Upgrade to OpenSSH 6.8p1.

svn path=/head/; revision=294332

crypto/openssh/.cvsignore

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+*.0
+*.out
+Makefile
+autom4te.cache
+buildit.sh
+buildpkg.sh
+config.cache
+config.h
+config.h.in
+config.log
+config.status
+configure
+openssh.xml
+opensshd.init
+scp
+sftp
+sftp-server
+ssh
+ssh-add
+ssh-agent
+ssh-keygen
+ssh-keyscan
+ssh-keysign
+ssh-pkcs11-helper
+sshd
+stamp-h.in
+survey
+survey.sh

crypto/openssh/Makefile.in

@@ -65,28 +65,33 @@ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
 TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
 
 LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+	ssh_api.o \
 	ssherr.o \
 	sshbuf.o \
 	sshkey.o \
 	sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
 	sshbuf-misc.o \
-	sshbuf-getput-crypto.o
+	sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
+	krl.o \
+	bitmap.o
 
 LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
-	authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
-	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
+	authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o bufec.o buffer.o \
+	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
 	cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
-	compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
-	log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
+	compat.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
+	log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o opacket.o \
 	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
-	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
-	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
-	ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
-	kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
-	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \
-	sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o
+	ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
+	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \
+	sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
+	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+	kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
+	kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o
 
 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
@@ -99,8 +104,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
 	auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
 	auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
-	monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
-	kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \
+	monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
@@ -230,6 +234,12 @@ clean:	regressclean
 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex
 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean)
 
 distclean:	regressclean
@@ -244,6 +254,12 @@ distclean:	regressclean
 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex
 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
 	if test -d pkg ; then \
 		rm -fr pkg ; \
@@ -417,15 +433,21 @@ uninstall:
 	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
 
 regress-prep:
-	[ -d `pwd`/regress ]  ||  mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
-	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests ]  ||  mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests
-	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper ]  || \
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper ] || \
 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
-	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf ]  || \
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf ] || \
 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf
-	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey ]  || \
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey ] || \
 		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
-	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ]  || \
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys
+	[ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex ] || \
+		mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex
+	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
 	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
 
 regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c
@@ -436,6 +458,10 @@ regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \
 	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 
+regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
 UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\
 	regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \
 	regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o
@@ -473,11 +499,46 @@ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \
 	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 
+UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \
+	regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o \
+	roaming_dummy.o
+
+regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.o \
+	regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o
+
+regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
 REGRESS_BINARIES=\
 	regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
-	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT)
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT)
 
 tests interop-tests t-exec: regress-prep $(TARGETS) $(REGRESS_BINARIES)
 	BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \

crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL

@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
      "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
 
 OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate
-authentication for users and hostkeys. These methods are documented in
-the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
+authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented
+in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
 
 1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography
 
@@ -282,6 +282,53 @@ by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
 	boolean		FALSE
 	string		socket path
 
+2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
+and "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
+
+OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform
+a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication
+has completed.
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
+	string[]	hostkeys
+
+Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the
+supplied host keys are present in known_hosts. For keys that are
+not present, it should send a "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" message
+to request the server prove ownership of the private half of the
+key.
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
+	char		1 /* want-reply */
+	string[]	hostkeys
+
+When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature
+using each requested key over the following:
+
+	string		"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
+	string		session identifier
+	string		hostkey
+
+These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching
+the hostkeys in the request:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
+	string[]	signatures
+
+When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should
+validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys
+that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that
+are no longer offered.
+
+These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously
+encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker
+key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation:
+a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to
+give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before
+removing the deprecated key from those offered.
+
 3. SFTP protocol changes
 
 3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
@@ -406,4 +453,4 @@ respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
 "1".
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.24 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.27 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $

crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.krl

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ The available section types are:
 #define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1		3
 #define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE			4
 
-3. Certificate serial section
+2. Certificate section
 
 These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES to revoke certificates by
 serial number or key ID. The consist of the CA key that issued the
@@ -47,6 +47,11 @@ ignored.
 	string ca_key
 	string reserved
 
+Where "ca_key" is the standard SSH wire serialisation of the CA's
+public key. Alternately, "ca_key" may be an empty string to indicate
+the certificate section applies to all CAs (this is most useful when
+revoking key IDs).
+
 Followed by one or more sections:
 
 	byte	cert_section_type
@@ -161,4 +166,4 @@ Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify
 signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by
 trusted means.
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.2 2013/01/18 00:24:58 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.3 2015/01/30 01:10:33 djm Exp $

crypto/openssh/README

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7 for the release notes.
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.8 for the release notes.
 
 - A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
 - available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html

crypto/openssh/atomicio.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.26 2010/09/22 22:58:51 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.27 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 #endif
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 #include "atomicio.h"
 

crypto/openssh/auth-options.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.64 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.65 2015/01/14 10:30:34 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -21,15 +21,19 @@
 #include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "key.h"	/* XXX for typedef */
+#include "buffer.h"	/* XXX for typedef */
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
@@ -417,7 +421,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
 #define OPTIONS_CRITICAL	1
 #define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS	2
 static int
-parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
+parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
     u_int which, int crit,
     int *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
     int *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
@@ -430,26 +434,25 @@ parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
 	char *command, *allowed;
 	const char *remote_ip;
 	char *name = NULL;
-	u_char *data_blob = NULL;
-	u_int nlen, dlen, clen;
-	Buffer c, data;
-	int ret = -1, result, found;
+	struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL;
+	int r, ret = -1, result, found;
 
-	buffer_init(&data);
+	if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
 
-	/* Make copy to avoid altering original */
-	buffer_init(&c);
-	buffer_append(&c, optblob, optblob_len);
-
-	while (buffer_len(&c) > 0) {
-		if ((name = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&c, &nlen)) == NULL ||
-		    (data_blob = buffer_get_string_ret(&c, &dlen)) == NULL) {
-			error("Certificate options corrupt");
+	while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(data);
+		data = NULL;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) {
+			error("Unable to parse certificate options: %s",
+			    ssh_err(r));
 			goto out;
 		}
-		buffer_append(&data, data_blob, dlen);
-		debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %u",
-		    name, dlen);
+		debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu",
+		    name, sshbuf_len(data));
 		found = 0;
 		if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) {
 			if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
@@ -473,10 +476,10 @@ parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
 		}
 		if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) {
 			if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
-				if ((command = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&data,
-				    &clen)) == NULL) {
-					error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" "
-					    "corrupt", name);
+				if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command,
+				    NULL)) != 0) {
+					error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
+					    "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
 					goto out;
 				}
 				if (*cert_forced_command != NULL) {
@@ -489,10 +492,10 @@ parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
 				found = 1;
 			}
 			if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
-				if ((allowed = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&data,
-				    &clen)) == NULL) {
-					error("Certificate constraint "
-					    "\"%s\" corrupt", name);
+				if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed,
+				    NULL)) != 0) {
+					error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
+					    "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
 					goto out;
 				}
 				if ((*cert_source_address_done)++) {
@@ -540,16 +543,13 @@ parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
 				logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" "
 				    "is not supported", name);
 			}
-		} else if (buffer_len(&data) != 0) {
+		} else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) {
 			error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt "
 			    "(extra data)", name);
 			goto out;
 		}
-		buffer_clear(&data);
 		free(name);
-		free(data_blob);
 		name = NULL;
-		data_blob = NULL;
 	}
 	/* successfully parsed all options */
 	ret = 0;
@@ -563,10 +563,8 @@ parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
 	}
 	if (name != NULL)
 		free(name);
-	if (data_blob != NULL)
-		free(data_blob);
-	buffer_free(&data);
-	buffer_free(&c);
+	sshbuf_free(data);
+	sshbuf_free(c);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -575,7 +573,7 @@ parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
  * options so this must be called after auth_parse_options().
  */
 int
-auth_cert_options(Key *k, struct passwd *pw)
+auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw)
 {
 	int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
 	int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
@@ -585,10 +583,9 @@ auth_cert_options(Key *k, struct passwd *pw)
 	char *cert_forced_command = NULL;
 	int cert_source_address_done = 0;
 
-	if (key_cert_is_legacy(k)) {
+	if (sshkey_cert_is_legacy(k)) {
 		/* All options are in the one field for v00 certs */
-		if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(k->cert->critical),
-		    buffer_len(k->cert->critical), pw,
+		if (parse_option_list(k->cert->critical, pw,
 		    OPTIONS_CRITICAL|OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1,
 		    &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
 		    &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
@@ -600,14 +597,12 @@ auth_cert_options(Key *k, struct passwd *pw)
 			return -1;
 	} else {
 		/* Separate options and extensions for v01 certs */
-		if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(k->cert->critical),
-		    buffer_len(k->cert->critical), pw,
+		if (parse_option_list(k->cert->critical, pw,
 		    OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
 		    &cert_forced_command,
 		    &cert_source_address_done) == -1)
 			return -1;
-		if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(k->cert->extensions),
-		    buffer_len(k->cert->extensions), pw,
+		if (parse_option_list(k->cert->extensions, pw,
 		    OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1,
 		    &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
 		    &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,

crypto/openssh/auth-options.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.20 2010/05/07 11:30:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.21 2015/01/14 10:30:34 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -35,6 +35,6 @@ extern char *authorized_principals;
 
 int	auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
 void	auth_clear_options(void);
-int	auth_cert_options(Key *, struct passwd *);
+int	auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *);
 
 #endif

crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <pwd.h>
@@ -102,3 +104,5 @@ auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
 	packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
 	return 1;
 }
+
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */

crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.45 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.46 2014/12/23 22:42:48 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -57,7 +57,8 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
 		  const char *server_user)
 {
 	FILE *f;
-	char buf[1024];	/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
+#define RBUFLN 1024
+	char buf[RBUFLN];/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
 	int fd;
 	struct stat st;
 
@@ -80,8 +81,9 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
 		return 0;
 	}
 	while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
-		/* All three must be at least as big as buf to avoid overflows. */
-		char hostbuf[1024], userbuf[1024], dummy[1024], *host, *user, *cp;
+		/* All three must have length >= buf to avoid overflows. */
+		char hostbuf[RBUFLN], userbuf[RBUFLN], dummy[RBUFLN];
+		char *host, *user, *cp;
 		int negated;
 
 		for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
@@ -140,8 +142,8 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
 		/* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
 		if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
 			/* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
-			auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names in %.100s.",
-			    filename);
+			auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names "
+			    "in %.100s.", filename);
 			continue;
 		}
 		/* Verify that host name matches. */
@@ -149,7 +151,8 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
 			if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
 			    !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
 				continue;
-		} else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
+		} else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) &&
+		    strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
 			continue;	/* Different hostname. */
 
 		/* Verify that user name matches. */
@@ -208,7 +211,8 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
 	/* Switch to the user's uid. */
 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 	/*
-	 * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files, return
+	 * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files and
+	 * no system hosts.equiv/shosts.equiv files exist then return
 	 * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
 	 * servers.
 	 */
@@ -223,27 +227,38 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
 	/* Switch back to privileged uid. */
 	restore_uid();
 
-	/* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there are no system-wide files. */
+	/*
+	 * Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there
+	 * are no system-wide files.
+	 */
 	if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
 	    stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 &&
-	    stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0)
+	    stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) {
+		debug3("%s: no hosts access files exist", __func__);
 		return 0;
+	}
 
-	/* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and shosts.equiv. */
-	if (pw->pw_uid != 0) {
+	/*
+	 * If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and
+	 * shosts.equiv.
+	 */
+	if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
+		debug3("%s: root user, ignoring system hosts files", __func__);
+	else {
 		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
 		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
-			auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by /etc/hosts.equiv.",
-			    hostname, ipaddr);
+			auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
+			    "/etc/hosts.equiv.", hostname, ipaddr);
 			return 1;
 		}
 		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
 		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
-			auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by %.100s.",
-			    hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
+			auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
+			    "%.100s.", hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
 			return 1;
 		}
 	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
 	 * not group or world writable.
@@ -290,20 +305,25 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
 			auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
 			continue;
 		}
-		/* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts and .shosts files. */
+		/*
+		 * Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts
+		 * and .shosts files.
+		 */
 		if (options.ignore_rhosts) {
-			auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to ignore %.100s.",
-			    rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+			auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to "
+			    "ignore %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
 			continue;
 		}
 		/* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
-		if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+		if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr,
+		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
 			auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.",
 			    rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
 			/* Restore the privileged uid. */
 			restore_uid();
-			auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user %s server_user %s",
-				hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name);
+			auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user "
+			    "%s server_user %s", hostname, ipaddr,
+			    client_user, pw->pw_name);
 			return 1;
 		}
 	}

crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.88 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.90 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 
@@ -236,7 +238,9 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
 			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
 			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
 
-		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			continue;
 		debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
 		    file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
 		free(fp);
@@ -341,3 +345,5 @@ auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
 	packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
 	return (1);
 }
+
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */

crypto/openssh/auth.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.106 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.110 2015/02/25 17:29:38 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
 
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 
@@ -51,6 +50,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "match.h"
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #endif
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "krl.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 
 /* import */
@@ -331,13 +332,14 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
 void
 auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
-	packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures for "
+	error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
 	    "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s",
 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
 	    authctxt->user,
 	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
 	    get_remote_port(),
 	    compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1");
+	packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures");
 	/* NOTREACHED */
 }
 
@@ -376,7 +378,7 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
 char *
 expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
 {
-	char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
+	char *file, ret[PATH_MAX];
 	int i;
 
 	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
@@ -468,7 +470,7 @@ int
 auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
     uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
 {
-	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
+	char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
 	char *cp;
 	int comparehome = 0;
 	struct stat st;
@@ -674,43 +676,39 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
 int
 auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
 {
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-	char *key_fp;
+	char *fp = NULL;
+	int r;
 
 	if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
 		return 0;
-	switch (ssh_krl_file_contains_key(options.revoked_keys_file, key)) {
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		error("%s: fingerprint key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file);
+	switch (r) {
 	case 0:
-		return 0;	/* Not revoked */
-	case -2:
-		break;		/* Not a KRL */
+		break; /* not revoked */
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
+		error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s",
+		    sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file);
+		goto out;
 	default:
-		goto revoked;
+		error("Error checking authentication key %s %s in "
+		    "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(key), fp,
+		    options.revoked_keys_file, ssh_err(r));
+		goto out;
 	}
-#endif
-	debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__,
-	    options.revoked_keys_file);
-	switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
-	case 0:
-		/* key not revoked */
-		return 0;
-	case -1:
-		/* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
-		error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
-		    "authentication");
-		return 1;
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-	case 1:
- revoked:
-		/* Key revoked */
-		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
-		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
-		free(key_fp);
-		return 1;
-#endif
-	}
-	fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
+
+	/* Success */
+	r = 0;
+
+ out:
+	free(fp);
+	return r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
 }
 
 void

crypto/openssh/auth.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.78 2014/07/03 11:16:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.82 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@
 #include <krb5.h>
 #endif
 
+struct ssh;
+struct sshkey;
+
 typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
 typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
 typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
@@ -75,6 +78,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
 #endif
 	Buffer		*loginmsg;
 	void		*methoddata;
+
+	struct sshkey	**prev_userkeys;
+	u_int		 nprev_userkeys;
 };
 /*
  * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
@@ -123,6 +129,8 @@ int	 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
 int	 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
 void	 pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...)
 	    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4)));
+void	 auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *);
+int	 auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *);
 
 struct stat;
 int	 auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
@@ -195,12 +203,13 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
 
 /* hostkey handling */
 Key	*get_hostkey_by_index(int);
-Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_index(int);
-Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_type(int);
-Key	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
-int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *);
+Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *);
+Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
+Key	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
+int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *);
 int	 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
-void	 sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+int	 sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *,
+	     const u_char *, size_t, u_int);
 
 /* debug messages during authentication */
 void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));

crypto/openssh/auth1.c

@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <stdarg.h>
@@ -438,3 +440,5 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 }
+
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */

crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.41 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.42 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson.  All rights reserved.
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
 
 static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *);
 static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *);
-static void input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static int input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device;
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static void
+static int
 input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
@@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	}
 	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
 	    devicename);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void

crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.21 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -48,10 +48,10 @@
 
 extern ServerOptions options;
 
-static void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
-static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
-static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
-static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 /*
  * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	return (0);
 }
 
-static void
+static int
 input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
@@ -178,9 +178,10 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 	}
 
 	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void
+static int
 input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
@@ -212,6 +213,7 @@ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 	/* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
 
 	gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -220,7 +222,7 @@ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
  * which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete.
  */
 
-static void
+static int
 input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
@@ -244,9 +246,10 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
 	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void
+static int
 input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
@@ -284,6 +287,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
 	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 Authmethod method_gssapi = {

crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.18 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.24 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 #endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
+#include "match.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -107,6 +108,14 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		    "signature format");
 		goto done;
 	}
+	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+	    options.hostbased_key_types,
+	    strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) != 1) {
+		logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes",
+		    __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
 	service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
 	    authctxt->service;
 	buffer_init(&b);
@@ -163,7 +172,7 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
 	resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
 	ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
 
-	debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s",
+	debug2("%s: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", __func__,
 	    chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
 
 	if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
@@ -172,19 +181,27 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
 	}
 
 	if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
-		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0)
+		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) {
+			debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
+			    "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" (from packet)",
+			    __func__, cuser, chost);
 			return 0;
+		}
 		lookup = chost;
 	} else {
 		if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
 			logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
 			    "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
 			    chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
-		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0)
+		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) {
+			debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
+			    "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"",
+			    __func__, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr);
 			return 0;
+		}
 		lookup = resolvedname;
 	}
-	debug2("userauth_hostbased: access allowed by auth_rhosts2");
+	debug2("%s: access allowed by auth_rhosts2", __func__);
 
 	if (key_is_cert(key) && 
 	    key_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) {
@@ -207,14 +224,17 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
 
 	if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
-			fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-			    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+				fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
 			    "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
 			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
 			    cuser, lookup);
 		} else {
-			fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
+			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+				fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
 			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
 			    key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
 		}

crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.41 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.47 2015/02/17 00:14:05 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <time.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -122,6 +123,17 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		    "signature scheme");
 		goto done;
 	}
+	if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
+		logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_key_types,
+	    strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) != 1) {
+		logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
+		    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
 	if (have_sig) {
 		sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
 		packet_check_eom();
@@ -159,8 +171,12 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		authenticated = 0;
 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
 		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
+		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
 			authenticated = 1;
+			/* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
+			auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
+			key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
+		}
 		buffer_free(&b);
 		free(sig);
 	} else {
@@ -212,17 +228,20 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
 	}
 
 	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
-		fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-		    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", 
 		    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
 		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
+		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
+		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
 		free(fp);
 	} else {
-		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp,
+		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key),
+		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
 		free(fp);
 	}
@@ -365,8 +384,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
 				continue;
 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
 				continue;
-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
-			    SSH_FP_HEX);
+			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
+			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+				continue;
 			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
 			/*
@@ -405,11 +425,13 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
 				continue;
 			if (key_is_cert_authority)
 				continue;
-			found_key = 1;
-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
+			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+				continue;
 			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
 			free(fp);
+			found_key = 1;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
@@ -431,11 +453,12 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
-	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
 
-	if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
-	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
+	if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
+	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) {
 		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
@@ -680,6 +703,35 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
 	return success;
 }
 
+/* Records a public key in the list of previously-successful keys */
+void
+auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct sshkey **tmp;
+
+	if (authctxt->nprev_userkeys >= INT_MAX ||
+	    (tmp = reallocarray(authctxt->prev_userkeys,
+	    authctxt->nprev_userkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__);
+	authctxt->prev_userkeys = tmp;
+	authctxt->prev_userkeys[authctxt->nprev_userkeys] = key;
+	authctxt->nprev_userkeys++;
+}
+
+/* Checks whether a key has already been used successfully for authentication */
+int
+auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_userkeys; i++) {
+		if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_userkeys[i])) {
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 Authmethod method_pubkey = {
 	"publickey",
 	userauth_pubkey,

crypto/openssh/auth2.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.132 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.135 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
 
 /* protocol */
 
-static void input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-static void input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 /* helper */
 static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
@@ -153,9 +153,7 @@ userauth_banner(void)
 {
 	char *banner = NULL;
 
-	if (options.banner == NULL ||
-	    strcasecmp(options.banner, "none") == 0 ||
-	    (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER) != 0)
+	if (options.banner == NULL || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER) != 0)
 		return;
 
 	if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL)
@@ -178,7 +176,7 @@ do_authentication2(Authctxt *authctxt)
 }
 
 /*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
+static int
 input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
@@ -209,10 +207,11 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		packet_disconnect("bad service request %s", service);
 	}
 	free(service);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
+static int
 input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
@@ -316,6 +315,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	free(service);
 	free(user);
 	free(method);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
 	} else {
 
 		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
-		if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
+		if (!partial && !authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
 		    (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
 			authctxt->failures++;
 		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {

crypto/openssh/authfd.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.37 2009/08/27 17:44:52 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.38 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -16,6 +16,33 @@
 #ifndef AUTHFD_H
 #define AUTHFD_H
 
+/* List of identities returned by ssh_fetch_identitylist() */
+struct ssh_identitylist {
+	size_t nkeys;
+	struct sshkey **keys;
+	char **comments;
+};
+
+int	ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp);
+void	ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock);
+
+int	ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password);
+int	ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version,
+	    struct ssh_identitylist **idlp);
+void	ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl);
+int	ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+	    const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm);
+int	ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key);
+int	ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id,
+	    const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm);
+int	ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version);
+
+int	ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
+	    u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16]);
+int	ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+	    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+	    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+
 /* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
 #define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES	1
 #define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER		2
@@ -60,35 +87,4 @@
 
