linux/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* IPV4 GSO/GRO offload support
* Linux INET implementation
*
* UDPv4 GSO support
*/
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/inet_common.h>
static struct sk_buff *__skb_udp_tunnel_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features,
struct sk_buff *(*gso_inner_segment)(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features),
__be16 new_protocol, bool is_ipv6)
{
int tnl_hlen = skb_inner_mac_header(skb) - skb_transport_header(skb);
bool remcsum, need_csum, offload_csum, gso_partial;
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb);
u16 mac_offset = skb->mac_header;
__be16 protocol = skb->protocol;
u16 mac_len = skb->mac_len;
int udp_offset, outer_hlen;
__wsum partial;
bool need_ipsec;
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, tnl_hlen)))
goto out;
/* Adjust partial header checksum to negate old length.
* We cannot rely on the value contained in uh->len as it is
* possible that the actual value exceeds the boundaries of the
* 16 bit length field due to the header being added outside of an
* IP or IPv6 frame that was already limited to 64K - 1.
*/
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_PARTIAL)
partial = (__force __wsum)uh->len;
else
partial = (__force __wsum)htonl(skb->len);
partial = csum_sub(csum_unfold(uh->check), partial);
/* setup inner skb. */
skb->encapsulation = 0;
SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->encap_level = 0;
__skb_pull(skb, tnl_hlen);
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_inner_network_offset(skb));
skb->mac_len = skb_inner_network_offset(skb);
skb->protocol = new_protocol;
need_csum = !!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM);
skb->encap_hdr_csum = need_csum;
remcsum = !!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TUNNEL_REMCSUM);
skb->remcsum_offload = remcsum;
need_ipsec = skb_dst(skb) && dst_xfrm(skb_dst(skb));
/* Try to offload checksum if possible */
offload_csum = !!(need_csum &&
!need_ipsec &&
(skb->dev->features &
(is_ipv6 ? (NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM) :
(NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_IP_CSUM))));
features &= skb->dev->hw_enc_features;
/* The only checksum offload we care about from here on out is the
* outer one so strip the existing checksum feature flags and
* instead set the flag based on our outer checksum offload value.
*/
if (remcsum) {
features &= ~NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK;
if (!need_csum || offload_csum)
features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
}
/* segment inner packet. */
segs = gso_inner_segment(skb, features);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(segs)) {
skb_gso_error_unwind(skb, protocol, tnl_hlen, mac_offset,
mac_len);
goto out;
}
gso_partial = !!(skb_shinfo(segs)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_PARTIAL);
outer_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(skb);
udp_offset = outer_hlen - tnl_hlen;
skb = segs;
do {
unsigned int len;
if (remcsum)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/* Set up inner headers if we are offloading inner checksum */
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
skb_reset_inner_headers(skb);
skb->encapsulation = 1;
}
skb->mac_len = mac_len;
skb->protocol = protocol;
__skb_push(skb, outer_hlen);
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_set_network_header(skb, mac_len);
skb_set_transport_header(skb, udp_offset);
len = skb->len - udp_offset;
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
/* If we are only performing partial GSO the inner header
* will be using a length value equal to only one MSS sized
* segment instead of the entire frame.
