsigned int hdrlen;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
int tail;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
return TX_CONTINUE;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
if (skb->len < hdrlen)
return TX_DROP;
data = skb->data + hdrlen;
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
/* Need to use software crypto for the test */
info->control.hw_key = NULL;
}
if (info->control.hw_key &&
(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
ieee80211_hw_check(&tx->local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG)) &&
!(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
/* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
if (!info->control.hw_key)
tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
"mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n",
skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
skb_tailroom(skb), tail))
return TX_DROP;
key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
mic[0]++;
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
u8 *data, *key = NULL;
size_t data_len;
unsigned int hdrlen;
u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
/*
* it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
* than data frames.
*/
if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
return RX_CONTINUE;
/*
* No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
* the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
* on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
* MIC failure report.
*/
if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
goto mic_fail_no_key;
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
goto update_iv;
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
* though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
* MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
*/
if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
return RX_CONTINUE;
if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
/*
* APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
* errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
* group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
* frames in the BSS.
*/
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
goto mic_fail;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
hdr = (void *)skb->data;
data = skb->data + hdrlen;
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
goto mic_fail;
/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
update_iv:
/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
return RX_CONTINUE;
mic_fail:
rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
mic_fail_no_key:
/*
* In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
* a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
* the key is set.
*/
cfg80211_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata->dev, hdr->addr2,
is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) ?
NL80211_KEYTYPE_GROUP :
NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE,
rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
unsigned int hdrlen;
int len, tail;
u64 pn;
u8 *pos;
if (info->control.hw_key &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
/* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
return 0;
}
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
len = skb->len - hdrlen;
if (info->control.hw_key)
tail = 0;
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 21:01:55 +00:00
else
tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
return -1;
pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
pos += hdrlen;
/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
if (info->control.hw_key &&
(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
return 0;
/* Increase IV for the frame */
pn = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, &key->conf, pn);
/* hwaccel - with software IV */
if (info->control.hw_key)
return 0;
/* Add room for ICV */
skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
key, skb, pos, len);
}
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
return TX_DROP;
}
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
return RX_CONTINUE;
if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
/* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
hdr = (void *)skb->data;
/*
* Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
* In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
* we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
*/
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
hwaccel = 1;
res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
key, skb->data + hdrlen,
skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
&rx->tkip_iv32,
&rx->tkip_iv16);
if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
/* Trim ICV */
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED))
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
/* Remove IV */
memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
{
__le16 mask_fc;
int a4_included, mgmt;
u8 qos_tid;
u16 len_a;
unsigned int hdrlen;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
/*
* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
* Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
*/
mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
if (!mgmt)
mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
len_a = hdrlen - 2;
a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
else
qos_tid = 0;
/* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
* mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
* from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
* data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
* care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
* and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
*/
b_0[0] = 0x1;
/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
* Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
*/
b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
* FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
aad[23] = 0;
if (a4_included) {
memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
aad[30] = qos_tid;
aad[31] = 0;
} else {
memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
aad[24] = qos_tid;
}
}
static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
{
hdr[0] = pn[5];
hdr[1] = pn[4];
hdr[2] = 0;
hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
hdr[4] = pn[3];
hdr[5] = pn[2];
hdr[6] = pn[1];
hdr[7] = pn[0];
}
static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
{
pn[0] = hdr[7];
pn[1] = hdr[6];
pn[2] = hdr[5];
pn[3] = hdr[4];
pn[4] = hdr[1];
pn[5] = hdr[0];
}
static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int mic_len)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
int hdrlen, len, tail;
u8 *pos;
u8 pn[6];
u64 pn64;
u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN];
u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (info->control.hw_key &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
!((info->control.hw_key->flags &
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
/*
* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
* header or MIC fields
*/
return 0;
}
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
len = skb->len - hdrlen;
if (info->control.hw_key)
tail = 0;
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 21:01:55 +00:00
else
tail = mic_len;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
return -1;
pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
if (info->control.hw_key &&
(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
return 0;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
pos += hdrlen;
pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
pn[5] = pn64;
pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
/* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
if (info->control.hw_key)
return 0;
pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len);
}
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
unsigned int mic_len)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0)
return TX_DROP;
}
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
unsigned int mic_len)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
int hdrlen;
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
int data_len;
int queue;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
!ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
return RX_CONTINUE;
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
mic_len = 0;
} else {
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
int res;
ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
queue = rx->security_idx;
res = memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
if (res < 0 ||
(!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
key->u.ccmp.replays++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
data_len,
skb->data + skb->len - mic_len, mic_len))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
}
/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
{
__le16 mask_fc;
u8 qos_tid;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
j_0[13] = 0;
j_0[14] = 0;
j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01;
/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
* FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC]
*/
put_unaligned_be16(ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2, &aad[0]);
/* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
* Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
*/
mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
aad[22] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
aad[23] = 0;
if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
else
qos_tid = 0;
if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control)) {
memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
aad[30] = qos_tid;
aad[31] = 0;
} else {
memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
aad[24] = qos_tid;
}
}
static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id)
{
hdr[0] = pn[5];
hdr[1] = pn[4];
hdr[2] = 0;
hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
hdr[4] = pn[3];
hdr[5] = pn[2];
hdr[6] = pn[1];
hdr[7] = pn[0];
}
static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr)
{
pn[0] = hdr[7];
pn[1] = hdr[6];
pn[2] = hdr[5];
pn[3] = hdr[4];
pn[4] = hdr[1];
pn[5] = hdr[0];
}
static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
int hdrlen, len, tail;
u8 *pos;
u8 pn[6];
u64 pn64;
u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN];
u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (info->control.hw_key &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
!((info->control.hw_key->flags &
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
/* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP
* header or MIC fields
*/
return 0;
}
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
len = skb->len - hdrlen;
if (info->control.hw_key)
tail = 0;
else
tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
return -1;
pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
if (info->control.hw_key &&
(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
return 0;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)pos;
pos += hdrlen;
pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
pn[5] = pn64;
pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
/* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */
if (info->control.hw_key)
return 0;
pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len,
skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN));
}
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
return TX_DROP;
}
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
int hdrlen;
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN];
int data_len, queue, mic_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
!ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
return RX_CONTINUE;
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
mic_len = 0;
} else {
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
int res;
gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
queue = rx->security_idx;
res = memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue],
IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
if (res < 0 ||
(!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
key->u.gcmp.replays++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(
key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad,
skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN,
data_len,
skb->data + skb->len -
IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
}
/* Remove GCMP header and MIC */
if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
static ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
int hdrlen;
u8 *pos, iv_len = key->conf.iv_len;
if (info->control.hw_key &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
/* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < iv_len &&
pskb_expand_head(skb, iv_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)))
return TX_DROP;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
pos = skb_push(skb, iv_len);
memmove(pos, pos + iv_len, hdrlen);
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len)
{
int i;
/* pn is little endian */
for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (pn1[i] < pn2[i])
return -1;
else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i])
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL;
int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
int data_len;
u8 *rx_pn;
u8 *skb_pn;
u8 qos_tid;
if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme ||
!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
return RX_CONTINUE;
cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme;
data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len;
if (data_len < 0)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
else
qos_tid = 0;
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid];
skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off;
if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len);
/* remove security header and MIC */
if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen);
skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len);
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
{
__le16 mask_fc;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
/* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
/* FC type/subtype */
/* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
/* A1 || A2 || A3 */
memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
}
static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
{
*d++ = pn;
*d++ = pn >> 8;
*d++ = pn >> 16;
*d++ = pn >> 24;
*d++ = pn >> 32;
*d = pn >> 40;
}
static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
{
*d++ = s[5];
*d++ = s[4];
*d++ = s[3];
*d++ = s[2];
*d++ = s[1];
*d = s[0];
}
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
u8 aad[20];
u64 pn64;
if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
return TX_DROP;
skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
if (info->control.hw_key)
return TX_CONTINUE;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
return TX_DROP;
mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
/* PN = PN + 1 */
pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
bip_aad(skb, aad);
/*
* MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
*/
ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
u8 aad[20];
u64 pn64;
if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
return TX_DROP;
skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
if (info->control.hw_key)
return TX_CONTINUE;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
return TX_DROP;
mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
/* PN = PN + 1 */
pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
bip_aad(skb, aad);
/* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128)
*/
ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
return RX_CONTINUE;
/* management frames are already linear */
if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
bip_aad(skb, aad);
ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
}
memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
/* Remove MMIE */
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6];
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
return RX_CONTINUE;
/* management frames are already linear */
if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
bip_aad(skb, aad);
ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
}
memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
/* Remove MMIE */
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN];
u64 pn64;
u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
return TX_DROP;
skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
if (info->control.hw_key)
return TX_CONTINUE;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
return TX_DROP;
mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
/* PN = PN + 1 */
pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
bip_aad(skb, aad);
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
bip_ipn_swap(nonce + ETH_ALEN, mmie->sequence_number);
/* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */
if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic) < 0)
return TX_DROP;
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], mic[GMAC_MIC_LEN], ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
return RX_CONTINUE;
/* management frames are already linear */
if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
key->u.aes_gmac.replays++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
bip_aad(skb, aad);
memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6);
if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24,
mic) < 0 ||
memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
}
memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
/* Remove MMIE */
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
ieee80211_tx_result res;
skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
/* handle hw-only algorithm */
if (!info->control.hw_key)
return TX_DROP;
if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME) {
res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb);
if (res != TX_CONTINUE)
return res;
}
}
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
if (rx->sta && rx->sta->cipher_scheme)
return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx);
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}