 #define	SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE			0x01
 
-typedef struct {
-	int	fd;
-	Buffer	identities;
-	int	howmany;
-}	AuthenticationConnection;
-
-int	ssh_agent_present(void);
-int	ssh_get_authentication_socket(void);
-void	ssh_close_authentication_socket(int);
-
-AuthenticationConnection *ssh_get_authentication_connection(void);
-void	ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *);
-int	 ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int);
-Key	*ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
-Key	*ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
-int	 ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *,
-    const char *, u_int, u_int);
-int	 ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *);
-int	 ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int);
-int	 ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *);
-int	 ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *,
-    const char *, u_int, u_int);
-
-int
-ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[16],
-    u_int, u_char[16]);
-
-int
-ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *,
-    u_int);
-
 #endif				/* AUTHFD_H */

crypto/openssh/authfile.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.107 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.111 2015/02/23 16:55:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/uio.h>
 
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -37,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 #include "cipher.h"
 #include "key.h"
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "ssherr.h"
+#include "krl.h"
 
 #define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE	(1024 * 1024)
 
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
 
 /* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */
 int
-sshkey_load_file(int fd, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *blob)
+sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
 {
 	u_char buf[1024];
 	size_t len;
@@ -141,8 +142,7 @@ sshkey_load_file(int fd, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *blob)
  * otherwise.
  */
 static int
-sshkey_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename,
-    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+sshkey_load_public_rsa1(int fd, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
 {
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 	int r;
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ sshkey_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename,
 
 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, filename, b)) != 0)
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, b)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	if ((r = sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(b, keyp, commentp)) != 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -164,33 +164,6 @@ sshkey_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename,
 }
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-/* XXX Deprecate? */
-int
-sshkey_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
-    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
-{
-	struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
-	int r;
-
-	*keyp = NULL;
-	if (commentp != NULL)
-		*commentp = NULL;
-
-	if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, NULL, buffer)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(buffer, type, passphrase,
-	    keyp, commentp)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	r = 0;
- out:
-	sshbuf_free(buffer);
-	return r;
-}
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-
 /* XXX remove error() calls from here? */
 int
 sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
@@ -226,7 +199,6 @@ sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
     struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp, int *perm_ok)
 {
 	int fd, r;
-	struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
 
 	*keyp = NULL;
 	if (commentp != NULL)
@@ -246,18 +218,31 @@ sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
 	if (perm_ok != NULL)
 		*perm_ok = 1;
 
+	r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp);
+ out:
+	close(fd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
+	int r;
+
 	if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, filename, buffer)) != 0)
-		goto out;
-	if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type, passphrase,
-	    keyp, commentp)) != 0)
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type,
+	    passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0)
 		goto out;
+
+	/* success */
 	r = 0;
  out:
-	close(fd);
 	if (buffer != NULL)
 		sshbuf_free(buffer);
 	return r;
@@ -286,7 +271,7 @@ sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, filename, buffer)) != 0 ||
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buffer, passphrase, filename,
 	    keyp, commentp)) != 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -350,7 +335,7 @@ int
 sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
 {
 	struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
-	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+	char file[PATH_MAX];
 	int r, fd;
 
 	if (keyp != NULL)
@@ -358,11 +343,13 @@ sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
 	if (commentp != NULL)
 		*commentp = NULL;
 
+	/* XXX should load file once and attempt to parse each format */
+
 	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
 		goto skip;
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	/* try rsa1 private key */
-	r = sshkey_load_public_rsa1(fd, filename, keyp, commentp);
+	r = sshkey_load_public_rsa1(fd, keyp, commentp);
 	close(fd);
 	switch (r) {
 	case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
@@ -409,6 +396,7 @@ sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
 		return 0;
 	}
 	sshkey_free(pub);
+
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -494,11 +482,14 @@ sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
 /*
  * Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename",
  * SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error.
- * If strict_type is set then the key type must match exactly,
+ * If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly,
  * otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed.
+ * If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is
+ * also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found.
  */
 int
-sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type)
+sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
+    int check_ca)
 {
 	FILE *f;
 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
@@ -509,12 +500,8 @@ sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type)
 	int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) =
 	    strict_type ?  sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public;
 
-	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) {
-		if (errno == ENOENT)
-			return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
-		else
-			return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-	}
+	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
 
 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line),
 	    &linenum) != -1) {
@@ -538,7 +525,9 @@ sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type)
 		}
 		if ((r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) != 0)
 			goto out;
-		if (sshkey_compare(key, pub)) {
+		if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) ||
+		    (check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
+		    sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) {
 			r = 0;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -553,3 +542,37 @@ sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type)
 	return r;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not,
+ * SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something
+ * unexpected happened.
+ * This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too.
+ * "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key);
+	/* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */
+	if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC)
+		return r;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to
+	 * parse the file as a flat list of keys.
+	 */
+	switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Key found => revoked */
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
+		/* Key not found => not revoked */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		/* Some other error occurred */
+		return r;
+	}
+}
+

crypto/openssh/authfile.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.19 2014/07/03 23:18:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.21 2015/01/08 10:14:08 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -30,9 +30,12 @@
 struct sshbuf;
 struct sshkey;
 
+/* XXX document these */
+/* XXX some of these could probably be merged/retired */
+
 int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *, const char *,
     const char *, const char *, int, const char *, int);
-int sshkey_load_file(int, const char *, struct sshbuf *);
+int sshkey_load_file(int, struct sshbuf *);
 int sshkey_load_cert(const char *, struct sshkey **);
 int sshkey_load_public(const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
 int sshkey_load_private(const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
@@ -40,8 +43,10 @@ int sshkey_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *,
     struct sshkey **, int *);
 int sshkey_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *,
     struct sshkey **, char **, int *);
-int sshkey_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
+int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
 int sshkey_perm_ok(int, const char *);
-int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int);
+int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int, int);
+int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file);
 
 #endif

crypto/openssh/bitmap.c

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "bitmap.h"
+
+#define BITMAP_WTYPE	u_int
+#define BITMAP_MAX	(1<<24)
+#define BITMAP_BYTES	(sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE))
+#define BITMAP_BITS	(sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE) * 8)
+#define BITMAP_WMASK	((BITMAP_WTYPE)BITMAP_BITS - 1)
+struct bitmap {
+	BITMAP_WTYPE *d;
+	size_t len; /* number of words allocated */
+	size_t top; /* index of top word allocated */
+};
+
+struct bitmap *
+bitmap_new(void)
+{
+	struct bitmap *ret;
+
+	if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if ((ret->d = calloc(1, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL) {
+		free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	ret->len = 1;
+	ret->top = 0;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+	if (b != NULL && b->d != NULL) {
+		memset(b->d, 0, b->len);
+		free(b->d);
+	}
+	free(b);
+}
+
+void
+bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+	memset(b->d, 0, b->len * BITMAP_BYTES);
+	b->top = 0;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+	if (b->top >= b->len)
+		return 0; /* invalid */
+	if (b->len == 0 || (n / BITMAP_BITS) > b->top)
+		return 0;
+	return (b->d[n / BITMAP_BITS] >> (n & BITMAP_WMASK)) & 1;
+}
+
+static int
+reserve(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+	BITMAP_WTYPE *tmp;
+	size_t nlen;
+
+	if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX)
+		return -1; /* invalid */
+	nlen = (n / BITMAP_BITS) + 1;
+	if (b->len < nlen) {
+		if ((tmp = reallocarray(b->d, nlen, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		b->d = tmp;
+		memset(b->d + b->len, 0, (nlen - b->len) * BITMAP_BYTES);
+		b->len = nlen;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t offset;
+
+	if ((r = reserve(b, n)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	offset = n / BITMAP_BITS;
+	if (offset > b->top)
+		b->top = offset;
+	b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Resets b->top to point to the most significant bit set in b->d */
+static void
+retop(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+	if (b->top >= b->len)
+		return;
+	while (b->top > 0 && b->d[b->top] == 0)
+		b->top--;
+}
+
+void
+bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+	size_t offset;
+
+	if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX)
+		return; /* invalid */
+	offset = n / BITMAP_BITS;
+	if (offset > b->top)
+		return;
+	b->d[offset] &= ~((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK));
+	/* The top may have changed as a result of the clear */
+	retop(b);
+}
+
+size_t
+bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+	size_t bits;
+	BITMAP_WTYPE w;
+
+	retop(b);
+	if (b->top >= b->len)
+		return 0; /* invalid */
+	if (b->len == 0 || (b->top == 0 && b->d[0] == 0))
+		return 0;
+	/* Find MSB set */
+	w = b->d[b->top];
+	bits = (b->top + 1) * BITMAP_BITS;
+	while (!(w & ((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (BITMAP_BITS - 1)))) {
+		w <<= 1;
+		bits--;
+	}
+	return bits;
+}
+
+size_t
+bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+	return (bitmap_nbits(b) + 7) / 8;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l)
+{
+	u_char *s = (u_char *)p;
+	size_t i, j, k, need = bitmap_nbytes(b);
+
+	if (l < need || b->top >= b->len)
+		return -1;
+	if (l > need)
+		l = need;
+	/* Put the bytes from LSB backwards */
+	for (i = k = 0; i < b->top + 1; i++) {
+		for (j = 0; j < BITMAP_BYTES; j++) {
+			if (k >= l)
+				break;
+			s[need - 1 - k++] = (b->d[i] >> (j * 8)) & 0xff;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t i, offset, shift;
+	u_char *s = (u_char *)p;
+
+	if (l > BITMAP_MAX / 8)
+		return -1;
+	if ((r = reserve(b, l * 8)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	bitmap_zero(b);
+	if (l == 0)
+		return 0;
+	b->top = offset = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) / BITMAP_BYTES) - 1;
+	shift = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) % BITMAP_BYTES) * 8;
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)s[i] << shift;
+		if (shift == 0) {
+			offset--;
+			shift = BITMAP_BITS - 8;
+		} else
+			shift -= 8;
+	}
+	retop(b);
+	return 0;
+}

crypto/openssh/bitmap.h

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BITMAP_H
+#define _BITMAP_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+/* Simple bit vector routines */
+
+struct bitmap;
+
+/* Allocate a new bitmap. Returns NULL on allocation failure. */
+struct bitmap *bitmap_new(void);
+
+/* Free a bitmap */
+void bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Zero an existing bitmap */
+void bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Test whether a bit is set in a bitmap. */
+int bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
+
+/* Set a bit in a bitmap. Returns 0 on success or -1 on error */
+int bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
+
+/* Clear a bit in a bitmap */
+void bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
+
+/* Return the number of bits in a bitmap (i.e. the position of the MSB) */
+size_t bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Return the number of bytes needed to represent a bitmap */
+size_t bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Convert a bitmap to a big endian byte string */
+int bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l);
+
+/* Convert a big endian byte string to a bitmap */
+int bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l);
+
+#endif /* _BITMAP_H */

crypto/openssh/bufbn.c

@@ -20,12 +20,15 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "ssherr.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 int
 buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
 {
@@ -63,6 +66,7 @@ buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 	if (buffer_get_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
 }
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 
 int
 buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
@@ -101,3 +105,5 @@ buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 	if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
 }
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/buffer.h

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ int	 buffer_get_ret(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
 int	 buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
 int	 buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
 
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 void    buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
 void    buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);

crypto/openssh/canohost.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.71 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.72 2015/03/01 15:44:40 millert Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -260,24 +260,29 @@ get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
 	}
 
 	/* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
-	if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+	if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
 		addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+		ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen);
+	}
 
-	if (addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX) {
+	switch (addr.ss_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+	case AF_INET6:
+		/* Get the address in ascii. */
+		if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop,
+		    sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) {
+			error("get_socket_address: getnameinfo %d failed: %s",
+			    flags, ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	case AF_UNIX:
 		/* Get the Unix domain socket path. */
 		return xstrdup(((struct sockaddr_un *)&addr)->sun_path);
-	}
-
-	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen);
-
-	/* Get the address in ascii. */
-	if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop,
-	    sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) {
-		error("get_socket_address: getnameinfo %d failed: %s", flags,
-		    ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+	default:
+		/* We can't look up remote Unix domain sockets. */
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	return xstrdup(ntop);
 }
 
 char *
@@ -390,8 +395,8 @@ get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
 	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
 		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
 
-	/* Unix domain sockets don't have a port number. */
-	if (from.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
+	/* Non-inet sockets don't have a port number. */
+	if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Return port number. */

crypto/openssh/channels.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.336 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.341 2015/02/06 23:21:59 millert Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>	/* MIN MAX */
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <sys/un.h>
@@ -57,6 +58,9 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -670,7 +674,7 @@ channel_open_message(void)
 		}
 	}
 	buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
-	cp = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&buffer));
+	cp = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&buffer));
 	buffer_free(&buffer);
 	return cp;
 }
@@ -1056,7 +1060,7 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 	len = sizeof(s4_req);
 	if (have < len)
 		return 0;
-	p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+	p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input);
 
 	need = 1;
 	/* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */
@@ -1086,7 +1090,7 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_port, 2);
 	buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_addr, 4);
 	have = buffer_len(&c->input);
-	p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+	p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input);
 	if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL)
 		fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated",
 		    c->self);
@@ -1106,7 +1110,7 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 		c->path = xstrdup(host);
 	} else {				/* SOCKS4A: two strings */
 		have = buffer_len(&c->input);
-		p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+		p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input);
 		len = strlen(p);
 		debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d",
 		    c->self, p, len);
@@ -2183,7 +2187,7 @@ channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
 
 	nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS);
 	/* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */
-	if (nfdset && SIZE_T_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask))
+	if (nfdset && SIZE_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask))
 		fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n);
 	sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask);
 
@@ -2343,7 +2347,7 @@ channel_output_poll(void)
 /* -- protocol input */
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	int id;
@@ -2360,7 +2364,7 @@ channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	/* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */
 	if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
 	    c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN)
-		return;
+		return 0;
 
 	/* Get the data. */
 	data = packet_get_string_ptr(&data_len);
@@ -2380,7 +2384,7 @@ channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 			c->local_window -= win_len;
 			c->local_consumed += win_len;
 		}
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (compat20) {
@@ -2391,7 +2395,7 @@ channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		if (win_len > c->local_window) {
 			logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %d, win %d",
 			    c->self, win_len, c->local_window);
-			return;
+			return 0;
 		}
 		c->local_window -= win_len;
 	}
@@ -2400,10 +2404,11 @@ channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	else
 		buffer_append(&c->output, data, data_len);
 	packet_check_eom();
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	int id;
@@ -2419,7 +2424,7 @@ channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		packet_disconnect("Received extended_data for bad channel %d.", id);
 	if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
 		logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", id);
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	}
 	if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
 		if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF)
@@ -2433,7 +2438,7 @@ channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE ||
 	    tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) {
 		logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self);
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	}
 	data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
 	packet_check_eom();
@@ -2441,16 +2446,17 @@ channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %d, win %d",
 		    c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
 		free(data);
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	}
 	debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %d", c->self, data_len);
 	c->local_window -= data_len;
 	buffer_append(&c->extended, data, data_len);
 	free(data);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	int id;
@@ -2470,11 +2476,11 @@ channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0)
 			chan_ibuf_empty(c);
 	}
-
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	int id;
@@ -2509,11 +2515,12 @@ channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		buffer_clear(&c->input);
 		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING;
 	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	int id = packet_get_int();
@@ -2523,10 +2530,11 @@ channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	if (c == NULL)
 		packet_disconnect("Received oclose for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
 	chan_rcvd_oclose(c);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	int id = packet_get_int();
@@ -2540,10 +2548,11 @@ channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for "
 		    "non-closed channel %d (type %d).", id, c->type);
 	channel_free(c);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	int id, remote_id;
@@ -2572,6 +2581,7 @@ channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		    c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket);
 	}
 	packet_check_eom();
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static char *
@@ -2591,7 +2601,7 @@ reason2txt(int reason)
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	int id, reason;
@@ -2623,10 +2633,11 @@ channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	packet_check_eom();
 	/* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */
 	chan_mark_dead(c);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c;
@@ -2634,7 +2645,7 @@ channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	u_int adjust;
 
 	if (!compat20)
-		return;
+		return 0;
 
 	/* Get the channel number and verify it. */
 	id = packet_get_int();
@@ -2642,16 +2653,17 @@ channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 
 	if (c == NULL) {
 		logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id);
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	}
 	adjust = packet_get_int();
 	packet_check_eom();
 	debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", id, adjust);
 	c->remote_window += adjust;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
@@ -2679,10 +2691,11 @@ channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		packet_send();
 	} else
 		c->remote_id = remote_id;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c;
@@ -2699,15 +2712,15 @@ channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 
 	if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) {
 		logit("channel_input_status_confirm: %d: unknown", id);
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	}	
-	;
 	if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL)
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	cc->cb(type, c, cc->ctx);
 	TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
 	explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
 	free(cc);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* -- tcp forwarding */
@@ -4095,7 +4108,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
  */
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
@@ -4135,11 +4148,12 @@ x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		packet_put_int(c->self);
 	}
 	packet_send();
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	int rchan = packet_get_int();
@@ -4159,6 +4173,7 @@ deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
 	packet_put_int(rchan);
 	packet_send();
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*

crypto/openssh/channels.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.115 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.116 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 /*
@@ -231,17 +231,17 @@ void	 channel_send_window_changes(void);
 
 /* protocol handler */
 
-void	 channel_input_close(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 channel_input_close_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 channel_input_close(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 channel_input_close_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 /* file descriptor handling (read/write) */
 
@@ -287,10 +287,10 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
 
 int	 x11_connect_display(void);
 int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
-void     x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int      x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *,
 	     const char *, int);
-void	 deny_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 deny_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 /* agent forwarding */
 

crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c

@@ -1,15 +1,10 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.11 2014/07/02 04:59:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.12 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
  *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
@@ -26,13 +21,9 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
-
+#include <string.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
 #include "ssherr.h"
 
 /*
@@ -151,7 +142,7 @@ evp_ssh1_3des(void)
 {
 	static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_3des;
 
-	memset(&ssh1_3des, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+	memset(&ssh1_3des, 0, sizeof(ssh1_3des));
 	ssh1_3des.nid = NID_undef;
 	ssh1_3des.block_size = 8;
 	ssh1_3des.iv_len = 0;

crypto/openssh/cipher-aesctr.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.c,v 1.1 2014/04/29 15:39:33 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.c,v 1.2 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
@@ -15,9 +15,13 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
+#include "includes.h"
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
 #include "cipher-aesctr.h"
 
 /*
@@ -25,7 +29,7 @@
  * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order.
  * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0])
  */
-static __inline__ void
+static inline void
 aesctr_inc(u8 *ctr, u32 len)
 {
 	ssize_t i;
@@ -76,3 +80,4 @@ aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes)
 		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	}
 }
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/cipher-bf1.c

@@ -1,15 +1,10 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-bf1.c,v 1.6 2010/10/01 23:05:32 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-bf1.c,v 1.7 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
  *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
@@ -25,15 +20,14 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 
@@ -106,3 +100,4 @@ evp_ssh1_bf(void)
 	ssh1_bf.key_len = 32;
 	return (&ssh1_bf);
 }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.6 2014/07/03 12:42:16 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.7 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -116,4 +116,3 @@ chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
 	*plenp = PEEK_U32(buf);
 	return 0;
 }
-

crypto/openssh/cipher-ctr.c

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
  */
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR)
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <stdarg.h>
@@ -143,4 +143,4 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
 	return (&aes_ctr);
 }
 
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR */
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR) */

crypto/openssh/cipher.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.99 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.100 2015/01/14 10:29:45 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -512,6 +512,8 @@ cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
 		ivlen = 24;
 	else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
 		ivlen = 0;
+	else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
+		ivlen = sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr);
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 	else
 		ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
@@ -532,6 +534,12 @@ cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
 			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 		return 0;
 	}
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
+		if (len != sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr))
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		memcpy(iv, cc->ac_ctx.ctr, len);
+		return 0;
+	}
 	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
 		return 0;
 

crypto/openssh/cipher.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.46 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.47 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -72,19 +72,19 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx {
 	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
 };
 
-typedef struct sshcipher Cipher ;
-typedef struct sshcipher_ctx CipherContext ;
+typedef struct sshcipher Cipher;
+typedef struct sshcipher_ctx CipherContext;
 
 u_int	 cipher_mask_ssh1(int);
 const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
 const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_number(int);
 int	 cipher_number(const char *);
 char	*cipher_name(int);
+const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
 int	 ciphers_valid(const char *);
 char	*cipher_alg_list(char, int);
 int	 cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const struct sshcipher *,
     const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int);
-const char* cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
 int	 cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *,
     u_int, u_int, u_int);
 int	 cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int,

crypto/openssh/clientloop.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.261 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.272 2015/02/25 19:54:02 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -62,9 +62,9 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
+#include <sys/param.h>	/* MIN MAX */
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
 # include <sys/stat.h>
 #endif
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <termios.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -111,6 +112,8 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "match.h"
 #include "msg.h"
 #include "roaming.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 
 /* import options */
 extern Options options;
@@ -192,9 +195,6 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm);
 static struct global_confirms global_confirms =
     TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms);
 
-/*XXX*/
-extern Kex *xxx_kex;
-
 void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, Buffer *);
 
