blocking allocation could occur as a result of a label
initialization. This will simulate the behavior of allocated
label policies such as MLS and Biba when running mac_test from
the perspective of WITNESS lock and sleep warnings.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
don't try and convert the argument flags to malloc flags, or we risk
implicitly requesting blocking and generating witness warnings.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and
avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this:
- Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not
found.
- Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work
mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an
mbuf.
- Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke
mac_init_mbuf_tag().
- Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since
m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than
at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d.
- Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related
notions.
- Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use
mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This
required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!).
- Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(),
tag destruction takes care of it for us now.
- Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() --
the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that
we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf,
rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will
already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's.
- Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC
m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the
new storage and do a deep copy of the label.
- Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places
having to do with mbuf header copies previously.
- When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to
explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the
m_tag code now.
- No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during
header copies.
- Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test.
In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be
dynamically loaded.
In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion
of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC
labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs.
Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS
flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this
opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL
slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot
entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was
allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot
handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified.
- mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether
any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever
the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags().
The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the
flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy
list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons.
This might change if it causes problems.
- Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update
function to assert appropriate locks.
- This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag.
Reviewed by: sam
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
mbuf_to_label(). This permits the vast majority of entry point code
to be unaware that labels are stored in m->m_pkthdr.label, such that
we can experiment storage of labels elsewhere (such as in m_tags).
Reviewed by: sam
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
of asserting that an mbuf has a packet header. Use it instead of hand-
rolled versions wherever applicable.
Submitted by: Hiten Pandya <hiten@unixdaemons.com>
the vendor is only included in the long name currently, reducing
verbosity when modules are registered and unregistered.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
additional flags argument to indicate blocking disposition, and
pass in M_NOWAIT from the IP reassembly code to indicate that
blocking is not OK when labeling a new IP fragment reassembly
queue. This should eliminate some of the WITNESS warnings that
have started popping up since fine-grained IP stack locking
started going in; if memory allocation fails, the creation of
the fragment queue will be aborted.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
functionality for the following entry pints:
mac_test_init_proc_label()
mac_test_destroy_proc_label()
For process labeling entry points, now also track the use of process
labels and test assertions about their integrity and life cycle.
mac_test_thread_userret()
mac_test_check_kenv_dump()
mac_test_check_kenv_get()
mac_test_check_kenv_set()
mac_test_check_kenv_unset()
mac_test_check_kld_load()
mac_test_check_kld_stat()
mac_test_check_kld_unload()
mac_test_check_sysarch_ioperm()
mac_test_check_system_acct()
mac_test_check_system_reboot()
mac_test_check_system_settime()
mac_test_check_system_swapon()
mac_test_check_system_swapoff()
mac_test_check_system_sysctl()
For other entry points, just provide testing stubs.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
for enforcement:
mac_mls_check_system_swapon() - Require that the subject and the
swapfile target vnode labels dominate one another. An additional
check is probably needed here to require that the swapfile target
has a label of mls/high to prevent information leakage through
swapfiles.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
include a new entry point available for enforcement:
mac_bsdextended_check_system_swapon() - Apply extended access
control checks to the file target of swap.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
points available for enforcement:
mac_biba_check_sysarch_ioperm() - Require Biba privilege to make
use of privileged machine-dependent interfaces, protecting against
bypass of the policy via various mechanisms.
mac_biba_check_system_swapoff() - Require Biba privilege to disable
swapping against a vnode target.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
which are no longer required now that we have UFS2 with extended
attribute transactions.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
check, mac_check_sysarch_ioperm(), permitting MAC security policy
modules to control access to these interfaces. Currently, they
protect access to IOPL on i386, and setting HAE on Alpha.
Additional checks might be required on other platforms to prevent
bypass of kernel security protections by unauthorized processes.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
modules to authorize disabling of swap against a particular vnode.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
permit users and groups to bind ports for TCP or UDP, and is intended
to be combined with the recently committed support for
net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh. The policy is twiddled using
sysctl(8). To use this module, you will need to compile in MAC
support, and probably set reservedhigh to 0, then twiddle
security.mac.portacl.rules to set things as desired. This policy
module only restricts ports explicitly bound using bind(), not
implicitly bound ports where the port number is selected by the
IP stack. It appears to work properly in my local configuration,
but needs more broad testing.