*/
if (gso_partial && skb_is_gso(skb)) {
uh->len = htons(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size +
SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->data_offset +
skb->head - (unsigned char *)uh);
} else {
uh->len = htons(len);
}
if (!need_csum)
continue;
uh->check = ~csum_fold(csum_add(partial,
(__force __wsum)htonl(len)));
if (skb->encapsulation || !offload_csum) {
uh->check = gso_make_checksum(skb, ~uh->check);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
} else {
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum_start = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb->head;
skb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct udphdr, check);
}
} while ((skb = skb->next));
out:
return segs;
}
struct sk_buff *skb_udp_tunnel_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features,
bool is_ipv6)
{
__be16 protocol = skb->protocol;
const struct net_offload **offloads;
const struct net_offload *ops;
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
struct sk_buff *(*gso_inner_segment)(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features);
rcu_read_lock();
switch (skb->inner_protocol_type) {
case ENCAP_TYPE_ETHER:
protocol = skb->inner_protocol;
gso_inner_segment = skb_mac_gso_segment;
break;
case ENCAP_TYPE_IPPROTO:
offloads = is_ipv6 ? inet6_offloads : inet_offloads;
ops = rcu_dereference(offloads[skb->inner_ipproto]);
if (!ops || !ops->callbacks.gso_segment)
goto out_unlock;
gso_inner_segment = ops->callbacks.gso_segment;
break;
default:
goto out_unlock;
}
segs = __skb_udp_tunnel_segment(skb, features, gso_inner_segment,
protocol, is_ipv6);
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return segs;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_udp_tunnel_segment);
static struct sk_buff *__udp_gso_segment_list(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
unsigned int mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
skb = skb_segment_list(skb, features, skb_mac_header_len(skb));
if (IS_ERR(skb))
return skb;
udp_hdr(skb)->len = htons(sizeof(struct udphdr) + mss);
return skb;
}
struct sk_buff *__udp_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *gso_skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct sock *sk = gso_skb->sk;
unsigned int sum_truesize = 0;
struct sk_buff *segs, *seg;
struct udphdr *uh;
unsigned int mss;
bool copy_dtor;
__sum16 check;
__be16 newlen;
if (skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)
return __udp_gso_segment_list(gso_skb, features);
mss = skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_size;
if (gso_skb->len <= sizeof(*uh) + mss)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
skb_pull(gso_skb, sizeof(*uh));
/* clear destructor to avoid skb_segment assigning it to tail */
copy_dtor = gso_skb->destructor == sock_wfree;
if (copy_dtor)
gso_skb->destructor = NULL;
segs = skb_segment(gso_skb, features);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(segs)) {
if (copy_dtor)
gso_skb->destructor = sock_wfree;
return segs;
}
/* GSO partial and frag_list segmentation only requires splitting
* the frame into an MSS multiple and possibly a remainder, both
* cases return a GSO skb. So update the mss now.
*/
if (skb_is_gso(segs))
mss *= skb_shinfo(segs)->gso_segs;
seg = segs;
uh = udp_hdr(seg);
net/udp_gso: Allow TX timestamp with UDP GSO Fixes an issue where TX Timestamps are not arriving on the error queue when UDP_SEGMENT CMSG type is combined with CMSG type SO_TIMESTAMPING. This can be illustrated with an updated updgso_bench_tx program which includes the '-T' option to test for this condition. It also introduces the '-P' option which will call poll() before reading the error queue. ./udpgso_bench_tx -4ucTPv -S 1472 -l2 -D 172.16.120.18 poll timeout udp tx: 0 MB/s 1 calls/s 1 msg/s The "poll timeout" message above indicates that TX timestamp never arrived. This patch preserves tx_flags for the first UDP GSO segment. Only the first segment is timestamped, even though in some cases there may be benefital in timestamping both the first and last segment. Factors in deciding on first segment timestamp only: - Timestamping both first and last segmented is not feasible. Hardware can only have one outstanding TS request at a time. - Timestamping last segment may under report network latency of the previous segments. Even though the doorbell is suppressed, the ring producer counter has been incremented. - Timestamping the first segment has the upside in that it reports timestamps from the application's view, e.g. RTT. - Timestamping the first segment has the downside that it may underreport tx host network latency. It appears that we have to pick one or the other. And possibly follow-up with a config flag to choose behavior. v2: Remove tests as noted by Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Moving tests from net to net-next v3: Update only relevant tx_flag bits as per Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> v4: Update comments and commit message as per Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Fixes: ee80d1ebe5ba ("udp: add udp gso") Signed-off-by: Fred Klassen <fklassen@appneta.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-17 19:05:07 +00:00
