By default only report unverified files at severity VE_WANT
and above. This inlcudes *.conf but not *.hints, *.cookie
or *.tgz which get VE_TRY as their severity.
If Verbose is set to 0, then VerifyFlags should default to 0 too.
Thus the combination of
module_verbose=0
VE_VEBOSE=0
is sufficient to make the loader almost totally silent.
When verify_prep has to find_manifest and it is verified ok
return VE_NOT_CHECKED to verify_file so that it can skip
repeating verify_fd
Also add better debugging output for is_verified and add_verify_status.
vectx handle compressed modules
When verifying a compressed module (.ko.gz or .ko.bz2)
stat() reports the size as -1 (unknown).
vectx_lseek needs to spot this during closing - and just read until
EOF is hit.
Note: because of the way libsa's open() works, verify_prep will see
the path to be verified as module.ko not module.ko.bz2 etc. This is
actually ok, because we need a separate module.ko.bz2 entry so that
the package can be verified, and the hash for module.ko is of the
uncompressed file which is what vectx will see.
Re-work local.trust.mk so site.trust.mk need only set
VE_SIGN_URL_LIST (if using the mentioned signing server)
interp.c: restrict interactive input
Apply the same restrictions to interactive input as for
unverified conf and hints files.
Use version.veriexec when LOADER_VERIEXEC is yes
Reviewed by: kevans
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks, Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D43810
During software installation, use veriexec -S to strictly
enforce certificate validity checks (notBefore, notAfter).
Otherwise ignore certificate validity period.
It is generally unacceptible for the Internet to stop working
just because someone did not upgrade their infrastructure for a decade.
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks, Inc.
Reviewed by: sebastien.bini_stormshield.eu
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D35758
Preparation for updating bearssl, pull in updates to libsecureboot.
o fix handling of some out-of-memory cases
o allow more control over reporting of Verified/Unverified files.
this helps boot time when console output is slow
o recheck verbose/debug level after reading any unverified file
o more debug support for vectx
o hash_string to support fake stat for tftp
o tests/tvo add -v to simply verify signatures
o vets.c allow for HAVE_BR_X509_TIME_CHECK which will greatly simplify
verification in loader
o report date when certificate fails validity period checks
Reviewed by: stevek
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks, Inc.
We need a valid st_dev, st_ino and st_mtime
to correctly track which files have been verified
and to update our notion of time.
ve_utc_set(): ignore utc if it would jump our current time
by more than VE_UTC_MAX_JUMP (20 years).
Allow testing of install command via userboot.
Need to fix its stat implementation too.
bhyveload also needs stat fixed - due to change to userboot.h
Call ve_error_get() from vectx_close() when hash is wrong.
Track the names of files we have hashed into pcr
For the purposes of measured boot, it is important
to be able to reproduce the hash reflected in
loader.ve.pcr
so loader.ve.hashed provides a list of names in the order they
were added.
Reviewed by: imp
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org//D24027
The vectx API, computes the hash for verifying a file as it is read.
This avoids the overhead of reading files twice - once to verify, then
again to load.
For doing an install via loader, avoiding the need to rewind
large files is critical.
This API is only used for modules, kernel and mdimage as these are the
biggest files read by the loader.
The reduction in boot time depends on how expensive the I/O is
on any given platform. On a fast VM we see 6% improvement.
For install via loader the first file to be verified is likely to be the
kernel, so some of the prep work (finding manifest etc) done by
verify_file() needs to be factored so it can be reused for
vectx_open().
For missing or unrecognized fingerprint entries, we fail
in vectx_open() unless verifying is disabled.
Otherwise fingerprint check happens in vectx_close() and
since this API is only used for files which must be verified
(VE_MUST) we panic if we get an incorrect hash.
Reviewed by: imp,tsoome
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org//D23827
Since we can now add OpenPGP trust anchors at runtime,
ensure the latent support is available.
Ensure we do not add duplicate keys to trust store.
Also allow reporting names of trust anchors added/revoked
We only do this for loader and only after initializing trust store.
Thus only changes to initial trust store will be logged.
Reviewed by: stevek
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20700
During boot we only want to measure things which *must*
be verified - this should provide more deterministic ordering.
Reviewed by: stevek
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20297
sbin/veriexec will ignore entries that have no hash anyway,
but loader needs to be explicitly told that such files are
ok to ignore (not verify).
We will report as Unverified depending on verbose level,
but with no reason - because we are not rejecting the file.
Reviewed by: imp, mindal_semihalf
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
MFC After: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org//D20018
The current approach of injecting manifest into mac_veriexec is to
verify the integrity of it in userspace (veriexec (8)) and pass its
entries into kernel using a char device (/dev/veriexec).
This requires verifying root partition integrity in loader,
for example by using memory disk and checking its hash.
Otherwise if rootfs is compromised an attacker could inject their own data.
This patch introduces an option to parse manifest in kernel based on envs.
The loader sets manifest path and digest.
EVENTHANDLER is used to launch the module right after the rootfs is mounted.
It has to be done this way, since one might want to verify integrity of the init file.
This means that manifest is required to be present on the root partition.
Note that the envs have to be set right before boot to make sure that no one can spoof them.
Submitted by: Kornel Duleba <mindal@semihalf.com>
Reviewed by: sjg
Obtained from: Semihalf
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19281
UEFI related headers were copied from edk2.
A new build option "MK_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT" was added to allow
loading of trusted anchors from UEFI.
Certificate revocation support is also introduced.
The forbidden certificates are loaded from dbx variable.
Verification fails in two cases:
There is a direct match between cert in dbx and the one in the chain.
The CA used to sign the chain is found in dbx.
One can also insert a hash of TBS section of a certificate into dbx.
In this case verifications fails only if a direct match with a
certificate in chain is found.
Submitted by: Kornel Duleba <mindal@semihalf.com>
Reviewed by: sjg
Obtained from: Semihalf
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19093
