linux/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

1960 lines
43 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/* Updated: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
*
* Added conditional policy language extensions
*
* Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
*
* Added support for the policy capability bitmap
*
* Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
* Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
* Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/major.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/kobject.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
/* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
#include "flask.h"
#include "avc.h"
#include "avc_ss.h"
#include "security.h"
#include "objsec.h"
#include "conditional.h"
/* Policy capability filenames */
static char *policycap_names[] = {
"network_peer_controls",
"open_perms"
};
unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long checkreqprot;
if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
/* global data for booleans */
static struct dentry *bool_dir;
static int bool_num;
static char **bool_pending_names;
static int *bool_pending_values;
/* global data for classes */
static struct dentry *class_dir;
static unsigned long last_class_ino;
static char policy_opened;
/* global data for policy capabilities */
static struct dentry *policycap_dir;
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a security operation. */
static int task_has_security(struct task_struct *tsk,
u32 perms)
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
u32 sid = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
tsec = __task_cred(tsk)->security;
if (tsec)
sid = tsec->sid;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!tsec)
return -EACCES;
return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_SECURITY,
SECCLASS_SECURITY, perms, NULL);
}
enum sel_inos {
SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
SEL_LOAD, /* load policy */
SEL_ENFORCE, /* get or set enforcing status */
SEL_CONTEXT, /* validate context */
SEL_ACCESS, /* compute access decision */
SEL_CREATE, /* compute create labeling decision */
SEL_RELABEL, /* compute relabeling decision */
SEL_USER, /* compute reachable user contexts */
SEL_POLICYVERS, /* return policy version for this kernel */
SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS, /* commit new boolean values */
SEL_MLS, /* return if MLS policy is enabled */
SEL_DISABLE, /* disable SELinux until next reboot */
SEL_MEMBER, /* compute polyinstantiation membership decision */
SEL_CHECKREQPROT, /* check requested protection, not kernel-applied one */
SEL_COMPAT_NET, /* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown reject handling to userspace */
SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */
selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status) This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications read-only mmap(2). This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space. struct selinux_kernel_status { u32 length; /* length of this structure */ u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */ u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */ u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */ u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */ }; When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce to keep consistency. However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process. In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache. If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own worker thread from the module. If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce. A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space. Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing mode, without any system call invocations. This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need to wait for a while if it is odd number. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -- security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-09-14 09:28:39 +00:00
SEL_STATUS, /* export current status using mmap() */
SEL_POLICY, /* allow userspace to read the in kernel policy */
SEL_INO_NEXT, /* The next inode number to use */
};
static unsigned long sel_last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
#define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET 0x01000000
#define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET 0x02000000
#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET 0x04000000
#define SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET 0x08000000
#define SEL_INO_MASK 0x00ffffff
#define TMPBUFLEN 12
static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t length;
length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_enforcing);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page = NULL;
ssize_t length;
int new_value;
length = -ENOMEM;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
/* No partial writes. */
length = EINVAL;
if (*ppos != 0)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
goto out;
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
if (new_value != selinux_enforcing) {
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE);
if (length)
goto out;
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
new_value, selinux_enforcing,
audit_get_loginuid(current),
audit_get_sessionid(current));
selinux_enforcing = new_value;
if (selinux_enforcing)
avc_ss_reset(0);
selnl_notify_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status) This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications read-only mmap(2). This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space. struct selinux_kernel_status { u32 length; /* length of this structure */ u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */ u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */ u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */ u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */ }; When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce to keep consistency. However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process. In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache. If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own worker thread from the module. If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce. A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space. Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing mode, without any system call invocations. This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need to wait for a while if it is odd number. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -- security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-09-14 09:28:39 +00:00
selinux_status_update_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
}
length = count;
out:
free_page((unsigned long) page);
return length;
}
#else
#define sel_write_enforce NULL
#endif
static const struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = {
.read = sel_read_enforce,
