useful for post install configuration or other cases that might not be
handled by usb.c. (usb.c already sets usbd_enable iff sysinstall
detects usb during install).
PR: bin/18946
Submitted by: Peter van Heusden <pvh@egenetics.com>
Reviewed by: jhb
post-configuration "Startup" menu. In the event that diskcheckd is
removed, this can easily be trimmed also; in the mean time, it allows
diskcheckd to be easily disabled using our documented management
tool
conservative default, and actually prompt specifically for inetd rather
than handling it as a side effect of the security profile. Update the
help file to reflect this change.
o Rename "Fascist" to "Extreme" in the source code, to match the names
presented to the user.
o Remove portmap and inetd from profile management. Portmap is now
disabled by default, but automatically turned on if a feature requires
it (such as NFS, etc).
This is an MFC candidate for 4.4-RELEASE.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch@FreeBSD.org
Approved by: re@FreeBSD.org
MFC after: 2 days
post-install config, reduce the potential confusion from the existence
of both configTTYs and configTtys by renaming configTTYs to
configEtcTtys. While this is not a C naming conflict, it was probably
a poor choice of names on my part.
system installation process. This allows users installing via serial
console to enable serial console login during the installation
process using an un-customized install. The user is not prompted to
modify /etc/ttys during a normal install, but is offered the
opportunity during post-install configuration.
- Introduce configTTYs(), which describes the benefits of editing
/etc/ttys, and asks for confirmation before spawning the editor.
- add configTTYs to the post-install configuration, as well as to
the global configuration index.
by providing the opportunity to edit inetd.conf during the system
installation process. The following modifications were made:
(1) Expand the Anonymous FTP description dialog to indicate that inetd
and ftpd must be enabled before it can be used.
(2) Introduce a new configInetd() pair of dialogs, the first describing
inetd, giving a couple of examples of services that require it, and
hinting at potential risk, then asking the user if they wish to
enable it. The second indicates that inetd.conf must be configured
to enabled specific services, and asks if the user would like to
load inetd.conf into the editor to modify it. Add this
configuration action to the index.
There are some further improvements that might be considered:
(1) Provide a more inetd.conf-specific configuration tool that speaks
inetd.conf(5). However, this is made difficult by the "yet another
configuration format" nature of inetd.conf, as well as its use of
commenting to disable services, rather than an in-syntax way to
disable a service without commenting it out. Submissions here
would probably be welcome.
(2) There's some overlap between settings in the somewhat obtuse
Security Profile mechanism and other settings, including the inetd
setting, and NFS server configuration. As features become
individually tunable, they should probably be removed from the
security profile mechanism. Otherwise, somewhat counter-intuitively,
sysinstall (in practice) queries multiple times whether inetd, nfsd,
etc, should be enabled/disabled. A possible future direction might
be to drive profiles not by degree of paranoia, rather, the set
of services desired. Or simply to remove the Security Profile
mechanism and resort to feature-driven configuration.
Reviewed by: imp, chris, jake, nate, -arch, -stable
/usr/src/usr.sbin/sysinstall/menus.c:1323: initializer element is not computable at load time
/usr/src/usr.sbin/sysinstall/menus.c:1323: (near initialization for `MenuNetworking.items[9].aux')
Eliminate an old warning brought about by insufficient foresight when creating
the Menu structure. Have I ever mentioned that sysinstall really needs to
be rewritten?
and also obey most of the rules of english in their construction.
Add a help screen for the security menu which gives the user a rough idea
just what the various security profiles do.
rename the previous one to indicate that it's not just high, it's
extreme (everything off, secure level raised).
Submitted mostly by: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
appropriate(?) defaults for "low", "medium" and "high" security
environments. Medium is basically what we currently have with a little
seat-belt tightening where it made sense. Low is the same as medium but
without the tightening. High is positively fascist with nothing turned
on by default and an automatic call to 911 if it can find a modem.