/* preserve TX timestamp flags and TS key for first segment */
skb_shinfo(seg)->tskey = skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->tskey;
skb_shinfo(seg)->tx_flags |=
(skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_ANY_TSTAMP);
/* compute checksum adjustment based on old length versus new */
newlen = htons(sizeof(*uh) + mss);
check = csum16_add(csum16_sub(uh->check, uh->len), newlen);
for (;;) {
if (copy_dtor) {
seg->destructor = sock_wfree;
seg->sk = sk;
sum_truesize += seg->truesize;
}
if (!seg->next)
break;
uh->len = newlen;
uh->check = check;
if (seg->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
gso_reset_checksum(seg, ~check);
else
uh->check = gso_make_checksum(seg, ~check) ? :
CSUM_MANGLED_0;
seg = seg->next;
uh = udp_hdr(seg);
}
/* last packet can be partial gso_size, account for that in checksum */
newlen = htons(skb_tail_pointer(seg) - skb_transport_header(seg) +
seg->data_len);
check = csum16_add(csum16_sub(uh->check, uh->len), newlen);
uh->len = newlen;
uh->check = check;
if (seg->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
gso_reset_checksum(seg, ~check);
else
uh->check = gso_make_checksum(seg, ~check) ? : CSUM_MANGLED_0;
/* update refcount for the packet */
udp: avoid refcount_t saturation in __udp_gso_segment() For some reason, Willem thought that the issue we fixed for TCP in commit 7ec318feeed1 ("tcp: gso: avoid refcount_t warning from tcp_gso_segment()") was not relevant for UDP GSO. But syzbot found its way. refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10261 at lib/refcount.c:78 refcount_add_not_zero+0x2d4/0x320 lib/refcount.c:78 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 10261 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #38 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x22f/0x4de kernel/panic.c:184 __warn.cold.8+0x163/0x1b3 kernel/panic.c:536 report_bug+0x252/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline] do_error_trap+0x1de/0x490 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296 do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:992 RIP: 0010:refcount_add_not_zero+0x2d4/0x320 lib/refcount.c:78 RSP: 0018:ffff880196db6b90 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: 00000000ffffff01 RCX: ffffc900040d9000 RDX: 0000000000004a29 RSI: ffffffff8160f6f1 RDI: ffff880196db66f0 RBP: ffff880196db6c78 R08: ffff8801b33d6740 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff8801b33d6740 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: ffff880196db6c50 R15: 0000000000020101 refcount_add+0x1b/0x70 lib/refcount.c:102 __udp_gso_segment+0xaa5/0xee0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:272 udp4_ufo_fragment+0x592/0x7a0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:301 inet_gso_segment+0x639/0x12b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1342 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4050 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3122 __dev_queue_xmit+0xbf8/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3579 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3620 neigh_direct_output+0x15/0x20 net/core/neighbour.c:1401 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:483 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xa5f/0x1840 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:229 ip_finish_output+0x828/0xf80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:317 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:277 [inline] ip_output+0x21b/0x850 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:405 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] ip_local_out+0xc5/0x1b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x40/0xe0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1434 udp_send_skb.isra.37+0x5eb/0x1000 net/ipv4/udp.c:825 udp_push_pending_frames+0x5c/0xf0 net/ipv4/udp.c:853 udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x380/0x3e0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1105 udp_lib_setsockopt+0x59a/0x600 net/ipv4/udp.c:2403 udpv6_setsockopt+0x95/0xa0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1447 sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3046 __sys_setsockopt+0x1bd/0x390 net/socket.c:1903 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1914 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1911 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1911 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: ad405857b174 ("udp: better wmem accounting on gso") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-05-11 02:07:13 +00:00
if (copy_dtor) {
int delta = sum_truesize - gso_skb->truesize;
/* In some pathological cases, delta can be negative.