 /* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */
@@ -342,12 +342,12 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
 			display = xdisplay;
 		}
 		if (trusted == 0) {
-			xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-			xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, MAXPATHLEN);
+			xauthdir = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
+			xauthfile = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
+			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, PATH_MAX);
 			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
 				do_unlink = 1;
-				snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile",
+				snprintf(xauthfile, PATH_MAX, "%s/xauthfile",
 				    xauthdir);
 				snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
 				    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
@@ -539,13 +539,13 @@ client_check_window_change(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static void
+static int
 client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	struct global_confirm *gc;
 
 	if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL)
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	if (gc->cb != NULL)
 		gc->cb(type, seq, gc->ctx);
 	if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) {
@@ -555,6 +555,7 @@ client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	}
 
 	packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void
@@ -1415,8 +1416,7 @@ client_process_output(fd_set *writeset)
 static void
 client_process_buffered_input_packets(void)
 {
-	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending,
-	    compat20 ? xxx_kex : NULL);
+	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending, active_state);
 }
 
 /* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */
@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
 {
 	fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
 	double start_time, total_time;
-	int max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len, rekeying = 0;
+	int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len, rekeying = 0;
 	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
 	u_int nalloc = 0;
 	char buf[100];
@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
 		if (compat20 && session_closed && !channel_still_open())
 			break;
 
-		rekeying = (xxx_kex != NULL && !xxx_kex->done);
+		rekeying = (active_state->kex != NULL && !active_state->kex->done);
 
 		if (rekeying) {
 			debug("rekeying in progress");
@@ -1599,8 +1599,10 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
 			channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
 			if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
 				debug("need rekeying");
-				xxx_kex->done = 0;
-				kex_send_kexinit(xxx_kex);
+				active_state->kex->done = 0;
+				if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(active_state)) != 0)
+					fatal("%s: kex_send_kexinit: %s",
+					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
 				need_rekeying = 0;
 			}
 		}
@@ -1729,8 +1731,7 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
 
 	/* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */
 	total_time = get_current_time() - start_time;
-	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
-	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
+	packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes);
 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds",
 	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time);
 	if (total_time > 0)
@@ -1743,7 +1744,7 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
 
 /*********/
 
-static void
+static int
 client_input_stdout_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	u_int data_len;
@@ -1752,8 +1753,9 @@ client_input_stdout_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, data, data_len);
 	explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
 	free(data);
+	return 0;
 }
-static void
+static int
 client_input_stderr_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	u_int data_len;
@@ -1762,8 +1764,9 @@ client_input_stderr_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, data, data_len);
 	explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
 	free(data);
+	return 0;
 }
-static void
+static int
 client_input_exit_status(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	exit_status = packet_get_int();
@@ -1778,12 +1781,14 @@ client_input_exit_status(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	packet_write_wait();
 	/* Flag that we want to exit. */
 	quit_pending = 1;
+	return 0;
 }
-static void
+
+static int
 client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
-	int remote_id, sock;
+	int r, remote_id, sock;
 
 	/* Read the remote channel number from the message. */
 	remote_id = packet_get_int();
@@ -1793,7 +1798,11 @@ client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	 * Get a connection to the local authentication agent (this may again
 	 * get forwarded).
 	 */
-	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
+	if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0 &&
+	    r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+		debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+		    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
 
 	/*
 	 * If we could not connect the agent, send an error message back to
@@ -1818,6 +1827,7 @@ client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		packet_put_int(c->self);
 	}
 	packet_send();
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static Channel *
@@ -1911,7 +1921,7 @@ static Channel *
 client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
-	int sock;
+	int r, sock;
 
 	if (!options.forward_agent) {
 		error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
@@ -1919,9 +1929,12 @@ client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan)
 		    "malicious server.");
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
-	if (sock < 0)
+	if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0) {
+		if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+			debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
+			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
 		return NULL;
+	}
 	c = channel_new("authentication agent connection",
 	    SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
 	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
@@ -1975,7 +1988,7 @@ client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun)
 }
 
 /* XXXX move to generic input handler */
-static void
+static int
 client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
@@ -2026,8 +2039,10 @@ client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		packet_send();
 	}
 	free(ctype);
+	return 0;
 }
-static void
+
+static int
 client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
@@ -2072,18 +2087,395 @@ client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		packet_send();
 	}
 	free(rtype);
+	return 0;
 }
+
+struct hostkeys_update_ctx {
+	/* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */
+	char *host_str, *ip_str;
+
+	/*
+	 * Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating
+	 * whether they already exist in known_hosts.
+	 * keys_seen is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new
+	 * keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm().
+	 */
+	struct sshkey **keys;
+	int *keys_seen;
+	size_t nkeys;
+
+	size_t nnew;
+
+	/*
+	 * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update
+	 * from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted).
+	 * Filled in by hostkeys_find().
+	 */
+	struct sshkey **old_keys;
+	size_t nold;
+};
+
 static void
+hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++)
+		sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
+	free(ctx->keys);
+	free(ctx->keys_seen);
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++)
+		sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]);
+	free(ctx->old_keys);
+	free(ctx->host_str);
+	free(ctx->ip_str);
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+static int
+hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
+	size_t i;
+	struct sshkey **tmp;
+
+	if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL ||
+	    l->key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) {
+			debug3("%s: found %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
+			    sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum);
+			ctx->keys_seen[i] = 1;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	/* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */
+	debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
+	    sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
+	if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold + 1,
+	    sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nold = %zu",
+		    __func__, ctx->nold);
+	ctx->old_keys = tmp;
+	ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key;
+	l->key = NULL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	int r, was_raw = 0;
+	int loglevel = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK ?
+	    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+	char *fp, *response;
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2)
+			continue;
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i],
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+		do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s",
+		    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp);
+		free(fp);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i],
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+		do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s",
+		    sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp);
+		free(fp);
+	}
+	if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
+		if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) {
+			leave_raw_mode(1);
+			was_raw = 1;
+		}
+		response = NULL;
+		for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) {
+			free(response);
+			response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? "
+			    "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO);
+			if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
+				break;
+			else if (quit_pending || response == NULL ||
+			    strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) {
+				options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+				break;
+			} else {
+				do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter "
+				    "\"yes\" or \"no\"");
+			}
+		}
+		if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL)
+			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+		free(response);
+		if (was_raw)
+			enter_raw_mode(1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace
+	 * them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't
+	 * cancel the operation).
+	 */
+	if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 &&
+	    (r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0],
+	    ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys,
+	    options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
+	    options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0)
+		error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s",
+		    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+static void
+client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
+	size_t i, ndone;
+	struct sshbuf *signdata;
+	int r;
+	const u_char *sig;
+	size_t siglen;
+
+	if (ctx->nnew == 0)
+		fatal("%s: ctx->nnew == 0", __func__); /* sanity */
+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
+		error("Server failed to confirm ownership of "
+		    "private host keys");
+		hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	/* Don't want to accidentally accept an unbound signature */
+	if (ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0)
+		fatal("%s: ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0", __func__);
+	/*
+	 * Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we
+	 * haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the
+	 * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_seen[i] == 0.
+	 */
+	for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
+			continue;
+		/* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */
+		sshbuf_reset(signdata);
+		if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata,
+		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id,
+		    ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: failed to prepare signature: %s",
+			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		/* Extract and verify signature */
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) {
+			error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
+			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata), 0)) != 0) {
+			error("%s: server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
+			    __func__, sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */
+		ctx->keys_seen[i] = 2;
+		ndone++;
+	}
+	if (ndone != ctx->nnew)
+		fatal("%s: ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", __func__,
+		    ndone, ctx->nnew);  /* Shouldn't happen */
+	ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh);
+
+	/* Make the edits to known_hosts */
+	update_known_hosts(ctx);
+ out:
+	hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all
+ * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's
+ * HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted.
+ */
+static int
+client_input_hostkeys(void)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+	const u_char *blob = NULL;
+	size_t i, len = 0;
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp;
+	int r;
+	char *fp;
+	static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */
+	extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */
+	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+
+	if (hostkeys_seen)
+		fatal("%s: server already sent hostkeys", __func__);
+	if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK &&
+	    options.batch_mode)
+		return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */
+	if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
+	while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
+		sshkey_free(key);
+		key = NULL;
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) {
+			error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
+			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) {
+			error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			goto out;
+		}
+		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+		debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__,
+		    sshkey_type(key), fp);
+		free(fp);
+		/* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
+		if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL &&
+		    match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+		    options.hostkeyalgorithms,
+		    strlen(options.hostkeyalgorithms), 0) != 1) {
+			debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
+			    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Skip certs */
+		if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+			debug3("%s: %s key is a certificate; skipping",
+			    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Ensure keys are unique */
+		for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+			if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) {
+				error("%s: received duplicated %s host key",
+				    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		/* Key is good, record it */
+		if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys + 1,
+		    sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nkeys = %zu",
+			    __func__, ctx->nkeys);
+		ctx->keys = tmp;
+		ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key;
+		key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->nkeys == 0) {
+		debug("%s: server sent no hostkeys", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((ctx->keys_seen = calloc(ctx->nkeys,
+	    sizeof(*ctx->keys_seen))) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
+
+	get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host,
+	    options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL,
+	    options.port, &ctx->host_str,
+	    options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL);
+
+	/* Find which keys we already know about. */
+	if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[0], hostkeys_find,
+	    ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
+	    HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) {
+		error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */
+	ctx->nnew = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (!ctx->keys_seen[i])
+			ctx->nnew++;
+	}
+
+	debug3("%s: %zu keys from server: %zu new, %zu retained. %zu to remove",
+	    __func__, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew, ctx->nold);
+
+	if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold != 0) {
+		/* We have some keys to remove. Just do it. */
+		update_known_hosts(ctx);
+	} else if (ctx->nnew != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * We have received hitherto-unseen keys from the server.
+		 * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves.
+		 */
+		debug3("%s: asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys",
+		    __func__, ctx->nnew);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */
+			fatal("%s: cannot prepare packet: %s",
+			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+		for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+			if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
+				continue;
+			sshbuf_reset(buf);
+			if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: sshkey_putb: %s",
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: sshpkt_put_string: %s",
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		}
+		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: sshpkt_send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		client_register_global_confirm(
+		    client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx);
+		ctx = NULL;  /* will be freed in callback */
+	}
+
+	/* Success */
+ out:
+	hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	/*
+	 * NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know
+	 * what the client does with its hosts file.
+	 */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
 client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	char *rtype;
 	int want_reply;
 	int success = 0;
 
-	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	rtype = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
 	want_reply = packet_get_char();
 	debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
 	    rtype, want_reply);
+	if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0)
+		success = client_input_hostkeys();
 	if (want_reply) {
 		packet_start(success ?
 		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
@@ -2091,6 +2483,7 @@ client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		packet_write_wait();
 	}
 	free(rtype);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void

crypto/openssh/compat.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.85 2014/04/20 02:49:32 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.87 2015/01/19 20:20:20 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ enable_compat13(void)
 	compat13 = 1;
 }
 /* datafellows bug compatibility */
-void
+u_int
 compat_datafellows(const char *version)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -175,13 +175,14 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat,
 		    strlen(check[i].pat), 0) == 1) {
-			datafellows = check[i].bugs;
 			debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
-			    version, check[i].pat, datafellows);
-			return;
+			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+			datafellows = check[i].bugs;	/* XXX for now */
+			return check[i].bugs;
 		}
 	}
 	debug("no match: %s", version);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 #define	SEP	","
@@ -193,7 +194,9 @@ proto_spec(const char *spec)
 
 	if (spec == NULL)
 		return ret;
-	q = s = xstrdup(spec);
+	q = s = strdup(spec);
+	if (s == NULL)
+		return ret;
 	for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) {
 		switch (atoi(p)) {
 		case 1:
@@ -235,7 +238,7 @@ filter_proposal(char *proposal, const char *filter)
 			debug2("Compat: skipping algorithm \"%s\"", cp);
 	}
 	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
-	fix_prop = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
+	fix_prop = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&b));
 	buffer_free(&b);
 	free(orig_prop);
 

crypto/openssh/compat.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.45 2014/04/18 23:52:25 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.46 2015/01/19 20:20:20 markus Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 /*
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
 
 void     enable_compat13(void);
 void     enable_compat20(void);
-void     compat_datafellows(const char *);
+u_int    compat_datafellows(const char *);
 int	 proto_spec(const char *);
 char	*compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
 char	*compat_pkalg_proposal(char *);

crypto/openssh/compress.c

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compress.c,v 1.26 2010/09/08 04:13:31 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * Interface to packet compression for ssh.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "compress.h"
-
-#include <zlib.h>
-
-z_stream incoming_stream;
-z_stream outgoing_stream;
-static int compress_init_send_called = 0;
-static int compress_init_recv_called = 0;
-static int inflate_failed = 0;
-static int deflate_failed = 0;
-
-/*
- * Initializes compression; level is compression level from 1 to 9
- * (as in gzip).
- */
-
-void
-buffer_compress_init_send(int level)
-{
-	if (compress_init_send_called == 1)
-		deflateEnd(&outgoing_stream);
-	compress_init_send_called = 1;
-	debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
-	if (level < 1 || level > 9)
-		fatal("Bad compression level %d.", level);
-	deflateInit(&outgoing_stream, level);
-}
-void
-buffer_compress_init_recv(void)
-{
-	if (compress_init_recv_called == 1)
-		inflateEnd(&incoming_stream);
-	compress_init_recv_called = 1;
-	inflateInit(&incoming_stream);
-}
-
-/* Frees any data structures allocated for compression. */
-
-void
-buffer_compress_uninit(void)
-{
-	debug("compress outgoing: raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
-	    (unsigned long long)outgoing_stream.total_in,
-	    (unsigned long long)outgoing_stream.total_out,
-	    outgoing_stream.total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
-	    (double) outgoing_stream.total_out / outgoing_stream.total_in);
-	debug("compress incoming: raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
-	    (unsigned long long)incoming_stream.total_out,
-	    (unsigned long long)incoming_stream.total_in,
-	    incoming_stream.total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
-	    (double) incoming_stream.total_in / incoming_stream.total_out);
-	if (compress_init_recv_called == 1 && inflate_failed == 0)
-		inflateEnd(&incoming_stream);
-	if (compress_init_send_called == 1 && deflate_failed == 0)
-		deflateEnd(&outgoing_stream);
-}
-
-/*
- * Compresses the contents of input_buffer into output_buffer.  All packets
- * compressed using this function will form a single compressed data stream;
- * however, data will be flushed at the end of every call so that each
- * output_buffer can be decompressed independently (but in the appropriate
- * order since they together form a single compression stream) by the
- * receiver.  This appends the compressed data to the output buffer.
- */
-
-void
-buffer_compress(Buffer * input_buffer, Buffer * output_buffer)
-{
-	u_char buf[4096];
-	int status;
-
-	/* This case is not handled below. */
-	if (buffer_len(input_buffer) == 0)
-		return;
-
-	/* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */
-	outgoing_stream.next_in = buffer_ptr(input_buffer);
-	outgoing_stream.avail_in = buffer_len(input_buffer);
-
-	/* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */
-	do {
-		/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
-		outgoing_stream.next_out = buf;
-		outgoing_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
-
-		/* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */
-		status = deflate(&outgoing_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
-		switch (status) {
-		case Z_OK:
-			/* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */
-			buffer_append(output_buffer, buf,
-			    sizeof(buf) - outgoing_stream.avail_out);
-			break;
-		default:
-			deflate_failed = 1;
-			fatal("buffer_compress: deflate returned %d", status);
-			/* NOTREACHED */
-		}
-	} while (outgoing_stream.avail_out == 0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Uncompresses the contents of input_buffer into output_buffer.  All packets
- * uncompressed using this function will form a single compressed data
- * stream; however, data will be flushed at the end of every call so that
- * each output_buffer.  This must be called for the same size units that the
- * buffer_compress was called, and in the same order that buffers compressed
- * with that.  This appends the uncompressed data to the output buffer.
- */
-
-void
-buffer_uncompress(Buffer * input_buffer, Buffer * output_buffer)
-{
-	u_char buf[4096];
-	int status;
-
-	incoming_stream.next_in = buffer_ptr(input_buffer);
-	incoming_stream.avail_in = buffer_len(input_buffer);
-
-	for (;;) {
-		/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
-		incoming_stream.next_out = buf;
-		incoming_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
-
-		status = inflate(&incoming_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
-		switch (status) {
-		case Z_OK:
-			buffer_append(output_buffer, buf,
-			    sizeof(buf) - incoming_stream.avail_out);
-			break;
-		case Z_BUF_ERROR:
-			/*
-			 * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling
-			 * inflate() until we get an error.  This appears to
-			 * be the error that we get.
-			 */
-			return;
-		default:
-			inflate_failed = 1;
-			fatal("buffer_uncompress: inflate returned %d", status);
-			/* NOTREACHED */
-		}
-	}
-}

crypto/openssh/compress.h

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compress.h,v 1.12 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * Interface to packet compression for ssh.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#ifndef COMPRESS_H
-#define COMPRESS_H
-
-void	 buffer_compress_init_send(int);
-void	 buffer_compress_init_recv(void);
-void     buffer_compress_uninit(void);
-void     buffer_compress(Buffer *, Buffer *);
-void     buffer_uncompress(Buffer *, Buffer *);
-
-#endif				/* COMPRESS_H */

crypto/openssh/config.h

@@ -292,6 +292,10 @@
 /* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
 #define HAVE_DAEMON 1
 
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `AI_NUMERICSERV', and to 0 if
+   you don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV 1
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you
    don't. */
 /* #undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE */
@@ -875,6 +879,9 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
 #define HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H 1
 
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */
+#define HAVE_REALLOCARRAY 1
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */
 #define HAVE_REALPATH 1
 
@@ -1471,7 +1478,7 @@
 /* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
 /* #undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES */
 
-/* Define if you want OpenSSL's internally seeded PRNG only */
+/* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */
 #define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1
 
 /* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */

crypto/openssh/config.h.in

@@ -291,6 +291,10 @@
 /* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
 #undef HAVE_DAEMON
 
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `AI_NUMERICSERV', and to 0 if
+   you don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you
    don't. */
 #undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE
@@ -874,6 +878,9 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
 
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */
+#undef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */
 #undef HAVE_REALPATH
 
@@ -1470,7 +1477,7 @@
 /* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
 #undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES
 
-/* Define if you want OpenSSL's internally seeded PRNG only */
+/* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */
 #undef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
 
