implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel:
- Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm
object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with
a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared
memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2),
ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared
memory file descriptors.
- shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that
manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps
pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash
table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash
of the pathname.
- As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the
path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory
file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for
shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among
processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but
it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea
bandied about the lists several times over the years.
- The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage
collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or
the shm_open(2) virtual namespace.
Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions)
Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version)
Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
entry point, which is no longer required now that we don't support
old-style multicast tunnels. This removes the last mbuf object class
entry point that isn't init/copy/destroy.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Framework by moving from mac_mbuf_create_netlayer() to more specific
entry points for specific network services:
- mac_netinet_firewall_reply() to be used when replying to in-bound TCP
segments in pf and ipfw (etc).
- Rename mac_netinet_icmp_reply() to mac_netinet_icmp_replyinplace() and
add mac_netinet_icmp_reply(), reflecting that in some cases we overwrite
a label in place, but in others we apply the label to a new mbuf.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework:
- Add mac_atalk.c and add explicit entry point mac_netatalk_aarp_send()
for AARP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer
entry point.
- Add mac_inet6.c and add explicit entry point mac_netinet6_nd6_send()
for ND6 packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry
point.
- Add expliict entry point mac_netinet_arp_send() for ARP packet
labeling, and mac_netinet_igmp_send() for IGMP packet labeling,
rather than using a generic link layer entry point.
- Remove previous genering link layer entry point,
mac_mbuf_create_linklayer() as it is no longer used.
- Add implementations of new entry points to various policies, largely
by replicating the existing link layer entry point for them; remove
old link layer entry point implementation.
- Make MAC_IFNET_LOCK(), MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(), and mac_ifnet_mtx global
to the MAC Framework rather than static to mac_net.c as it is now
needed outside of mac_net.c.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
we move towards netinet as a pseudo-object for the MAC Framework.
Rename 'mac_create_mbuf_linklayer' to 'mac_mbuf_create_linklayer' to
reflect general object-first ordering preference.
Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
primary object type, and then by secondarily by method name. This sorts
entry points relating to particular objects, such as pipes, sockets, and
vnodes together.
Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
from mac_vfs.c to mac_process.c to join other functions that setup up
process labels for specific purposes. Unlike the two proc create calls,
this call is intended to run after creation when a process registers as
the NFS daemon, so remains an _associate_ call..
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:
mac_<object>_<method/action>
mac_<object>_check_<method/action>
The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly
reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more
consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain
multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical
parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for
certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly,
some entry point names.
All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules
not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to
conform to the new KPI.
Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
point to mac_check_vnode_unlink(), reflecting UNIX naming conventions.
This is the first of several commits to synchronize the MAC Framework
in FreeBSD 7.0 with the MAC Framework as it will appear in Mac OS X
Leopard.
Reveiwed by: csjp, Samy Bahra <sbahra at gwu dot edu>
Submitted by: Jacques Vidrine <nectar at apple dot com>
Obtained from: Apple Computer, Inc.
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (bmah)
mpo_check_proc_setaudit_addr to be used when controlling use of
setaudit_addr(), rather than mpo_check_proc_setaudit(), which takes a
different argument type.
Reviewed by: csjp
Approved by: re (kensmith)
where similar data structures exist to support devfs and the MAC
Framework, but are named differently.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
variable name conventions for arguments passed into the framework --
for example, name network interfaces 'ifp', sockets 'so', mounts 'mp',
mbufs 'm', processes 'p', etc, wherever possible. Previously there
was significant variation in this regard.
Normalize copyright lists to ranges where sensible.
the introduction of priv(9) and MAC Framework entry points for privilege
checking/granting. These entry points exactly aligned with privileges and
provided no additional security context:
- mac_check_sysarch_ioperm()
- mac_check_kld_unload()
- mac_check_settime()
- mac_check_system_nfsd()
Add mpo_priv_check() implementations to Biba and LOMAC policies, which,
for each privilege, determine if they can be granted to processes
considered unprivileged by those two policies. These mostly, but not
entirely, align with the set of privileges granted in jails.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for
audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid().
MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where
additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other
audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9)
entry points.
Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in
some cases, other missing system-related checks.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
LABEL_TO_SLOT() macro used by policy modules to query and set label data
in struct label. Instead of using a union, store an intptr_t, simplifying
the API.
Update policies: in most cases this required only small tweaks to current
wrapper macros. In two cases, a single wrapper macros had to be split into
separate get and set macros.
Move struct label definition from _label.h to mac_internal.h and remove
_label.h. With this change, policies may now treat struct label * as
opaque, allowing us to change the layout of struct label without breaking
the policy module ABI. For example, we could make the maximum number of
policies with labels modifiable at boot-time rather than just at
compile-time.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Exapnd comments on System V IPC labeling methods, which could use improved
consistency with respect to other object types.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
kernel. This LOR snuck in with some of the recent syncache changes. To
fix this, the inpcb handling was changed:
- Hang a MAC label off the syncache object
- When the syncache entry is initially created, we pickup the PCB lock
is held because we extract information from it while initializing the
syncache entry. While we do this, copy the MAC label associated with
the PCB and use it for the syncache entry.