.write = sel_write_enforce,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t length;
ino_t ino = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
security_get_reject_unknown() : !security_get_allow_unknown();
length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", handle_unknown);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
}
static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
.read = sel_read_handle_unknown,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status) This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications read-only mmap(2). This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space. struct selinux_kernel_status { u32 length; /* length of this structure */ u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */ u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */ u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */ u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */ }; When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce to keep consistency. However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process. In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache. If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own worker thread from the module. If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce. A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space. Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing mode, without any system call invocations. This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need to wait for a while if it is odd number. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -- security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-09-14 09:28:39 +00:00
static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct page *status = selinux_kernel_status_page();
if (!status)
return -ENOMEM;
filp->private_data = status;
return 0;
}
static ssize_t sel_read_handle_status(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct page *status = filp->private_data;
BUG_ON(!status);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos,
page_address(status),
sizeof(struct selinux_kernel_status));
}
static int sel_mmap_handle_status(struct file *filp,
struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct page *status = filp->private_data;
unsigned long size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
BUG_ON(!status);
/* only allows one page from the head */
if (vma->vm_pgoff > 0 || size != PAGE_SIZE)
return -EIO;
/* disallow writable mapping */
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
return -EPERM;
/* disallow mprotect() turns it into writable */
vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start,
page_to_pfn(status),
size, vma->vm_page_prot);
}
static const struct file_operations sel_handle_status_ops = {
.open = sel_open_handle_status,
.read = sel_read_handle_status,
.mmap = sel_mmap_handle_status,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page = NULL;
ssize_t length;
int new_value;
length = -ENOMEM;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
/* No partial writes. */
length = -EINVAL;
if (*ppos != 0)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
goto out;
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
if (new_value) {
length = selinux_disable();
if (length)
goto out;
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
"selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u",
audit_get_loginuid(current),
audit_get_sessionid(current));
}
length = count;
out:
free_page((unsigned long) page);
return length;
}
#else
#define sel_write_disable NULL
#endif
static const struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = {
.write = sel_write_disable,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t length;
length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
}
static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
.read = sel_read_policyvers,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
/* declaration for sel_write_load */
static int sel_make_bools(void);
static int sel_make_classes(void);
static int sel_make_policycap(void);
/* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */
static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
unsigned long *ino);
static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t length;
length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
security_mls_enabled());
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
}
static const struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = {
.read = sel_read_mls,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
struct policy_load_memory {
size_t len;
void *data;
};
static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct policy_load_memory *plm = NULL;
int rc;
BUG_ON(filp->private_data);
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
rc = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
if (rc)
goto err;
rc = -EBUSY;
if (policy_opened)
goto err;
rc = -ENOMEM;
plm = kzalloc(sizeof(*plm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!plm)
goto err;
if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len()) {
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len());
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
}
rc = security_read_policy(&plm->data, &plm->len);
if (rc)
goto err;
policy_opened = 1;
filp->private_data = plm;
mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
return 0;
err:
mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
if (plm)
vfree(plm->data);
kfree(plm);
return rc;
}
static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
BUG_ON(!plm);
policy_opened = 0;
vfree(plm->data);
kfree(plm);
return 0;
}
static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len);
out:
mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
return ret;
}
static int sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct policy_load_memory *plm = vma->vm_file->private_data;
unsigned long offset;
struct page *page;
if (vmf->flags & (FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE | FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (offset >= roundup(plm->len, PAGE_SIZE))
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
page = vmalloc_to_page(plm->data + offset);
get_page(page);
vmf->page = page;
return 0;
}
static struct vm_operations_struct sel_mmap_policy_ops = {
.fault = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
.page_mkwrite = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
};
static int sel_mmap_policy(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
/* do not allow mprotect to make mapping writable */
vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
return -EACCES;
}
vma->vm_flags |= VM_RESERVED;
vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops;
return 0;
}
static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = {
.open = sel_open_policy,
.read = sel_read_policy,
.mmap = sel_mmap_policy,
.release = sel_release_policy,
};
static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
ssize_t length;
void *data = NULL;
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY);
if (length)
goto out;
/* No partial writes. */
length = -EINVAL;
if (*ppos != 0)
goto out;
length = -EFBIG;
if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
data = vmalloc(count);
if (!data)
goto out;
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
goto out;
length = security_load_policy(data, count);
if (length)
goto out;
length = sel_make_bools();
if (length)
goto out1;
length = sel_make_classes();
if (length)
goto out1;
length = sel_make_policycap();
if (length)
goto out1;
length = count;
out1:
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
"policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u",
audit_get_loginuid(current),
audit_get_sessionid(current));
out:
mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
vfree(data);
return length;
}
static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
.write = sel_write_load,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *canon = NULL;
u32 sid, len;
ssize_t length;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_sid_to_context(sid, &canon, &len);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -ERANGE;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
"payload max\n", __func__, len);
goto out;
}
memcpy(buf, canon, len);
length = len;
out:
kfree(canon);
return length;
}
static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t length;
length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_checkreqprot);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
}
static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page = NULL;
ssize_t length;
unsigned int new_value;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
/* No partial writes. */
length = -EINVAL;
if (*ppos != 0)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
goto out;
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
selinux_checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
length = count;
out:
free_page((unsigned long) page);
return length;
}
static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
.read = sel_read_checkreqprot,
.write = sel_write_checkreqprot,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
/*
* Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c
*/
static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
[SEL_ACCESS] = sel_write_access,
[SEL_CREATE] = sel_write_create,
[SEL_RELABEL] = sel_write_relabel,
[SEL_USER] = sel_write_user,
[SEL_MEMBER] = sel_write_member,
[SEL_CONTEXT] = sel_write_context,
};
static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos)
{
ino_t ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
char *data;
ssize_t rv;
if (ino >= ARRAY_SIZE(write_op) || !write_op[ino])
return -EINVAL;
data = simple_transaction_get(file, buf, size);
if (IS_ERR(data))
return PTR_ERR(data);
rv = write_op[ino](file, data, size);
if (rv > 0) {
simple_transaction_set(file, rv);
rv = size;
}
return rv;
}
static const struct file_operations transaction_ops = {
.write = selinux_transaction_write,
.read = simple_transaction_read,
.release = simple_transaction_release,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
/*
* payload - write methods
* If the method has a response, the response should be put in buf,
* and the length returned. Otherwise return 0 or and -error.
*/
static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
u32 ssid, tsid;
u16 tclass;
struct av_decision avd;
ssize_t length;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length)
goto out;
security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
2009-04-01 01:07:57 +00:00
"%x %x %x %x %u %x",
avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
2009-04-01 01:07:57 +00:00
avd.seqno, avd.flags);
out:
kfree(tcon);
kfree(scon);
return length;
}
static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
char *namebuf = NULL, *objname = NULL;
u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
u16 tclass;
ssize_t length;
char *newcon = NULL;
u32 len;
int nargs;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
namebuf = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!namebuf)
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
nargs = sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu %s", scon, tcon, &tclass, namebuf);
if (nargs < 3 || nargs > 4)
goto out;
if (nargs == 4) {
/*
* If and when the name of new object to be queried contains
* either whitespace or multibyte characters, they shall be
* encoded based on the percentage-encoding rule.
* If not encoded, the sscanf logic picks up only left-half
* of the supplied name; splitted by a whitespace unexpectedly.
*/
char *r, *w;
int c1, c2;
r = w = namebuf;
do {
c1 = *r++;
if (c1 == '+')
c1 = ' ';
else if (c1 == '%') {
c1 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
if (c1 < 0)
goto out;
c2 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
if (c2 < 0)
goto out;
c1 = (c1 << 4) | c2;
}
*w++ = c1;
} while (c1 != '\0');
objname = namebuf;
}
length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass,
objname, &newsid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -ERANGE;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
"payload max\n", __func__, len);
goto out;
}
memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
length = len;
out:
kfree(newcon);
kfree(namebuf);
kfree(tcon);
kfree(scon);
return length;
}
static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
u16 tclass;
ssize_t length;
char *newcon = NULL;
u32 len;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_change_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -ERANGE;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT)
goto out;
memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
length = len;
out:
kfree(newcon);
kfree(tcon);
kfree(scon);
return length;
}
static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *con = NULL, *user = NULL, *ptr;
u32 sid, *sids = NULL;
ssize_t length;
char *newcon;
int i, rc;
u32 len, nsids;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
con = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!con)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
user = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!user)
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_get_user_sids(sid, user, &sids, &nsids);
if (length)
goto out;
length = sprintf(buf, "%u", nsids) + 1;
ptr = buf + length;
for (i = 0; i < nsids; i++) {
rc = security_sid_to_context(sids[i], &newcon, &len);
if (rc) {
length = rc;
goto out;
}
if ((length + len) >= SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
kfree(newcon);
length = -ERANGE;
goto out;
}
memcpy(ptr, newcon, len);
kfree(newcon);
ptr += len;
length += len;
}
out:
kfree(sids);
kfree(user);
kfree(con);
return length;
}
static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
u16 tclass;
ssize_t length;
char *newcon = NULL;
u32 len;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_member_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
if (length)
goto out;
length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -ERANGE;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
"payload max\n", __func__, len);