 /* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */

crypto/openssh/contrib/Makefile

@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ all:
 	@echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2"
 
 gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
-	$(CC) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
 		gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
 		`gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
 
 gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-	$(CC) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
 		gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
 		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
 

crypto/openssh/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec

@@ -1,365 +0,0 @@
-
-# Some of this will need re-evaluation post-LSB.  The SVIdir is there
-# because the link appeared broken.  The rest is for easy compilation,
-# the tradeoff open to discussion.  (LC957)
-
-%define	SVIdir		/etc/rc.d/init.d
-%{!?_defaultdocdir:%define	_defaultdocdir	%{_prefix}/share/doc/packages}
-%{!?SVIcdir:%define		SVIcdir		/etc/sysconfig/daemons}
-
-%define _mandir		%{_prefix}/share/man/en
-%define _sysconfdir	/etc/ssh
-%define	_libexecdir	%{_libdir}/ssh
-
-# Do we want to disable root_login? (1=yes 0=no)
-%define no_root_login 0
-
-#old cvs stuff.  please update before use.  may be deprecated.
-%define use_stable	1
-%define version 	6.7p1
-%if %{use_stable}
-  %define cvs		%{nil}
-  %define release 	1
-%else
-  %define cvs		cvs20050315
-  %define release 	0r1
-%endif
-%define xsa		x11-ssh-askpass		
-%define askpass		%{xsa}-1.2.4.1
-
-# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
-%define sshd_uid    67
-%define sshd_gid    67
-
-Name        	: openssh
-Version     	: %{version}%{cvs}
-Release     	: %{release}
-Group       	: System/Network
-
-Summary     	: OpenSSH free Secure Shell (SSH) implementation.
-Summary(de) 	: OpenSSH - freie Implementation der Secure Shell (SSH).
-Summary(es) 	: OpenSSH implementación libre de Secure Shell (SSH).
-Summary(fr) 	: Implémentation libre du shell sécurisé OpenSSH (SSH).
-Summary(it) 	: Implementazione gratuita OpenSSH della Secure Shell.
-Summary(pt) 	: Implementação livre OpenSSH do protocolo 'Secure Shell' (SSH).
-Summary(pt_BR) 	: Implementação livre OpenSSH do protocolo Secure Shell (SSH).
-
-Copyright   	: BSD
-Packager    	: Raymund Will <ray@caldera.de>
-URL         	: http://www.openssh.com/
-
-Obsoletes   	: ssh, ssh-clients, openssh-clients
-
-BuildRoot   	: /tmp/%{name}-%{version}
-BuildRequires	: XFree86-imake
-
-# %{use_stable}==1:	ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable
-# %{use_stable}==0:	:pserver:cvs@bass.directhit.com:/cvs/openssh_cvs
-Source0: see-above:/.../openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
-%if %{use_stable}
-Source1: see-above:/.../openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
-%endif
-Source2: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/%{xsa}/%{askpass}.tar.gz
-Source3: http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
-
-%Package server
-Group       	: System/Network
-Requires    	: openssh = %{version}
-Obsoletes   	: ssh-server
-
-Summary     	: OpenSSH Secure Shell protocol server (sshd).
-Summary(de) 	: OpenSSH Secure Shell Protocol-Server (sshd).
-Summary(es) 	: Servidor del protocolo OpenSSH Secure Shell (sshd).
-Summary(fr) 	: Serveur de protocole du shell sécurisé OpenSSH (sshd).
-Summary(it) 	: Server OpenSSH per il protocollo Secure Shell (sshd).
-Summary(pt) 	: Servidor do protocolo 'Secure Shell' OpenSSH (sshd).
-Summary(pt_BR) 	: Servidor do protocolo Secure Shell OpenSSH (sshd).
-
-
-%Package askpass
-Group       	: System/Network
-Requires    	: openssh = %{version}
-URL       	: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
-Obsoletes   	: ssh-extras
-
-Summary     	: OpenSSH X11 pass-phrase dialog.
-Summary(de) 	: OpenSSH X11 Passwort-Dialog.
-Summary(es) 	: Aplicación de petición de frase clave OpenSSH X11.
-Summary(fr) 	: Dialogue pass-phrase X11 d'OpenSSH.
-Summary(it) 	: Finestra di dialogo X11 per la frase segreta di OpenSSH.
-Summary(pt) 	: Diálogo de pedido de senha para X11 do OpenSSH.
-Summary(pt_BR) 	: Diálogo de pedido de senha para X11 do OpenSSH.
-
-
-%Description
-OpenSSH (Secure Shell) provides access to a remote system. It replaces
-telnet, rlogin,  rexec, and rsh, and provides secure encrypted 
-communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.  
-X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over 
-the secure channel.
-
-%Description -l de
-OpenSSH (Secure Shell) stellt den Zugang zu anderen Rechnern her. Es ersetzt
-telnet, rlogin, rexec und rsh und stellt eine sichere, verschlüsselte
-Verbindung zwischen zwei nicht vertrauenswürdigen Hosts über eine unsicheres
-Netzwerk her. X11 Verbindungen und beliebige andere TCP/IP Ports können ebenso
-über den sicheren Channel weitergeleitet werden.
-
-%Description -l es
-OpenSSH (Secure Shell) proporciona acceso a sistemas remotos. Reemplaza a
-telnet, rlogin, rexec, y rsh, y proporciona comunicaciones seguras encriptadas
-entre dos equipos entre los que no se ha establecido confianza a través de una
-red insegura. Las conexiones X11 y puertos TCP/IP arbitrarios también pueden
-ser canalizadas sobre el canal seguro.
-
-%Description -l fr
-OpenSSH (Secure Shell) fournit un accès à un système distant. Il remplace
-telnet, rlogin, rexec et rsh, tout en assurant des communications cryptées
-securisées entre deux hôtes non fiabilisés sur un réseau non sécurisé. Des
-connexions X11 et des ports TCP/IP arbitraires peuvent également être
-transmis sur le canal sécurisé.
-
-%Description -l it
-OpenSSH (Secure Shell) fornisce l'accesso ad un sistema remoto.
-Sostituisce telnet, rlogin, rexec, e rsh, e fornisce comunicazioni sicure
-e crittate tra due host non fidati su una rete non sicura. Le connessioni
-X11 ad una porta TCP/IP arbitraria possono essere inoltrate attraverso
-un canale sicuro.
-
-%Description -l pt
-OpenSSH (Secure Shell) fornece acesso a um sistema remoto. Substitui o
-telnet, rlogin, rexec, e o rsh e fornece comunicações seguras e cifradas
-entre duas máquinas sem confiança mútua sobre uma rede insegura.
-Ligações X11 e portos TCP/IP arbitrários também poder ser reenviados
-pelo canal seguro.
-
-%Description -l pt_BR
-O OpenSSH (Secure Shell) fornece acesso a um sistema remoto. Substitui o
-telnet, rlogin, rexec, e o rsh e fornece comunicações seguras e criptografadas
-entre duas máquinas sem confiança mútua sobre uma rede insegura.
-Ligações X11 e portas TCP/IP arbitrárias também podem ser reenviadas
-pelo canal seguro.
-
-%Description server
-This package installs the sshd, the server portion of OpenSSH. 
-
-%Description -l de server
-Dieses Paket installiert den sshd, den Server-Teil der OpenSSH.
-
-%Description -l es server
-Este paquete instala sshd, la parte servidor de OpenSSH.
-
-%Description -l fr server
-Ce paquetage installe le 'sshd', partie serveur de OpenSSH.
-
-%Description -l it server
-Questo pacchetto installa sshd, il server di OpenSSH.
-
-%Description -l pt server
-Este pacote intala o sshd, o servidor do OpenSSH.
-
-%Description -l pt_BR server
-Este pacote intala o sshd, o servidor do OpenSSH.
-
-%Description askpass
-This package contains an X11-based pass-phrase dialog used per
-default by ssh-add(1). It is based on %{askpass}
-by Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>.
-
-
-%Prep
-%setup %([ -z "%{cvs}" ] || echo "-n %{name}_cvs") -a2
-%if ! %{use_stable}
-  autoreconf
-%endif
-
-
-%Build
-CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
-%configure \
-            --with-pam \
-	    --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \
-	    #leave this line for easy edits.
-
-%__make
-
-cd %{askpass}
-%configure \
-	    #leave this line for easy edits.
-
-xmkmf
-%__make includes
-%__make
-
-
-%Install
-[ %{buildroot} != "/" ] && rm -rf %{buildroot}
-
-make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot}
-%makeinstall -C %{askpass} \
-    BINDIR=%{_libexecdir} \
-    MANPATH=%{_mandir} \
-    DESTDIR=%{buildroot}
-
-# OpenLinux specific configuration
-mkdir -p %{buildroot}{/etc/pam.d,%{SVIcdir},%{SVIdir}}
-mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_var}/empty/sshd
-
-# enabling X11 forwarding on the server is convenient and okay,
-# on the client side it's a potential security risk!
-%__perl -pi -e 's:#X11Forwarding no:X11Forwarding yes:g' \
-    %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config
-
-%if %{no_root_login}
-%__perl -pi -e 's:#PermitRootLogin yes:PermitRootLogin no:g' \
-    %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config
-%endif
-
-install -m644 contrib/caldera/sshd.pam %{buildroot}/etc/pam.d/sshd
-# FIXME: disabled, find out why this doesn't work with nis
-%__perl -pi -e 's:(.*pam_limits.*):#$1:' \
-    %{buildroot}/etc/pam.d/sshd
-
-install -m 0755 contrib/caldera/sshd.init %{buildroot}%{SVIdir}/sshd
-
-# the last one is needless, but more future-proof
-find %{buildroot}%{SVIdir} -type f -exec \
-    %__perl -pi -e 's:\@SVIdir\@:%{SVIdir}:g;\
-		    s:\@sysconfdir\@:%{_sysconfdir}:g; \
-		    s:/usr/sbin:%{_sbindir}:g'\
-    \{\} \;
-
-cat <<-EoD > %{buildroot}%{SVIcdir}/sshd
-	IDENT=sshd
-	DESCRIPTIVE="OpenSSH secure shell daemon"
-	# This service will be marked as 'skipped' on boot if there
-	# is no host key. Use ssh-host-keygen to generate one
-	ONBOOT="yes"
-	OPTIONS=""
-EoD
-
-SKG=%{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/ssh-host-keygen
-install -m 0755 contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen $SKG
-# Fix up some path names in the keygen toy^Hol
-    %__perl -pi -e 's:\@sysconfdir\@:%{_sysconfdir}:g; \
-		    s:\@sshkeygen\@:%{_bindir}/ssh-keygen:g' \
-	%{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/ssh-host-keygen
-
-# This looks terrible.  Expect it to change.
-# install remaining docs
-DocD="%{buildroot}%{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}"
-mkdir -p $DocD/%{askpass}
-cp -a CREDITS ChangeLog LICENCE OVERVIEW README* TODO PROTOCOL* $DocD
-install -p -m 0444 %{SOURCE3}  $DocD/faq.html
-cp -a %{askpass}/{README,ChangeLog,TODO,SshAskpass*.ad}  $DocD/%{askpass}
-%if %{use_stable}
-  cp -p %{askpass}/%{xsa}.man $DocD/%{askpass}/%{xsa}.1
-%else
-  cp -p %{askpass}/%{xsa}.man %{buildroot}%{_mandir}man1/%{xsa}.1
-  ln -s  %{xsa}.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}man1/ssh-askpass.1
-%endif
-
-find %{buildroot}%{_mandir} -type f -not -name	'*.gz' -print0 | xargs -0r %__gzip -9nf
-rm %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1 && \
-    ln -s %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1.gz \
-    %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1.gz
-
-
-%Clean
-#%{rmDESTDIR}
-[ %{buildroot} != "/" ] && rm -rf %{buildroot}
-
-%Post
-# Generate host key when none is present to get up and running,
-# both client and server require this for host-based auth!
-# ssh-host-keygen checks for existing keys.
-/usr/sbin/ssh-host-keygen
-: # to protect the rpm database
-
-%pre server
-%{_sbindir}/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || :
-%{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \
-	-c "SSH Daemon virtual user" -g sshd sshd 2>/dev/null || :
-: # to protect the rpm database
-
-%Post server
-if [ -x %{LSBinit}-install ]; then
-  %{LSBinit}-install sshd
-else
-  lisa --SysV-init install sshd S55 2:3:4:5 K45 0:1:6
-fi
-
-! %{SVIdir}/sshd status || %{SVIdir}/sshd restart
-: # to protect the rpm database
-
-
-%PreUn server
-[ "$1" = 0 ] || exit 0
-! %{SVIdir}/sshd status || %{SVIdir}/sshd stop
-if [ -x %{LSBinit}-remove ]; then
-  %{LSBinit}-remove sshd
-else
-  lisa --SysV-init remove sshd $1
-fi
-: # to protect the rpm database
-
-%Files 
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%dir %{_sysconfdir}
-%config %{_sysconfdir}/ssh_config
-%{_bindir}/scp
-%{_bindir}/sftp
-%{_bindir}/ssh
-%{_bindir}/slogin
-%{_bindir}/ssh-add
-%attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
-%{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
-%{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
-%dir %{_libexecdir}
-%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh-keysign
-%{_libexecdir}/ssh-pkcs11-helper
-%{_sbindir}/ssh-host-keygen
-%dir %{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}
-%{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/CREDITS
-%{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/ChangeLog
-%{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/LICENCE
-%{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/OVERVIEW
-%{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/README*
-%{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/TODO
-%{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/faq.html
-%{_mandir}/man1/*
-%{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8.gz
-%{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.gz
-%{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5.gz
- 
-%Files server
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%dir %{_var}/empty/sshd
-%config %{SVIdir}/sshd
-%config /etc/pam.d/sshd
-%config %{_sysconfdir}/moduli
-%config %{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config
-%config %{SVIcdir}/sshd
-%{_libexecdir}/sftp-server
-%{_sbindir}/sshd
-%{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5.gz
-%{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5.gz
-%{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8.gz
-%{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8.gz
- 
-%Files askpass
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%{_libexecdir}/ssh-askpass
-%{_libexecdir}/x11-ssh-askpass
-%{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/%{askpass}
- 
-
-%ChangeLog
-* Tue Jan 18 2011 Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-- Use CFLAGS from Makefile instead of RPM so build completes.
-- Signatures were changed to .asc since 4.1p1.
-
-* Mon Jan 01 1998 ...
-Template Version: 1.31
-
-$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.85 2014/08/19 01:36:08 djm Exp $

crypto/openssh/contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-#! /bin/sh
-#
-# $Id: ssh-host-keygen,v 1.3 2008/11/03 09:16:01 djm Exp $
-#
-# This script is normally run only *once* for a given host
-# (in a given period of time) -- on updates/upgrades/recovery
-# the ssh_host_key* files _should_ be retained! Otherwise false
-# "man-in-the-middle-attack" alerts will frighten unsuspecting
-# clients...
-
-keydir=@sysconfdir@
-keygen=@sshkeygen@
-
-if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_key -o \
-	     -f $keydir/ssh_host_key.pub ]; then
-  echo "You already have an SSH1 RSA host key in $keydir/ssh_host_key."
-else
-  echo "Generating SSH1 RSA host key."
-  $keygen -t rsa1 -f $keydir/ssh_host_key -C '' -N ''
-fi
-
-if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key -o \
-	     -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub ]; then
-  echo "You already have an SSH2 RSA host key in $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key."
-else
-  echo "Generating SSH2 RSA host key."
-  $keygen -t rsa -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key -C '' -N ''
-fi
-
-if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key -o \
-	     -f $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub ]; then
-  echo "You already have an SSH2 DSA host key in $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key."
-else
-  echo "Generating SSH2 DSA host key."
-  $keygen -t dsa -f $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key -C '' -N ''
-fi

crypto/openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.init

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-#! /bin/bash
-#
-# $Id: sshd.init,v 1.4 2003/11/21 12:48:57 djm Exp $
-#
-### BEGIN INIT INFO
-# Provides:
-# Required-Start: $network
-# Required-Stop:
-# Default-Start:  3 4 5
-# Default-Stop:   0 1 2 6
-# Description: sshd
-#                Bring up/down the OpenSSH secure shell daemon.
-### END INIT INFO
-#
-# Written by Miquel van Smoorenburg <miquels@drinkel.ow.org>.
-# Modified for Debian GNU/Linux by Ian Murdock <imurdock@gnu.ai.mit.edu>.
-# Modified for OpenLinux by Raymund Will <ray@caldera.de>
-
-NAME=sshd
-DAEMON=/usr/sbin/$NAME
-# Hack-Alert(TM)!  This is necessary to get around the 'reload'-problem
-# created by recent OpenSSH daemon/ssd combinations. See Caldera internal
-# PR [linux/8278] for details...
-PIDF=/var/run/$NAME.pid
-NAME=$DAEMON
-
-_status() {
-  [ -z "$1" ] || local pidf="$1"
-  local ret=-1
-  local pid
-  if [ -n "$pidf" ] && [  -r "$pidf" ]; then
-    pid=$(head -1 $pidf)
-  else
-    pid=$(pidof $NAME)
-  fi
-
-  if [ ! -e $SVIlock ]; then
-    # no lock-file => not started == stopped?
-    ret=3
-  elif [ -n "$pidf" -a ! -f "$pidf" ] || [ -z "$pid" ]; then
-    # pid-file given but not present or no pid => died, but was not stopped
-    ret=2
-  elif [ -r /proc/$pid/cmdline ] &&
-       echo -ne $NAME'\000' | cmp -s - /proc/$pid/cmdline; then
-    # pid-file given and present or pid found => check process...
-    # but don't compare exe, as this will fail after an update!
-    # compares OK => all's well, that ends well...
-    ret=0
-  else
-    # no such process or exe does not match => stale pid-file or process died
-    #   just recently...
-    ret=1
-  fi
-  return $ret
-}
-
-# Source function library (and set vital variables).
-. @SVIdir@/functions
-
-case "$1" in
- start)
-  [ ! -e $SVIlock ] || exit 0
-  [ -x $DAEMON ] || exit 5
-  SVIemptyConfig @sysconfdir@/sshd_config && exit 6
-
-  if [ ! \( -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_key -a            \
-	    -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_key.pub \) -a     \
-       ! \( -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_rsa_key -a        \
-	    -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub \) -a \
-       ! \( -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_dsa_key -a        \
-	    -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub \) ]; then
-
-    echo "$SVIsubsys: host key not initialized: skipped!"
-    echo "$SVIsubsys: use ssh-host-keygen to generate one!"
-    exit 6
-  fi
-
-  echo -n "Starting $SVIsubsys services: "
-  ssd -S -x $DAEMON -n $NAME -- $OPTIONS
-  ret=$?
-
-  echo  "."
-  touch $SVIlock
-  ;;
-
- stop)
-  [ -e $SVIlock ] || exit 0
-
-  echo -n "Stopping $SVIsubsys services: "
-  ssd -K -p $PIDF -n $NAME
-  ret=$?
-
-  echo "."
-  rm -f $SVIlock
-  ;;
-
- force-reload|reload)
-  [ -e $SVIlock ] || exit 0
-
-  echo "Reloading $SVIsubsys configuration files: "
-  ssd -K --signal 1 -q -p $PIDF -n $NAME
-  ret=$?
-  echo "done."
-  ;;
-
- restart)
-  $0 stop
-  $0 start
-  ret=$?
-  ;;
-
- status)
-  _status $PIDF
-  ret=$?
-  ;;
-
- *)
-  echo "Usage: $SVIscript {[re]start|stop|[force-]reload|status}"
-  ret=2
-  ;;
-
-esac
-
-exit $ret
-

crypto/openssh/contrib/caldera/sshd.pam

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-#%PAM-1.0
-auth       required     /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nodelay
-account    required     /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
-account    required     /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so
-password   required     /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so
-password   required     /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok
-session    required     /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so
-session    required     /lib/security/pam_limits.so

crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 #
-# ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000-2011 Red Hat Inc.
+# ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc.
 #
 # This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
 #
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ LOCALSTATEDIR=/var
 
 sshd_config_configured=no
 port_number=22
+service_name=sshd
 strictmodes=yes
 privsep_used=yes
 cygwin_value=""
@@ -353,11 +354,9 @@ check_service_files_ownership() {
     fi
     if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
     then
-      csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running sshd service from /etc/passwd!"
+      csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running sshd service from account database!"
       csih_warning "As a result, this script cannot make sure that the files used"
       csih_warning "by the sshd service belong to the user running the service."
-      csih_warning "Please re-run the mkpasswd tool to make sure the /etc/passwd"
-      csih_warning "file is in a good shape."
       return 1
     fi
   fi
@@ -410,7 +409,7 @@ install_service() {
   local ret=0
 
   echo
-  if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q sshd >/dev/null 2>&1
+  if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1
   then
     csih_inform "Sshd service is already installed."
     check_service_files_ownership "" || let ret+=$?
@@ -466,7 +465,7 @@ install_service() {
       fi
       if [ -z "${password}" ]
       then
-	if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I sshd -d "CYGWIN sshd" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
+	if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
 			      -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}"
 	then
 	  echo
@@ -476,20 +475,20 @@ install_service() {
 	  csih_inform "will start automatically after the next reboot."
 	fi
       else
-	if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I sshd -d "CYGWIN sshd" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
+	if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
 			      -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" \
 			      -u "${run_service_as}" -w "${password}"
 	then
 	  /usr/bin/editrights -u "${run_service_as}" -a SeServiceLogonRight
 	  echo
 	  csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the '${run_service_as}'"
-	  csih_inform "account.  To start the service now, call \`net start sshd' or"
-	  csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S sshd'.  Otherwise, it will start automatically"
+	  csih_inform "account.  To start the service now, call \`net start ${service_name}' or"
+	  csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S ${service_name}'.  Otherwise, it will start automatically"
 	  csih_inform "after the next reboot."
 	fi
       fi
 
-      if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q sshd >/dev/null 2>&1
+      if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1
       then
 	check_service_files_ownership "${run_service_as}" || let ret+=$?
       else
@@ -563,6 +562,11 @@ do
     shift
     ;;
 
+  -N | --name )
+    service_name=$1
+    shift
+    ;;
+
   -p | --port )
     port_number=$1
     shift
@@ -592,6 +596,7 @@ do
     echo "  --yes    -y            Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
     echo "  --no     -n            Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
     echo "  --cygwin -c <options>  Use \"options\" as value for CYGWIN environment var."
+    echo "  --name   -N <name>     sshd windows service name."
     echo "  --port   -p <n>        sshd listens on port n."
     echo "  --user   -u <account>  privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'."
     echo "  --pwd    -w <passwd>   Use \"pwd\" as password for privileged user."
@@ -625,10 +630,7 @@ then
   csih_warning "However, it seems your account does not have these privileges."
   csih_warning "Here's the list of groups in your user token:"
   echo
-  for i in $(/usr/bin/id -G)
-  do
-    /usr/bin/awk -F: "/[^:]*:[^:]*:$i:/{ print \"    \" \$1; }" /etc/group
-  done
+  /usr/bin/id -Gnz | xargs -0n1 echo "   "
   echo
   csih_warning "This usually means you're running this script from a non-admin"
   csih_warning "desktop session, or in a non-elevated shell under UAC control."

crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 #
-# ssh-user-config, Copyright 2000-2008 Red Hat Inc.
+# ssh-user-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc.
 #
 # This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
 #
@@ -75,19 +75,18 @@ readonly -f create_identity
 #   pwdhome
 # ======================================================================
 check_user_homedir() {
-  local uid=$(id -u)
-  pwdhome=$(awk -F: '{ if ( $3 == '${uid}' ) print $6; }' < ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd)
+  pwdhome=$(getent passwd $UID | awk -F: '{ print $6; }')
   if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X" ]
   then
     csih_error_multi \
-      "There is no home directory set for you in ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd." \
+      "There is no home directory set for you in the account database." \
       'Setting $HOME is not sufficient!'
   fi
   
   if [ ! -d "${pwdhome}" ]
   then
     csih_error_multi \
-      "${pwdhome} is set in ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd as your home directory" \
+      "${pwdhome} is set in the account database as your home directory" \
       'but it is not a valid directory. Cannot create user identity files.'
   fi
   
@@ -96,7 +95,7 @@ check_user_homedir() {
   if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X/" ]
   then
     # But first raise a warning!
-    csih_warning "Your home directory in ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd is set to root (/). This is not recommended!"
+    csih_warning "Your home directory in the account database is set to root (/). This is not recommended!"
     if csih_request "Would you like to proceed anyway?"
     then
       pwdhome=''
@@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ check_user_homedir() {
     fi
   fi
   
