freebsd-src/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh
Ed Maste 4d3fc8b057 ssh: Update to OpenSSH 9.3p1
This release fixes a number of security bugs and has minor new
features and bug fixes.  Security fixes, from the release notes
(https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-9.3):

This release contains fixes for a security problem and a memory
safety problem. The memory safety problem is not believed to be
exploitable, but we report most network-reachable memory faults as
security bugs.

 * ssh-add(1): when adding smartcard keys to ssh-agent(1) with the
   per-hop destination constraints (ssh-add -h ...) added in OpenSSH
   8.9, a logic error prevented the constraints from being
   communicated to the agent. This resulted in the keys being added
   without constraints. The common cases of non-smartcard keys and
   keys without destination constraints are unaffected. This problem
   was reported by Luci Stanescu.

 * ssh(1): Portable OpenSSH provides an implementation of the
   getrrsetbyname(3) function if the standard library does not
   provide it, for use by the VerifyHostKeyDNS feature. A
   specifically crafted DNS response could cause this function to
   perform an out-of-bounds read of adjacent stack data, but this
   condition does not appear to be exploitable beyond denial-of-
   service to the ssh(1) client.

   The getrrsetbyname(3) replacement is only included if the system's
   standard library lacks this function and portable OpenSSH was not
   compiled with the ldns library (--with-ldns). getrrsetbyname(3) is
   only invoked if using VerifyHostKeyDNS to fetch SSHFP records. This
   problem was found by the Coverity static analyzer.

Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
2023-03-16 10:29:55 -04:00

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# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.25 2023/03/01 09:29:32 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="integrity"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
# start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
tries=10
startoffset=2900
macs=`${SSH} -Q mac`
# The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are
# handled specially below.
macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`"
# avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the
# offset into the stream right.
#echo "KexAlgorithms -diffie-hellman-group*" \
# >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
# sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh)
cmd="$SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" sh ${OBJ}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
for m in $macs; do
trace "test $tid: mac $m"
elen=0
epad=0
emac=0
etmo=0
ecnt=0
skip=0
for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do
skip=`expr $skip - 1`
if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then
# avoid modifying the high bytes of the length
continue
fi
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# modify output from sshd at offset $off
pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1"
if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
macopt="-c $m"
else
echo "Ciphers=aes128-ctr" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr"
fi
verbose "test $tid: $m @$off"
${SSH} $macopt -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
-oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \
999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
fi
ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1`
out=$(egrep -v "^debug" $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | tail -2 | \
tr -s '\r\n' '.')
case "$out" in
Bad?packet*) elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;;
Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*)
emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;;
padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;;
*Timeout,?server*)
etmo=`expr $etmo + 1`; skip=0;;
*) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";;
esac
done
verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen timeout $etmo"
if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then
fail "$m: no mac errors"
fi
expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen - $etmo`
if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then
fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac"
fi
done