goto out;
}
memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
length = len;
out:
kfree(newcon);
kfree(tcon);
kfree(scon);
return length;
}
static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode)
{
struct inode *ret = new_inode(sb);
if (ret) {
ret->i_mode = mode;
ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = ret->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
}
return ret;
}
static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page = NULL;
ssize_t length;
ssize_t ret;
int cur_enforcing;
struct inode *inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
unsigned index = inode->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
ret = -EINVAL;
if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index]))
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
goto out;
cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(index);
if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
ret = cur_enforcing;
goto out;
}
length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing,
bool_pending_values[index]);
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
out:
mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
free_page((unsigned long)page);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page = NULL;
ssize_t length;
int new_value;
struct inode *inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
unsigned index = inode->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index]))
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
/* No partial writes. */
length = -EINVAL;
if (*ppos != 0)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
goto out;
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
if (new_value)
new_value = 1;
bool_pending_values[index] = new_value;
length = count;
out:
mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
free_page((unsigned long) page);
return length;
}
static const struct file_operations sel_bool_ops = {
.read = sel_read_bool,
.write = sel_write_bool,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page = NULL;
ssize_t length;
int new_value;
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
if (length)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
/* No partial writes. */
length = -EINVAL;
if (*ppos != 0)
goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
goto out;
length = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
goto out;
length = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
length = 0;
if (new_value && bool_pending_values)
length = security_set_bools(bool_num, bool_pending_values);
if (!length)
length = count;
out:
mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
free_page((unsigned long) page);
return length;
}
static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = {
.write = sel_commit_bools_write,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
{
struct list_head *node;
spin_lock(&de->d_lock);
node = de->d_subdirs.next;
while (node != &de->d_subdirs) {
[PATCH] shrink dentry struct Some long time ago, dentry struct was carefully tuned so that on 32 bits UP, sizeof(struct dentry) was exactly 128, ie a power of 2, and a multiple of memory cache lines. Then RCU was added and dentry struct enlarged by two pointers, with nice results for SMP, but not so good on UP, because breaking the above tuning (128 + 8 = 136 bytes) This patch reverts this unwanted side effect, by using an union (d_u), where d_rcu and d_child are placed so that these two fields can share their memory needs. At the time d_free() is called (and d_rcu is really used), d_child is known to be empty and not touched by the dentry freeing. Lockless lookups only access d_name, d_parent, d_lock, d_op, d_flags (so the previous content of d_child is not needed if said dentry was unhashed but still accessed by a CPU because of RCU constraints) As dentry cache easily contains millions of entries, a size reduction is worth the extra complexity of the ugly C union. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Cc: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com> Cc: Maneesh Soni <maneesh@in.ibm.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com> Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 09:03:32 +00:00
struct dentry *d = list_entry(node, struct dentry, d_u.d_child);
spin_lock_nested(&d->d_lock, DENTRY_D_LOCK_NESTED);
list_del_init(node);
if (d->d_inode) {
dget_dlock(d);
spin_unlock(&de->d_lock);
spin_unlock(&d->d_lock);
d_delete(d);
simple_unlink(de->d_inode, d);
dput(d);
spin_lock(&de->d_lock);
} else
spin_unlock(&d->d_lock);
node = de->d_subdirs.next;
}
spin_unlock(&de->d_lock);
}
#define BOOL_DIR_NAME "booleans"
static int sel_make_bools(void)
{
int i, ret;
ssize_t len;
struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
struct dentry *dir = bool_dir;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
char **names = NULL, *page;
int num;
int *values = NULL;
u32 sid;
/* remove any existing files */
for (i = 0; i < bool_num; i++)
kfree(bool_pending_names[i]);
kfree(bool_pending_names);
kfree(bool_pending_values);
bool_pending_names = NULL;
bool_pending_values = NULL;
sel_remove_entries(dir);
ret = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
goto out;
ret = security_get_bools(&num, &names, &values);
if (ret)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, names[i]);
if (!dentry)
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
if (!inode)
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
if (len < 0)
goto out;
ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (len >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
if (ret)
goto out;
isec->sid = sid;
isec->initialized = 1;
inode->i_fop = &sel_bool_ops;
inode->i_ino = i|SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET;
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
bool_num = num;
bool_pending_names = names;
bool_pending_values = values;
free_page((unsigned long)page);
return 0;
out:
free_page((unsigned long)page);
if (names) {
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
kfree(names[i]);
kfree(names);
}
kfree(values);
sel_remove_entries(dir);
return ret;
}
#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
struct dentry *selinux_null;
static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t length;
length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", avc_cache_threshold);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
}
static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page = NULL;
ssize_t ret;
int new_value;
ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
/* No partial writes. */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (*ppos != 0)
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
goto out;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
avc_cache_threshold = new_value;
ret = count;
out:
free_page((unsigned long)page);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page;
ssize_t length;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
length = avc_get_hash_stats(page);
if (length >= 0)
length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