-  if [ -d "${pwdhome}" -a csih_is_nt -a -n "`chmod -c g-w,o-w "${pwdhome}"`" ]
+  if [ -d "${pwdhome}" -a -n "`chmod -c g-w,o-w "${pwdhome}"`" ]
   then
     echo
     csih_warning 'group and other have been revoked write permission to your home'
@@ -149,9 +148,10 @@ readonly -f check_user_dot_ssh_dir
 #   pwdhome   -- check_user_homedir()
 # ======================================================================
 fix_authorized_keys_perms() {
-  if [ csih_is_nt -a -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" ]
+  if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" ]
   then
-    if ! setfacl -m "u::rw-,g::---,o::---" "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+    setfacl -b "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" 2>/dev/null || echo -n
+    if ! chmod u-x,g-wx,o-wx "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
     then
       csih_warning "Setting correct permissions to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
       csih_warning "failed.  Please care for the correct permissions.  The minimum requirement"
@@ -243,15 +243,6 @@ done
 # Action!
 # ======================================================================
 
-# Check passwd file
-if [ ! -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd ]
-then
-  csih_error_multi \
-    "${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd is nonexistant. Please generate an ${SYSCONFDIR}/passwd file" \
-    'first using mkpasswd. Check if it contains an entry for you and' \
-    'please care for the home directory in your entry as well.'
-fi
-
 check_user_homedir
 check_user_dot_ssh_dir
 create_identity id_rsa rsa "SSH2 RSA"

crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-%define ver 6.7p1
+%define ver 6.8p1
 %define rel 1
 
 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID

crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 
 Summary:	OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
 Name:		openssh
-Version:	6.7p1
+Version:	6.8p1
 URL:		http://www.openssh.com/
 Release:	1
 Source0:	openssh-%{version}.tar.gz

crypto/openssh/deattack.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.30 2006/09/16 19:53:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.32 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
  *
@@ -20,16 +20,13 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "deattack.h"
-#include "log.h"
 #include "crc32.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 
 /*
@@ -66,7 +63,7 @@
 
 
 /* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */
-#define HASH(x)		get_u32(x)
+#define HASH(x)		PEEK_U32(x)
 
 #define CMP(a, b)	(memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE))
 
@@ -79,10 +76,10 @@ crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b)
 
 /* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */
 static int
-check_crc(u_char *S, u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
+check_crc(const u_char *S, const u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
 {
 	u_int32_t crc;
-	u_char *c;
+	const u_char *c;
 
 	crc = 0;
 	for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
@@ -94,36 +91,44 @@ check_crc(u_char *S, u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
 			crc_update(&crc, 0);
 		}
 	}
-	return (crc == 0);
+	return crc == 0;
 }
 
+void
+deattack_init(struct deattack_ctx *dctx)
+{
+	bzero(dctx, sizeof(*dctx));
+	dctx->n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
+}
 
 /* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */
 int
-detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
+detect_attack(struct deattack_ctx *dctx, const u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
 {
-	static u_int16_t *h = (u_int16_t *) NULL;
-	static u_int32_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
-	u_int32_t i, j;
-	u_int32_t l, same;
-	u_char *c;
-	u_char *d;
+	u_int32_t i, j, l, same;
+	u_int16_t *tmp;
+	const u_char *c, *d;
 
 	if (len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) ||
-	    len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0) {
-		fatal("detect_attack: bad length %d", len);
-	}
-	for (l = n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2)
+	    len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0)
+		return DEATTACK_ERROR;
+	for (l = dctx->n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2)
 		;
 
-	if (h == NULL) {
-		debug("Installing crc compensation attack detector.");
-		h = (u_int16_t *) xcalloc(l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
-		n = l;
+	if (dctx->h == NULL) {
+		if ((dctx->h = calloc(l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE)) == NULL)
+			return DEATTACK_ERROR;
+		dctx->n = l;
 	} else {
-		if (l > n) {
-			h = (u_int16_t *)xrealloc(h, l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
-			n = l;
+		if (l > dctx->n) {
+			if ((tmp = reallocarray(dctx->h, l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE))
+			    == NULL) {
+				free(dctx->h);
+				dctx->h = NULL;
+				return DEATTACK_ERROR;
+			}
+			dctx->h = tmp;
+			dctx->n = l;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -132,29 +137,29 @@ detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
 			for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
 				if (!CMP(c, d)) {
 					if ((check_crc(c, buf, len)))
-						return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
+						return DEATTACK_DETECTED;
 					else
 						break;
 				}
 			}
 		}
-		return (DEATTACK_OK);
+		return DEATTACK_OK;
 	}
-	memset(h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
+	memset(dctx->h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, dctx->n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
 
 	for (c = buf, same = j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
-		for (i = HASH(c) & (n - 1); h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
-		    i = (i + 1) & (n - 1)) {
-			if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
+		for (i = HASH(c) & (dctx->n - 1); dctx->h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
+		    i = (i + 1) & (dctx->n - 1)) {
+			if (!CMP(c, buf + dctx->h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
 				if (++same > MAX_IDENTICAL)
-					return (DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED);
+					return DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED;
 				if (check_crc(c, buf, len))
-					return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
+					return DEATTACK_DETECTED;
 				else
 					break;
 			}
 		}
-		h[i] = j;
+		dctx->h[i] = j;
 	}
-	return (DEATTACK_OK);
+	return DEATTACK_OK;
 }

crypto/openssh/deattack.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: deattack.h,v 1.10 2006/09/16 19:53:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: deattack.h,v 1.11 2015/01/19 19:52:16 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - Header file
@@ -26,6 +26,13 @@
 #define DEATTACK_OK		0
 #define DEATTACK_DETECTED	1
 #define DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED	2
+#define DEATTACK_ERROR		3
 
-int	 detect_attack(u_char *, u_int32_t);
+struct deattack_ctx {
+	u_int16_t *h;
+	u_int32_t n;
+};
+
+void	 deattack_init(struct deattack_ctx *);
+int	 detect_attack(struct deattack_ctx *, const u_char *, u_int32_t);
 #endif

crypto/openssh/defines.h

@@ -105,6 +105,17 @@ enum
 # endif /* PATH_MAX */
 #endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
 
+#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX
+# include "netdb.h" /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */
+# if defined(_POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX)
+#  define HOST_NAME_MAX _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX
+# elif defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN)
+#  define HOST_NAME_MAX MAXHOSTNAMELEN
+# else
+#  define HOST_NAME_MAX	255
+# endif
+#endif /* HOST_NAME_MAX */
+
 #if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0
 # define MAXSYMLINKS 5
 #endif
@@ -586,6 +597,12 @@ struct winsize {
 # undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
 #endif
 
+#if defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
+# if defined(HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV) && HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV == 0
+#   define AI_NUMERICSERV	0
+# endif
+#endif
+
 #if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX)
 # undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
 #endif
@@ -805,14 +822,6 @@ struct winsize {
 # define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
 #endif
 
-#ifndef _NSIG
-# ifdef NSIG
-#  define _NSIG NSIG
-# else
-#  define _NSIG 128
-# endif
-#endif
-
 /*
  * Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir()
  * shouldn't need the latter.

crypto/openssh/dh.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.53 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.55 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>	/* MIN */
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -34,11 +34,13 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 #include "dh.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 
 static int
 parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
@@ -107,10 +109,11 @@ parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
-	if ((dhg->g = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("parse_prime: BN_new failed");
-	if ((dhg->p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("parse_prime: BN_new failed");
+	if ((dhg->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (dhg->p = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("parse_prime: BN_new failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
 	if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->g, gen) == 0) {
 		error("moduli:%d: could not parse generator value", linenum);
 		goto fail;
@@ -128,7 +131,6 @@ parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
 		error("moduli:%d: generator is invalid", linenum);
 		goto fail;
 	}
-
 	return 1;
 
  fail:
@@ -137,7 +139,6 @@ parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
 	if (dhg->p != NULL)
 		BN_clear_free(dhg->p);
 	dhg->g = dhg->p = NULL;
-	error("Bad prime description in line %d", linenum);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -200,9 +201,11 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
 		break;
 	}
 	fclose(f);
-	if (linenum != which+1)
-		fatal("WARNING: line %d disappeared in %s, giving up",
+	if (linenum != which+1) {
+		logit("WARNING: line %d disappeared in %s, giving up",
 		    which, _PATH_DH_PRIMES);
+		return (dh_new_group14());
+	}
 
 	return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p));
 }
@@ -251,22 +254,22 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void
+int
 dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
 {
 	int pbits;
 
-	if (need <= 0)
-		fatal("%s: need <= 0", __func__);
-	if (dh->p == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: dh->p == NULL", __func__);
-	if ((pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0)
-		fatal("%s: bits(p) <= 0", __func__);
+	if (need < 0 || dh->p == NULL ||
+	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0 ||
+	    need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need >= pbits)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	dh->length = MIN(need * 2, pbits - 1);
-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
-		fatal("%s: key generation failed", __func__);
-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key))
-		fatal("%s: generated invalid key", __func__);
+	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0 ||
+	    !dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)) {
+		BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key);
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 DH *
@@ -275,13 +278,12 @@ dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus)
 	DH *dh;
 
 	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("dh_new_group_asc: DH_new");
-
-	if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0)
-		fatal("BN_hex2bn p");
-	if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0)
-		fatal("BN_hex2bn g");
-
+		return NULL;
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0 ||
+	    BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0) {
+		DH_free(dh);
+		return NULL;
+	}
 	return (dh);
 }
 
@@ -296,7 +298,7 @@ dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus)
 	DH *dh;
 
 	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("dh_new_group: DH_new");
+		return NULL;
 	dh->p = modulus;
 	dh->g = gen;
 
@@ -344,7 +346,7 @@ dh_new_group14(void)
  * from RFC4419 section 3.
  */
 
-int
+u_int
 dh_estimate(int bits)
 {
 	if (bits <= 112)

crypto/openssh/dh.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.11 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.12 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ DH	*dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
 DH	*dh_new_group1(void);
 DH	*dh_new_group14(void);
 
-void	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
 int	 dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
 
-int	 dh_estimate(int);
+u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
 
 /* Min and max values from RFC4419. */
 #define DH_GRP_MIN	1024

crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.3 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.4 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -18,15 +18,19 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#if 0
 #include <md5.h>
 #include <rmd160.h>
 #include <sha1.h>
 #include <sha2.h>
+#endif
 
 #include "ssherr.h"
 #include "sshbuf.h"
@@ -89,30 +93,30 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[SSH_DIGEST_MAX] = {
 		"SHA256",
 		SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH,
 		SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-		sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
-		(md_init_fn *) SHA256Init,
-		(md_update_fn *) SHA256Update,
-		(md_final_fn *) SHA256Final
+		sizeof(SHA256_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) SHA256_Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) SHA256_Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) SHA256_Final
 	},
 	{
 		SSH_DIGEST_SHA384,
 		"SHA384",
 		SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH,
 		SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-		sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
-		(md_init_fn *) SHA384Init,
-		(md_update_fn *) SHA384Update,
-		(md_final_fn *) SHA384Final
+		sizeof(SHA384_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) SHA384_Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) SHA384_Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) SHA384_Final
 	},
 	{
 		SSH_DIGEST_SHA512,
 		"SHA512",
 		SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH,
 		SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-		sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
-		(md_init_fn *) SHA512Init,
-		(md_update_fn *) SHA512Update,
-		(md_final_fn *) SHA512Final
+		sizeof(SHA512_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) SHA512_Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) SHA512_Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) SHA512_Final
 	}
 };
 
@@ -126,6 +130,26 @@ ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
 	return &(digests[alg]);
 }
 
+int
+ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+	int alg;
+
+	for (alg = 0; alg < SSH_DIGEST_MAX; alg++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0)
+			return digests[alg].id;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+const char *
+ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+
+	return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name;
+}
+
 size_t
 ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
 {
@@ -237,3 +261,4 @@ ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
 {
 	return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen);
 }
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/digest-openssl.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.4 2014/07/03 03:26:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.5 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -74,6 +76,26 @@ ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
 	return &(digests[alg]);
 }
 
+int
+ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+	int alg;
+
+	for (alg = 0; digests[alg].id != -1; alg++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0)
+			return digests[alg].id;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+const char *
+ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+
+	return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name;
+}
+
 size_t
 ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
 {
@@ -180,3 +202,4 @@ ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
 {
 	return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen);
 }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/digest.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.6 2014/07/03 04:36:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.7 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@
 struct sshbuf;
 struct ssh_digest_ctx;
 
+/* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
+int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
+
+/* Returns the algorithm name for a digest identifier */
+const char *ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg);
+
 /* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */
 size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg);
 

crypto/openssh/dispatch.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.22 2008/10/31 15:05:34 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.26 2015/02/12 20:34:19 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -36,69 +36,123 @@
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 
-#define DISPATCH_MAX	255
-
-dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];
-
-void
-dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+int
+dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctx)
 {
+	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+	int r;
+
 	logit("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
 	if (!compat20)
 		fatal("protocol error");
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
-	packet_put_int(seq);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
+	return 0;
 }
-void
-dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+
+int
+dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ssh)
 {
 	logit("dispatch_protocol_ignore: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+	return 0;
 }
+
 void
-dispatch_init(dispatch_fn *dflt)
+ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *ssh, dispatch_fn *dflt)
 {
 	u_int i;
 	for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++)
-		dispatch[i] = dflt;
+		ssh->dispatch[i] = dflt;
 }
+
 void
-dispatch_range(u_int from, u_int to, dispatch_fn *fn)
+ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *ssh, u_int from, u_int to, dispatch_fn *fn)
 {
 	u_int i;
 
 	for (i = from; i <= to; i++) {
 		if (i >= DISPATCH_MAX)
 			break;
-		dispatch[i] = fn;
+		ssh->dispatch[i] = fn;
 	}
 }
-void
-dispatch_set(int type, dispatch_fn *fn)
-{
-	dispatch[type] = fn;
-}
-void
-dispatch_run(int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done, void *ctxt)
-{
-	for (;;) {
-		int type;
-		u_int32_t seqnr;
 
+void
+ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *ssh, int type, dispatch_fn *fn)
+{
+	ssh->dispatch[type] = fn;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done,
+    void *ctxt)
+{
+	int r;
+	u_char type;
+	u_int32_t seqnr;
+
+	for (;;) {
 		if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) {
-			type = packet_read_seqnr(&seqnr);
+			r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr);
+			if (r != 0)
+				return r;
 		} else {
-			type = packet_read_poll_seqnr(&seqnr);
+			r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr);
+			if (r != 0)
+				return r;
 			if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE)
-				return;
+				return 0;
+		}
+		if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX &&
+		    ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) {
+			if (ssh->dispatch_skip_packets) {
+				debug2("skipped packet (type %u)", type);
+				ssh->dispatch_skip_packets--;
+				continue;
+			}
+			/* XXX 'ssh' will replace 'ctxt' later */
+			r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ctxt);
+			if (r != 0)
+				return r;
+		} else {
+			r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
+			    "protocol error: rcvd type %d", type);
+			if (r != 0)
+				return r;
+			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
 		}
-		if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && dispatch[type] != NULL)
-			(*dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ctxt);
-		else
-			packet_disconnect("protocol error: rcvd type %d", type);
 		if (done != NULL && *done)
-			return;
+			return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done,
+    void *ctxt)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done, ctxt)) != 0) {
+		switch (r) {
+		case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
+			logit("Connection closed by %.200s",
+			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
+			logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while "
+			    "waiting to read", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
+			logit("Disconnected from %.200s",
+			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		default:
+			fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		}
 	}
 }

crypto/openssh/dispatch.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.11 2006/04/20 09:27:09 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.12 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -24,18 +24,35 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
-#include <signal.h>
+#ifndef DISPATCH_H
+#define DISPATCH_H
+
+#define DISPATCH_MAX	255
 
 enum {
 	DISPATCH_BLOCK,
 	DISPATCH_NONBLOCK
 };
 
-typedef void dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+struct ssh;
 
-void	 dispatch_init(dispatch_fn *);
-void	 dispatch_set(int, dispatch_fn *);
-void	 dispatch_range(u_int, u_int, dispatch_fn *);
-void	 dispatch_run(int, volatile sig_atomic_t *, void *);
-void	 dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+typedef int dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int	dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *, dispatch_fn *);
+void	ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *, int, dispatch_fn *);
+void	ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *, u_int, u_int, dispatch_fn *);
+int	ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *, void *);
+void	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *, void *);
+
+#define dispatch_init(dflt) \
+	ssh_dispatch_init(active_state, (dflt))
+#define dispatch_range(from, to, fn) \
+	ssh_dispatch_range(active_state, (from), (to), (fn))
+#define dispatch_set(type, fn) \
+	ssh_dispatch_set(active_state, (type), (fn))
+#define dispatch_run(mode, done, ctxt) \
+	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, (mode), (done), (ctxt))
+
+#endif

crypto/openssh/dns.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.31 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.34 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
@@ -38,9 +38,11 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 #include "dns.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 
 static const char *errset_text[] = {
 	"success",		/* 0 ERRSET_SUCCESS */
@@ -77,10 +79,10 @@ dns_result_totext(unsigned int res)
  */
 static int
 dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
-    u_char **digest, u_int *digest_len, Key *key)
+    u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, struct sshkey *key)
 {
-	int success = 0;
-	enum fp_type fp_type = 0;
+	int r, success = 0;
+	int fp_alg = -1;
 
 	switch (key->type) {
 	case KEY_RSA:
@@ -110,19 +112,20 @@ dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
 
 	switch (*digest_type) {
 	case SSHFP_HASH_SHA1:
-		fp_type = SSH_FP_SHA1;
+		fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
 		break;
 	case SSHFP_HASH_SHA256:
-		fp_type = SSH_FP_SHA256;
+		fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
 		break;
 	default:
 		*digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */
 	}
 
 	if (*algorithm && *digest_type) {
-		*digest = key_fingerprint_raw(key, fp_type, digest_len);
-		if (*digest == NULL)
-			fatal("dns_read_key: null from key_fingerprint_raw()");
+		if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, fp_alg, digest,
+		    digest_len)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint_raw: %s", __func__,
+			   ssh_err(r));
 		success = 1;
 	} else {
 		*digest = NULL;
@@ -138,7 +141,7 @@ dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
  */
 static int
 dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
-    u_char **digest, u_int *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len)
+    u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len)
 {
 	int success = 0;
 
@@ -199,7 +202,7 @@ is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname)
  */
 int
 verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
-    Key *hostkey, int *flags)
+    struct sshkey *hostkey, int *flags)
 {
 	u_int counter;
 	int result;
@@ -208,12 +211,12 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
 	u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
 	u_int8_t hostkey_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
 	u_char *hostkey_digest;
-	u_int hostkey_digest_len;
+	size_t hostkey_digest_len;
 
 	u_int8_t dnskey_algorithm;
 	u_int8_t dnskey_digest_type;
 	u_char *dnskey_digest;
-	u_int dnskey_digest_len;
+	size_t dnskey_digest_len;
 
 	*flags = 0;
 
@@ -291,7 +294,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
 		free(dnskey_digest);
 	}
 
-	free(hostkey_digest); /* from key_fingerprint_raw() */
+	free(hostkey_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */
 	freerrset(fingerprints);
 
 	if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND)
@@ -309,13 +312,13 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
  * Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record
  */
 int
-export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, Key *key, FILE *f, int generic)
+export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, struct sshkey *key, FILE *f, int generic)
 {
 	u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0;
 	u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
 	u_int8_t dtype;
 	u_char *rdata_digest;
-	u_int i, rdata_digest_len;
+	size_t i, rdata_digest_len;
 	int success = 0;
 
 	for (dtype = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; dtype < SSHFP_HASH_MAX; dtype++) {
@@ -323,7 +326,7 @@ export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, Key *key, FILE *f, int generic)
 		if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type,
 		    &rdata_digest, &rdata_digest_len, key)) {
 			if (generic) {
-				fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %d %02x %02x ",
+				fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %zu %02x %02x ",
 				    hostname, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP,
 				    2 + rdata_digest_len,
 				    rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type);
@@ -334,7 +337,7 @@ export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, Key *key, FILE *f, int generic)
 			for (i = 0; i < rdata_digest_len; i++)
 				fprintf(f, "%02x", rdata_digest[i]);
 			fprintf(f, "\n");
-			free(rdata_digest); /* from key_fingerprint_raw() */
+			free(rdata_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */
 			success = 1;
 		}
 	}

crypto/openssh/dns.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.13 2014/04/20 09:24:26 logan Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.14 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ enum sshfp_hashes {
 #define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH	0x00000002
 #define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE	0x00000004
 
-int	verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *, int *);
-int	export_dns_rr(const char *, Key *, FILE *, int);
+int	verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *,
+    struct sshkey *, int *);
+int	export_dns_rr(const char *, struct sshkey *, FILE *, int);
 
 #endif /* DNS_H */

crypto/openssh/entropy.c

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
@@ -230,3 +232,13 @@ seed_rng(void)
 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
 }
+
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+/* Handled in arc4random() */
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/ge25519.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ge25519.h,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ge25519.h,v 1.4 2015/02/16 18:26:26 miod Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange,
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ typedef struct
   fe25519 t;
 } ge25519;
 
-const ge25519 ge25519_base;
+extern const ge25519 ge25519_base;
 
 int ge25519_unpackneg_vartime(ge25519 *r, const unsigned char p[32]);
 

crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.14 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.15 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -26,13 +26,13 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
 
 #include <grp.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "groupaccess.h"

crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.22 2013/11/08 00:39:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.23 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/param.h>
 
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>

crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.27 2014/07/03 03:34:09 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.28 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
 
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>

crypto/openssh/hmac.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.10 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.11 2015/01/15 21:37:14 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
-#include "buffer.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "digest.h"
 #include "hmac.h"
 
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
 }
 
 int
-ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b)
+ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
 {
 	return ssh_digest_update_buffer(ctx->digest, b);
 }

crypto/openssh/hostfile.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.57 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.64 2015/02/16 22:08:57 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -39,22 +39,26 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
 
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 
+#include <errno.h>
 #include <resolv.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "match.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 #include "digest.h"
 #include "hmac.h"
 
@@ -63,6 +67,8 @@ struct hostkeys {
 	u_int num_entries;
 };
 
+/* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
+
 static int
 extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len)
 {
@@ -155,15 +161,16 @@ host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len)
  */
 
 int
-hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, int *bitsp, Key *ret)
+hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, struct sshkey *ret)
 {
 	char *cp;
+	int r;
 
 	/* Skip leading whitespace. */
 	for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
 		;
 
-	if (key_read(ret, &cp) != 1)
+	if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, &cp)) != 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Skip trailing whitespace. */
@@ -172,28 +179,8 @@ hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, int *bitsp, Key *ret)
 
 	/* Return results. */
 	*cpp = cp;
-	if (bitsp != NULL) {
-		if ((*bitsp = key_size(ret)) <= 0)
-			return 0;
-	}
-	return 1;
-}
-
-static int
-hostfile_check_key(int bits, const Key *key, const char *host,
-    const char *filename, u_long linenum)
-{
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-	if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA1 || key->rsa == NULL)
-		return 1;
-	if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) {
-		logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch for host %s: "
-		    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
-		    filename, linenum, host, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
-		logit("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %lu.",
-		    bits, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), filename, linenum);
-	}
-#endif
+	if (bitsp != NULL)
+		*bitsp = sshkey_size(ret);
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -241,95 +228,65 @@ init_hostkeys(void)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+struct load_callback_ctx {
+	const char *host;
+	u_long num_loaded;
+	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+};
+
+static int
+record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
+	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
+	struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
+
+	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+		error("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file",
+		    l->path, l->linenum);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__,
+	    l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
+	    (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
+	    sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
+	if ((tmp = reallocarray(hostkeys->entries,
+	    hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries))) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	hostkeys->entries = tmp;
+	hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(ctx->host);
+	hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(l->path);
+	hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = l->linenum;
+	hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = l->key;
+	l->key = NULL; /* steal it */
+	hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = l->marker;
+	hostkeys->num_entries++;
+	ctx->num_loaded++;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void
 load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path)
 {
-	FILE *f;
-	char line[8192];
-	u_long linenum = 0, num_loaded = 0;
-	char *cp, *cp2, *hashed_host;
-	HostkeyMarker marker;
-	Key *key;
-	int kbits;
+	int r;
+	struct load_callback_ctx ctx;
 
-	if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
-		return;
-	debug3("%s: loading entries for host \"%.100s\" from file \"%s\"",
-	    __func__, host, path);
-	while (read_keyfile_line(f, path, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) == 0) {
-		cp = line;
+	ctx.host = host;
+	ctx.num_loaded = 0;
+	ctx.hostkeys = hostkeys;
 
-		/* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */
-		for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-			;
-		if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
-			continue;
-
-		if ((marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) {
-			verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu",
-			    __func__, path, linenum);
-			continue;
-		}
-
-		/* Find the end of the host name portion. */
-		for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++)
-			;
-
-		/* Check if the host name matches. */
-		if (match_hostname(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 1) {
-			if (*cp != HASH_DELIM)
-				continue;
-			hashed_host = host_hash(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp));
-			if (hashed_host == NULL) {
-				debug("Invalid hashed host line %lu of %s",
-				    linenum, path);
-				continue;
-			}
-			if (strncmp(hashed_host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 0)
-				continue;
-		}
-
-		/* Got a match.  Skip host name. */
-		cp = cp2;
-
-		/*
-		 * Extract the key from the line.  This will skip any leading
-		 * whitespace.  Ignore badly formatted lines.
-		 */
-		key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-		if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, key)) {
-			key_free(key);
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-			key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-			if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, key)) {
-				key_free(key);
-				continue;
-			}
-#else
-			continue;
-#endif
-		}
-		if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, key, host, path, linenum))
-			continue;
-
-		debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__,
-		    marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
-		    (marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
-		    key_type(key), path, linenum);
-		hostkeys->entries = xrealloc(hostkeys->entries,
-		    hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
-		hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(host);
-		hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(path);
-		hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = linenum;
-		hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = key;
-		hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = marker;
-		hostkeys->num_entries++;
-		num_loaded++;
+	if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(path, record_hostkey, &ctx, host, NULL,
+	    HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) {
+		if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno != ENOENT)
+			debug("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s",
+			    __func__, path, ssh_err(r));
 	}
-	debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys", __func__, num_loaded);
-	fclose(f);
-	return;
-}	
+	if (ctx.num_loaded != 0)
+		debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys from %s", __func__,
+		    ctx.num_loaded, host);
+}
 
 void
 free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys)
@@ -339,7 +296,7 @@ free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys)
 	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
 		free(hostkeys->entries[i].host);
 		free(hostkeys->entries[i].file);
-		key_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key);
+		sshkey_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key);
 		explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
 	}
 	free(hostkeys->entries);
@@ -348,18 +305,18 @@ free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys)
 }
 
 static int
-check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *k)
+check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k)
 {
-	int is_cert = key_is_cert(k);
+	int is_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
 	u_int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
 		if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE)
 			continue;
-		if (key_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key))
+		if (sshkey_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key))
 			return -1;
 		if (is_cert &&
-		    key_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
+		    sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
 		    hostkeys->entries[i].key))
 			return -1;
 	}
@@ -383,11 +340,11 @@ check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *k)
  */
 static HostStatus
 check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys,
-    Key *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found)
+    struct sshkey *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found)
 {
 	u_int i;
 	HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW;
-	int want_cert = key_is_cert(k);
+	int want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
 	HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE;
 	int proto = (k ? k->type : keytype) == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
 
@@ -411,7 +368,7 @@ check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys,
 			break;
 		}
 		if (want_cert) {
-			if (key_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
+			if (sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
 			    hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
 				/* A matching CA exists */
 				end_return = HOST_OK;
@@ -420,7 +377,7 @@ check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys,
 				break;
 			}
 		} else {
-			if (key_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
+			if (sshkey_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
 				end_return = HOST_OK;
 				if (found != NULL)
 					*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
@@ -439,9 +396,9 @@ check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys,
 	}
 	return end_return;
 }
-	
+
 HostStatus
-check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key,
+check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key,
     const struct hostkey_entry **found)
 {
 	if (key == NULL)
@@ -457,40 +414,438 @@ lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype,
 	    found) == HOST_FOUND);
 }
 
+static int
+write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
+    const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
+{
+	int r, success = 0;
+	char *hashed_host = NULL;
+
+	if (store_hash) {
+		if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
+			error("%s: host_hash failed", __func__);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host);
+	} else if (ip != NULL)
+		fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", host, ip);
+	else
+		fprintf(f, "%s ", host);
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0)
+		success = 1;
+	else
+		error("%s: sshkey_write failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	fputc('\n', f);
+	return success;
+}
+
 /*
  * Appends an entry to the host file.  Returns false if the entry could not
  * be appended.
  */
-
 int
-add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const Key *key,
-    int store_hash)
+add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
+    const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
 {
 	FILE *f;
-	int success = 0;
-	char *hashed_host = NULL;
+	int success;
 
 	if (key == NULL)
 		return 1;	/* XXX ? */
 	f = fopen(filename, "a");
 	if (!f)
 		return 0;
-
-	if (store_hash) {
-		if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
-			error("add_host_to_hostfile: host_hash failed");
-			fclose(f);
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-	fprintf(f, "%s ", store_hash ? hashed_host : host);
-
-	if (key_write(key, f)) {
-		success = 1;
-	} else {
-		error("add_host_to_hostfile: saving key in %s failed", filename);
-	}
-	fprintf(f, "\n");
+	success = write_host_entry(f, host, NULL, key, store_hash);
 	fclose(f);
 	return success;
 }
+
+struct host_delete_ctx {
+	FILE *out;
+	int quiet;
+	const char *host;
+	int *skip_keys; /* XXX split for host/ip? might want to ensure both */
+	struct sshkey * const *keys;
+	size_t nkeys;
+	int modified;
+};
+
+static int
+host_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct host_delete_ctx *ctx = (struct host_delete_ctx *)_ctx;
+	int loglevel = ctx->quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
+		if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+			/* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
+			fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* XXX might need a knob for this later */
+		/* Don't remove RSA1 keys */
+		if (l->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+			fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If this line contains one of the keys that we will be
+		 * adding later, then don't change it and mark the key for
+		 * skipping.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+			if (sshkey_equal(ctx->keys[i], l->key)) {
+				ctx->skip_keys[i] = 1;
+				fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+				debug3("%s: %s key already at %s:%ld", __func__,
+				    sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke marker, delete it
+		 * by *not* writing the line to ctx->out.
+		 */
+		do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: Removed %s key for host %s",
+		    ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
+		    l->path, l->linenum, sshkey_type(l->key), ctx->host);
+		ctx->modified = 1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Retain non-matching hosts and invalid lines when deleting */
+	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+		do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: invalid known_hosts entry",
+		    ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
+		    l->path, l->linenum);
+	}
+	fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip,
+    struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg)
+{
+	int r, fd, oerrno = 0;
+	int loglevel = quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+	struct host_delete_ctx ctx;
+	char *fp, *temp = NULL, *back = NULL;
+	mode_t omask;
+	size_t i;
+
+	omask = umask(077);
+
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.host = host;
+	ctx.quiet = quiet;
+	if ((ctx.skip_keys = calloc(nkeys, sizeof(*ctx.skip_keys))) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	ctx.keys = keys;
+	ctx.nkeys = nkeys;
+	ctx.modified = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare temporary file for in-place deletion.
+	 */
+	if ((r = asprintf(&temp, "%s.XXXXXXXXXXX", filename)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = asprintf(&back, "%s.old", filename)) < 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if ((fd = mkstemp(temp)) == -1) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno));
+		r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		close(fd);
+		error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno));
+		r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* Remove all entries for the specified host from the file */
+	if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(filename, host_delete, &ctx, host, ip,
+	    HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) {
+		error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* Add the requested keys */
+	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+		if (ctx.skip_keys[i])
+			continue;
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		do_log2(loglevel, "%s%sAdding new key for %s to %s: %s %s",
+		    quiet ? __func__ : "", quiet ? ": " : "", host, filename,
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(keys[i]), fp);
+		free(fp);
+		if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, ip, keys[i], store_hash)) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		ctx.modified = 1;
+	}
+	fclose(ctx.out);
+	ctx.out = NULL;
+
+	if (ctx.modified) {
+		/* Backup the original file and replace it with the temporary */
+		if (unlink(back) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) {
+			oerrno = errno;
+			error("%s: unlink %.100s: %s", __func__,
+			    back, strerror(errno));
+			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (link(filename, back) == -1) {
+			oerrno = errno;
+			error("%s: link %.100s to %.100s: %s", __func__,
+			    filename, back, strerror(errno));
+			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (rename(temp, filename) == -1) {
+			oerrno = errno;
+			error("%s: rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", __func__,
+			    temp, filename, strerror(errno));
+			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* No changes made; just delete the temporary file */
+		if (unlink(temp) != 0)
+			error("%s: unlink \"%s\": %s", __func__,
+			    temp, strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ fail:
+	if (temp != NULL && r != 0)
+		unlink(temp);
+	free(temp);
+	free(back);
+	if (ctx.out != NULL)
+		fclose(ctx.out);
+	free(ctx.skip_keys);
+	umask(omask);
+	if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+		errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed)
+{
+	int hashed = *names == HASH_DELIM;
+	const char *hashed_host;
+	size_t nlen = strlen(names);
+
+	if (was_hashed != NULL)
+		*was_hashed = hashed;
+	if (hashed) {
+		if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, names, nlen)) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		return nlen == strlen(hashed_host) &&
+		    strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0;
+	}
+	return match_hostname(host, names, nlen) == 1;
+}
+
+int
+hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
+    const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char line[8192], oline[8192], ktype[128];
+	u_long linenum = 0;
+	char *cp, *cp2;
+	u_int kbits;
+	int hashed;
+	int s, r = 0;
+	struct hostkey_foreach_line lineinfo;
+	size_t l;
+
+	memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
+	if (host == NULL && (options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+
+	debug3("%s: reading file \"%s\"", __func__, path);
+	while (read_keyfile_line(f, path, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) == 0) {
+		line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0';
+		strlcpy(oline, line, sizeof(oline));
+
+		sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
+		memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
+		lineinfo.path = path;
+		lineinfo.linenum = linenum;
+		lineinfo.line = oline;
+		lineinfo.marker = MRK_NONE;
+		lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_OK;
+		lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
+
+		/* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */
+		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') {
+			if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) {
+				lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_COMMENT;
+				if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
+					break;
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if ((lineinfo.marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) {
+			verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu",
+			    __func__, path, linenum);
+			if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0)
+				goto bad;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Find the end of the host name portion. */
+		for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++)
+			;
+		lineinfo.hosts = cp;
+		*cp2++ = '\0';
+
+		/* Check if the host name matches. */
+		if (host != NULL) {
+			if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(host, lineinfo.hosts,
+			    &hashed)) == -1) {
+				debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad host hash \"%.32s\"",
+				    __func__, path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
+				goto bad;
+			}
+			if (s == 1) {
+				lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
+				lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_HOST |
+				    (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED : 0);
+			}
+			/* Try matching IP address if supplied */
+			if (ip != NULL) {
+				if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(ip, lineinfo.hosts,
+				    &hashed)) == -1) {
+					debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad ip hash "
+					    "\"%.32s\"", __func__, path,
+					    linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
+					goto bad;
+				}
+				if (s == 1) {
+					lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
+					lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_IP |
+					    (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED : 0);
+				}
+			}
+			/*
+			 * Skip this line if host matching requested and
+			 * neither host nor address matched.
+			 */
+			if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0 &&
+			    lineinfo.status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED)
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Got a match.  Skip host name and any following whitespace */
+		for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
+			;
+		if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
+			debug2("%s:%ld: truncated before key type",
+			    path, linenum);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		lineinfo.rawkey = cp = cp2;
+
+		if ((options & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Extract the key from the line.  This will skip
+			 * any leading whitespace.  Ignore badly formatted
+			 * lines.
+			 */
+			if ((lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+				error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
+				r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+				sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
+				lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1);
+				if (lineinfo.key  == NULL) {
+					error("%s: sshkey_new fail", __func__);
+					r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+					break;
+				}
+				if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits,
+				    lineinfo.key))
+					goto bad;
+#else
+				goto bad;
+#endif
+			}
+			lineinfo.keytype = lineinfo.key->type;
+			lineinfo.comment = cp;
+		} else {
+			/* Extract and parse key type */
+			l = strcspn(lineinfo.rawkey, " \t");
+			if (l <= 1 || l >= sizeof(ktype) ||
+			    lineinfo.rawkey[l] == '\0')
+				goto bad;
+			memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l);
+			ktype[l] = '\0';
+			lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+			/*
+			 * Assume RSA1 if the first component is a short
+			 * decimal number.
+			 */
+			if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 &&
+			    strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l)
+				lineinfo.keytype = KEY_RSA1;
+#endif
+			/*
+			 * Check that something other than whitespace follows
+			 * the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but
+			 * it does catch trivial truncation.
+			 */
+			cp2 += l; /* Skip past key type */
+			for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
+				;
+			if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
+				debug2("%s:%ld: truncated after key type",
+				    path, linenum);
+				lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
+			}
+			if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ bad:
+				sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
+				lineinfo.key = NULL;
+				lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID;
+				if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
+					break;
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+		if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
+	fclose(f);
+	return r;
+}

crypto/openssh/hostfile.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.20 2013/07/12 00:19:58 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.24 2015/02/16 22:08:57 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct hostkey_entry {
 	char *host;
 	char *file;
 	u_long line;
-	Key *key;
+	struct sshkey *key;
 	HostkeyMarker marker;
 };
 struct hostkeys;
@@ -35,13 +35,18 @@ struct hostkeys *init_hostkeys(void);
 void	 load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, const char *, const char *);
 void	 free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *);
 
-HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, Key *,
+HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *,
     const struct hostkey_entry **);
 int	 lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int,
     const struct hostkey_entry **);
 
-int	 hostfile_read_key(char **, int *, Key *);
-int	 add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, const Key *, int);
+int	 hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, struct sshkey *);
+int	 add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *,
+    const struct sshkey *, int);
+
+int	 hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename,
+    const char *host, const char *ip, struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys,
+    int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg);
 
 #define HASH_MAGIC	"|1|"
 #define HASH_DELIM	'|'
@@ -51,4 +56,53 @@ int	 add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, const Key *, int);
 
 char	*host_hash(const char *, const char *, u_int);
 
+/*
+ * Iterate through a hostkeys file, optionally parsing keys and matching
+ * hostnames. Allows access to the raw keyfile lines to allow
+ * streaming edits to the file to take place.
+ */
+#define HKF_WANT_MATCH		(1)	/* return only matching hosts/addrs */
+#define HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY	(1<<1)	/* need key parsed */
+
+#define HKF_STATUS_OK		0	/* Line parsed, didn't match host */
+#define HKF_STATUS_INVALID	1	/* line had parse error */
+#define HKF_STATUS_COMMENT	2	/* valid line contained no key */
+#define HKF_STATUS_MATCHED	3	/* hostname or IP matched */
+
+#define HKF_MATCH_HOST		(1)	/* hostname matched */
+#define HKF_MATCH_IP		(1<<1)	/* address matched */
+#define HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED	(1<<2)	/* hostname was hashed */
+#define HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED	(1<<3)	/* address was hashed */
+/* XXX HKF_MATCH_KEY_TYPE? */
+
+/*
+ * The callback function receives this as an argument for each matching 
+ * hostkey line. The callback may "steal" the 'key' field by setting it to NULL.
+ * If a parse error occurred, then "hosts" and subsequent options may be NULL.
+ */
+struct hostkey_foreach_line {
+	const char *path; /* Path of file */
+	u_long linenum;	/* Line number */
+	u_int status;	/* One of HKF_STATUS_* */
+	u_int match;	/* Zero or more of HKF_MATCH_* OR'd together */
+	char *line;	/* Entire key line; mutable by callback */
+	int marker;	/* CA/revocation markers; indicated by MRK_* value */
+	const char *hosts; /* Raw hosts text, may be hashed or list multiple */
+	const char *rawkey; /* Text of key and any comment following it */
+	int keytype;	/* Type of key; KEY_UNSPEC for invalid/comment lines */
+	struct sshkey *key; /* Key, if parsed ok and HKF_WANT_MATCH_HOST set */
+	const char *comment; /* Any comment following the key */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Callback fires for each line (or matching line if a HKF_WANT_* option
+ * is set). The foreach loop will terminate if the callback returns a non-
+ * zero exit status.
+ */
+typedef int hostkeys_foreach_fn(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *ctx);
+
+/* Iterate over a hostkeys file */
+int hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
+    const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options);
+
 #endif

crypto/openssh/includes.h

@@ -23,10 +23,11 @@
 #endif
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h> /* For CMSG_* */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
-# include <limits.h> /* For PATH_MAX */
+# include <limits.h> /* For PATH_MAX, _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX */
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H
 # include <bstring.h>
@@ -166,7 +167,9 @@
 # endif
 #endif
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+#endif
 
 #include "defines.h"
 

crypto/openssh/kex.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.99 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.105 2015/01/30 00:22:25 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>	/* MAX roundup */
 
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
@@ -37,20 +37,22 @@
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #endif
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "mac.h"
 #include "match.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "monitor.h"
 #include "roaming.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "digest.h"
 
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
@@ -62,12 +64,12 @@ extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
 #endif
 
 /* prototype */
-static void kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *);
-static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *);
+static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
+static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 struct kexalg {
 	char *name;
-	int type;
+	u_int type;
 	int ec_nid;
 	int hash_alg;
 };
@@ -89,18 +91,17 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
 	    SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
 # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-	{ KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+#if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 	{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
 	{ NULL, -1, -1, -1},
 };
 
 char *
 kex_alg_list(char sep)
 {
-	char *ret = NULL;
+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
 	const struct kexalg *k;
 
@@ -108,7 +109,11 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
 		if (ret != NULL)
 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
 		nlen = strlen(k->name);
-		ret = xrealloc(ret, 1, rlen + nlen + 2);
+		if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
+			free(ret);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		ret = tmp;
 		memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1);
 		rlen += nlen;
 	}
@@ -135,7 +140,8 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
 
 	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
 		return 0;
-	s = cp = xstrdup(names);
+	if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
@@ -150,56 +156,75 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
 }
 
 /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
-static void
-kex_prop2buf(Buffer *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+int
+kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
 {
 	u_int i;
+	int r;
+
+	sshbuf_reset(b);
 
-	buffer_clear(b);
 	/*
 	 * add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by
 	 * kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set
 	 */
-	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
-		buffer_put_char(b, 0);
-	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
-		buffer_put_cstring(b, proposal[i]);
-	buffer_put_char(b, 0);			/* first_kex_packet_follows */
-	buffer_put_int(b, 0);			/* uint32 reserved */
+	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 ||	/* first_kex_packet_follows */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0)	/* uint32 reserved */
+		return r;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */
-static char **
-kex_buf2prop(Buffer *raw, int *first_kex_follows)
+int
+kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp)
 {
-	Buffer b;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	u_char v;
 	u_int i;
-	char **proposal;
+	char **proposal = NULL;
+	int r;
 