- When the packet is transmitted, copy the label from the syncache entry
to the mbuf so it can be processed by security policies which analyze
mbuf labels.
This change required that the MAC framework be extended to support the
label copy operations from the PCB to the syncache entry, and then from
the syncache entry to the mbuf.
These functions really should be referencing the syncache structure instead
of the label. However, due to some of the complexities associated with
exposing this syncache structure we operate directly on it's label pointer.
This should be OK since we aren't making any access control decisions within
this code directly, we are merely allocating and copying label storage so
we can properly initialize mbuf labels for any packets the syncache code
might create.
This also has a nice side effect of caching. Prior to this change, the
PCB would be looked up/locked for each packet transmitted. Now the label
is cached at the time the syncache entry is initialized.
Submitted by: andre [1]
Discussed with: rwatson
[1] andre submitted the tcp_syncache.c changes
privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9)
interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege
checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of
privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the
existing suser(9) interface:
suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv)
suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags)
A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be
found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the
comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read
before doing so.
The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the
privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to
determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine,
rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the
SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail
check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used
by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted
in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail
is now present in kern_jail.c.
The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both
to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant
privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy
modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader
range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with
root privilege.
The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms
of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition
and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not
been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to
check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier.
This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it
modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security
policy become more feasible.
Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on: arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h. sys/mac.h now
contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all
in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included
across most of the kernel instead.
This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC
Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA
exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize
mbufs generated by the firewall. An example where this might happen is keep
alive packets, or ICMP error packets in response to other packets.
This takes care of kernel panics associated with un-initialize mbuf labels
when the firewall generates packets.
[1] I modified this patch from it's original version, the initial patch
introduced a number of entry points which were programmatically
equivalent. So I introduced only one. Instead, we should leverage
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer() which is used for similar situations,
an example being icmp_error()
This will minimize the impact associated with the MFC
Submitted by: mlaier [1]
MFC after: 1 week
This is a RELENG_6 candidate
credential: mac_associate_nfsd_label()
This entry point can be utilized by various Mandatory Access Control policies
so they can properly initialize the label of files which get created
as a result of an NFS operation. This work will be useful for fixing kernel
panics associated with accessing un-initialized or invalid vnode labels.
The implementation of these entry points will come shortly.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD
Requested by: mdodd
MFC after: 3 weeks
process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver
creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers to adapt the
device node based on security aspects of the process, such as the uid,
gid, and MAC label.
- Add a cred reference to struct cdev, so that when a device node is
instantiated as a vnode, the cloning credential can be exposed to
MAC.
- Add make_dev_cred(), a version of make_dev() that additionally
accepts the credential to stick in the struct cdev. Implement it and
make_dev() in terms of a back-end make_dev_credv().
- Add a new event handler, dev_clone_cred, which can be registered to
receive the credential instead of dev_clone, if desired.
- Modify the MAC entry point mac_create_devfs_device() to accept an
optional credential pointer (may be NULL), so that MAC policies can
inspect and act on the label or other elements of the credential
when initializing the skeleton device protections.
- Modify tty_pty.c to register clone_dev_cred and invoke make_dev_cred(),
so that the pty clone credential is exposed to the MAC Framework.
While currently primarily focussed on MAC policies, this change is also
a prerequisite for changes to allow ptys to be instantiated with the UID
of the process looking up the pty. This requires further changes to the
pty driver -- in particular, to immediately recycle pty nodes on last
close so that the credential-related state can be recreated on next
lookup.
Submitted by: Andrew Reisse <andrew.reisse@sparta.com>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
MFC after: 1 week
MFC note: Merge to 6.x, but not 5.x for ABI reasons
redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines. Expose
a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and
use that; use the existing mpo_copy_mbuf_label() routine on the
bottom end.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)
which is invoked from socket() and socketpair(), permitting MAC
policy modules to control the creation of sockets by domain, type, and
protocol.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)
Requested by: SCC
points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with
respect to the other semaphore-related entry points:
mac_init_sysv_sema() -> mac_init_sysv_sem()
mac_destroy_sysv_sem() -> mac_destroy_sysv_sem()
mac_create_sysv_sema() -> mac_create_sysv_sem()
mac_cleanup_sysv_sema() -> mac_cleanup_sysv_sem()
Congruent changes are made to the policy interface to support this.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
access to POSIX Semaphores:
mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore
mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore
mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed
mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried
mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened
mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to
mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked
mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore
Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points.
For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively
read/write.
Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific
processes. This permits MAC policies to limit information flow from
children that have changed label, although has to be handled carefully
due to common programming expectations regarding the behavior of
wait4(). The cr_seeotheruids() check in p_canwait() is #if 0'd for
this reason.
The mac_stub and mac_test policies are updated to reflect these new
entry points.
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations,
required for some policies:
poll() mac_check_socket_poll()
fstat() mac_check_socket_stat()
accept() mac_check_socket_accept()
Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points.