free_page((unsigned long)page);
return length;
}
static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = {
.read = sel_read_avc_cache_threshold,
.write = sel_write_avc_cache_threshold,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static const struct file_operations sel_avc_hash_stats_ops = {
.read = sel_read_avc_hash_stats,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
static struct avc_cache_stats *sel_avc_get_stat_idx(loff_t *idx)
{
int cpu;
for (cpu = *idx; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) {
if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
continue;
*idx = cpu + 1;
return &per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, cpu);
}
return NULL;
}
static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
{
loff_t n = *pos - 1;
if (*pos == 0)
return SEQ_START_TOKEN;
return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(&n);
}
static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(pos);
}
static int sel_avc_stats_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct avc_cache_stats *st = v;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
seq_printf(seq, "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims "
"frees\n");
else {
unsigned int lookups = st->lookups;
unsigned int misses = st->misses;
unsigned int hits = lookups - misses;
seq_printf(seq, "%u %u %u %u %u %u\n", lookups,
hits, misses, st->allocations,
st->reclaims, st->frees);
}
return 0;
}
static void sel_avc_stats_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{ }
static const struct seq_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops = {
.start = sel_avc_stats_seq_start,
.next = sel_avc_stats_seq_next,
.show = sel_avc_stats_seq_show,
.stop = sel_avc_stats_seq_stop,
};
static int sel_open_avc_cache_stats(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops);
}
static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_ops = {
.open = sel_open_avc_cache_stats,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = seq_release,
};
#endif
static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
{
int i;
static struct tree_descr files[] = {
{ "cache_threshold",
&sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
{ "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
{ "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
#endif
};
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(files); i++) {
struct inode *inode;
struct dentry *dentry;
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
if (!dentry)
return -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
if (!inode)
return -ENOMEM;
inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
return 0;
}
static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct inode *inode;
char *con;
u32 sid, len;
ssize_t ret;
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
sid = inode->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, con, len);
kfree(con);
return ret;
}
static const struct file_operations sel_initcon_ops = {
.read = sel_read_initcon,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
{
int i;
for (i = 1; i <= SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
struct inode *inode;
struct dentry *dentry;
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, security_get_initial_sid_context(i));
if (!dentry)
return -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
if (!inode)
return -ENOMEM;
inode->i_fop = &sel_initcon_ops;
inode->i_ino = i|SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET;
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
return 0;
}
static inline unsigned int sel_div(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
{
return a / b - (a % b < 0);
}
static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class)
{
return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1)) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
}
static inline u16 sel_ino_to_class(unsigned long ino)
{
return sel_div(ino & SEL_INO_MASK, SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
}
static inline unsigned long sel_perm_to_ino(u16 class, u32 perm)
{
return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1) + perm) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
}
static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
{
return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) % (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
}
static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
ssize_t rc, len;
char *page;
unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
free_page((unsigned long)page);
return rc;
}
static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
.read = sel_read_class,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
ssize_t rc, len;
char *page;
unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
free_page((unsigned long)page);
return rc;
}
static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
.read = sel_read_perm,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
int value;
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t length;
unsigned long i_ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
}
static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = {
.read = sel_read_policycap,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
struct dentry *dir)
{
int i, rc, nperms;
char **perms;
rc = security_get_permissions(objclass, &perms, &nperms);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++) {
struct inode *inode;
struct dentry *dentry;
rc = -ENOMEM;
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, perms[i]);
if (!dentry)
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
if (!inode)
goto out;
inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
/* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i + 1);
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
rc = 0;
out:
for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++)
kfree(perms[i]);
kfree(perms);
return rc;
}
static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
struct dentry *dir)
{
struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
int rc;
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, "index");
if (!dentry)
return -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
if (!inode)
return -ENOMEM;
inode->i_fop = &sel_class_ops;
inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index);
d_add(dentry, inode);
dentry = sel_make_dir(dir, "perms", &last_class_ino);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
return PTR_ERR(dentry);
rc = sel_make_perm_files(classname, index, dentry);
return rc;
}
static void sel_remove_classes(void)
{
struct list_head *class_node;
list_for_each(class_node, &class_dir->d_subdirs) {
struct dentry *class_subdir = list_entry(class_node,
struct dentry, d_u.d_child);
struct list_head *class_subdir_node;
list_for_each(class_subdir_node, &class_subdir->d_subdirs) {
struct dentry *d = list_entry(class_subdir_node,
struct dentry, d_u.d_child);
if (d->d_inode)
if (d->d_inode->i_mode & S_IFDIR)
sel_remove_entries(d);
}
sel_remove_entries(class_subdir);
}
sel_remove_entries(class_dir);
}
static int sel_make_classes(void)
{
int rc, nclasses, i;
char **classes;
/* delete any existing entries */
sel_remove_classes();
rc = security_get_classes(&classes, &nclasses);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
struct dentry *class_name_dir;
class_name_dir = sel_make_dir(class_dir, classes[i],
&last_class_ino);
if (IS_ERR(class_name_dir)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(class_name_dir);
goto out;
}
/* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */
rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i + 1,
class_name_dir);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
rc = 0;
out:
for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++)
kfree(classes[i]);
kfree(classes);
return rc;
}
static int sel_make_policycap(void)
{
unsigned int iter;
struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
sel_remove_entries(policycap_dir);
for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) {
if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(policycap_names))
dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir,
policycap_names[iter]);
else
dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir, "unknown");
if (dentry == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(policycap_dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO);
if (inode == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
inode->i_fop = &sel_policycap_ops;
inode->i_ino = iter | SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET;
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
return 0;
}
static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
unsigned long *ino)
{
struct dentry *dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, name);
struct inode *inode;
if (!dentry)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
if (!inode) {
dput(dentry);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
inode->i_ino = ++(*ino);
/* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
inc_nlink(inode);
d_add(dentry, inode);
/* bump link count on parent directory, too */
inc_nlink(dir->d_inode);
return dentry;
}
static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
int ret;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
static struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
[SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR},
[SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
[SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
[SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
[SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
[SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
[SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, S_IRUGO},
[SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, S_IWUSR},
[SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, S_IRUGO},
[SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR},
[SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
[SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
[SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status) This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications read-only mmap(2). This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space. struct selinux_kernel_status { u32 length; /* length of this structure */ u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */ u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */ u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */ u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */ }; When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce to keep consistency. However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process. In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache. If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own worker thread from the module. If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce. A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space. Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing mode, without any system call invocations. This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need to wait for a while if it is odd number. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -- security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-09-14 09:28:39 +00:00
[SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
[SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUSR},
/* last one */ {""}
};
ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
if (ret)
goto err;
bool_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &sel_last_ino);
if (IS_ERR(bool_dir)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(bool_dir);
bool_dir = NULL;
goto err;
}
ret = -ENOMEM;
dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, NULL_FILE_NAME);
if (!dentry)
goto err;
ret = -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
if (!inode)
goto err;
inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
isec->initialized = 1;
init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
d_add(dentry, inode);
selinux_null = dentry;
dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &sel_last_ino);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
goto err;
}
ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
if (ret)
goto err;
dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts", &sel_last_ino);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
goto err;
}
ret = sel_make_initcon_files(dentry);
if (ret)
goto err;
class_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "class", &sel_last_ino);
if (IS_ERR(class_dir)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(class_dir);
class_dir = NULL;
goto err;
}
policycap_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities", &sel_last_ino);
if (IS_ERR(policycap_dir)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(policycap_dir);
policycap_dir = NULL;
goto err;
}
return 0;
err:
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n",
__func__);
return ret;
}
static struct dentry *sel_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
return mount_single(fs_type, flags, data, sel_fill_super);
}
static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = {
.name = "selinuxfs",
.mount = sel_mount,
.kill_sb = kill_litter_super,
};
struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
static struct kobject *selinuxfs_kobj;
static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
{
int err;
if (!selinux_enabled)
return 0;
selinuxfs_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("selinux", fs_kobj);
if (!selinuxfs_kobj)
return -ENOMEM;
err = register_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
if (err) {
kobject_put(selinuxfs_kobj);
return err;
}
selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: could not mount!\n");
err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
selinuxfs_mount = NULL;
}
return err;
}
__initcall(init_sel_fs);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
void exit_sel_fs(void)
{
kobject_put(selinuxfs_kobj);
kern_unmount(selinuxfs_mount);
unregister_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
}
#endif