* We need to either use refcount_add() or refcount_sub_and_test()
*/
if (likely(delta >= 0))
refcount_add(delta, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
else
WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_sub_and_test(-delta, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc));
}
return segs;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__udp_gso_segment);
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively. Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all features that the source host does. Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677. This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification. It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP insertion and software UFO segmentation. It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload (NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap. To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1 ("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO"). (*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id, ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted at the end of the enum to minimize code churn. Tested Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel. A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device: host: nc -l -p -u 8000 & tcpdump -n -i tap0 guest: dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000 nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds, packets arriving fragmented: ./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1 (from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests) Changes v1 -> v2 - simplified set_offload change (review comment) - documented test procedure Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com> Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.") Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-21 15:22:25 +00:00
static struct sk_buff *udp4_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively. Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all features that the source host does. Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677. This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification. It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP insertion and software UFO segmentation. It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload (NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap. To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1 ("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO"). (*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id, ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted at the end of the enum to minimize code churn. Tested Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel. A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device: host: nc -l -p -u 8000 & tcpdump -n -i tap0 guest: dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000 nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds, packets arriving fragmented: ./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1 (from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests) Changes v1 -> v2 - simplified set_offload change (review comment) - documented test procedure Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com> Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.") Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-21 15:22:25 +00:00
unsigned int mss;
__wsum csum;
struct udphdr *uh;
struct iphdr *iph;
if (skb->encapsulation &&
(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively. Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all features that the source host does. Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677. This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification. It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP insertion and software UFO segmentation. It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload (NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap. To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1 ("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO"). (*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id, ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted at the end of the enum to minimize code churn. Tested Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel. A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device: host: nc -l -p -u 8000 & tcpdump -n -i tap0 guest: dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000 nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds, packets arriving fragmented: ./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1 (from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests) Changes v1 -> v2 - simplified set_offload change (review comment) - documented test procedure Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com> Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.") Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-21 15:22:25 +00:00
(SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL|SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM))) {
segs = skb_udp_tunnel_segment(skb, features, false);
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively. Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all features that the source host does. Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677. This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification. It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP insertion and software UFO segmentation. It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload (NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap. To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1 ("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO"). (*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id, ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted at the end of the enum to minimize code churn. Tested Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel. A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device: host: nc -l -p -u 8000 & tcpdump -n -i tap0 guest: dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000 nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds, packets arriving fragmented: ./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1 (from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests) Changes v1 -> v2 - simplified set_offload change (review comment) - documented test procedure Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com> Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.") Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-21 15:22:25 +00:00
goto out;
}
if (!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_UDP | SKB_GSO_UDP_L4)))
goto out;
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively. Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all features that the source host does. Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677. This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification. It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP insertion and software UFO segmentation. It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload (NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap. To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1 ("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO"). (*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id, ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted at the end of the enum to minimize code churn. Tested Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel. A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device: host: nc -l -p -u 8000 & tcpdump -n -i tap0 guest: dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000 nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds, packets arriving fragmented: ./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1 (from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests) Changes v1 -> v2 - simplified set_offload change (review comment) - documented test procedure Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com> Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.") Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-21 15:22:25 +00:00
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
goto out;
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_L4)
return __udp_gso_segment(skb, features);
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively. Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all features that the source host does. Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677. This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification. It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP insertion and software UFO segmentation. It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload (NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap. To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1 ("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO"). (*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id, ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted at the end of the enum to minimize code churn. Tested Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel. A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device: host: nc -l -p -u 8000 & tcpdump -n -i tap0 guest: dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000 nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds, packets arriving fragmented: ./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1 (from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests) Changes v1 -> v2 - simplified set_offload change (review comment) - documented test procedure Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com> Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.") Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-21 15:22:25 +00:00
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as
* HW cannot do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple
* IP fragments.
*/
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively. Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all features that the source host does. Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677. This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification. It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP insertion and software UFO segmentation. It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload (NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap. To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1 ("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO"). (*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id, ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted at the end of the enum to minimize code churn. Tested Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel. A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device: host: nc -l -p -u 8000 & tcpdump -n -i tap0 guest: dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000 nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds, packets arriving fragmented: ./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1 (from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests) Changes v1 -> v2 - simplified set_offload change (review comment) - documented test procedure Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com> Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.") Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-11-21 15:22:25 +00:00
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
uh->check = 0;
csum = skb_checksum(skb, 0, skb->len, 0);
uh->check = udp_v4_check(skb->len, iph->saddr, iph->daddr, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
/* If there is no outer header we can fake a checksum offload
* due to the fact that we have already done the checksum in
* software prior to segmenting the frame.
*/
if (!skb->encap_hdr_csum)
features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
/* Fragment the skb. IP headers of the fragments are updated in
* inet_gso_segment()
*/
segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
out:
return segs;
}
#define UDP_GRO_CNT_MAX 64
static struct sk_buff *udp_gro_receive_segment(struct list_head *head,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb);
struct sk_buff *pp = NULL;
struct udphdr *uh2;
struct sk_buff *p;
udp: fix GRO packet of death syzbot was able to crash host by sending UDP packets with a 0 payload. TCP does not have this issue since we do not aggregate packets without payload. Since dev_gro_receive() sets gso_size based on skb_gro_len(skb) it seems not worth trying to cope with padded packets. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826 Read of size 16 at addr ffff88808893fff0 by task syz-executor612/7889 CPU: 0 PID: 7889 Comm: syz-executor612 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #96 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 __asan_report_load16_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:133 skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826 udp_gro_receive_segment net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:382 [inline] call_gro_receive include/linux/netdevice.h:2349 [inline] udp_gro_receive+0xb61/0xfd0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:414 udp4_gro_receive+0x763/0xeb0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:478 inet_gro_receive+0xe72/0x1110 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1510 dev_gro_receive+0x1cd0/0x23c0 net/core/dev.c:5581 napi_gro_frags+0x36b/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5843 tun_get_user+0x2f24/0x3fb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981 tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2027 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e1/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:681 do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:957 [inline] do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:938 vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1002 do_writev+0x15e/0x370 fs/read_write.c:1037 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1110 [inline] __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1107 [inline] __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1107 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x441cc0 Code: 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 9d 09 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 83 3d 51 93 29 00 00 75 14 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 74 09 fc ff c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ba 2b 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffe8c716118 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe8c716150 RCX: 0000000000441cc0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffe8c716170 RDI: 00000000000000f0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000ffff R09: 0000000000a64668 R10: 0000000020000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000c2d9 R13: 0000000000402b50 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 5143: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:497 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:470 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:505 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3393 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3555 mm_alloc+0x1d/0xd0 kernel/fork.c:1030 bprm_mm_init fs/exec.c:363 [inline] __do_execve_file.isra.0+0xaa3/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1791 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline] do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 5351: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:459 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:467 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3499 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3765 __mmdrop+0x238/0x320 kernel/fork.c:677 mmdrop include/linux/sched/mm.h:49 [inline] finish_task_switch+0x47b/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:2746 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2880 [inline] __schedule+0x81b/0x1cc0 kernel/sched/core.c:3518 preempt_schedule_irq+0xb5/0x140 kernel/sched/core.c:3745 retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d arch_local_irq_restore arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:767 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0xab/0x260 mm/slab.c:3766 anon_vma_chain_free mm/rmap.c:134 [inline] unlink_anon_vmas+0x2ba/0x870 mm/rmap.c:401 free_pgtables+0x1af/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:394 exit_mmap+0x2d1/0x530 mm/mmap.c:3144 __mmput kernel/fork.c:1046 [inline] mmput+0x15f/0x4c0 kernel/fork.c:1067 exec_mmap fs/exec.c:1046 [inline] flush_old_exec+0x8d9/0x1c20 fs/exec.c:1279 load_elf_binary+0x9bc/0x53f0 fs/binfmt_elf.c:864 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1656 [inline] search_binary_handler+0x17f/0x570 fs/exec.c:1634 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1698 [inline] __do_execve_file.isra.0+0x1394/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1818 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline] do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808893f7c0 which belongs to the cache mm_struct of size 1496 The buggy address is located 600 bytes to the right of 1496-byte region [ffff88808893f7c0, ffff88808893fd98) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002224f80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821bc40ac0 index:0xffff88808893f7c0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head) raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea00025b4f08 ffffea00027b9d08 ffff88821bc40ac0 raw: ffff88808893f7c0 ffff88808893e440 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808893fe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88808893ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88808893ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888088940000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888088940080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: e20cf8d3f1f7 ("udp: implement GRO for plain UDP sockets.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-02 01:56:28 +00:00
unsigned int ulen;
int ret = 0;
/* requires non zero csum, for symmetry with GSO */
if (!uh->check) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 1;
return NULL;
}