While here, add missing entry point implementations for:
mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive()
mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send()
mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send()
mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible()
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential,
including:
setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid()
seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid()
setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid()
setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid()
setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups()
setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid()
setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid()
setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid()
setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid()
MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both
current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments
to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated.
Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally.
This may be useful for security policies which want to perform access
control checks around run-time linking.
-add the mmap(2) flags argument to the check_vnode_mmap entry point
so that we can make access control decisions based on the type of
mapped object.
-update any dependent API around this parameter addition such as
function prototype modifications, entry point parameter additions
and the inclusion of sys/mman.h header file.
-Change the MLS, BIBA and LOMAC security policies so that subject
domination routines are not executed unless the type of mapping is
shared. This is done to maintain compatibility between the old
vm_mmap_vnode(9) and these policies.
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 1 month
objects and operations:
- System V IPC message, message queue, semaphore, and shared memory
segment init, destroy, cleanup, create operations.
- System V IPC message, message queue, seamphore, and shared memory
segment access control entry points, including rights to attach,
destroy, and manipulate these IPC objects.
Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
Now I believe it is done in the right way.
Removed some XXMAC cases, we now assume 'high' integrity level for all
sysctls, except those with CTLFLAG_ANYBODY flag set. No more magic.
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: rwatson, scottl (mentor)
Tested with: LINT (compilation), mac_biba(4) (functionality)
to use the "year1-year3" format, as opposed to "year1, year2, year3".
This seems to make lawyers more happy, but also prevents the
lines from getting excessively long as the years start to add up.
Suggested by: imp
would allocate two 'struct pipe's from the pipe zone, and malloc a
mutex.
- Create a new "struct pipepair" object holding the two 'struct
pipe' instances, struct mutex, and struct label reference. Pipe
structures now have a back-pointer to the pipe pair, and a
'pipe_present' flag to indicate whether the half has been
closed.
- Perform mutex init/destroy in zone init/destroy, avoiding
reallocating the mutex for each pipe. Perform most pipe structure
setup in zone constructor.
- VM memory mappings for pageable buffers are still done outside of
the UMA zone.
- Change MAC API to speak 'struct pipepair' instead of 'struct pipe',
update many policies. MAC labels are also handled outside of the
UMA zone for now. Label-only policy modules don't have to be
recompiled, but if a module is recompiled, its pipe entry points
will need to be updated. If a module actually reached into the
pipe structures (unlikely), that would also need to be modified.
These changes substantially simplify failure handling in the pipe
code as there are many fewer possible failure modes.
On half-close, pipes no longer free the 'struct pipe' for the closed
half until a full-close takes place. However, VM mapped buffers
are still released on half-close.
Some code refactoring is now possible to clean up some of the back
references, etc; this patch attempts not to change the structure
of most of the pipe implementation, only allocation/free code
paths, so as to avoid introducing bugs (hopefully).
This cuts about 8%-9% off the cost of sequential pipe allocation
and free in system call tests on UP and SMP in my micro-benchmarks.
May or may not make a difference in macro-benchmarks, but doing
less work is good.
Reviewed by: juli, tjr
Testing help: dwhite, fenestro, scottl, et al
wait, rather than the socket label. This avoids reaching up to
the socket layer during connection close, which requires locking
changes. To do this, introduce MAC Framework entry point
mac_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), which is called from tcp_twrespond()
instead of calling mac_create_mbuf_from_socket() or
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(). Introduce MAC Policy entry point
mpo_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), and implementations for various
policies, which generally just copy label data from the inpcb to
the mbuf. Assert the inpcb lock in the entry point since we
require consistency for the inpcb label reference.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
and the mpo_create_cred() MAC policy entry point to
mpo_copy_cred_label(). This is more consistent with similar entry
points for creation and label copying, as mac_create_cred() was
called from crdup() as opposed to during process creation. For
a number of policies, this removes the requirement for special
handling when copying credential labels, and improves consistency.
Approved by: re (scottl)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and
IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during
network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket
to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to
grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer.
This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the
MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points:
initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a
delivery access control check.
For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the
socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced,
pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label
has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding
appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using
pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use
the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the
MAC Framework to perform a cache update.
Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub
policy, and test policy.
Reviewed by: sam, bms
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
SO_PEERLABEL. This provides an interface to query the label of a
socket peer without embedding implementation details of mac_t in
the application. Previously, sizeof(*mac_t) had to be specified
by an application when performing getsockopt().
Document mac_get_peer(3), and expand documentation of the other
mac_get(3) functions. Note that it's possible to get EINVAL back
from mac_get_fd(3) when pointing it at an inappropriate object.
NOTE: mac_get_fd() and mac_set_fd() support for sockets will
follow shortly, so the documentation is slightly ahead of the
code.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a
(struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using
a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct
label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel
objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens
the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence
changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies
at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to
embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching
with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures.
This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the
structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention
dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the
MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability.
While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it
will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data
structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable)
performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory
conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory.
NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a
result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party
MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&'
symbol.
Suggestions from: bmilekic
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories