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OpenSSL: Cleanup record length checks for KTLS

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In some corner cases the check for packets
which exceed the allowed record length was missing
when KTLS is initially enabled, when some
unprocessed packets are still pending.

Approved by:	jkim
Obtained from:	OpenSSL commit 8fff986d52606e1a33f9404504535e2e2aee3e8b
MFC after:	1 week
Sponsored by:	Netflix
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D34972
This commit is contained in:
John Baldwin 2022-05-04 13:07:36 -07:00
parent 4b3bf90900
commit f6e5fcdc84
1 changed files with 22 additions and 6 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

28
crypto/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
View file

@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
is_ktls_left = (rbuf->left > 0);
is_ktls_left = (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) > 0);
max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
if (max_recs == 0)
max_recs = 1;
@ -412,7 +412,11 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
#endif
if (thisrr->length > len && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
/* KTLS may use all of the buffer */
if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !is_ktls_left)
len = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf);
if (thisrr->length > len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
@ -775,16 +779,28 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
return -1;
}
if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
/*
* Usually thisrr->length is the length of a single record, but when
* KTLS handles the decryption, thisrr->length may be larger than
* SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH because the kernel may have coalesced
* multiple records.
* Therefore we have to rely on KTLS to check the plaintext length
* limit in the kernel.
*/
if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
&& (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) || is_ktls_left)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
/* If received packet overflows current Max Fragment Length setting */
/*
* Check if the received packet overflows the current
* Max Fragment Length setting.
* Note: USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT and KTLS are mutually exclusive.
*/
if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
&& thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)
&& !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
&& thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return -1;