A sample policy might be:
# sysctl security.mac.portacl.rules="uid:425:tcp:80,uid:425:tcp:79"
This permits uid 425 to bind TCP sockets to ports 79 and 80. Currently
no distinction is made for incoming vs. outgoing ports with TCP,
although that would probably be easy to add.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
I was in two minds as to where to put them in the first case..
I should have listenned to the other mind.
Submitted by: parts by davidxu@
Reviewed by: jeff@ mini@
MAC policy. To load a KLD, require that the subject hold Biba privilege,
and the the kernel module be marked as high integrity. To unload a
KLD, require that the subject hold Biba privilege.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
and MLS policies: as we support both an effective (single) element and
range (available) elements, require that the single be in the range if
both the single and range are defined in the update. Remove comments
suggesting that such a check might be a good idea.
Don't introduce a similar check for network interfaces; due to different
interpretations of the single and range elements, it's not clear that
it's useful to do so.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
labeling for Biba.
Rename the variable 'level' to 'type' in interface parsing and
labeling for MLS.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
pointer types, and remove a huge number of casts from code using it.
Change struct xfile xf_data to xun_data (ABI is still compatible).
If we need to add a #define for f_data and xf_data we can, but I don't
think it will be necessary. There are no operational changes in this
commit.
kernel, you should expect them to do something, so now they do. This
doesn't affect users who don't load or explicitly compile in the
policies.
Approved by: re (jhb)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount
that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointer to MAC
Framework entry points, where all current policies don't use the
pointer. This permits the SEBSD port of SELinux's FLASK/TE to compile
out-of-the-box on 5.0-CURRENT with full file system labeling support.
Approved by: re (murray)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
wrong, since we don't want the variable changed, but since we assign
it to variables that may also refer to other non-const strings,
warnings were generated that could break LINT.
Approved by: re
Spotted by: sam
Control) as a MAC Framework policy module. Unlike the existing
src/sys/security/lomac implementation, this one has its fingers out
of the kernel lock order and doesn't make use of flags in existing
kernel structures. This greatly reduces the quantity of replicated
code with src/sys/kern, simplifies the implementation (3000 vs 8500
lines), and correctes a number of known stability problems with
the existing LOMAC implementation, which will be removed. A bit
more hooking up to do here.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
by policy modules making use of downgrades in the MAC AST event. This
is required by the mac_lomac port of LOMAC to the MAC Framework.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
in struct proc. While the process label is actually stored in the
struct ucred pointed to by p_ucred, there is a need for transient
storage that may be used when asynchronous (deferred) updates need to
be performed on the "real" label for locking reasons. Unlike other
label storage, this label has no locking semantics, relying on policies
to provide their own protection for the label contents, meaning that
a policy leaf mutex may be used, avoiding lock order issues. This
permits policies that act based on historical process behavior (such
as audit policies, the MAC Framework port of LOMAC, etc) can update
process properties even when many existing locks are held without
violating the lock order. No currently committed policies implement use
of this label storage.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
checks permit policy modules to augment the system policy for permitting
kld operations. This permits policies to limit access to kld operations
based on credential (and other) properties, as well as to perform checks
on the kld being loaded (integrity, etc).
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
the MAC policy list is busy during a load or unload attempt.
We assert no locks held during the cv wait, meaning we should
be fairly deadlock-safe. Because of the cv model and busy
count, it's possible for a cv waiter waiting for exclusive
access to the policy list to be starved by active and
long-lived access control/labeling events. For now, we
accept that as a necessary tradeoff.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
we brought in the new cache and locking model for vnode labels. We
now rely on mac_associate_devfs_vnode().
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
dynamic mapping of an operation vector into an operation structure,
rather, we rely on C99 sparse structure initialization.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
points, rather than relying on policies to grub around in the
image activator instance structure.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
(1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic
with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the
SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK. Attempts to invoke this without
MAC compiled in result in ENOSYS, as with all other MAC system
calls. Complexity, if desired, is present in policy modules,
rather than the framework.
(2) Permit policies to have access to both the label of the vnode
being executed as well as the interpreter if it's a shell
script or related UNIX nonsense. Because we can't hold both
vnode locks at the same time, cache the interpreter label.
SEBSD relies on this because it supports secure transitioning
via shell script executables. Other policies might want to
take both labels into account during an integrity or
confidentiality decision at execve()-time.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