-	proposal = xcalloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *));
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(raw), buffer_len(raw));
-	/* skip cookie */
-	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
-		buffer_get_char(&b);
+	*propp = NULL;
+	if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) /* skip cookie */
+		goto out;
 	/* extract kex init proposal strings */
 	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
-		proposal[i] = buffer_get_cstring(&b,NULL);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0)
+			goto out;
 		debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: %s", proposal[i]);
 	}
 	/* first kex follows / reserved */
-	i = buffer_get_char(&b);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 	if (first_kex_follows != NULL)
 		*first_kex_follows = i;
-	debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: first_kex_follows %d ", i);
-	i = buffer_get_int(&b);
+	debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: first_kex_follows %d ", v);
 	debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: reserved %u ", i);
-	buffer_free(&b);
-	return proposal;
+	r = 0;
+	*propp = proposal;
+ out:
+	if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL)
+		kex_prop_free(proposal);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
 }
 
-static void
+void
 kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
 {
 	u_int i;
@@ -210,97 +235,111 @@ kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-static void
+static int
 kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	error("Hm, kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void
-kex_reset_dispatch(void)
+kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
+	ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
 	    SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
 }
 
-void
-kex_finish(Kex *kex)
+int
+kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	kex_reset_dispatch();
+	int r;
 
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
-	packet_send();
-	/* packet_write_wait(); */
+	kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
 	debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
-
 	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
-	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
-	packet_check_eom();
-	debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys);
+	return 0;
+}
 
+static int
+kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
 	kex->done = 1;
-	buffer_clear(&kex->peer);
-	/* buffer_clear(&kex->my); */
+	sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
+	/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
 	kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT;
 	free(kex->name);
 	kex->name = NULL;
+	return 0;
 }
 
-void
-kex_send_kexinit(Kex *kex)
+int
+kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
 	u_char *cookie;
-	u_int i;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
 
-	if (kex == NULL) {
-		error("kex_send_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey");
-		return;
-	}
-	if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT) {
-		debug("KEX_INIT_SENT");
-		return;
-	}
+	if (kex == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)
+		return 0;
 	kex->done = 0;
 
 	/* generate a random cookie */
-	if (buffer_len(&kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN)
-		fatal("kex_send_kexinit: kex proposal too short");
-	cookie = buffer_ptr(&kex->my);
-	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
-		if (i % 4 == 0)
-			rnd = arc4random();
-		cookie[i] = rnd;
-		rnd >>= 8;
-	}
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
-	packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my));
-	packet_send();
+	if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
 	kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* ARGSUSED */
-void
+int
 kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
-	char *ptr;
-	u_int i, dlen;
-	Kex *kex = (Kex *)ctxt;
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	const u_char *ptr;
+	u_int i;
+	size_t dlen;
+	int r;
 
 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
 	if (kex == NULL)
-		fatal("kex_input_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey");
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 
-	ptr = packet_get_raw(&dlen);
-	buffer_append(&kex->peer, ptr, dlen);
+	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+		return r;
 
 	/* discard packet */
 	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
-		packet_get_char();
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
+			return r;
 	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
-		free(packet_get_string(NULL));
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
+			return r;
 	/*
 	 * XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
 	 * KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
@@ -311,55 +350,129 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	 * for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
 	 * ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
 	 */
-	(void) packet_get_char();	/* first_kex_follows */
-	(void) packet_get_int();	/* reserved */
-	packet_check_eom();
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||	/* first_kex_follows */
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||	/* reserved */
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+			return r;
 
-	kex_kexinit_finish(kex);
-}
-
-Kex *
-kex_setup(char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
-{
-	Kex *kex;
-
-	kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
-	buffer_init(&kex->peer);
-	buffer_init(&kex->my);
-	kex_prop2buf(&kex->my, proposal);
-	kex->done = 0;
-
-	kex_send_kexinit(kex);					/* we start */
-	kex_reset_dispatch();
-
-	return kex;
-}
-
-static void
-kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *kex)
-{
 	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
-		kex_send_kexinit(kex);
+		if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
 
-	kex_choose_conf(kex);
+	if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
+		return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
 
-	if (kex->kex_type >= 0 && kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX &&
-	    kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) {
-		(kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(kex);
-	} else {
-		fatal("Unsupported key exchange %d", kex->kex_type);
-	}
+	return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 }
 
-static void
-choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
+int
+kex_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **kexp)
+{
+	struct kex *kex;
+	int r;
+
+	*kexp = NULL;
+	if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, proposal)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	kex->done = 0;
+	kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
+	r = 0;
+	*kexp = kex;
+ out:
+	if (r != 0)
+		kex_free(kex);
+	return r;
+}
+
+void
+kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+	if (newkeys == NULL)
+		return;
+	if (newkeys->enc.key) {
+		explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len);
+		free(newkeys->enc.key);
+		newkeys->enc.key = NULL;
+	}
+	if (newkeys->enc.iv) {
+		explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.block_size);
+		free(newkeys->enc.iv);
+		newkeys->enc.iv = NULL;
+	}
+	free(newkeys->enc.name);
+	explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc));
+	free(newkeys->comp.name);
+	explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
+	mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
+	if (newkeys->mac.key) {
+		explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len);
+		free(newkeys->mac.key);
+		newkeys->mac.key = NULL;
+	}
+	free(newkeys->mac.name);
+	explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac));
+	explicit_bzero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys));
+	free(newkeys);
+}
+
+void
+kex_free(struct kex *kex)
+{
+	u_int mode;
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	if (kex->dh)
+		DH_free(kex->dh);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	if (kex->ec_client_key)
+		EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]);
+		kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
+	sshbuf_free(kex->my);
+	free(kex->session_id);
+	free(kex->client_version_string);
+	free(kex->server_version_string);
+	free(kex);
+}
+
+int
+kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = kex_new(ssh, proposal, &ssh->kex)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) {		/* we start */
+		kex_free(ssh->kex);
+		ssh->kex = NULL;
+		return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
 {
 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
 	if (name == NULL)
-		fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
-		    client, server);
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
 	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
-		fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	enc->name = name;
 	enc->enabled = 0;
 	enc->iv = NULL;
@@ -367,31 +480,34 @@ choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
 	enc->key = NULL;
 	enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
 	enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void
-choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
+static int
+choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
 {
 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
 	if (name == NULL)
-		fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
-		    client, server);
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
 	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
-		fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	/* truncate the key */
-	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
+	if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
 		mac->key_len = 16;
 	mac->name = name;
 	mac->key = NULL;
 	mac->enabled = 0;
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void
-choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
+static int
+choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
 {
 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
 	if (name == NULL)
-		fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
 	if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
 		comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
@@ -399,36 +515,42 @@ choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
 	} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
 		comp->type = COMP_NONE;
 	} else {
-		fatal("unsupported comp %s", name);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	}
 	comp->name = name;
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void
-choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+static int
+choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
 {
 	const struct kexalg *kexalg;
 
 	k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
 	if (k->name == NULL)
-		fatal("Unable to negotiate a key exchange method");
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH;
 	if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL)
-		fatal("unsupported kex alg %s", k->name);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	k->kex_type = kexalg->type;
 	k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg;
 	k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid;
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void
-choose_hostkeyalg(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+static int
+choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
 {
 	char *hostkeyalg = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
 	if (hostkeyalg == NULL)
-		fatal("no hostkey alg");
-	k->hostkey_type = key_type_from_name(hostkeyalg);
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH;
+	k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(hostkeyalg);
 	if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC)
-		fatal("bad hostkey alg '%s'", hostkeyalg);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(hostkeyalg);
 	free(hostkeyalg);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int
@@ -455,18 +577,20 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
 	return (1);
 }
 
-static void
-kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
+static int
+kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	Newkeys *newkeys;
-	char **my, **peer;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	struct newkeys *newkeys;
+	char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL;
 	char **cprop, **sprop;
 	int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
 	u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
-	int first_kex_follows, type;
+	int r, first_kex_follows;
 
-	my   = kex_buf2prop(&kex->my, NULL);
-	peer = kex_buf2prop(&kex->peer, &first_kex_follows);
+	if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	if (kex->server) {
 		cprop=peer;
@@ -478,8 +602,9 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
 
 	/* Check whether server offers roaming */
 	if (!kex->server) {
-		char *roaming;
-		roaming = match_list(KEX_RESUME, peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
+		char *roaming = match_list(KEX_RESUME,
+		    peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
+
 		if (roaming) {
 			kex->roaming = 1;
 			free(roaming);
@@ -488,28 +613,39 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
 
 	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
-		newkeys = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys));
+		if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
 		ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
 		    (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
 		nenc  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
 		nmac  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
 		ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
-		choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], sprop[nenc]);
-		/* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */
+		if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc],
+		    sprop[nenc])) != 0)
+			goto out;
 		authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher);
-		if (authlen == 0)
-			choose_mac(&newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac]);
-		choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp]);
+		/* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */
+		if (authlen == 0 &&
+		    (r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac],
+		    sprop[nmac])) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
+		    sprop[ncomp])) != 0)
+			goto out;
 		debug("kex: %s %s %s %s",
 		    ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
 		    newkeys->enc.name,
 		    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
 		    newkeys->comp.name);
 	}
-	choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
-	choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-	    sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]);
+	if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+	    sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0 ||
+	    (r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+	    sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0)
+		goto out;
 	need = dh_need = 0;
 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
 		newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
@@ -528,45 +664,47 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
 
 	/* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
 	if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) &&
-	    !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) {
-		type = packet_read();
-		debug2("skipping next packet (type %u)", type);
-	}
-
+	    !(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX))
+		ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
 	kex_prop_free(my);
 	kex_prop_free(peer);
+	return r;
 }
 
-static u_char *
-derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-    const u_char *shared_secret, u_int slen)
+static int
+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
 {
-	Buffer b;
-	struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL;
 	char c = id;
 	u_int have;
 	size_t mdsz;
 	u_char *digest;
+	int r;
 
 	if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
-		fatal("bad kex md size %zu", mdsz);
-	digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_append(&b, shared_secret, slen);
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((digest = calloc(1, roundup(need, mdsz))) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */
-	if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start failed", __func__);
-	if (ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, &b) != 0 ||
+	if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
+	    ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
 	    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
 	    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 ||
 	    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id,
-	    kex->session_id_len) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__);
-	if (ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final failed", __func__);
+	    kex->session_id_len) != 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+	hashctx = NULL;
 
 	/*
 	 * expand key:
@@ -574,107 +712,115 @@ derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
 	 * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn
 	 */
 	for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) {
-		if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL)
-			fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start failed", __func__);
-		if (ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, &b) != 0 ||
+		if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
+		    ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
 		    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
-		    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0)
-			fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__);
-		if (ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0)
-			fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final failed", __func__);
+		    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 ||
+		    ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+		hashctx = NULL;
 	}
-	buffer_free(&b);
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEX
 	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c);
 	dump_digest("key", digest, need);
 #endif
-	return digest;
+	*keyp = digest;
+	digest = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (digest)
+		free(digest);
+	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+	return r;
 }
 
-Newkeys *current_keys[MODE_MAX];
-
 #define NKEYS	6
-void
-kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-    const u_char *shared_secret, u_int slen)
+int
+kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret)
 {
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
 	u_char *keys[NKEYS];
-	u_int i, mode, ctos;
+	u_int i, j, mode, ctos;
+	int r;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) {
-		keys[i] = derive_key(kex, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen,
-		    shared_secret, slen);
+		if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen,
+		    shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) {
+			for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+				free(keys[j]);
+			return r;
+		}
 	}
-
-	debug2("kex_derive_keys");
 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
-		current_keys[mode] = kex->newkeys[mode];
-		kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
 		ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
 		    (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
-		current_keys[mode]->enc.iv  = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
-		current_keys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
-		current_keys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
+		kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv  = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
+		kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
+		kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
 	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-void
-kex_derive_keys_bn(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const BIGNUM *secret)
+int
+kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+    const BIGNUM *secret)
 {
-	Buffer shared_secret;
+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret;
+	int r;
 
-	buffer_init(&shared_secret);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&shared_secret, secret);
-	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen,
-	    buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret));
-	buffer_free(&shared_secret);
+	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(shared_secret, secret)) == 0)
+		r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+	return r;
 }
 #endif
 
-Newkeys *
-kex_get_newkeys(int mode)
-{
-	Newkeys *ret;
-
-	ret = current_keys[mode];
-	current_keys[mode] = NULL;
-	return ret;
-}
-
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
-void
+int
 derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus,
     u_int8_t cookie[8], u_int8_t id[16])
 {
-	u_int8_t nbuf[2048], obuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-	int len;
-	struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx;
+	u_int8_t hbuf[2048], sbuf[2048], obuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL;
+	size_t hlen, slen;
+	int r;
 
-	if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start", __func__);
-
-	len = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus);
-	if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf))
-		fatal("%s: bad host modulus (len %d)", __func__, len);
-	BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, nbuf);
-	if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, nbuf, len) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__);
-
-	len = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus);
-	if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf))
-		fatal("%s: bad server modulus (len %d)", __func__, len);
-	BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, nbuf);
-	if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, nbuf, len) != 0 ||
-	    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, cookie, 8) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__);
-	if (ssh_digest_final(hashctx, obuf, sizeof(obuf)) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final failed", __func__);
+	hlen = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus);
+	slen = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus);
+	if (hlen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)hlen > sizeof(hbuf) ||
+	    slen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)slen > sizeof(sbuf))
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
+	if (BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, hbuf) <= 0 ||
+	    BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, sbuf) <= 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hbuf, hlen) != 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, sbuf, slen) != 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, cookie, 8) != 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(hashctx, obuf, sizeof(obuf)) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	memcpy(id, obuf, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5));
-
-	explicit_bzero(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf));
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+	explicit_bzero(hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
+	explicit_bzero(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
 	explicit_bzero(obuf, sizeof(obuf));
+	return r;
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -682,16 +828,7 @@ derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus,
 void
 dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len)
 {
-	int i;
-
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
-	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "%02x", digest[i]);
-		if (i%32 == 31)
-			fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-		else if (i%8 == 7)
-			fprintf(stderr, " ");
-	}
-	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr);
 }
 #endif

crypto/openssh/kex.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.64 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.71 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -26,13 +26,28 @@
 #ifndef KEX_H
 #define KEX_H
 
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "buffer.h" /* XXX for typedef */
+#include "key.h" /* XXX for typedef */
+
+#ifdef WITH_LEAKMALLOC
+#include "leakmalloc.h"
 #endif
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#  include <openssl/ec.h>
+# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#  define EC_KEY	void
+#  define EC_GROUP	void
+#  define EC_POINT	void
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+# define EC_KEY		void
+# define EC_GROUP	void
+# define EC_POINT	void
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
 #define KEX_COOKIE_LEN	16
 
 #define	KEX_DH1			"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
@@ -49,6 +64,8 @@
 #define COMP_ZLIB	1
 #define COMP_DELAYED	2
 
+#define CURVE25519_SIZE 32
+
 enum kex_init_proposals {
 	PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS,
 	PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS,
@@ -81,15 +98,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
 
 #define KEX_INIT_SENT	0x0001
 
-typedef struct Kex Kex;
-typedef struct Mac Mac;
-typedef struct Comp Comp;
-typedef struct Enc Enc;
-typedef struct Newkeys Newkeys;
-
-struct Enc {
+struct sshenc {
 	char	*name;
-	const Cipher *cipher;
+	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
 	int	enabled;
 	u_int	key_len;
 	u_int	iv_len;
@@ -97,108 +108,120 @@ struct Enc {
 	u_char	*key;
 	u_char	*iv;
 };
-struct Mac {
-	char	*name;
-	int	enabled;
-	u_int	mac_len;
-	u_char	*key;
-	u_int	key_len;
-	int	type;
-	int	etm;		/* Encrypt-then-MAC */
-	struct ssh_hmac_ctx	*hmac_ctx;
-	struct umac_ctx		*umac_ctx;
-};
-struct Comp {
-	int	type;
+struct sshcomp {
+	u_int	type;
 	int	enabled;
 	char	*name;
 };
-struct Newkeys {
-	Enc	enc;
-	Mac	mac;
-	Comp	comp;
+struct newkeys {
+	struct sshenc	enc;
+	struct sshmac	mac;
+	struct sshcomp  comp;
 };
-struct Kex {
+
+struct ssh;
+
+struct kex {
 	u_char	*session_id;
-	u_int	session_id_len;
-	Newkeys	*newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+	size_t	session_id_len;
+	struct newkeys	*newkeys[MODE_MAX];
 	u_int	we_need;
 	u_int	dh_need;
 	int	server;
 	char	*name;
 	int	hostkey_type;
-	int	kex_type;
+	int	hostkey_nid;
+	u_int	kex_type;
 	int	roaming;
-	Buffer	my;
-	Buffer	peer;
+	struct sshbuf *my;
+	struct sshbuf *peer;
 	sig_atomic_t done;
-	int	flags;
+	u_int	flags;
 	int	hash_alg;
 	int	ec_nid;
 	char	*client_version_string;
 	char	*server_version_string;
-	int	(*verify_host_key)(Key *);
-	Key	*(*load_host_public_key)(int);
-	Key	*(*load_host_private_key)(int);
-	int	(*host_key_index)(Key *);
-	void    (*sign)(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
-	void	(*kex[KEX_MAX])(Kex *);
+	int	(*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
+	struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
+	struct sshkey *(*load_host_private_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
+	int	(*host_key_index)(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
+	int	(*sign)(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+	    u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, u_int);
+	int	(*kex[KEX_MAX])(struct ssh *);
+	/* kex specific state */
+	DH	*dh;			/* DH */
+	u_int	min, max, nbits;	/* GEX */
+	EC_KEY	*ec_client_key;		/* ECDH */
+	const EC_GROUP *ec_group;	/* ECDH */
+	u_char c25519_client_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */
+	u_char c25519_client_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */
 };
 
 int	 kex_names_valid(const char *);
 char	*kex_alg_list(char);
 
-Kex	*kex_setup(char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
-void	 kex_finish(Kex *);
+int	 kex_new(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **);
+int	 kex_setup(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+void	 kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *);
+void	 kex_free(struct kex *);
 
-void	 kex_send_kexinit(Kex *);
-void	 kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-void	 kex_derive_keys(Kex *, u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
-void	 kex_derive_keys_bn(Kex *, u_char *, u_int, const BIGNUM *);
+int	 kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *, int *, char ***);
+int	 kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+void	 kex_prop_free(char **);
 
-Newkeys *kex_get_newkeys(int);
+int	 kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *);
+int	 kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int	 kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const struct sshbuf *);
+int	 kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const BIGNUM *);
+int	 kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *);
 
-void	 kexdh_client(Kex *);
-void	 kexdh_server(Kex *);
-void	 kexgex_client(Kex *);
-void	 kexgex_server(Kex *);
-void	 kexecdh_client(Kex *);
-void	 kexecdh_server(Kex *);
-void	 kexc25519_client(Kex *);
-void	 kexc25519_server(Kex *);
+int	 kexdh_client(struct ssh *);
+int	 kexdh_server(struct ssh *);
+int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
+int	 kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
+int	 kexecdh_client(struct ssh *);
+int	 kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
+int	 kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
+int	 kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
 
-void
-kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
-    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
-void
-kexgex_hash(int, char *, char *, char *, int, char *,
-    int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
-    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-void
-kex_ecdh_hash(int, const EC_GROUP *, char *, char *, char *, int,
-    char *, int, u_char *, int, const EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *,
-    const BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
-#endif
-void
-kex_c25519_hash(int, char *, char *, char *, int,
-    char *, int, u_char *, int, const u_char *, const u_char *,
-    const u_char *, u_int, u_char **, u_int *);
+int	 kex_dh_hash(const char *, const char *,
+    const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
 
-#define CURVE25519_SIZE 32
-void	kexc25519_keygen(u_char[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char[CURVE25519_SIZE])
+int	 kexgex_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
+    const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+    int, int, int,
+    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+    u_char *, size_t *);
+
+int kex_ecdh_hash(int, const EC_GROUP *, const char *, const char *,
+    const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+    const EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
+
+int	 kex_c25519_hash(int, const char *, const char *, const char *, size_t,
+    const char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, const u_char *,
+    const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t *);
+
+void	kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
-void kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
-    const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], Buffer *out)
+int	kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+    const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out)
 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
 
-void
+int
 derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]);
 
 #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
 void	dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int);
 #endif
 
+#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) || !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#endif
+
 #endif

crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.7 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.8 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -35,13 +35,14 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
-#include "buffer.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 
 extern int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(u_char a[CURVE25519_SIZE],
     const u_char b[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char c[CURVE25519_SIZE])
@@ -58,65 +59,70 @@ kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
 	crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pub, key, basepoint);
 }
 
-void
+int
 kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
-    const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], Buffer *out)
+    const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out)
 {
 	u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+	int r;
 
 	crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub);
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
 #endif
-	buffer_clear(out);
-	buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+	sshbuf_reset(out);
+	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
 	explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+	return r;
 }
 
