Upgrade to OpenSSH 7.5p1.

svn path=/head/; revision=322052
2024-07-21 10:19:04 +00:00 · 2017-08-04 12:57:24 +00:00 · 2017-08-04 12:57:24 +00:00 · d93a896ef9 · 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
parent dbba8930ce 343d577115
commit d93a896ef9
73 changed files with 2331 additions and 3053 deletions
--- a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
--- a/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
+++ b/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+1. Prerequisites
 ----------------

 A C compiler.  Any C89 or better compiler should work.  Where supported,
@ -243,7 +244,7 @@ manually using the following commands:

    ssh-keygen -t [type] -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""

-for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsaa) or
+for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsa) or

    ssh-keygen -A

--- a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
@ -236,6 +236,8 @@ clean:	regressclean
 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
 	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
 	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
 	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
 	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
 	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
@ -262,6 +264,8 @@ distclean:	regressclean
 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
 	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
 	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
 	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
 	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
 	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
@ -426,6 +430,8 @@ regress-prep:
 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap ] || \
 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion
 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys ] || \
 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys
 	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex ] || \
@ -503,6 +509,16 @@ regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \
 	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)

+UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/conversion/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
 UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\
 	regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \
 	regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o
@ -558,13 +574,14 @@ regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)

-tests interop-tests t-exec: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
+tests interop-tests t-exec unit: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
 	BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
 	TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \
 	TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \
--- a/crypto/openssh/README
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#7.4p1 for the release notes.
+See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#7.5p1 for the release notes.

 Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting
 instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
@ -833,6 +833,8 @@ fake_password(const char *wire_password)
 		fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);

 	ret = malloc(l + 1);
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		return NULL;
 	for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
 		ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
 	ret[i] = '\0';
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
@ -1,448 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.82 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "blacklist_client.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
-static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *);
-
-static char *client_user = NULL;    /* Used to fill in remote user for PAM */
-
-struct AuthMethod1 {
-	int type;
-	char *name;
-	int *enabled;
-	int (*method)(Authctxt *);
-};
-
-const struct AuthMethod1 auth1_methods[] = {
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password",
-		&options.password_authentication, auth1_process_password
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA, "rsa",
-		&options.rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rsa
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA, "rhosts-rsa",
-		&options.rhosts_rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rhosts_rsa
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, "challenge-response",
-		&options.challenge_response_authentication,
-		auth1_process_tis_challenge
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE, "challenge-response",
-		&options.challenge_response_authentication,
-		auth1_process_tis_response
-	},
-	{ -1, NULL, NULL, NULL}
-};
-
-static const struct AuthMethod1
-*lookup_authmethod1(int type)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
-		if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
-			return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
-
-	return (NULL);
-}
-
-static char *
-get_authname(int type)
-{
-	const struct AuthMethod1 *a;
-	static char buf[64];
-
-	if ((a = lookup_authmethod1(type)) != NULL)
-		return (a->name);
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
-	return (buf);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	char *password;
-	u_int dlen;
-
-	/*
-	 * Read user password.  It is in plain text, but was
-	 * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
-	 * not visible to an outside observer.
-	 */
-	password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	/* Try authentication with the password. */
-	authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
-
-	explicit_bzero(password, dlen);
-	free(password);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	BIGNUM *n;
-
-	/* RSA authentication requested. */
-	if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
-	packet_get_bignum(n);
-	packet_check_eom();
-	authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
-	BN_clear_free(n);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int keybits, authenticated = 0;
-	u_int bits;
-	Key *client_host_key;
-	u_int ulen;
-
-	/*
-	 * Get client user name.  Note that we just have to
-	 * trust the client; root on the client machine can
-	 * claim to be any user.
-	 */
-	client_user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
-
-	/* Get the client host key. */
-	client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-	bits = packet_get_int();
-	packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
-	packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
-
-	keybits = BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n);
-	if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
-		verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
-		    "actual %d, announced %d",
-		    BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
-	}
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
-	    client_host_key);
-	key_free(client_host_key);
-
-	auth_info(authctxt, "ruser %.100s", client_user);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	char *challenge;
-
-	if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt)) == NULL)
-		return (0);
-
-	debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
-	packet_put_cstring(challenge);
-	free(challenge);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	return (-1);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	char *response;
-	u_int dlen;
-
-	response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-	authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
-	explicit_bzero(response, dlen);
-	free(response);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*
- * read packets, try to authenticate the user and
- * return only if authentication is successful
- */
-static void
-do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	int prev = 0, type = 0;
-	const struct AuthMethod1 *meth;
-
-	debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
-	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
-
-	/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
-	if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication &&
-#ifdef KRB5
-	    (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
-#endif
-	    PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) {
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-		if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())))
-#endif
-		{
-			auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication",
-			    NULL);
-			return;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* Indicate that authentication is needed. */
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	for (;;) {
-		/* default to fail */
-		authenticated = 0;
-
-
-		/* Get a packet from the client. */
-		prev = type;
-		type = packet_read();
-
-		/*
-		 * If we started challenge-response authentication but the
-		 * next packet is not a response to our challenge, release
-		 * the resources allocated by get_challenge() (which would
-		 * normally have been released by verify_response() had we
-		 * received such a response)
-		 */
-		if (prev == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS &&
-		    type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE)
-			abandon_challenge_response(authctxt);
-
-		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries)
-			goto skip;
-		if ((meth = lookup_authmethod1(type)) == NULL) {
-			logit("Unknown message during authentication: "
-			    "type %d", type);
-			goto skip;
-		}
-
-		if (!*(meth->enabled)) {
-			verbose("%s authentication disabled.", meth->name);
-			goto skip;
-		}
-
-		authenticated = meth->method(authctxt);
-		if (authenticated == -1)
-			continue; /* "postponed" */
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-		if (authctxt->as) {
-			auth_close(authctxt->as);
-			authctxt->as = NULL;
-		}
-#endif
-		if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
-			fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
-			    authctxt->user);
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
-		if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
-			authenticated = 0;
-			fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
-		}
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
-		/* Special handling for root */
-		if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-		    !auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) {
- 			authenticated = 0;
-# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
-# endif
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-		if (options.use_pam && authenticated &&
-		    !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
-			char *msg;
-			size_t len;
-
-			BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
-			error("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
-			    "configuration", authctxt->user);
-			len = buffer_len(&loginmsg);
-			buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
-			msg = buffer_ptr(&loginmsg);
-			/* strip trailing newlines */
-			if (len > 0)
-				while (len > 0 && msg[--len] == '\n')
-					msg[len] = '\0';
-			else
-				msg = "Access denied.";
-			packet_disconnect("%s", msg);
-		}
-#endif
-
- skip:
-		/* Log before sending the reply */
-		auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type), NULL);
-
-		free(client_user);
-		client_user = NULL;
-
-		if (authenticated)
-			return;
-
-		BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
-		if (++authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
-#endif
-			auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt);
-		}
-
-		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs authentication of an incoming connection.  Session key has already
- * been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
- */
-void
-do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	u_int ulen;
-	char *user, *style = NULL;
-
-	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
-	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
-
-	/* Get the user name. */
-	user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
-		*style++ = '\0';
-
-	authctxt->user = user;
-	authctxt->style = style;
-
-	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
-	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
-		authctxt->valid = 1;
-	else {
-		debug("do_authentication: invalid user %s", user);
-		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-		BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_BAD_USER, user);
-	}
-
-	/* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */
-	if (options.num_auth_methods != 0)
-		fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH "
-		    "protocol 1");
-
-	setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
-	    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (options.use_pam)
-		PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
-#endif
-
-	/*
-	 * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
-	 * the server.
-	 */
-#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw &&
-	    authctxt->pw->pw_uid != getuid())
-		packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
-#endif
-
-	/*
-	 * Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is
-	 * closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful
-	 */
-	do_authloop(authctxt);
-
-	/* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-}
-
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.60 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.62 2017/01/30 01:03:00 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 *
@ -564,9 +564,12 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 {
 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
 	u_long linenum = 0;
-	u_int i;
+	u_int i, found_principal = 0;

 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+		/* Always consume entire input */
+		if (found_principal)
+			continue;
 		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
 			;
@ -599,11 +602,12 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 				if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
 				    file, linenum) != 1)
 					continue;
-				return 1;
+				found_principal = 1;
+				continue;
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	return 0;
+	return found_principal;
 }

 static int
@ -727,6 +731,9 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)

 	ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);

+	fclose(f);
+	f = NULL;
+
 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
 		goto out;

@ -768,6 +775,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
 		char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
 		const char *reason = NULL;

+		/* Always consume entrire file */
+		if (found_key)
+			continue;
 		if (found != NULL)
 			key_free(found);
 		found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
@ -854,7 +864,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
 			free(fp);
 			found_key = 1;
-			break;
+			continue;
 		}
 	}
 	if (found != NULL)
@ -1050,6 +1060,9 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)

 	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);

+	fclose(f);
+	f = NULL;
+
 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
 		goto out;

--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.136 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.137 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 *
@ -214,15 +214,16 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 static int
 input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
+	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
 	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
 	int authenticated = 0;
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
 	login_cap_t *lc;
 	const char *from_host, *from_ip;
 #endif
+
 	if (authctxt == NULL)
 		fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");

@ -241,9 +242,10 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
 		if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
 			authctxt->valid = 1;
-			debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
+			debug2("%s: setting up authctxt for %s",
+			    __func__, user);
 		} else {
-			logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
+			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
@ -253,6 +255,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		if (options.use_pam)
 			PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
 #endif
+		ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
+		    authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user);
 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
@ -320,6 +324,7 @@ void
 userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
    const char *submethod)
 {
+	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
 	char *methods;
 	int partial = 0;

@ -381,6 +386,7 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
 		packet_write_wait();
 		/* now we can break out */
 		authctxt->success = 1;
+		ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
 	} else {

 		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.356 2016/10/18 17:32:54 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.357 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -3065,7 +3065,7 @@ channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	}
 	packet_check_eom();
 	c = channel_connect_to_port(host, host_port,
-	    "connected socket", originator_string);
+	    "connected socket", originator_string, NULL, NULL);
 	free(originator_string);
 	free(host);
 	if (c == NULL) {
@ -4026,9 +4026,13 @@ channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx)
 	memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
 }

-/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */
+/*
+ * Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path,
+ * passing back the failure reason if appropriate.
+ */
 static Channel *
-connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+connect_to_reason(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname,
+     int *reason, const char **errmsg)
 {
 	struct addrinfo hints;
 	int gaierr;
@ -4069,7 +4073,12 @@ connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
 		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
 		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 		snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
-		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) != 0) {
+		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop))
+		    != 0) {
+			if (errmsg != NULL)
+				*errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr);
+			if (reason != NULL)
+				*reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
 			error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name,
 			    ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
 			return NULL;
@ -4092,6 +4101,13 @@ connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
 	return c;
 }

+/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */
+static Channel *
+connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+	return connect_to_reason(name, port, ctype, rname, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
 /*
 * returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel
 * that needs to deal with this connection.
@ -4136,7 +4152,8 @@ channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname)

 /* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */
 Channel *
-channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype,
+    char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
 {
 	int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;

@ -4161,9 +4178,11 @@ channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname
 	if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
 		logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, "
 		    "but the request was denied.", host, port);
+		if (reason != NULL)
+			*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	return connect_to(host, port, ctype, rname);
+	return connect_to_reason(host, port, ctype, rname, reason, errmsg);
 }

 /* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */
@ -4354,6 +4373,33 @@ connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
 	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
 }

+#ifdef __APPLE__
+static int
+is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen)
+{
+	struct stat sbuf;
+
+	if (strlcpy(path, display, pathlen) >= pathlen) {
+		error("%s: display path too long", __func__);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (display[0] != '/')
+		return 0;
+	if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
+		return 1;
+	} else {
+		char *dot = strrchr(path, '.');
+		if (dot != NULL) {
+			*dot = '\0';
+			if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 int
 x11_connect_display(void)
 {
@ -4375,15 +4421,22 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
 	 * connection to the real X server.
 	 */

-	/* Check if the display is from launchd. */
 #ifdef __APPLE__
-	if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) {
-		sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display);
-		if (sock < 0)
-			return -1;
+	/* Check if display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */
+	{
+		char path[PATH_MAX];

-		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
-		return sock;
+		if (is_path_to_xsocket(display, path, sizeof(path))) {
+			debug("x11_connect_display: $DISPLAY is launchd");
+
+			/* Create a socket. */
+			sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path);
+			if (sock < 0)
+				return -1;
+
+			/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+			return sock;
+		}
 	}
 #endif
 	/*
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.h
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.120 2016/10/18 17:32:54 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.121 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */

 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -275,7 +275,8 @@ void	 channel_update_permitted_opens(int, int);
 void	 channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
 void	 channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void);
 void 	 channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void);
-Channel	*channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *);
+Channel	*channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *, int *,
+	     const char **);
 Channel *channel_connect_to_path(const char *, char *, char *);
 Channel	*channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char*, u_short, int, int);
 Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *, u_short,
--- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.289 2016/09/30 09:19:13 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.291 2017/03/10 05:01:13 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ process_cmdline(void)
 			    CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
 			    &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
 		if (!ok) {
-			logit("Unkown port forwarding.");
+			logit("Unknown port forwarding.");
 			goto out;
 		}
 		logit("Canceled forwarding.");
@ -2390,6 +2390,26 @@ client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx)
 	hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
 }

+/*
+ * Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms.
+ * Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names.
+ */
+static int
+key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
+	const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL ?
+	    options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+		return 0;
+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA &&
+	    (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+	    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1))
+		return 1;
+	return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1;
+}
+
 /*
 * Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all
 * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's
@ -2436,10 +2456,7 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void)
 		    sshkey_type(key), fp);
 		free(fp);

-		/* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
-		if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-		    options.hostkeyalgorithms ? options.hostkeyalgorithms :
-		    KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, 0) != 1) {
+		if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) {
 			debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
 			    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
 			continue;
--- a/crypto/openssh/compat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.99 2016/05/24 02:31:57 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.100 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 *
@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "match.h"
+#include "kex.h"

 int compat13 = 0;
 int compat20 = 0;
@ -250,42 +251,14 @@ proto_spec(const char *spec)
 	return ret;
 }

-/*
- * Filters a proposal string, excluding any algorithm matching the 'filter'
- * pattern list.
- */
-static char *
-filter_proposal(char *proposal, const char *filter)
-{
-	Buffer b;
-	char *orig_prop, *fix_prop;
-	char *cp, *tmp;
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(proposal);
-	while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
-		if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) {
-			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
-				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
-			buffer_append(&b, cp, strlen(cp));
-		} else
-			debug2("Compat: skipping algorithm \"%s\"", cp);
-	}
-	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
-	fix_prop = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&b));
-	buffer_free(&b);
-	free(orig_prop);
-
-	return fix_prop;
-}
-
 char *
 compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop)
 {
 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
 		return cipher_prop;
 	debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
-	cipher_prop = filter_proposal(cipher_prop, "aes*");
+	if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_list(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
+		fatal("match_filter_list failed");
 	debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
 	if (*cipher_prop == '\0')
 		fatal("No supported ciphers found");
@ -298,7 +271,8 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
 		return pkalg_prop;
 	debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
-	pkalg_prop = filter_proposal(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa");
+	if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_list(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
+		fatal("match_filter_list failed");
 	debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
 	if (*pkalg_prop == '\0')
 		fatal("No supported PK algorithms found");
@ -312,10 +286,14 @@ compat_kex_proposal(char *p)
 		return p;
 	debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
 	if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
-		p = filter_proposal(p, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
+		if ((p = match_filter_list(p,
+		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
+			fatal("match_filter_list failed");
 	if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
-		p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256");
-		p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1");
+		if ((p = match_filter_list(p,
+		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
+		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
+			fatal("match_filter_list failed");
 	}
 	debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
 	if (*p == '\0')
--- a/crypto/openssh/config.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/config.h
@ -737,6 +737,9 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/seccomp.h> header file. */
 /* #undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */

+/* Define to 1 if you have the `llabs' function. */
+#define HAVE_LLABS 1
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <locale.h> header file. */
 #define HAVE_LOCALE_H 1

@ -786,7 +789,7 @@
 #define HAVE_MEMORY_H 1

 /* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */
-/* #undef HAVE_MEMSET_S */
+#define HAVE_MEMSET_S 1

 /* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
 #define HAVE_MKDTEMP 1
--- a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
+++ b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
@ -747,6 +747,9 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	use_pie=auto
 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
 	check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
+	dnl Target SUSv3/POSIX.1-2001 plus BSD specifics.
+	dnl _DEFAULT_SOURCE is the new name for _BSD_SOURCE
+	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE"
 	AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
 		[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
 	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
@ -1523,7 +1526,6 @@ int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
 					TCPW_MSG="yes"
 				], [
 					AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
-				
 			])
 			LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
 		fi
@ -1534,36 +1536,47 @@ int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
 LDNS_MSG="no"
 AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
 	[  --with-ldns[[=PATH]]      Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)],
-    [
-        if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+	[
+	ldns=""
+	if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+		AC_PATH_TOOL([LDNSCONFIG], [ldns-config], [no])
+		if test "x$PKGCONFIG" = "xno"; then
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+			LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+			ldns=yes
+		else
+			LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`"
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`"
+		fi
+	elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+			LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+			ldns=yes
+	fi

-			if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
-				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
-				LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
-			fi
-
-            AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support])
-            LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
-            LDNS_MSG="yes"
-
-            AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support])
-            AC_LINK_IFELSE(
-                [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+	# Verify that it works.
+	if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support])
+		LDNS_MSG="yes"
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support])
+		AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+			[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <ldns/ldns.h>
 int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
-                                ]])
-                ],
-				[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+			]])
+		],
+			[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
 				[
 					AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
 					AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.])
 				])
-        fi
-    ]
-)
+	fi
+])

 # Check whether user wants libedit support
 LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
@ -1766,6 +1779,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
 	inet_ntoa \
 	inet_ntop \
 	innetgr \
+	llabs \
 	login_getcapbool \
 	md5_crypt \
 	memmove \
@ -1834,11 +1848,8 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
 	warn \
 ])

-dnl Wide character support.  Linux man page says it needs _XOPEN_SOURCE.
-saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE"
+dnl Wide character support.
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth])
-CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"

 TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes}
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([for utf8 locale support])
@ -2583,8 +2594,8 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
 			ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
 			# Check version is supported.
 			case "$ssl_library_ver" in
-				0090[[0-7]]*|009080[[0-5]]*)
-					AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
+				10000*|0*)
+					AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
 			                ;;
 			        *) ;;
 			esac
@ -5147,6 +5158,7 @@ echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
 echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
 echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
 echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+echo "                   libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
 echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
 echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
 echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ sshd_config_configured=no
 port_number=22
 service_name=sshd
 strictmodes=yes
-privsep_used=yes
 cygwin_value=""
 user_account=
 password_value=
@ -140,33 +139,21 @@ sshd_strictmodes() {

 # ======================================================================
 # Routine: sshd_privsep
-#  MODIFIES: privsep_used
+# Try to create ssshd user account
 # ======================================================================
 sshd_privsep() {
  local ret=0

  if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
  then
-    echo
-    csih_inform "Privilege separation is set to 'sandbox' by default since"
-    csih_inform "OpenSSH 6.1.  This is unsupported by Cygwin and has to be set"
-    csih_inform "to 'yes' or 'no'."
-    csih_inform "However, using privilege separation requires a non-privileged account"
-    csih_inform "called 'sshd'."
-    csih_inform "For more info on privilege separation read /usr/share/doc/openssh/README.privsep."
-    if csih_request "Should privilege separation be used?"
+    if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
    then
-      privsep_used=yes
-      if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
-      then
-	csih_error_recoverable "Couldn't create user 'sshd'!"
-	csih_error_recoverable "Privilege separation set to 'no' again!"
-	csih_error_recoverable "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
-	let ++ret
-	privsep_used=no
-      fi
-    else
-      privsep_used=no
+      csih_error_recoverable "Could not create user 'sshd'!"
+      csih_error_recoverable "You will not be able to run an sshd service"
+      csih_error_recoverable "under a privileged account successfully."
+      csih_error_recoverable "Make sure to create a non-privileged user 'sshd'"
+      csih_error_recoverable "manually before trying to run the service!"
+      let ++ret
    fi
  fi
  return $ret
@ -202,18 +189,6 @@ sshd_config_tweak() {
      let ++ret
    fi
  fi
-  if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
-  then
-    /usr/bin/sed -i -e "
-      s/^#\?UsePrivilegeSeparation .*/UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}/" \
-      ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
-    if [ $? -ne 0 ]
-    then
-      csih_warning "Setting privilege separation failed!"
-      csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
-      let ++ret
-    fi
-  fi
  return $ret
 } # --- End of sshd_config_tweak --- #

@ -693,7 +668,7 @@ then
  fi
 fi

-# handle sshd_config (and privsep)
+# handle sshd_config
 csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
 if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
 then
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-%define ver 7.4p1
+%define ver 7.5p1
 %define rel 1

 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@

 Summary:	OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
 Name:		openssh
-Version:	7.4p1
+Version:	7.5p1
 URL:		https://www.openssh.com/
 Release:	1
 Source0:	openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
--- a/crypto/openssh/digest-openssl.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/digest-openssl.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.5 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.6 2017/03/10 02:59:51 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
 *
@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
 	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
 	u_int l = dlen;

-	if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
+	if (digest == NULL || dlen > UINT_MAX)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--- a/crypto/openssh/freebsd-configure.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/freebsd-configure.sh
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ configure_args="
    --with-libedit
    --with-ssl-engine
    --without-xauth
-" 
+"

 set -e

--- a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.67 2016/09/17 18:00:27 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.68 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -419,19 +419,24 @@ write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
    const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
 {
 	int r, success = 0;
-	char *hashed_host = NULL;
+	char *hashed_host = NULL, *lhost;
+
+	lhost = xstrdup(host);
+	lowercase(lhost);

 	if (store_hash) {
-		if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
+		if ((hashed_host = host_hash(lhost, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
 			error("%s: host_hash failed", __func__);
+			free(lhost);
 			return 0;
 		}
 		fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host);
 	} else if (ip != NULL)
-		fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", host, ip);
-	else
-		fprintf(f, "%s ", host);
-
+		fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", lhost, ip);
+	else {
+		fprintf(f, "%s ", lhost);
+	}
+	free(lhost);
 	if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0)
 		success = 1;
 	else
--- a/crypto/openssh/kex.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.127 2016/10/10 19:28:48 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.131 2017/03/15 07:07:39 markus Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 *
@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
 char *
 kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
 {
-	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
 	size_t len;

 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
@ -195,8 +195,10 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
 	}
 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
-		if (match_list(ret, p, NULL) != NULL)
+		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
+			free(m);
 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+		}
 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
 			free(tmp);
@ -211,7 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
 /*
 * Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a
 * configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to
- * indicate that it should be appended to the default.
+ * indicate that it should be appended to the default or '-' that the
+ * specified names should be removed.
 */
 int
 kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char **list)
@ -222,14 +225,18 @@ kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char **list)
 		*list = strdup(def);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	if (**list != '+') {
-		return 0;
+	if (**list == '+') {
+		if ((ret = kex_names_cat(def, *list + 1)) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		free(*list);
+		*list = ret;
+	} else if (**list == '-') {
+		if ((ret = match_filter_list(def, *list + 1)) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		free(*list);
+		*list = ret;
 	}

-	if ((ret = kex_names_cat(def, *list + 1)) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	free(*list);
-	*list = ret;
 	return 0;
 }

@ -334,7 +341,6 @@ kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
 	ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
 	    SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
 }

 static int
@ -343,7 +349,7 @@ kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
 	int r;
 	char *algs;

-	if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, ',')) == NULL)
+	if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
@ -424,6 +430,7 @@ kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)

 	debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 		return r;
 	if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0)
@ -538,6 +545,7 @@ kex_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **kexp)
 		goto out;
 	kex->done = 0;
 	kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
 	r = 0;
 	*kexp = kex;
 out:
@ -646,8 +654,10 @@ choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)

 	if (name == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
-	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
+	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
+		free(name);
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
 	enc->name = name;
 	enc->enabled = 0;
 	enc->iv = NULL;
@ -665,8 +675,10 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)

 	if (name == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
-	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
+	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
+		free(name);
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
 	/* truncate the key */
 	if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
 		mac->key_len = 16;
@ -690,6 +702,7 @@ choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
 	} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
 		comp->type = COMP_NONE;
 	} else {
+		free(name);
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	}
 	comp->name = name;
--- a/crypto/openssh/krl.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/krl.c
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 */

-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.38 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.39 2017/03/10 07:18:32 dtucker Exp $ */

 #include "includes.h"

@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
 			break;
 		case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
 			/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
-			sshbuf_reset(sect);
+			sshbuf_free(sect);
 			sect = NULL;
 			if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
 				goto out;
@ -1288,7 +1288,8 @@ ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
 	debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
 	r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
 out:
-	close(fd);
+	if (fd != -1)
+		close(fd);
 	sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
 	ssh_krl_free(krl);
 	if (r != 0)
--- a/crypto/openssh/log.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/log.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.48 2016/07/15 05:01:58 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.49 2017/03/10 03:15:58 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -453,7 +453,8 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
 		tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
 		log_handler = tmp_handler;
 	} else if (log_on_stderr) {
-		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
+		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n",
+		    (int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf);
 		(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
 	} else {
 #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
--- a/crypto/openssh/match.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/match.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.33 2016/11/06 05:46:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.37 2017/03/10 04:24:55 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -42,9 +42,11 @@
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>

 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "match.h"
+#include "misc.h"

 /*
 * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
 		if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
 			return 0;

-		/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, skip the comma. */
+		/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */
 		if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
 			i++;

@ -177,7 +179,13 @@ match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
 int
 match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern)
 {
-	return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, 1);
+	char *hostcopy = xstrdup(host);
+	int r;
+
+	lowercase(hostcopy);
+	r = match_pattern_list(hostcopy, pattern, 1);
+	free(hostcopy);
+	return r;
 }

 /*
@ -284,3 +292,35 @@ match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
 	free(s);
 	return NULL;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Filters a comma-separated list of strings, excluding any entry matching
+ * the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+match_filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
+{
+	size_t len = strlen(proposal) + 1;
+	char *fix_prop = malloc(len);
+	char *orig_prop = strdup(proposal);
+	char *cp, *tmp;
+
+	if (fix_prop == NULL || orig_prop == NULL) {
+		free(orig_prop);
+		free(fix_prop);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	tmp = orig_prop;
+	*fix_prop = '\0';
+	while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
+		if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) {
+			if (*fix_prop != '\0')
+				strlcat(fix_prop, ",", len);
+			strlcat(fix_prop, cp, len);
+		}
+	}
+	free(orig_prop);
+	return fix_prop;
+}
+
--- a/crypto/openssh/match.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/match.h
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.17 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */

 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ int	 match_hostname(const char *, const char *);
 int	 match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
 int	 match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
 char	*match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
+char	*match_filter_list(const char *, const char *);

 /* addrmatch.c */
 int	 addr_match_list(const char *, const char *);
--- a/crypto/openssh/misc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/misc.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.107 2016/11/30 00:28:31 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.109 2017/03/14 00:55:37 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ a2tun(const char *s, int *remote)
 long
 convtime(const char *s)
 {
-	long total, secs;
+	long total, secs, multiplier = 1;
 	const char *p;
 	char *endp;

@ -334,23 +334,28 @@ convtime(const char *s)
 			break;
 		case 'm':
 		case 'M':
-			secs *= MINUTES;
+			multiplier = MINUTES;
 			break;
 		case 'h':
 		case 'H':
-			secs *= HOURS;
+			multiplier = HOURS;
 			break;
 		case 'd':
 		case 'D':
-			secs *= DAYS;
+			multiplier = DAYS;
 			break;
 		case 'w':
 		case 'W':
-			secs *= WEEKS;
+			multiplier = WEEKS;
 			break;
 		default:
 			return -1;
 		}
+		if (secs >= LONG_MAX / multiplier)
+			return -1;
+		secs *= multiplier;
+		if  (total >= LONG_MAX - secs)
+			return -1;
 		total += secs;
 		if (total < 0)
 			return -1;
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.166 2016/09/28 16:33:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.167 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
 * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
 void
 monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 {
+	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
 	struct mon_table *ent;
 	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;

@ -356,6 +357,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)

 	debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
 	    __func__, authctxt->user);
+	ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);

 	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);

@ -695,6 +697,7 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
 int
 mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
+	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
 	char *username;
 	struct passwd *pwent;
 	int allowed = 0;
@ -739,6 +742,8 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);

 out:
+	ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
+	    authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
 	buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));

 #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
--- a/crypto/openssh/mux.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/mux.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.63 2016/10/19 23:21:56 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.64 2017/01/21 11:32:04 guenther Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
 *
@ -2162,7 +2162,6 @@ int
 muxclient(const char *path)
 {
 	struct sockaddr_un addr;
-	socklen_t sun_len;
 	int sock;
 	u_int pid;

@ -2186,8 +2185,6 @@ muxclient(const char *path)

 	memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-	sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
-	    strlen(path) + 1;

 	if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path,
 	    sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
@ -2197,7 +2194,7 @@ muxclient(const char *path)
 	if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
 		fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));

-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) {
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
 		switch (muxclient_command) {
 		case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
 		case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@ -301,3 +301,11 @@ mbtowc(wchar_t *pwc, const char *s, size_t n)
 	return 1;
 }
 #endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
+long long
+llabs(long long j)
+{
+	return (j < 0 ? -j : j);
+}
+#endif
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
@ -135,4 +135,8 @@ void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
 void warn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 #endif

+#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
+long long llabs(long long);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.9 2007/03/20 03:42:52 tedu Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.13 2017/03/11 23:37:23 djm Exp $	*/

 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Ian F. Darwin.  All rights reserved.
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static long long scale_factors[] = {

 #define MAX_DIGITS (SCALE_LENGTH * 3)	/* XXX strlen(sprintf("%lld", -1)? */

-/** Convert the given input string "scaled" into numeric in "result".
+/* Convert the given input string "scaled" into numeric in "result".
 * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set on error.
 */
 int
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 	long long scale_fact = 1, whole = 0, fpart = 0;

 	/* Skip leading whitespace */
-	while (isascii(*p) && isspace(*p))
+	while (isascii((unsigned char)*p) && isspace((unsigned char)*p))
 		++p;

 	/* Then at most one leading + or - */
@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 	 * (but note that E for Exa might look like e to some!).
 	 * Advance 'p' to end, to get scale factor.
 	 */
-	for (; isascii(*p) && (isdigit(*p) || *p=='.'); ++p) {
+	for (; isascii((unsigned char)*p) &&
+	    (isdigit((unsigned char)*p) || *p=='.'); ++p) {
 		if (*p == '.') {
 			if (fract_digits > 0) {	/* oops, more than one '.' */
 				errno = EINVAL;
@ -124,6 +125,10 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 				/* ignore extra fractional digits */
 				continue;
 			fract_digits++;		/* for later scaling */
+			if (fpart >= LLONG_MAX / 10) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
 			fpart *= 10;
 			fpart += i;
 		} else {				/* normal digit */
@ -131,6 +136,10 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 				errno = ERANGE;
 				return -1;
 			}
+			if (whole >= LLONG_MAX / 10) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
 			whole *= 10;
 			whole += i;
 		}
@ -150,17 +159,22 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 	/* Validate scale factor, and scale whole and fraction by it. */
 	for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) {

-		/** Are we there yet? */
+		/* Are we there yet? */
 		if (*p == scale_chars[i] ||
-			*p == tolower(scale_chars[i])) {
+			*p == tolower((unsigned char)scale_chars[i])) {

 			/* If it ends with alphanumerics after the scale char, bad. */
-			if (isalnum(*(p+1))) {
+			if (isalnum((unsigned char)*(p+1))) {
 				errno = EINVAL;
 				return -1;
 			}
 			scale_fact = scale_factors[i];

+			if (whole >= LLONG_MAX / scale_fact) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
+
 			/* scale whole part */
 			whole *= scale_fact;

@ -181,7 +195,9 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
-	errno = ERANGE;
+
+	/* Invalid unit or character */
+	errno = EINVAL;
 	return -1;
 }

@ -196,7 +212,7 @@ fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result)
 	unsigned int i;
 	unit_type unit = NONE;

-	abval = (number < 0LL) ? -number : number;	/* no long long_abs yet */
+	abval = llabs(number);

 	/* Not every negative long long has a positive representation.
 	 * Also check for numbers that are just too darned big to format
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.243 2016/10/11 21:47:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.247 2017/03/11 13:07:35 markus Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -354,6 +354,25 @@ ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
 	return ssh->state->mux;
 }

+int
+ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	int r;
+
+	free(ssh->log_preamble);
+	if (fmt == NULL)
+		ssh->log_preamble = NULL;
+	else {
+		va_start(args, fmt);
+		r = vasprintf(&ssh->log_preamble, fmt, args);
+		va_end(args);
+		if (r < 0 || ssh->log_preamble == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int
 ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
@ -1051,7 +1070,7 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)

 	/* Time-based rekeying */
 	if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
-	    state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
+	    (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
 		return 1;

 	/* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */
@ -1449,8 +1468,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 				break;
 			}
 		}
-		if (r == 0)
-			return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
+		if (r == 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		/* Read data from the socket. */
 		len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
 		if (len == 0) {
@ -1831,11 +1852,11 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 			if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
 				goto out;
 			logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
-			if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+			if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
 				return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 			return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
 			    sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
-			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
+			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
 		}
 		/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
 		DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
@ -2076,27 +2097,36 @@ ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
 		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 }

+static void
+fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l)
+{
+	snprintf(s, l, "%.200s%s%s port %d",
+	    ssh->log_preamble ? ssh->log_preamble : "",
+	    ssh->log_preamble ? " " : "",
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+}
+
 /*
 * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit.
 */
 void
 sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
 {
+	char remote_id[512];
+
+	fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+
 	switch (r) {
 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
-		logdie("Connection closed by %.200s port %d",
-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+		logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id);
 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
-		logdie("Connection %s %.200s port %d timed out",
-		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+		logdie("Connection %s %s timed out",
+		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
 	case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
-		logdie("Disconnected from %.200s port %d",
-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+		logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id);
 	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
 		if (errno == ECONNRESET)
-			logdie("Connection reset by %.200s port %d",
-			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+			logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id);
 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
 	case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
@ -2105,17 +2135,16 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
 	case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
 		if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
 			BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
-			logdie("Unable to negotiate with %.200s port %d: %s. "
-			    "Their offer: %s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r),
+			logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. "
+			    "Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r),
 			    ssh->kex->failed_choice);
 		}
 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	default:
-		logdie("%s%sConnection %s %.200s port %d: %s",
+		logdie("%s%sConnection %s %s: %s",
 		    tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
 		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r));
+		    remote_id, ssh_err(r));
 	}
 }

@ -2128,7 +2157,7 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
 void
 ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
 {
-	char buf[1024];
+	char buf[1024], remote_id[512];
 	va_list args;
 	static int disconnecting = 0;
 	int r;
@ -2141,12 +2170,13 @@ ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
 	 * Format the message.  Note that the caller must make sure the
 	 * message is of limited size.
 	 */
+	fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
 	va_start(args, fmt);
 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
 	va_end(args);

 	/* Display the error locally */
-	logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
+	logit("Disconnecting %s: %.100s", remote_id, buf);

 	/*
 	 * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait
@ -2399,10 +2429,10 @@ ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, int nbytes)
 }

 void
-ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, time_t seconds)
+ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds)
 {
-	debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %d seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
-	    (int)seconds);
+	debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %u seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
+	    (unsigned int)seconds);
 	ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes;
 	ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds;
 }
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.74 2016/10/11 21:47:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.76 2017/02/03 23:03:33 djm Exp $ */

 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ struct ssh {
 	char *local_ipaddr;
 	int local_port;

+	/* Optional preamble for log messages (e.g. username) */
+	char *log_preamble;
+
 	/* Dispatcher table */
 	dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];
 	/* number of packets to ignore in the dispatcher */
@ -104,6 +107,8 @@ void     ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *);
 void     ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *);
 void     ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *);
 int	 ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));

 int	 ssh_packet_log_type(u_char);

@ -154,7 +159,7 @@ int	 ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *);
 const char *ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
 int	 ssh_local_port(struct ssh *);

-void	 ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, time_t);
+void	 ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, u_int32_t);
 time_t	 ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *);

 void	*ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *);
--- a/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
@ -167,15 +167,6 @@
 #define _PATH_LS			"ls"
 #endif

-/* path to login program */
-#ifndef LOGIN_PROGRAM
-# ifdef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
-#  define LOGIN_PROGRAM         LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
-# else
-#  define LOGIN_PROGRAM         "/usr/bin/login"
-# endif
-#endif /* LOGIN_PROGRAM */
-
 /* Askpass program define */
 #ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM
 #define ASKPASS_PROGRAM         "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass"
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.262 2016/10/25 04:08:13 jsg Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.270 2017/03/10 04:27:32 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");

   Host books.com
     RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999
-     Cipher 3des
+     Ciphers 3des-cbc

   Host fascist.blob.com
     Port 23123
@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
     PublicKeyAuthentication no

   Host *.su
-     Cipher none
+     Ciphers aes128-ctr
     PasswordAuthentication no

   Host vpn.fake.com
@ -183,6 +183,44 @@ static struct {
 	const char *name;
 	OpCodes opcode;
 } keywords[] = {
+	/* Deprecated options */
+	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+	{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+	{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
+	{ "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+	{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
+	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
+
+	/* Unsupported options */
+	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
+
+	/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+# else
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
+	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
+# else
+	{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
+	{ "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+	{ "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
+	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication },
+	{ "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel },
+# else
+	{ "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "compressionlevel", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+
 	{ "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
 	{ "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
 	{ "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
@ -191,30 +229,15 @@ static struct {
 	{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
 	{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
 	{ "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort },
-	{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
 	{ "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
 	{ "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
-	{ "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
 	{ "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
 	{ "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },		    /* alias */
-	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication },
 	{ "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
 	{ "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
 	{ "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },  /* alias */
-	{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
-	{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
-	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
-#if defined(GSSAPI)
-	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
-	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-#else
-	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
-	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-#endif
-	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
-	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
 	{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
 	{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile },			/* obsolete */
 	{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
@ -236,15 +259,12 @@ static struct {
 	{ "match", oMatch },
 	{ "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
 	{ "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
-	{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
 	{ "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },
-	{ "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
 	{ "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
 	{ "batchmode", oBatchMode },
 	{ "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP },
 	{ "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking },
 	{ "compression", oCompression },
-	{ "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel },
 	{ "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },
 	{ "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },				/* obsolete */
 	{ "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts },
@ -253,13 +273,6 @@ static struct {
 	{ "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
 	{ "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
 	{ "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-	{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
-	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
-#else
-	{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
-	{ "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
-#endif
 	{ "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
 	{ "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
 	{ "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS },
@ -280,7 +293,6 @@ static struct {
 	{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
 	{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
 	{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
-	{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
 	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
 	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
 	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
@ -841,11 +853,11 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 		activep = &cmdline;
 	}

-	/* Strip trailing whitespace */
+	/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
 	if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
 		return 0;
 	for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
-		if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL)
+		if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
 			break;
 		line[len] = '\0';
 	}
@ -1193,7 +1205,7 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 		arg = strdelim(&s);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
-		if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
@ -1204,7 +1216,7 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 		arg = strdelim(&s);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
-		if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
@ -1216,7 +1228,8 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
@ -1230,7 +1243,8 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
 				filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
@ -1497,6 +1511,7 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 			if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) {
 				debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no "
 				    "files",filename, linenum, arg2);
+				free(arg2);
 				continue;
 			} else if (r != 0 || gl.gl_pathc < 0)
 				fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
@ -1513,6 +1528,11 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 				    flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM |
 				    (oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH),
 				    activep, depth + 1);
+				if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) {
+					fatal("Can't open user config file "
+					    "%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i],
+					    strerror(errno));
+				}
 				/*
 				 * don't let Match in includes clobber the
 				 * containing file's Match state.
@ -1727,7 +1747,7 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
    int flags, int *activep, int depth)
 {
 	FILE *f;
-	char line[1024];
+	char line[4096];
 	int linenum;
 	int bad_options = 0;

@ -1757,6 +1777,8 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
 	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
 		/* Update line number counter. */
 		linenum++;
+		if (strlen(line) == sizeof(line) - 1)
+			fatal("%s line %d too long", filename, linenum);
 		if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
 		    line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, depth) != 0)
 			bad_options++;
@ -2482,10 +2504,10 @@ dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds)
 	/* oDynamicForward */
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 		fwd = &fwds[i];
-		if (code == oDynamicForward &&
+		if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
 		    strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0)
 			continue;
-		if (code == oLocalForward &&
+		if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
 		    strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0)
 			continue;
 		printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
@ -2558,8 +2580,10 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty);
+#ifdef WITH_RSA1
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication);
+#endif
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
@ -2571,7 +2595,9 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)

 	/* Integer options */
 	dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots);
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	dump_cfg_int(oCompressionLevel, o->compression_level);
+#endif
 	dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts);
 	dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout);
 	dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
@ -2591,7 +2617,9 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
 	dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command);
 	dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
 	dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_CLIENT_MAC);
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 	dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider);
+#endif
 	dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications);
 	dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types);
 	dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys);
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile
@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ unit:
 		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
 			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
 		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/conversion/test_conversion ; \
 		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \
 		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \
 			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.7 2016/09/26 21:34:38 bluhm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.8 2017/01/06 02:51:16 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.

 tid="disallow agent attach from other uid"
@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
 else
 	chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}

-	ssh-add -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+	${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
 	r=$?
 	if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
 		fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1"
 	fi
 	if test -z "$sudo" ; then
 		# doas
-		${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null
+		${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null
 	else
 		# sudo
-		< /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null
+		< /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null
 	fi
 	r=$?
 	if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 tid="AllowUsers/DenyUsers"

 me="$LOGNAME"
-if [ "x$me" == "x" ]; then
+if [ "x$me" = "x" ]; then
 	me=`whoami`
 fi
 other="nobody"
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-file.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-file.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.4 2016/12/16 02:48:55 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.5 2017/03/11 23:44:16 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.

 tid="ssh with certificates"
@ -17,24 +17,59 @@ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
 	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
 ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
 	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
 # Move the certificate to a different address to better control
 # when it is offered.
 ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
 	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
-		fail "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1"
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1"
 mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub
 ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key2 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
 	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
-		fail "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2"
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2"
 mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key3 ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key3 with user_ca_key1"
+rm $OBJ/user_key3.pub # to test use of private key w/o public half.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key4 ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key4 with user_ca_key1"
+rm $OBJ/user_key4 $OBJ/user_key4.pub # to test no matching pub/private key case.

 trace 'try with identity files'
 opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
 opts2="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
 echo "cert-authority $(cat $OBJ/user_ca_key1.pub)" > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER

+# Make a clean config that doesn't have any pre-added identities.
+cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy | grep -v IdentityFile > $OBJ/no_identity_config
+
+# XXX: verify that certificate used was what we expect. Needs exposure of
+# keys via enviornment variable or similar.
+
 for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
+	# Key with no .pub should work - finding the equivalent *-cert.pub.
+	verbose "protocol $p: identity cert with no plain public file"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
+	    -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 5$p
+	[ $? -ne 5$p ] && fail "ssh failed"
+
+	# CertificateFile matching private key with no .pub file should work.
+	verbose "protocol $p: CertificateFile with no plain public file"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
+	    -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub \
+	    -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 5$p
+	[ $? -ne 5$p ] && fail "ssh failed"
+
 	# Just keys should fail
+	verbose "protocol $p: plain keys"
 	${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 5$p
 	r=$?
 	if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then
@ -42,6 +77,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	fi

 	# Keys with untrusted cert should fail.
+	verbose "protocol $p: untrusted cert"
 	opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
 	${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
 	r=$?
@ -50,6 +86,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	fi

 	# Good cert with bad key should fail.
+	verbose "protocol $p: good cert, bad key"
 	opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2"
 	opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
 	${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
@ -59,6 +96,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	fi

 	# Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed.
+	verbose "protocol $p: single trusted"
 	opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
 	${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
 	r=$?
@ -67,6 +105,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	fi

 	# Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed.
+	verbose "protocol $p: multiple trusted"
 	opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
 	opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
 	${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
@ -74,14 +113,6 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
 		fail "ssh failed with multiple certs in protocol $p"
 	fi
-
-	#Keys with trusted certificate specified in config options, should succeed.
-	opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
-	${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p
-	r=$?
-	if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then
-		fail "ssh failed with trusted cert in config in protocol $p"
-	fi
 done

 #next, using an agent in combination with the keys
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/forwarding.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/forwarding.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.16 2016/04/14 23:57:17 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.19 2017/01/30 05:22:14 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.

 tid="local and remote forwarding"
@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ start_sshd
 base=33
 last=$PORT
 fwd=""
-CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
-rm -f $CTL
+CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$

 for j in 0 1 2; do
 	for i in 0 1 2; do
@ -29,7 +28,8 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 		q=$p
 	fi
 	trace "start forwarding, fork to background"
-	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10
+	rm -f $CTL
+	${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10

 	trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
 	${SSH} -$q -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	test -s ${COPY}		|| fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
 	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"

-	sleep 10
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
 done

 for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ for d in L R; do
 	    -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
 	    -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
 	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
-		fail "connection failed, should not"
+		fatal "connection failed, should not"
 	else
 		# this one should fail
 		${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
@ -75,30 +75,32 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true

 	trace "clear local forward proto $p"
-	${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	rm -f $CTL
+	${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
 	    -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
 	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
 		fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding"
 	else
 		# this one should fail
-		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
+		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \
 		     >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
 			fail "local forwarding not cleared"
 	fi
-	sleep 10
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
 	
 	trace "clear remote forward proto $p"
-	${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	rm -f $CTL
+	${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
 	    -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
 	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
 		fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding"
 	else
 		# this one should fail
-		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \
+		${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \
 		     >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
 			fail "remote forwarding not cleared"
 	fi
-	sleep 10
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
 done

 for p in 2; do
@ -115,6 +117,7 @@ echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
 echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
 for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background"
+	rm -f $CTL
 	${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10

 	trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
@ -123,21 +126,24 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do
 	test -s ${COPY}		|| fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
 	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"

-	${SSH} -S $CTL -O exit somehost
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
 done

 for p in 2; do
 	trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result"
 	rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
-	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10
-	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10
-	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10
-	${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10
+	rm -f $CTL $CTL.[123]
+	${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+	${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+	${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10
+	${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10
 	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
 		somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
 	test -s ${COPY}			|| fail "failed copy ${DATA}"
 	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"

-	#wait
-	sleep 10
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost
 done
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh
@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.19 2016/11/25 02:56:49 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.20 2017/01/06 02:26:10 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.

 tid="integrity"
 cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak

 # start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
-# XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length
-# XXX and ssh tries to read...
 tries=10
 startoffset=2900
 macs=`${SSH} -Q mac`
@ -27,6 +25,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
 	elen=0
 	epad=0
 	emac=0
+	etmo=0
 	ecnt=0
 	skip=0
 	for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.58 2016/12/16 01:06:27 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.59 2017/02/07 23:03:11 dtucker Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.

 #SUDO=sudo
@ -444,12 +444,10 @@ Host *
 	User			$USER
 	GlobalKnownHostsFile	$OBJ/known_hosts
 	UserKnownHostsFile	$OBJ/known_hosts
-	RSAAuthentication	yes
 	PubkeyAuthentication	yes
 	ChallengeResponseAuthentication	no
 	HostbasedAuthentication	no
 	PasswordAuthentication	no
-	RhostsRSAAuthentication	no
 	BatchMode		yes
 	StrictHostKeyChecking	yes
 	LogLevel		DEBUG3
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/Makefile
@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2016/08/19 06:44:13 djm Exp $
-REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY= yes
-SUBDIR=	test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2017/03/14 01:20:29 dtucker Exp $
+
+REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?=	yes
+SUBDIR=	test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion

 .include <bsd.subdir.mk>
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile
@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2017/03/14 01:20:29 dtucker Exp $
+
+PROG=test_conversion
+SRCS=tests.c
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2017/03/14 01:20:29 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for conversions
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	TEST_START("conversion_convtime");
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("0"), 0);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1"), 1);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1S"), 1);
+	/* from the examples in the comment above the function */
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("90m"), 5400);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1h30m"), 5400);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("2d"), 172800);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1w"), 604800);
+
+	/* negative time is not allowed */
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-7"), -1);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-9d"), -1);
+	
+	/* overflow */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX + 1);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
+
+	/* overflow with multiplier */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%lluM", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX/60 + 1);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1000000000000000000000w"), -1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2016/09/21 17:03:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2017/02/03 23:01:42 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Regress test for matching functions
 *
@ -103,6 +103,25 @@ tests(void)
 	/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 1); */
 	TEST_DONE();

+#define CHECK_FILTER(string,filter,expected) \
+	do { \
+		char *result = match_filter_list((string), (filter)); \
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, expected); \
+		free(result); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	TEST_START("match_filter_list");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "", "a,b,c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a", "b,c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b", "a,c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "c", "a,b");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b", "c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,c", "b");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b,c", "");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
+	CHECK_FILTER("", "a,b,c", "");
+	TEST_DONE();
 /*
 * XXX TODO
 * int      match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.6 2015/03/03 20:42:49 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.7 2017/03/14 01:10:07 dtucker Exp $	*/
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
 *
@ -441,6 +441,17 @@ assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
 	test_die();
 }

+void
+assert_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
 void
 assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
    long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.6 2015/01/18 19:52:44 djm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.7 2017/03/14 01:10:07 dtucker Exp $	*/
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
 *
@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ void assert_size_t(const char *file, int line,
 void assert_u_int(const char *file, int line,
    const char *a1, const char *a2,
    u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_long(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
 void assert_long_long(const char *file, int line,
    const char *a1, const char *a2,
    long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
@ -110,6 +113,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_EQ(a1, a2) \
@ -139,6 +144,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_NE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_NE(a1, a2) \
@ -166,6 +173,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_LT(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_LT(a1, a2) \
@ -193,6 +202,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_LE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_LE(a1, a2) \
@ -220,6 +231,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_GT(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_GT(a1, a2) \
@ -247,6 +260,8 @@ void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
 	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
 #define ASSERT_U_INT_GE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
 #define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \
 	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
 #define ASSERT_CHAR_GE(a1, a2) \
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2016/12/19 04:55:18 djm Exp $ */
+/*	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2017/02/19 00:11:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Regress test for the utf8.h *mprintf() API
 *
@ -15,10 +15,7 @@

 #include "utf8.h"

-void	 badarg(void);
-void	 one(const char *, const char *, int, int, int, const char *);
-
-void
+static void
 badarg(void)
 {
 	char	 buf[16];
@ -33,8 +30,8 @@ badarg(void)
 	TEST_DONE();
 }

-void
-one(const char *name, const char *mbs, int width,
+static void
+one(int utf8, const char *name, const char *mbs, int width,
    int wantwidth, int wantlen, const char *wants)
 {
 	char	 buf[16];
@ -43,7 +40,7 @@ one(const char *name, const char *mbs, int width,

 	if (wantlen == -2)
 		wantlen = strlen(wants);
-	(void)strlcpy(buf, "utf8_", sizeof(buf));
+	(void)strlcpy(buf, utf8 ? "utf8_" : "c_", sizeof(buf));
 	(void)strlcat(buf, name, sizeof(buf));
 	TEST_START(buf);
 	wp = wantwidth == -2 ? NULL : &width;
@ -65,19 +62,41 @@ tests(void)
 	TEST_DONE();

 	badarg();
-	one("empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
-	one("ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
-	one("newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
-	one("cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
-	one("tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
-	one("esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
-	one("inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
-	one("inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
-	one("inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
-	one("sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
-	one("sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
-	one("width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
-	one("width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
-	one("double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 3, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
-	one("double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 4, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
+	one(1, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
+	one(1, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
+	one(1, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
+	one(1, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
+	one(1, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
+	one(1, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
+	one(1, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
+	one(1, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
+	one(1, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
+	one(1, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
+	one(1, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
+	one(1, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
+	one(1, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
+	one(1, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 3, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
+	one(1, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 4, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
+
+	TEST_START("C_setlocale");
+	loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(loc, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	badarg();
+	one(0, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
+	one(0, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
+	one(0, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
+	one(0, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
+	one(0, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
+	one(0, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
+	one(0, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
+	one(0, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
+	one(0, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
+	one(0, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
+	one(0, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
+	one(0, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
+	one(0, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
+	one(0, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 7, 5, -1, "a\\343");
+	one(0, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 13, 13, 13, "a\\343\\201\\201");
 }
--- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@ -73,19 +73,35 @@
 # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */

+#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# define ARG_LO_OFFSET  0
+# define ARG_HI_OFFSET  sizeof(uint32_t)
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
+# define ARG_LO_OFFSET  sizeof(uint32_t)
+# define ARG_HI_OFFSET  0
+#else
+#error "Unknown endianness"
+#endif
+
 /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
 #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
 #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
 #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
-	/* load first syscall argument */ \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \
+	/* load and test first syscall argument, low word */ \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
-	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
+	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
+	    ((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \
+	/* load and test first syscall argument, high word */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
+	    (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
 	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
@ -104,108 +120,122 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {

 	/* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */
 #ifdef __NR_lstat
-	SC_DENY(lstat, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_lstat64
-	SC_DENY(lstat64, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_fstat
-	SC_DENY(fstat, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_fstat64
-	SC_DENY(fstat64, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_open
-	SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_openat
-	SC_DENY(openat, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_newfstatat
-	SC_DENY(newfstatat, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_stat
-	SC_DENY(stat, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_stat64
-	SC_DENY(stat64, EACCES),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES),
 #endif

 	/* Syscalls to permit */
 #ifdef __NR_brk
-	SC_ALLOW(brk),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
-	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_close
-	SC_ALLOW(close),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_exit
-	SC_ALLOW(exit),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_exit_group
-	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_getpgid
-	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_getpid
-	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_getrandom
-	SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
-	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_madvise
-	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_mmap
-	SC_ALLOW(mmap),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_mmap2
-	SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap2),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_mremap
-	SC_ALLOW(mremap),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_munmap
-	SC_ALLOW(munmap),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR__newselect
-	SC_ALLOW(_newselect),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_poll
-	SC_ALLOW(poll),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_pselect6
-	SC_ALLOW(pselect6),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_read
-	SC_ALLOW(read),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
-	SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_select
-	SC_ALLOW(select),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_select),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_shutdown
-	SC_ALLOW(shutdown),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
-	SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_time
-	SC_ALLOW(time),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_write
-	SC_ALLOW(write),
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_write),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_socketcall
-	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+#endif
+#if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__)
+	/* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+#endif
+#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
+	/*
+	 * On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the
+	 * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
+	 * https://bugs.debian.org/849923
+	 */
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT);
 #endif

 	/* Default deny */
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@

-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.301 2016/11/30 03:00:05 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.306 2017/03/14 07:19:07 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
 *                    All rights reserved
@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
 	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
-		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
+		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
 		options->password_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
-	{ "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
+	{ "useprivilegeseparation", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
 	{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL },
@ -983,6 +983,15 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 	long long val64;
 	const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;

+	/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
+	if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
+		if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
+			break;
+		line[len] = '\0';
+	}
+
 	cp = line;
 	if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
 		return 0;
@ -1185,7 +1194,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
@ -1381,11 +1391,6 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		intptr = &options->disable_forwarding;
 		goto parse_flag;

-	case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
-		intptr = &use_privsep;
-		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
-		goto parse_multistate;
-
 	case sAllowUsers:
 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
@ -1444,7 +1449,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
-		if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (options->ciphers == NULL)
@ -1455,7 +1460,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
-		if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (options->macs == NULL)
@ -1467,7 +1472,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
 		if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
@ -2117,8 +2123,6 @@ fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports);
 	case sCompression:
 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
-	case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
-		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep);
 	case sAllowTcpForwarding:
 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
 	case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
@ -2169,8 +2173,6 @@ dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
 static void
 dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
 {
-	if (val == NULL)
-		return;
 	printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
 	    val == NULL ? "none" : val);
 }
@ -2296,7 +2298,6 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
-	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseBlacklist, o->use_blacklist);

--- a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.189 2016/12/14 00:36:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.191 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 }

 static Channel *
-server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
+server_request_direct_tcpip(int *reason, const char **errmsg)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
 	char *target, *originator;
@ -449,11 +449,13 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
 	if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
 	    !no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding) {
 		c = channel_connect_to_port(target, target_port,
-		    "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip");
+		    "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg);
 	} else {
 		logit("refused local port forward: "
 		    "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
 		    originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
+		if (reason != NULL)
+			*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
 	}

 	free(originator);
@ -468,6 +470,10 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
 	Channel *c = NULL;
 	char *target, *originator;
 	u_short originator_port;
+	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+
+	if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");

 	target = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
@ -480,7 +486,7 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
 	/* XXX fine grained permissions */
 	if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
 	    !no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding &&
-	    use_privsep) {
+	    (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) {
 		c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
 		    "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
 	} else {
@ -577,7 +583,8 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
 	char *ctype;
-	int rchan;
+	const char *errmsg = NULL;
+	int rchan, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
 	u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;

 	ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
@ -591,7 +598,7 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
 		c = server_request_session();
 	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
-		c = server_request_direct_tcpip();
+		c = server_request_direct_tcpip(&reason, &errmsg);
 	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
 		c = server_request_direct_streamlocal();
 	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) {
@ -614,9 +621,9 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		debug("server_input_channel_open: failure %s", ctype);
 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
 		packet_put_int(rchan);
-		packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
+		packet_put_int(reason);
 		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
-			packet_put_cstring("open failed");
+			packet_put_cstring(errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed");
 			packet_put_cstring("");
 		}
 		packet_send();
@ -702,6 +709,10 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	int want_reply;
 	int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
 	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
+	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+
+	if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");