udp: fix GRO packet of death syzbot was able to crash host by sending UDP packets with a 0 payload. TCP does not have this issue since we do not aggregate packets without payload. Since dev_gro_receive() sets gso_size based on skb_gro_len(skb) it seems not worth trying to cope with padded packets. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826 Read of size 16 at addr ffff88808893fff0 by task syz-executor612/7889 CPU: 0 PID: 7889 Comm: syz-executor612 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #96 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 __asan_report_load16_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:133 skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826 udp_gro_receive_segment net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:382 [inline] call_gro_receive include/linux/netdevice.h:2349 [inline] udp_gro_receive+0xb61/0xfd0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:414 udp4_gro_receive+0x763/0xeb0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:478 inet_gro_receive+0xe72/0x1110 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1510 dev_gro_receive+0x1cd0/0x23c0 net/core/dev.c:5581 napi_gro_frags+0x36b/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5843 tun_get_user+0x2f24/0x3fb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981 tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2027 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e1/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:681 do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:957 [inline] do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:938 vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1002 do_writev+0x15e/0x370 fs/read_write.c:1037 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1110 [inline] __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1107 [inline] __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1107 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x441cc0 Code: 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 9d 09 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 83 3d 51 93 29 00 00 75 14 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 74 09 fc ff c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ba 2b 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffe8c716118 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe8c716150 RCX: 0000000000441cc0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffe8c716170 RDI: 00000000000000f0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000ffff R09: 0000000000a64668 R10: 0000000020000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000c2d9 R13: 0000000000402b50 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 5143: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:497 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:470 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:505 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3393 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3555 mm_alloc+0x1d/0xd0 kernel/fork.c:1030 bprm_mm_init fs/exec.c:363 [inline] __do_execve_file.isra.0+0xaa3/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1791 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline] do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 5351: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:459 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:467 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3499 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3765 __mmdrop+0x238/0x320 kernel/fork.c:677 mmdrop include/linux/sched/mm.h:49 [inline] finish_task_switch+0x47b/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:2746 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2880 [inline] __schedule+0x81b/0x1cc0 kernel/sched/core.c:3518 preempt_schedule_irq+0xb5/0x140 kernel/sched/core.c:3745 retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d arch_local_irq_restore arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:767 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0xab/0x260 mm/slab.c:3766 anon_vma_chain_free mm/rmap.c:134 [inline] unlink_anon_vmas+0x2ba/0x870 mm/rmap.c:401 free_pgtables+0x1af/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:394 exit_mmap+0x2d1/0x530 mm/mmap.c:3144 __mmput kernel/fork.c:1046 [inline] mmput+0x15f/0x4c0 kernel/fork.c:1067 exec_mmap fs/exec.c:1046 [inline] flush_old_exec+0x8d9/0x1c20 fs/exec.c:1279 load_elf_binary+0x9bc/0x53f0 fs/binfmt_elf.c:864 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1656 [inline] search_binary_handler+0x17f/0x570 fs/exec.c:1634 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1698 [inline] __do_execve_file.isra.0+0x1394/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1818 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline] do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808893f7c0 which belongs to the cache mm_struct of size 1496 The buggy address is located 600 bytes to the right of 1496-byte region [ffff88808893f7c0, ffff88808893fd98) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002224f80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821bc40ac0 index:0xffff88808893f7c0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head) raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea00025b4f08 ffffea00027b9d08 ffff88821bc40ac0 raw: ffff88808893f7c0 ffff88808893e440 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808893fe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88808893ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88808893ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888088940000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888088940080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: e20cf8d3f1f7 ("udp: implement GRO for plain UDP sockets.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-02 01:56:28 +00:00
/* Do not deal with padded or malicious packets, sorry ! */
ulen = ntohs(uh->len);
if (ulen <= sizeof(*uh) || ulen != skb_gro_len(skb)) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 1;
return NULL;
}
/* pull encapsulating udp header */
skb_gro_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr));
list_for_each_entry(p, head, list) {
if (!NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow)
continue;
uh2 = udp_hdr(p);
/* Match ports only, as csum is always non zero */
if ((*(u32 *)&uh->source != *(u32 *)&uh2->source)) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow = 0;
continue;
}
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_flist != NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->is_flist) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 1;
return p;
}
/* Terminate the flow on len mismatch or if it grow "too much".
* Under small packet flood GRO count could elsewhere grow a lot
udp: fix GRO packet of death syzbot was able to crash host by sending UDP packets with a 0 payload. TCP does not have this issue since we do not aggregate packets without payload. Since dev_gro_receive() sets gso_size based on skb_gro_len(skb) it seems not worth trying to cope with padded packets. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826 Read of size 16 at addr ffff88808893fff0 by task syz-executor612/7889 CPU: 0 PID: 7889 Comm: syz-executor612 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #96 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 __asan_report_load16_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:133 skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826 udp_gro_receive_segment net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:382 [inline] call_gro_receive include/linux/netdevice.h:2349 [inline] udp_gro_receive+0xb61/0xfd0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:414 udp4_gro_receive+0x763/0xeb0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:478 inet_gro_receive+0xe72/0x1110 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1510 dev_gro_receive+0x1cd0/0x23c0 net/core/dev.c:5581 napi_gro_frags+0x36b/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5843 tun_get_user+0x2f24/0x3fb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981 tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2027 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline] do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e1/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:681 do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:957 [inline] do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:938 vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1002 do_writev+0x15e/0x370 fs/read_write.c:1037 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1110 [inline] __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1107 [inline] __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1107 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x441cc0 Code: 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 9d 09 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 83 3d 51 93 29 00 00 75 14 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 74 09 fc ff c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ba 2b 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffe8c716118 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe8c716150 RCX: 0000000000441cc0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffe8c716170 RDI: 00000000000000f0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000ffff R09: 0000000000a64668 R10: 0000000020000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000c2d9 R13: 0000000000402b50 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 5143: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:497 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:470 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:505 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3393 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3555 mm_alloc+0x1d/0xd0 kernel/fork.c:1030 bprm_mm_init fs/exec.c:363 [inline] __do_execve_file.isra.0+0xaa3/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1791 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline] do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 5351: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:459 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:467 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3499 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3765 __mmdrop+0x238/0x320 kernel/fork.c:677 mmdrop include/linux/sched/mm.h:49 [inline] finish_task_switch+0x47b/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:2746 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2880 [inline] __schedule+0x81b/0x1cc0 kernel/sched/core.c:3518 preempt_schedule_irq+0xb5/0x140 kernel/sched/core.c:3745 retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d arch_local_irq_restore arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:767 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0xab/0x260 mm/slab.c:3766 anon_vma_chain_free mm/rmap.c:134 [inline] unlink_anon_vmas+0x2ba/0x870 mm/rmap.c:401 free_pgtables+0x1af/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:394 exit_mmap+0x2d1/0x530 mm/mmap.c:3144 __mmput kernel/fork.c:1046 [inline] mmput+0x15f/0x4c0 kernel/fork.c:1067 exec_mmap fs/exec.c:1046 [inline] flush_old_exec+0x8d9/0x1c20 fs/exec.c:1279 load_elf_binary+0x9bc/0x53f0 fs/binfmt_elf.c:864 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1656 [inline] search_binary_handler+0x17f/0x570 fs/exec.c:1634 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1698 [inline] __do_execve_file.isra.0+0x1394/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1818 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline] do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808893f7c0 which belongs to the cache mm_struct of size 1496 The buggy address is located 600 bytes to the right of 1496-byte region [ffff88808893f7c0, ffff88808893fd98) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002224f80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821bc40ac0 index:0xffff88808893f7c0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head) raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea00025b4f08 ffffea00027b9d08 ffff88821bc40ac0 raw: ffff88808893f7c0 ffff88808893e440 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808893fe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88808893ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88808893ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888088940000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888088940080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Fixes: e20cf8d3f1f7 ("udp: implement GRO for plain UDP sockets.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-02 01:56:28 +00:00
* leading to excessive truesize values.
* On len mismatch merge the first packet shorter than gso_size,
* otherwise complete the GRO packet.
*/
if (ulen > ntohs(uh2->len)) {
pp = p;
} else {
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_flist) {
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb))) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 1;
return NULL;
}
if ((skb->ip_summed != p->ip_summed) ||
(skb->csum_level != p->csum_level)) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 1;
return NULL;
}
ret = skb_gro_receive_list(p, skb);
} else {
skb_gro_postpull_rcsum(skb, uh,
sizeof(struct udphdr));
ret = skb_gro_receive(p, skb);
}
}
if (ret || ulen != ntohs(uh2->len) ||
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->count >= UDP_GRO_CNT_MAX)
pp = p;
return pp;
}
/* mismatch, but we never need to flush */
return NULL;
}
struct sk_buff *udp_gro_receive(struct list_head *head, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct udphdr *uh, struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *pp = NULL;
struct sk_buff *p;
struct udphdr *uh2;
unsigned int off = skb_gro_offset(skb);
int flush = 1;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_flist = 0;
if (skb->dev->features & NETIF_F_GRO_FRAGLIST)
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_flist = sk ? !udp_sk(sk)->gro_enabled: 1;
if ((sk && udp_sk(sk)->gro_enabled) || NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_flist) {
pp = call_gro_receive(udp_gro_receive_segment, head, skb);
return pp;
}
if (!sk || NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark ||
(skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_cnt == 0 &&
!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum_valid) ||
!udp_sk(sk)->gro_receive)
goto out;
/* mark that this skb passed once through the tunnel gro layer */
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark = 1;
flush = 0;
list_for_each_entry(p, head, list) {
if (!NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow)
continue;
uh2 = (struct udphdr *)(p->data + off);
/* Match ports and either checksums are either both zero
* or nonzero.
*/
if ((*(u32 *)&uh->source != *(u32 *)&uh2->source) ||
(!uh->check ^ !uh2->check)) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow = 0;
continue;
}
}
skb_gro_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)); /* pull encapsulating udp header */
skb_gro_postpull_rcsum(skb, uh, sizeof(struct udphdr));
pp = call_gro_receive_sk(udp_sk(sk)->gro_receive, sk, head, skb);
out:
skb_gro_flush_final(skb, pp, flush);
return pp;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_gro_receive);
INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE
struct sk_buff *udp4_gro_receive(struct list_head *head, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct udphdr *uh = udp_gro_udphdr(skb);
struct sk_buff *pp;
struct sock *sk;
if (unlikely(!uh))
goto flush;
/* Don't bother verifying checksum if we're going to flush anyway. */
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush)
goto skip;
if (skb_gro_checksum_validate_zero_check(skb, IPPROTO_UDP, uh->check,
inet_gro_compute_pseudo))
goto flush;
else if (uh->check)
skb_gro_checksum_try_convert(skb, IPPROTO_UDP,
inet_gro_compute_pseudo);
skip:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_ipv6 = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
sk = static_branch_unlikely(&udp_encap_needed_key) ? udp4_lib_lookup_skb(skb, uh->source, uh->dest) : NULL;
pp = udp_gro_receive(head, skb, uh, sk);
rcu_read_unlock();
return pp;
flush:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 1;
return NULL;
}
static int udp_gro_complete_segment(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb);
skb->csum_start = (unsigned char *)uh - skb->head;
skb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct udphdr, check);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_UDP_L4;
return 0;
}
int udp_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff,
udp_lookup_t lookup)
{
__be16 newlen = htons(skb->len - nhoff);
struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr *)(skb->data + nhoff);
int err = -ENOSYS;
struct sock *sk;
uh->len = newlen;
rcu_read_lock();
sk = INDIRECT_CALL_INET(lookup, udp6_lib_lookup_skb,
udp4_lib_lookup_skb, skb, uh->source, uh->dest);
if (sk && udp_sk(sk)->gro_complete) {
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = uh->check ? SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM
: SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL;
/* Set encapsulation before calling into inner gro_complete()
* functions to make them set up the inner offsets.
*/
skb->encapsulation = 1;
err = udp_sk(sk)->gro_complete(sk, skb,
nhoff + sizeof(struct udphdr));
} else {
err = udp_gro_complete_segment(skb);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (skb->remcsum_offload)
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_TUNNEL_REMCSUM;
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_gro_complete);
INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int udp4_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr *)(skb->data + nhoff);
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_flist) {
uh->len = htons(skb->len - nhoff);
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= (SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST|SKB_GSO_UDP_L4);
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->count;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) {
if (skb->csum_level < SKB_MAX_CSUM_LEVEL)
skb->csum_level++;
} else {
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
skb->csum_level = 0;
}
return 0;
}
if (uh->check)
uh->check = ~udp_v4_check(skb->len - nhoff, iph->saddr,
iph->daddr, 0);
return udp_gro_complete(skb, nhoff, udp4_lib_lookup_skb);
}
static const struct net_offload udpv4_offload = {
.callbacks = {
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively. Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all features that the source host does. Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677. This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification. It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP insertion and software UFO segmentation. It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload (NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap. To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1 ("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO"). (*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id, ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted at the end of the enum to minimize code churn. Tested Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel. A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device: host: nc -l -p -u 8000 & tcpdump -n -i tap0 guest: dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000 nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds, packets arriving fragmented: ./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1 (from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests) Changes v1 -> v2 - simplified set_offload change (review comment) - documented test procedure Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com> Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.") Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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.gso_segment = udp4_ufo_fragment,
.gro_receive = udp4_gro_receive,
.gro_complete = udp4_gro_complete,
},
};
int __init udpv4_offload_init(void)
{
return inet_add_offload(&udpv4_offload, IPPROTO_UDP);
}