 	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	want_reply = packet_get_char();
@ -709,12 +720,8 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)

 	/* -R style forwarding */
 	if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
-		struct passwd *pw;
 		struct Forward fwd;

-		pw = the_authctxt->pw;
-		if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
-			fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
 		memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
 		fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
 		fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
@ -762,9 +769,10 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		/* check permissions */
 		if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
 		    || no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding ||
-		    !use_privsep) {
+		    (pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) {
 			success = 0;
-			packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
+			packet_send_debug("Server has disabled "
+			    "streamlocal forwarding.");
 		} else {
 			/* Start listening on the socket */
 			success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c
@ -1261,7 +1261,8 @@ static void
 do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
 {
 	FILE *f = NULL;
-	char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
+	const char *nl;
+	char buf[1024], *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
 	struct stat sb;

 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
@ -1273,11 +1274,8 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
 		return;
 	nl = def_nl;
 #endif
-	if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) {
-		if (nl != def_nl)
-			free(nl);
+	if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1)
 		return;
-	}

 	/* /etc/nologin exists.  Print its contents if we can and exit. */
 	logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.125 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.126 2017/01/03 05:46:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
 *
@ -67,6 +67,13 @@ extern int showprogress;
 /* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */
 #define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64

+/* Directory separator characters */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS      "/\\"
+#else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS      "/"
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+
 struct sftp_conn {
 	int fd_in;
 	int fd_out;
@ -587,6 +594,8 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,

 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		if (count > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
+			fatal("%s: nonsensical number of entries", __func__);
 		if (count == 0)
 			break;
 		debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count);
@ -617,7 +626,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
 			 * These can be used to attack recursive ops
 			 * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd')
 			 */
-			if (strchr(filename, '/') != NULL) {
+			if (strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) {
 				error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" "
 				    "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path);
 			} else if (dir) {
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.177 2016/10/18 12:41:22 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.178 2017/02/15 01:46:47 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
 *
@ -969,23 +969,34 @@ static int
 do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
 {
 	struct sftp_statvfs st;
-	char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-	char s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-	char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-	char s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-	unsigned long long ffree;
+	char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	char s_icapacity[16], s_dcapacity[16];

 	if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1)
 		return -1;
+	if (st.f_files == 0)
+		strlcpy(s_icapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_icapacity));
+	else {
+		snprintf(s_icapacity, sizeof(s_icapacity), "%3llu%%",
+		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) /
+		    st.f_files));
+	}
+	if (st.f_blocks == 0)
+		strlcpy(s_dcapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_dcapacity));
+	else {
+		snprintf(s_dcapacity, sizeof(s_dcapacity), "%3llu%%",
+		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
+		    st.f_blocks));
+	}
 	if (iflag) {
-		ffree = st.f_files ? (100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) / st.f_files) : 0;
 		printf("     Inodes        Used       Avail      "
 		    "(root)    %%Capacity\n");
-		printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu         %3llu%%\n",
+		printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu         %s\n",
 		    (unsigned long long)st.f_files,
 		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree),
 		    (unsigned long long)st.f_favail,
-		    (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, ffree);
+		    (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, s_icapacity);
 	} else if (hflag) {
 		strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used));
 		strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail));
@ -996,21 +1007,18 @@ do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
 		fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root);
 		fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total);
 		printf("    Size     Used    Avail   (root)    %%Capacity\n");
-		printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB         %3llu%%\n",
-		    s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root,
-		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
-		    st.f_blocks));
+		printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB         %s\n",
+		    s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, s_dcapacity);
 	} else {
 		printf("        Size         Used        Avail       "
 		    "(root)    %%Capacity\n");
-		printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu         %3llu%%\n",
+		printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu         %s\n",
 		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024),
 		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize *
 		    (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024),
 		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024),
 		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024),
-		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
-		    st.f_blocks));
+		    s_dcapacity);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.215 2016/11/30 03:07:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.218 2017/03/15 03:52:30 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #endif

 #ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST
-# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*"
+# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
 #endif

 typedef enum {
@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
 static void
 process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
 {
-	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL;
+	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
 	int r, version, success = 0;
 	Identity *id, *nxt;
 	Idtab *tab;
@ -851,6 +851,13 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 	free(pin);

+	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
+		    provider, strerror(errno));
+		goto send;
+	}
+
+	debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
 	for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
 		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
 		for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
@ -858,18 +865,19 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
 			/* Skip file--based keys */
 			if (id->provider == NULL)
 				continue;
-			if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) {
+			if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
 				TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
 				free_identity(id);
 				tab->nentries--;
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0)
+	if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
 		success = 1;
 	else
 		error("process_remove_smartcard_key:"
 		    " pkcs11_del_provider failed");
+send:
 	free(provider);
 	send_status(e, success);
 }
@ -1214,10 +1222,9 @@ static void
 usage(void)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr,
-	    "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
+	    "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Ddx] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
 	    "                 [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
 	    "       ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
-	fprintf(stderr, "  -x          Exit when the last client disconnects.\n");
 	exit(1);
 }

--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.292 2016/09/12 03:29:16 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.299 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <limits.h>
+#include <locale.h>

 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "sshkey.h"
@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "krl.h"
 #include "digest.h"
+#include "utf8.h"

 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
@ -843,7 +845,7 @@ fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment)
 	ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
 	if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
-	printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
+	mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
 	    comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public));
 	if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
 		printf("%s\n", ra);
@ -1082,6 +1084,7 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 	struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
 	char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts;
 	int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts);
+	int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM;

 	switch (l->status) {
 	case HKF_STATUS_OK:
@ -1090,11 +1093,10 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 		 * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard
 		 * characters or a CA/revocation marker.
 		 */
-		if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED) != 0 ||
-		    has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+		if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
 			fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
 			if (has_wild && !find_host) {
-				logit("%s:%ld: ignoring host name "
+				logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name "
 				    "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path,
 				    l->linenum, l->hosts);
 			}
@ -1106,6 +1108,7 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 		 */
 		ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts);
 		while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
+			lowercase(cp);
 			if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
 				fatal("hash_host failed");
 			fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey);
@ -1116,7 +1119,7 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 	case HKF_STATUS_INVALID:
 		/* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */
 		ctx->invalid = 1;
-		logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
+		logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	default:
 		fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
@ -1150,14 +1153,14 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 				 */
 				ctx->found_key = 1;
 				if (!quiet)
-					printf("# Host %s found: line %ld\n",
+					printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n",
 					    ctx->host, l->linenum);
 			}
 			return 0;
 		} else if (find_host) {
 			ctx->found_key = 1;
 			if (!quiet) {
-				printf("# Host %s found: line %ld %s\n",
+				printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n",
 				    ctx->host,
 				    l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" :
 				    (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : ""));
@ -1166,7 +1169,7 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 				known_hosts_hash(l, ctx);
 			else if (print_fingerprint) {
 				fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep);
-				printf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host,
+				mprintf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host,
 				    sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment);
 				free(fp);
 			} else
@ -1177,7 +1180,7 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 		/* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */
 		if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
 			ctx->invalid = 1;
-			logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
+			logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
 		}
 		fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
 	}
@ -1317,7 +1320,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
 		fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r));
 	}
 	if (comment)
-		printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+		mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);

 	/* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
 	if (identity_new_passphrase) {
@ -1441,7 +1444,10 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
 		sshkey_free(private);
 		exit(1);
 	}
-	printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+	if (comment)
+		printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+	else
+		printf("Key now has no comment\n");

 	if (identity_comment) {
 		strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
@ -2203,11 +2209,17 @@ do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
 	exit(ret);
 }

+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+# define RSA1_USAGE " | rsa1"
+#else
+# define RSA1_USAGE ""
+#endif
+
 static void
 usage(void)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr,
-	    "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1]\n"
+	    "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa%s]\n"
 	    "                  [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
@ -2215,7 +2227,7 @@ usage(void)
 	    "       ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
-	    "       ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n");
+	    "       ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n", RSA1_USAGE);
 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 	fprintf(stderr,
 	    "       ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n");
@ -2280,6 +2292,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)

 	seed_rng();

+	msetlocale();
+
 	/* we need this for the home * directory.  */
 	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
 	if (!pw)
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.106 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.109 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
 *
@ -321,16 +321,18 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
 }

 static void
-keyprint_one(char *host, struct sshkey *key)
+keyprint_one(const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
 {
 	char *hostport;
-
-	if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
-		fatal("host_hash failed");
+	const char *known_host, *hashed;

 	hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port);
+	lowercase(hostport);
+	if (hash_hosts && (hashed = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+		fatal("host_hash failed");
+	known_host = hash_hosts ? hashed : hostport;
 	if (!get_cert)
-		fprintf(stdout, "%s ", hostport);
+		fprintf(stdout, "%s ", known_host);
 	sshkey_write(key, stdout);
 	fputs("\n", stdout);
 	free(hostport);
@ -752,10 +754,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			tname = strtok(optarg, ",");
 			while (tname) {
 				int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
+
 				switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 				case KEY_RSA1:
 					get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1;
 					break;
+#endif
 				case KEY_DSA:
 					get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
 					break;
@ -769,7 +774,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 					get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519;
 					break;
 				case KEY_UNSPEC:
-					fatal("unknown key type %s", tname);
+				default:
+					fatal("Unknown key type \"%s\"", tname);
 				}
 				tname = strtok(NULL, ",");
 			}
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.448 2016/12/06 07:48:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.451 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -685,11 +685,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0)
 				cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
 			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
-				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, '\n');
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
 			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
-				cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, '\n');
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n');
 			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0)
-				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, '\n');
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n');
 			else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0) {
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 				cp = xstrdup("1\n2");
@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
 		snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port);
 		xasprintf(&options.proxy_command,
-		    "ssh%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W %%h:%%p %s",
+		    "ssh%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s",
 		    /* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */
 		    options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ",
 		    options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user,
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
@ -50,4 +50,4 @@
 #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
 #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
 #   VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
-#   VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20170305
+#   VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20170804
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.240 2016/10/15 19:56:25 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.242 2017/02/27 14:30:33 jmc Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 15 2016 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 27 2017 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@ -417,6 +417,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The supported ciphers are:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
@ -786,6 +790,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default for this option is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -809,6 +817,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default for this option is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -1029,6 +1041,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default is:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
 curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
@ -1104,6 +1120,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The algorithms that contain
 .Qq -etm
@ -1129,7 +1149,7 @@ However, this option disables host authentication for localhost.
 The argument to this keyword must be
 .Cm yes
 or
-.Cm no .
+.Cm no
 (the default).
 .It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
 Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
@ -1266,6 +1286,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
 instead of replacing it.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default for this option is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -1650,7 +1674,7 @@ in
 Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
 OS- or site-specific modifications.
 The default is
-.Dq FreeBSD-20170305 .
+.Dq FreeBSD-20170804 .
 The value
 .Cm none
 may be used to disable this.
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
@ -40,7 +40,6 @@
 #define addr_match_cidr_list			Fssh_addr_match_cidr_list
 #define addr_match_list				Fssh_addr_match_list
 #define addr_netmatch				Fssh_addr_netmatch
-#define addr_pton				Fssh_addr_pton
 #define addr_pton_cidr				Fssh_addr_pton_cidr
 #define ask_permission				Fssh_ask_permission
 #define atomicio				Fssh_atomicio
@ -51,9 +50,10 @@
 #define bandwidth_limit				Fssh_bandwidth_limit
 #define bandwidth_limit_init			Fssh_bandwidth_limit_init
 #define barrett_reduce				Fssh_barrett_reduce
+#define baud_to_speed				Fssh_baud_to_speed
 #define bcrypt_hash				Fssh_bcrypt_hash
 #define bcrypt_pbkdf				Fssh_bcrypt_pbkdf
-#define bf_ssh1_cipher				Fssh_bf_ssh1_cipher
+#define bind_permitted				Fssh_bind_permitted
 #define bitmap_clear_bit			Fssh_bitmap_clear_bit
 #define bitmap_free				Fssh_bitmap_free
 #define bitmap_from_string			Fssh_bitmap_from_string
@ -110,7 +110,6 @@
 #define buffer_put_short			Fssh_buffer_put_short
 #define buffer_put_string			Fssh_buffer_put_string
 #define cert_free				Fssh_cert_free
-#define cert_new				Fssh_cert_new
 #define chacha_encrypt_bytes			Fssh_chacha_encrypt_bytes
 #define chacha_ivsetup				Fssh_chacha_ivsetup
 #define chacha_keysetup				Fssh_chacha_keysetup
@ -126,7 +125,6 @@
 #define chan_rcvd_oclose			Fssh_chan_rcvd_oclose
 #define chan_read_failed			Fssh_chan_read_failed
 #define chan_send_eof2				Fssh_chan_send_eof2
-#define chan_send_ieof1				Fssh_chan_send_ieof1
 #define chan_send_oclose1			Fssh_chan_send_oclose1
 #define chan_shutdown_read			Fssh_chan_shutdown_read
 #define chan_shutdown_write			Fssh_chan_shutdown_write
@ -135,6 +133,7 @@
 #define channel_add_permitted_opens		Fssh_channel_add_permitted_opens
 #define channel_after_select			Fssh_channel_after_select
 #define channel_by_id				Fssh_channel_by_id
+#define channel_by_remote_id			Fssh_channel_by_remote_id
 #define channel_cancel_cleanup			Fssh_channel_cancel_cleanup
 #define channel_cancel_lport_listener		Fssh_channel_cancel_lport_listener
 #define channel_cancel_rport_listener		Fssh_channel_cancel_rport_listener
@ -162,7 +161,6 @@
 #define channel_input_oclose			Fssh_channel_input_oclose
 #define channel_input_open_confirmation		Fssh_channel_input_open_confirmation
 #define channel_input_open_failure		Fssh_channel_input_open_failure
-#define channel_input_port_forward_request	Fssh_channel_input_port_forward_request
 #define channel_input_port_open			Fssh_channel_input_port_open
 #define channel_input_status_confirm		Fssh_channel_input_status_confirm
 #define channel_input_window_adjust		Fssh_channel_input_window_adjust
@ -192,6 +190,8 @@
 #define channel_pre_x11_open_13			Fssh_channel_pre_x11_open_13
 #define channel_prepare_select			Fssh_channel_prepare_select
 #define channel_print_adm_permitted_opens	Fssh_channel_print_adm_permitted_opens
+#define channel_proxy_downstream		Fssh_channel_proxy_downstream
+#define channel_proxy_upstream			Fssh_channel_proxy_upstream
 #define channel_register_cleanup		Fssh_channel_register_cleanup
 #define channel_register_fds			Fssh_channel_register_fds
 #define channel_register_filter			Fssh_channel_register_filter
@ -223,8 +223,10 @@
 #define cipher_blocksize			Fssh_cipher_blocksize
 #define cipher_by_name				Fssh_cipher_by_name
 #define cipher_by_number			Fssh_cipher_by_number
-#define cipher_cleanup				Fssh_cipher_cleanup
 #define cipher_crypt				Fssh_cipher_crypt
+#define cipher_ctx_get_number			Fssh_cipher_ctx_get_number
+#define cipher_ctx_is_plaintext			Fssh_cipher_ctx_is_plaintext
+#define cipher_free				Fssh_cipher_free
 #define cipher_get_keycontext			Fssh_cipher_get_keycontext
 #define cipher_get_keyiv			Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv
 #define cipher_get_keyiv_len			Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv_len
@ -254,7 +256,7 @@
 #define compat_pkalg_proposal			Fssh_compat_pkalg_proposal
 #define compress_buffer				Fssh_compress_buffer
 #define connect_next				Fssh_connect_next
-#define connect_to				Fssh_connect_to
+#define connect_to_reason			Fssh_connect_to_reason
 #define convtime				Fssh_convtime
 #define crypto_hash_sha512			Fssh_crypto_hash_sha512
 #define crypto_hashblocks_sha512		Fssh_crypto_hashblocks_sha512
@ -299,6 +301,7 @@
 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes
 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime
 #define crypto_verify_32			Fssh_crypto_verify_32
+#define daemonized				Fssh_daemonized
 #define dbl_p1p1				Fssh_dbl_p1p1
 #define deattack_init				Fssh_deattack_init
 #define debug					Fssh_debug
@ -325,11 +328,8 @@
 #define enable_compat13				Fssh_enable_compat13
 #define enable_compat20				Fssh_enable_compat20
 #define error					Fssh_error
-#define evp_ssh1_3des				Fssh_evp_ssh1_3des
-#define evp_ssh1_bf				Fssh_evp_ssh1_bf
 #define export_dns_rr				Fssh_export_dns_rr
 #define fatal					Fssh_fatal
-#define filter_proposal				Fssh_filter_proposal
 #define fingerprint_b64				Fssh_fingerprint_b64
 #define fingerprint_hex				Fssh_fingerprint_hex
 #define fmprintf				Fssh_fmprintf
@ -412,7 +412,6 @@
 #define kexgex_hash				Fssh_kexgex_hash
 #define kexgex_server				Fssh_kexgex_server
 #define key_add_private				Fssh_key_add_private
-#define key_alg_list				Fssh_key_alg_list
 #define key_cert_check_authority		Fssh_key_cert_check_authority
 #define key_cert_copy				Fssh_key_cert_copy
 #define key_certify				Fssh_key_certify
@ -461,10 +460,10 @@
 #define mac_setup				Fssh_mac_setup
 #define mac_valid				Fssh_mac_valid
 #define match					Fssh_match
+#define match_filter_list			Fssh_match_filter_list
 #define match_host_and_ip			Fssh_match_host_and_ip
 #define match_hostname				Fssh_match_hostname
 #define match_list				Fssh_match_list
-#define match_maybe_hashed			Fssh_match_maybe_hashed
 #define match_pattern				Fssh_match_pattern
 #define match_pattern_list			Fssh_match_pattern_list
 #define match_user				Fssh_match_user
@ -478,7 +477,7 @@
 #define mprintf					Fssh_mprintf
 #define ms_subtract_diff			Fssh_ms_subtract_diff
 #define ms_to_timeval				Fssh_ms_to_timeval
-#define mult					Fssh_mult
+#define msetlocale				Fssh_msetlocale
 #define mysignal				Fssh_mysignal
 #define newkeys_from_blob			Fssh_newkeys_from_blob
 #define newkeys_to_blob				Fssh_newkeys_to_blob
@ -509,7 +508,6 @@
 #define pkcs11_find				Fssh_pkcs11_find
 #define pkcs11_init				Fssh_pkcs11_init
 #define pkcs11_provider_finalize		Fssh_pkcs11_provider_finalize
-#define pkcs11_provider_unref			Fssh_pkcs11_provider_unref
 #define pkcs11_rsa_finish			Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_finish
 #define pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt		Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt
 #define pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt		Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt
@ -526,7 +524,6 @@
 #define port_open_helper			Fssh_port_open_helper
 #define prime_test				Fssh_prime_test
 #define proto_spec				Fssh_proto_spec
-#define put_bitmap				Fssh_put_bitmap
 #define put_host_port				Fssh_put_host_port
 #define put_u16					Fssh_put_u16
 #define put_u32					Fssh_put_u32
@ -537,6 +534,7 @@
 #define read_keyfile_line			Fssh_read_keyfile_line
 #define read_mux				Fssh_read_mux
 #define read_passphrase				Fssh_read_passphrase
+#define recip					Fssh_recip
 #define record_hostkey				Fssh_record_hostkey
 #define reduce_add_sub				Fssh_reduce_add_sub
 #define refresh_progress_meter			Fssh_refresh_progress_meter
@ -563,11 +561,7 @@
 #define sigdie					Fssh_sigdie
 #define snmprintf				Fssh_snmprintf
 #define sock_set_v6only				Fssh_sock_set_v6only
-#define square					Fssh_square
-#define ssh1_3des_cbc				Fssh_ssh1_3des_cbc
-#define ssh1_3des_cleanup			Fssh_ssh1_3des_cleanup
-#define ssh1_3des_init				Fssh_ssh1_3des_init
-#define ssh1_3des_iv				Fssh_ssh1_3des_iv
+#define speed_to_baud				Fssh_speed_to_baud
 #define ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms		Fssh_ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
 #define ssh_add_hostkey				Fssh_ssh_add_hostkey
 #define ssh_add_identity_constrained		Fssh_ssh_add_identity_constrained
@ -656,6 +650,7 @@
 #define ssh_packet_get_int			Fssh_ssh_packet_get_int
 #define ssh_packet_get_int64			Fssh_ssh_packet_get_int64
 #define ssh_packet_get_maxsize			Fssh_ssh_packet_get_maxsize
+#define ssh_packet_get_mux			Fssh_ssh_packet_get_mux
 #define ssh_packet_get_output			Fssh_ssh_packet_get_output
 #define ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags		Fssh_ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags
 #define ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout		Fssh_ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout
@ -666,6 +661,7 @@
 #define ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts		Fssh_ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts
 #define ssh_packet_is_interactive		Fssh_ssh_packet_is_interactive
 #define ssh_packet_is_rekeying			Fssh_ssh_packet_is_rekeying
+#define ssh_packet_log_type			Fssh_ssh_packet_log_type
 #define ssh_packet_need_rekeying		Fssh_ssh_packet_need_rekeying
 #define ssh_packet_next				Fssh_ssh_packet_next
 #define ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write	Fssh_ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write
@ -695,11 +691,13 @@
 #define ssh_packet_send_ignore			Fssh_ssh_packet_send_ignore
 #define ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts		Fssh_ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts
 #define ssh_packet_set_authenticated		Fssh_ssh_packet_set_authenticated
-#define ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks		Fssh_ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks
 #define ssh_packet_set_connection		Fssh_ssh_packet_set_connection
 #define ssh_packet_set_encryption_key		Fssh_ssh_packet_set_encryption_key
+#define ssh_packet_set_input_hook		Fssh_ssh_packet_set_input_hook
 #define ssh_packet_set_interactive		Fssh_ssh_packet_set_interactive
+#define ssh_packet_set_log_preamble		Fssh_ssh_packet_set_log_preamble
 #define ssh_packet_set_maxsize			Fssh_ssh_packet_set_maxsize
+#define ssh_packet_set_mux			Fssh_ssh_packet_set_mux
 #define ssh_packet_set_nonblocking		Fssh_ssh_packet_set_nonblocking
 #define ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags		Fssh_ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags
 #define ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits		Fssh_ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits
@ -725,6 +723,7 @@
 #define ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback	Fssh_ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback
 #define ssh_update_card				Fssh_ssh_update_card
 #define sshbuf_alloc				Fssh_sshbuf_alloc
+#define sshbuf_allocate				Fssh_sshbuf_allocate
 #define sshbuf_avail				Fssh_sshbuf_avail
 #define sshbuf_b64tod				Fssh_sshbuf_b64tod
 #define sshbuf_check_reserve			Fssh_sshbuf_check_reserve
@ -783,6 +782,7 @@
 #define sshbuf_set_max_size			Fssh_sshbuf_set_max_size
 #define sshbuf_set_parent			Fssh_sshbuf_set_parent
 #define sshkey_add_private			Fssh_sshkey_add_private
+#define sshkey_alg_list				Fssh_sshkey_alg_list
 #define sshkey_cert_check_authority		Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_authority
 #define sshkey_cert_copy			Fssh_sshkey_cert_copy
 #define sshkey_cert_type			Fssh_sshkey_cert_type
@ -925,6 +925,5 @@
 #define xcalloc					Fssh_xcalloc
 #define xcrypt					Fssh_xcrypt
 #define xmalloc					Fssh_xmalloc
-#define xmmap					Fssh_xmmap
 #define xreallocarray				Fssh_xreallocarray
 #define xstrdup					Fssh_xstrdup
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.272 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.273 2017/03/10 03:22:40 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -1533,6 +1533,7 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
 	if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
 	    !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
 		debug3("user denied adding this key");
+		close(auth_sock);
 		return;
 	}

@ -1541,4 +1542,5 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
 		debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
 	else
 		debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
+	close(auth_sock);
 }
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.79 2016/09/19 07:52:42 natano Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.80 2017/03/10 03:53:11 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -520,7 +520,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 		cookie[i] = packet_get_char();

 	/* Get the public key. */
-	server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	if ((server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
 	bits = packet_get_int();
 	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
 	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
@ -532,7 +533,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 		logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
 	}
 	/* Get the host key. */
-	host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	if ((host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
 	bits = packet_get_int();
 	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
 	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.251 2016/12/04 23:54:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.255 2017/03/11 23:40:26 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
 	}

 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
-		packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
-		    (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
+		packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
+		    options.rekey_interval);

 	/* start key exchange */
 	if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
@ -934,14 +934,14 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL;
 	char prompt[150];
-	const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias :
-	    authctxt->host;
+	const char *host;

 	debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq");

 	if (authctxt == NULL)
 		fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: "
 		    "no authentication context");
+	host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host;

 	info = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
@ -996,11 +996,11 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 }

 static const char *
-identity_sign_encode(struct identity *id)
+key_sign_encode(const struct sshkey *key)
 {
 	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;

-	if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
 		switch (ssh->kex->rsa_sha2) {
 		case 256:
 			return "rsa-sha2-256";
@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ identity_sign_encode(struct identity *id)
 			return "rsa-sha2-512";
 		}
 	}
-	return key_ssh_name(id->key);
+	return key_ssh_name(key);
 }

 static int
@ -1017,30 +1017,49 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 {
 	Key *prv;
 	int ret;
-	const char *alg;
-
-	alg = identity_sign_encode(id);

 	/* the agent supports this key */
-	if (id->agent_fd != -1)
+	if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1)
 		return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp,
-		    data, datalen, alg, compat);
+		    data, datalen, key_sign_encode(id->key), compat);

 	/*
 	 * we have already loaded the private key or
 	 * the private key is stored in external hardware
 	 */
-	if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))
-		return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg,
-		    compat));
+	if (id->key != NULL &&
+	    (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)))
+		return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+		    key_sign_encode(id->key), compat));
+
 	/* load the private key from the file */
 	if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
-	ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat);
+	ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+	    key_sign_encode(prv), compat);
 	sshkey_free(prv);
 	return (ret);
 }

+static int
+id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id)
+{
+	const char *suffixes[] = { ".pub", "-cert.pub", NULL };
+	size_t len = strlen(id->filename), plen = strlen(private_id->filename);
+	size_t i, slen;
+
+	if (strcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename) == 0)
+		return 1;
+	for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
+		slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
+		if (len > slen && plen == len - slen &&
+		    strcmp(id->filename + (len - slen), suffixes[i]) == 0 &&
+		    memcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename, plen) == 0)
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int
 sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
 {
@ -1083,7 +1102,7 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
 	} else {
 		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
 		buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
-		buffer_put_cstring(&b, identity_sign_encode(id));
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_sign_encode(id->key));
 	}
 	buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);

@ -1103,6 +1122,24 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
 				break;
 			}
 		}
+		/*
+		 * Exact key matches are preferred, but also allow
+		 * filename matches for non-PKCS#11/agent keys that
+		 * didn't load public keys. This supports the case
+		 * of keeping just a private key file and public
+		 * certificate on disk.
+		 */
+		if (!matched && !id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
+		    (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) {
+			TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
+				if (private_id->key == NULL &&
+				    id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) {
+					id = private_id;
+					matched = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
 		if (matched) {
 			debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for "
 			    "certificate", __func__, id->filename,
@ -1181,7 +1218,7 @@ send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
 	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
 	packet_put_char(have_sig);
 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
-		packet_put_cstring(identity_sign_encode(id));
+		packet_put_cstring(key_sign_encode(id->key));
 	packet_put_string(blob, bloblen);
 	free(blob);
 	packet_send();
@ -1632,7 +1669,7 @@ ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 	/* send # of sock, data to be signed */
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock) != 0) ||
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 	if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1)
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.287 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.288 2017/01/30 23:27:39 dtucker Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 30 2017 $
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ and
 files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
 The global file should
 be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
-maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host,
+maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host,
 its key is added to the per-user file.
 .Pp
 Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional),
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.480 2016/12/09 03:04:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.485 2017/03/15 03:52:30 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -383,14 +383,14 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
 {
 	u_int i;
 	int remote_major, remote_minor;
-	char *s, *newline = "\n";
+	char *s;
 	char buf[256];			/* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
 	char remote_version[256];	/* Must be at least as big as buf. */

-	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
+	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
 	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
-	    options.version_addendum, newline);
+	    options.version_addendum);

 	/* Send our protocol version identification. */
 	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
@ -1068,6 +1068,11 @@ server_listen(void)
 			close(listen_sock);
 			continue;
 		}
+		if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) {
+			verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno));
+			close(listen_sock);
+			continue;
+		}
 		/*
 		 * Set socket options.
 		 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
@ -1696,6 +1701,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			continue;
 		key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
 		pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL);
+
+		if ((pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type == KEY_RSA1) ||
+		    (key != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA1)) {
+			verbose("Ignoring RSA1 key %s",
+			    options.host_key_files[i]);
+			key_free(key);
+			key_free(pubkey);
+			continue;
+		}
 		if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL)
 			pubkey = key_demote(key);
 		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
@ -2227,7 +2241,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)

 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
 		packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
-		    (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
+		    options.rekey_interval);

 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
 	    list_hostkey_types());
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.100 2016/08/15 12:32:04 naddy Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.101 2017/03/14 07:19:07 djm Exp $
 #	$FreeBSD$

 # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
@ -42,7 +42,8 @@
 #PubkeyAuthentication yes

 # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
-#AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2
+# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
+AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys

 #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none

@ -95,7 +96,6 @@
 #PrintMotd yes
 #PrintLastLog yes
 #TCPKeepAlive yes
-#UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox
 #PermitUserEnvironment no
 #Compression delayed
 #ClientAliveInterval 0
@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
 #PermitTunnel no
 #ChrootDirectory none
 #UseBlacklist no
-#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20170305
+#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20170804

 # no default banner path
 #Banner none
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.239 2016/11/30 03:00:05 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.243 2017/03/14 07:19:07 djm Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: March 14 2017 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@ -438,6 +438,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The supported ciphers are:
 .Pp
@ -651,6 +655,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default for this option is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -845,6 +853,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The supported algorithms are:
 .Pp
 .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
@ -935,6 +947,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The algorithms that contain
 .Qq -etm
@ -1291,6 +1307,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
 instead of replacing them.
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
 The default for this option is:
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -1496,33 +1516,11 @@ is enabled, you will not be able to run
 as a non-root user.
 The default is
 .Cm yes .
-.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
-Specifies whether
-.Xr sshd 8
-separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
-to deal with incoming network traffic.
-After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
-the privilege of the authenticated user.
-The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
-escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.
-The argument must be
-.Cm yes ,
-.Cm no ,
-or
-.Cm sandbox .
-If
-.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
-is set to
-.Cm sandbox
-then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional
-restrictions.
-The default is
-.Cm sandbox .
 .It Cm VersionAddendum
 Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
 sent by the server upon connection.
 The default is
-.Qq FreeBSD-20170305 .
+.Qq FreeBSD-20170804 .
 The value
 .Cm none
 may be used to disable this.
@ -1669,13 +1667,13 @@ The username.
 .El
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
-accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %t, and %u.
+accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, and %u.
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
 accepts the tokens %%, %h, and %u.
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
-accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %K, %k, %h, %i, %s, %T, %t, and %u.
+accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, and %u.
 .Pp
 .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
 accepts the tokens %%, %h, and %u.
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.41 2016/10/24 01:09:17 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.45 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler.  All rights reserved.
@ -89,7 +89,9 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
 	{ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT",
 	    KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	{ NULL, "RSA1", KEY_RSA1, 0, 0, 0 },
+# endif
 	{ "ssh-rsa", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 0 },
 	{ "rsa-sha2-256", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
 	{ "rsa-sha2-512", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
@ -195,14 +197,16 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
 }

 char *
-sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, char sep)
+sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
 {
 	char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
 	const struct keytype *kt;

 	for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
-		if (kt->name == NULL || kt->sigonly)
+		if (kt->name == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
 			continue;
 		if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
 			continue;
@ -1237,6 +1241,9 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
 	u_long bits;
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */

+	if (ret == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
 	cp = *cpp;

 	switch (ret->type) {
@ -3786,7 +3793,46 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,

 	if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL,
 	    (char *)passphrase)) == NULL) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+		unsigned long pem_err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+		int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err);
+
+		/*
+		 * Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether
+		 * passphrase is required/incorrect.
+		 */
+		switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) {
+		case ERR_LIB_PEM:
+			switch (pem_reason) {
+			case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ:
+			case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD:
+			case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
+				r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+				goto out;
+			default:
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		case ERR_LIB_EVP:
+			switch (pem_reason) {
+			case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
+				r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+				goto out;
+			case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR:
+			case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR:
+#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR
+			case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:
+#endif
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			default:
+				r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
@ -3860,6 +3906,8 @@ int
 sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
    const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
 {
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
 	if (keyp != NULL)
 		*keyp = NULL;
 	if (commentp != NULL)
@ -3882,9 +3930,11 @@ sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
 		return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase,
 		    keyp, commentp);
 	case KEY_UNSPEC:
-		if (sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
-		    commentp) == 0)
-			return 0;
+		r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
+		    commentp);
+		/* Do not fallback to PEM parser if only passphrase is wrong. */
+		if (r == 0 || r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+			return r;
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 		return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
 		    passphrase, keyp);
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.14 2016/09/12 23:31:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.15 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */

 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int		 sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
 const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
 const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
 int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
-char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, char);
+char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);

 int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
 int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
--- a/crypto/openssh/utf8.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/utf8.c
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.3 2016/05/30 12:57:21 schwarze Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.5 2017/02/19 00:10:57 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org>
 *
@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ dangerous_locale(void) {
 	char	*loc;

 	loc = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
-	return strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") && strcmp(loc, "UTF-8");
+	return strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") != 0 && strcmp(loc, "UTF-8") != 0 &&
+	    strcmp(loc, "ANSI_X3.4-1968") != 0 && strcmp(loc, "646") != 0;
 }

 static int
@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ vasnmprintf(char **str, size_t maxsz, int *wp, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
 	sz = strlen(src) + 1;
 	if ((dst = malloc(sz)) == NULL) {
 		free(src);
+		ret = -1;
 		goto fail;
 	}

--- a/crypto/openssh/version.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h
@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.78 2016/12/19 04:55:51 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.79 2017/03/20 01:18:59 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */

-#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_7.4"
+#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_7.5"

 #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
 #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE

-#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD	"FreeBSD-20170305"
+#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD	"FreeBSD-20170804"

 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION	SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)