-void
+int
 kex_c25519_hash(
     int hash_alg,
-    char *client_version_string,
-    char *server_version_string,
-    char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
-    char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
-    u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
+    const char *client_version_string,
+    const char *server_version_string,
+    const char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
+    const char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
+    const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
     const u_char client_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE],
     const u_char server_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE],
-    const u_char *shared_secret, u_int secretlen,
-    u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen)
+    const u_char *shared_secret, size_t secretlen,
+    u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
 {
-	Buffer b;
-	static u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
-
-	/* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
-	buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
-	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
-	buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
-	buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
-	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
-	buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
-
-	buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
-	buffer_put_string(&b, client_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-	buffer_put_string(&b, server_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-	buffer_append(&b, shared_secret, secretlen);
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	int r;
 
+	if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg))
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) < 0 ||
+	    /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, client_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, server_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(b, shared_secret, secretlen)) < 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return r;
+	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-	buffer_dump(&b);
+	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
 #endif
-	if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: digest_buffer failed", __func__);
-
-	buffer_free(&b);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-	dump_digest("hash", digest, ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg));
-#endif
-	*hash = digest;
+	if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
 	*hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+	dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#endif
+	return 0;
 }

crypto/openssh/kexc25519c.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519c.c,v 1.4 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519c.c,v 1.7 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -33,97 +33,138 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 
-void
-kexc25519_client(Kex *kex)
+static int
+input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt);
+
+int
+kexc25519_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	Key *server_host_key;
-	u_char client_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
-	u_char client_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE];
-	u_char *server_pubkey = NULL;
-	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
-	u_char *hash;
-	u_int slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
-	Buffer shared_secret;
-
-	kexc25519_keygen(client_key, client_pubkey);
-
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
-	packet_put_string(client_pubkey, sizeof(client_pubkey));
-	packet_send();
-	debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
 
+	kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, kex->c25519_client_pubkey);
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-	dump_digest("client private key:", client_key, sizeof(client_key));
+	dump_digest("client private key:", kex->c25519_client_key,
+	    sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
 #endif
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, kex->c25519_client_pubkey,
+	    sizeof(kex->c25519_client_pubkey))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
 
 	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
-	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_c25519_reply);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+	u_char *server_pubkey = NULL;
+	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t slen, pklen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+	int r;
+
+	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* hostkey */
-	server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
-	server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
-	if (server_host_key == NULL)
-		fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
-	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
-		fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
-	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
-		fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
-	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
-		fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
+	    &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+	    &server_host_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
+	    (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+	    server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Q_S, server public key */
-	server_pubkey = packet_get_string(&slen);
-	if (slen != CURVE25519_SIZE)
-		fatal("Incorrect size for server Curve25519 pubkey: %d", slen);
+	/* signed H */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_pubkey, &pklen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (pklen != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	dump_digest("server public key:", server_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE);
 #endif
 
-	/* signed H */
-	signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	buffer_init(&shared_secret);
-	kexc25519_shared_key(client_key, server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pubkey,
+	    shared_secret)) < 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* calc and verify H */
-	kex_c25519_hash(
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kex_c25519_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
 	    kex->client_version_string,
 	    kex->server_version_string,
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
-	    client_pubkey,
+	    kex->c25519_client_pubkey,
 	    server_pubkey,
-	    buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret),
-	    &hash, &hashlen
-	);
-	free(server_host_key_blob);
-	free(server_pubkey);
-	if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
-		fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
-	key_free(server_host_key);
-	free(signature);
+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
+	    hash, &hashlen)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen,
+	    ssh->compat)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* save session id */
 	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
 		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
 	}
-	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen,
-	    buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret));
-	buffer_free(&shared_secret);
-	kex_finish(kex);
+
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
+	free(server_host_key_blob);
+	free(server_pubkey);
+	free(signature);
+	sshkey_free(server_host_key);
+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+	return r;
 }

crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.4 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.8 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -30,97 +30,129 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 
-void
-kexc25519_server(Kex *kex)
+static int input_kex_c25519_init(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexc25519_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	Key *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_c25519_init);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_c25519_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
 	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
 	u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
 	u_char *client_pubkey = NULL;
 	u_char server_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE];
-	u_char *hash;
-	u_int slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
-	Buffer shared_secret;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t slen, pklen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+	int r;
 
 	/* generate private key */
 	kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pubkey);
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	dump_digest("server private key:", server_key, sizeof(server_key));
 #endif
-
 	if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
-	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL)
-		fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
-	server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type);
-	if (server_host_public == NULL)
-		fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
-	server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type);
-
-	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
-	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
-	client_pubkey = packet_get_string(&slen);
-	if (slen != CURVE25519_SIZE)
-		fatal("Incorrect size for server Curve25519 pubkey: %d", slen);
-	packet_check_eom();
+	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+	    kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+	server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+	    kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+	if (server_host_public == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &client_pubkey, &pklen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (pklen != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	dump_digest("client public key:", client_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE);
 #endif
 
-	buffer_init(&shared_secret);
-	kexc25519_shared_key(server_key, client_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(server_key, client_pubkey,
+	    shared_secret)) < 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* calc H */
-	key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
-	kex_c25519_hash(
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
+	    &sbloblen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kex_c25519_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
 	    kex->client_version_string,
 	    kex->server_version_string,
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
 	    client_pubkey,
 	    server_pubkey,
-	    buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret),
-	    &hash, &hashlen
-	);
+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
+	    hash, &hashlen)) < 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* save session id := H */
 	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
 		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
 	}
 
 	/* sign H */
-	kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen,
-	    hash, hashlen);
-
-	/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
+	if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public,
+	    &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, ssh->compat)) < 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);
-	packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
-	packet_put_string(server_pubkey, sizeof(server_pubkey));
-	packet_put_string(signature, slen);
-	packet_send();
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_pubkey, sizeof(server_pubkey))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
-	free(signature);
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
 	free(server_host_key_blob);
-	/* have keys, free server key */
+	free(signature);
 	free(client_pubkey);
-
-	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen,
-	    buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret));
-	buffer_free(&shared_secret);
-	kex_finish(kex);
+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+	return r;
 }

crypto/openssh/kexdh.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.24 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.25 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -25,63 +25,69 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <signal.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
-#include "buffer.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "digest.h"
-#include "log.h"
 
-void
+int
 kex_dh_hash(
-    char *client_version_string,
-    char *server_version_string,
-    char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
-    char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
-    u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
-    BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
-    BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
-    BIGNUM *shared_secret,
-    u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen)
+    const char *client_version_string,
+    const char *server_version_string,
+    const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
+    const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
+    const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
+    const BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
+    const BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
+    const BIGNUM *shared_secret,
+    u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
 {
-	Buffer b;
-	static u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
-
-	/* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
-	buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
-	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
-	buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
-	buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
-	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
-	buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
-
-	buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, client_dh_pub);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, server_dh_pub);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	int r;
 
+	if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1))
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 ||
+	    /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, client_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, server_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return r;
+	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-	buffer_dump(&b);
+	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
 #endif
-	if (ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed", __func__);
-
-	buffer_free(&b);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-	dump_digest("hash", digest, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1));
-#endif
-	*hash = digest;
+	if (ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
 	*hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+	dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#endif
+	return 0;
 }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.15 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.18 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -34,128 +36,177 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "dh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 
-void
-kexdh_client(Kex *kex)
+static int input_kex_dh(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
-	DH *dh;
-	Key *server_host_key;
-	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
-	u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-	u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
-	int kout;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
 
 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
 	switch (kex->kex_type) {
 	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
-		dh = dh_new_group1();
+		kex->dh = dh_new_group1();
 		break;
 	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
-		dh = dh_new_group14();
+		kex->dh = dh_new_group14();
 		break;
 	default:
-		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
 	}
-	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
-	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-	packet_send();
-
 	debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
 	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 #endif
-
 	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY");
-	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, &input_kex_dh);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
 
+static int
+input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
+	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+	int kout, r;
+
+	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	/* key, cert */
-	server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
-	server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
-	if (server_host_key == NULL)
-		fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
-	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
-		fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
-	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
-		fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
-	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
-		fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
-
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
+	    &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+	    &server_host_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
+	    (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+	    server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	/* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
-	if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
-	packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-
+	if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* signed H */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_server_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
 	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 	debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
 #endif
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_server_pub)) {
+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad server public DH value");
+		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
-	/* signed H */
-	signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
-		packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-
-	klen = DH_size(dh);
-	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh)) < 0)
-		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
 #endif
-	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("kexdh_client: BN_new failed");
-	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-		fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
-	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
-	free(kbuf);
 
 	/* calc and verify H */
-	kex_dh_hash(
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
 	    kex->client_version_string,
 	    kex->server_version_string,
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
-	    dh->pub_key,
+	    kex->dh->pub_key,
 	    dh_server_pub,
 	    shared_secret,
-	    &hash, &hashlen
-	);
-	free(server_host_key_blob);
-	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-	DH_free(dh);
+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
-	if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
-		fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
-	key_free(server_host_key);
-	free(signature);
+	if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen,
+	    ssh->compat)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* save session id */
 	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
 		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
 	}
 
-	kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-	kex_finish(kex);
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	DH_free(kex->dh);
+	kex->dh = NULL;
+	if (dh_server_pub)
+		BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+	if (kbuf) {
+		explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+		free(kbuf);
+	}
+	if (shared_secret)
+		BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+	sshkey_free(server_host_key);
+	free(server_host_key_blob);
+	free(signature);
+	return r;
 }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.18 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.22 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <stdarg.h>
@@ -33,55 +35,89 @@
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "dh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 
-void
-kexdh_server(Kex *kex)
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+static int input_kex_dh_init(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexdh_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-	DH *dh;
-	Key *server_host_public, *server_host_private;
-	u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-	u_int sbloblen, klen, hashlen, slen;
-	int kout;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
 
 	/* generate server DH public key */
 	switch (kex->kex_type) {
 	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
-		dh = dh_new_group1();
+		kex->dh = dh_new_group1();
 		break;
 	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
-		dh = dh_new_group14();
+		kex->dh = dh_new_group14();
 		break;
 	default:
-		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
 	}
-	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
-	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, &input_kex_dh_init);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private;
+	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t sbloblen, slen;
+	size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
+	int kout, r;
 
 	if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
-	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL)
-		fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
-	server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type);
-	if (server_host_public == NULL)
-		fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
-	server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type);
+	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+	    kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+	server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+	    kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+	if (server_host_public == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* key, cert */
-	if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-	packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
-	packet_check_eom();
+	if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
@@ -91,70 +127,90 @@ kexdh_server(Kex *kex)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
 	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 #endif
-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-		packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_client_pub)) {
+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad client public DH value");
+		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
-	klen = DH_size(dh);
-	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh)) < 0)
-		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
 #endif
-	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("kexdh_server: BN_new failed");
-	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-		fatal("kexdh_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
-	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
-	free(kbuf);
-
-	key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
-
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
+	    &sbloblen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 	/* calc H */
-	kex_dh_hash(
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
 	    kex->client_version_string,
 	    kex->server_version_string,
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
 	    dh_client_pub,
-	    dh->pub_key,
+	    kex->dh->pub_key,
 	    shared_secret,
-	    &hash, &hashlen
-	);
-	BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* save session id := H */
 	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
 		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
 	}
 
 	/* sign H */
-	kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen,
-	    hash, hashlen);
+	if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public,
+	    &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, ssh->compat)) < 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
 
 	/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
-	packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
-	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);	/* f */
-	packet_put_string(signature, slen);
-	packet_send();
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||	/* f */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
-	free(signature);
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	DH_free(kex->dh);
+	kex->dh = NULL;
+	if (dh_client_pub)
+		BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+	if (kbuf) {
+		explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+		free(kbuf);
+	}
+	if (shared_secret)
+		BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
 	free(server_host_key_blob);
-	/* have keys, free DH */
-	DH_free(dh);
-
-	kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-	kex_finish(kex);
+	free(signature);
+	return r;
 }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/kexecdh.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.5 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.6 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
@@ -38,60 +38,63 @@
 #include <openssl/ec.h>
 #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
 
-#include "buffer.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 
-void
+int
 kex_ecdh_hash(
     int hash_alg,
     const EC_GROUP *ec_group,
-    char *client_version_string,
-    char *server_version_string,
-    char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
-    char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
-    u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
+    const char *client_version_string,
+    const char *server_version_string,
+    const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
+    const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
+    const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
     const EC_POINT *client_dh_pub,
     const EC_POINT *server_dh_pub,
     const BIGNUM *shared_secret,
-    u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen)
+    u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
 {
-	Buffer b;
-	static u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
-
-	/* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
-	buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
-	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
-	buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
-	buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
-	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
-	buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
-
-	buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
-	buffer_put_ecpoint(&b, ec_group, client_dh_pub);
-	buffer_put_ecpoint(&b, ec_group, server_dh_pub);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	int r;
 
+	if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg))
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 ||
+	    /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_ec(b, client_dh_pub, ec_group)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_ec(b, server_dh_pub, ec_group)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return r;
+	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-	buffer_dump(&b);
+	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
 #endif
-	if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed", __func__);
-
-	buffer_free(&b);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-	dump_digest("hash", digest, ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg));
-#endif
-	*hash = digest;
+	if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
 	*hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+	dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#endif
+	return 0;
 }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */

crypto/openssh/kexecdhc.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.7 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.10 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -26,140 +26,203 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "dh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+static int input_kex_ecdh_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-
-void
-kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
+int
+kexecdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	EC_KEY *client_key;
-	EC_POINT *server_public;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
 	const EC_GROUP *group;
-	BIGNUM *shared_secret;
-	Key *server_host_key;
-	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
-	u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-	u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+	const EC_POINT *public_key;
+	int r;
 
-	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: EC_KEY_generate_key failed", __func__);
+	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	group = EC_KEY_get0_group(client_key);
+	public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key);
 
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
-	packet_put_ecpoint(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key));
-	packet_send();
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, public_key, group)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 	debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	fputs("client private key:\n", stderr);
-	key_dump_ec_key(client_key);
+	sshkey_dump_ec_key(client_key);
 #endif
+	kex->ec_client_key = client_key;
+	kex->ec_group = group;
+	client_key = NULL;	/* owned by the kex */
 
 	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
-	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_ecdh_reply);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (client_key)
+		EC_KEY_free(client_key);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_ecdh_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	const EC_GROUP *group;
+	EC_POINT *server_public = NULL;
+	EC_KEY *client_key;
+	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
+	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t slen, sbloblen;
+	size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
+	int r;
+
+	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	group = kex->ec_group;
+	client_key = kex->ec_client_key;
 
 	/* hostkey */
-	server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
-	server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
-	if (server_host_key == NULL)
-		fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
-	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
-		fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
-	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
-		fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
-	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
-		fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
+	    &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+	    &server_host_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
+	    (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+	    server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Q_S, server public key */
-	if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: EC_POINT_new failed", __func__);
-	packet_get_ecpoint(group, server_public);
-
-	if (key_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: invalid server public key", __func__);
+	/* signed H */
+	if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, server_public, group)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	fputs("server public key:\n", stderr);
-	key_dump_ec_point(group, server_public);
+	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, server_public);
 #endif
-
-	/* signed H */
-	signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
-	packet_check_eom();
+	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0) {
+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid server public key");
+		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
-	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, server_public,
-	    client_key, NULL) != (int)klen)
-		fatal("%s: ECDH_compute_key failed", __func__);
+	    client_key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
 #endif
-	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
-	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
-	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
-	free(kbuf);
-
 	/* calc and verify H */
-	kex_ecdh_hash(
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kex_ecdh_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
 	    group,
 	    kex->client_version_string,
 	    kex->server_version_string,
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
 	    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key),
 	    server_public,
 	    shared_secret,
-	    &hash, &hashlen
-	);
-	free(server_host_key_blob);
-	EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public);
-	EC_KEY_free(client_key);
+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
-	if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
-		fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
-	key_free(server_host_key);
-	free(signature);
+	if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash,
+	    hashlen, ssh->compat)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* save session id */
 	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
 		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
 	}
 
-	kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-	kex_finish(kex);
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	if (kex->ec_client_key) {
+		EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
+		kex->ec_client_key = NULL;
+	}
+	if (server_public)
+		EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public);
+	if (kbuf) {
+		explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+		free(kbuf);
+	}
+	if (shared_secret)
+		BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+	sshkey_free(server_host_key);
+	free(server_host_key_blob);
+	free(signature);
+	return r;
 }
-#else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-void
-kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
-{
-	fatal("ECC support is not enabled");
-}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */
+

crypto/openssh/kexecdhs.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.10 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.14 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -26,136 +26,183 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+static int input_kex_ecdh_init(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
-void
-kexecdh_server(Kex *kex)
+int
+kexecdh_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	EC_POINT *client_public;
-	EC_KEY *server_key;
-	const EC_GROUP *group;
-	BIGNUM *shared_secret;
-	Key *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
-	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
-	u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-	u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_ecdh_init);
+	return 0;
+}
 
-	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: EC_KEY_generate_key failed", __func__);
+static int
+input_kex_ecdh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	EC_POINT *client_public;
+	EC_KEY *server_key = NULL;
+	const EC_GROUP *group;
+	const EC_POINT *public_key;
+	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
+	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t slen, sbloblen;
+	size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	group = EC_KEY_get0_group(server_key);
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	fputs("server private key:\n", stderr);
-	key_dump_ec_key(server_key);
+	sshkey_dump_ec_key(server_key);
 #endif
 
 	if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
-	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL)
-		fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
-	server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type);
-	if (server_host_public == NULL)
-		fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
-	server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type);
-
-	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
-	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
-	if ((client_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: EC_POINT_new failed", __func__);
-	packet_get_ecpoint(group, client_public);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (key_ec_validate_public(group, client_public) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: invalid client public key", __func__);
+	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+	    kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+	server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+	    kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+	if (server_host_public == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((client_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, client_public, group)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	fputs("client public key:\n", stderr);
-	key_dump_ec_point(group, client_public);
+	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, client_public);
 #endif
+	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, client_public) != 0) {
+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid client public key");
+		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Calculate shared_secret */
 	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
-	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, client_public,
-	    server_key, NULL) != (int)klen)
-		fatal("%s: ECDH_compute_key failed", __func__);
+	    server_key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
 #endif
-	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
-	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
-	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
-	free(kbuf);
-
 	/* calc H */
-	key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
-	kex_ecdh_hash(
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
+	    &sbloblen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kex_ecdh_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
 	    group,
 	    kex->client_version_string,
 	    kex->server_version_string,
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
 	    client_public,
 	    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key),
 	    shared_secret,
-	    &hash, &hashlen
-	);
-	EC_POINT_clear_free(client_public);
+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* save session id := H */
 	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
 		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
 	}
 
 	/* sign H */
-	kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen,
-	    hash, hashlen);
+	if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public,
+	    &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, ssh->compat)) < 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
 
+	public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key);
 	/* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);
-	packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
-	packet_put_ecpoint(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key));
-	packet_put_string(signature, slen);
-	packet_send();
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, public_key, group)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
-	free(signature);
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	if (kex->ec_client_key) {
+		EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
+		kex->ec_client_key = NULL;
+	}
+	if (server_key)
+		EC_KEY_free(server_key);
+	if (kbuf) {
+		explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+		free(kbuf);
+	}
+	if (shared_secret)
+		BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
 	free(server_host_key_blob);
-	/* have keys, free server key */
-	EC_KEY_free(server_key);
+	free(signature);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */
 
-	kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-	kex_finish(kex);
-}
-#else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-void
-kexecdh_server(Kex *kex)
-{
-	fatal("ECC support is not enabled");
-}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */

crypto/openssh/kexgex.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.28 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.29 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -26,73 +26,77 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "digest.h"
-#include "log.h"
 
-void
+int
 kexgex_hash(
     int hash_alg,
-    char *client_version_string,
-    char *server_version_string,
-    char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
-    char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
-    u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
-    int min, int wantbits, int max, BIGNUM *prime, BIGNUM *gen,
-    BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
-    BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
-    BIGNUM *shared_secret,
-    u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen)
+    const char *client_version_string,
+    const char *server_version_string,
+    const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
+    const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
+    const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
+    int min, int wantbits, int max,
+    const BIGNUM *prime,
+    const BIGNUM *gen,
+    const BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
+    const BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
+    const BIGNUM *shared_secret,
+    u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
 {
-	Buffer b;
-	static u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	int r;
 
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
-
-	/* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
-	buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
-	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
-	buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
-	buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
-	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
-	buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
-
-	buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
-	if (min == -1 || max == -1)
-		buffer_put_int(&b, wantbits);
-	else {
-		buffer_put_int(&b, min);
-		buffer_put_int(&b, wantbits);
-		buffer_put_int(&b, max);
+	if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1))
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 ||
+	    /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (min != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, min)) != 0) ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, wantbits)) != 0 ||
+	    (max != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, max)) != 0) ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, prime)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, gen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, client_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, server_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return r;
 	}
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, prime);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, gen);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, client_dh_pub);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, server_dh_pub);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
-
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	buffer_dump(&b);
+	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
 #endif
-	if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed", __func__);
-
-	buffer_free(&b);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-	dump_digest("hash", digest, ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg));
-#endif
-	*hash = digest;
+	if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
 	*hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#endif
+	return 0;
 }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.17 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.20 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -35,173 +37,243 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "dh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "compat.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 
-void
-kexgex_client(Kex *kex)
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
-	BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
-	Key *server_host_key;
-	u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-	u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
-	int kout;
-	int min, max, nbits;
-	DH *dh;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
+	u_int nbits;
 
 	nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
 
-	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) {
+	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+	kex->nbits = nbits;
+	if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) {
 		/* Old GEX request */
-		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD);
-		packet_put_int(nbits);
-		min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-		max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-
-		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", nbits);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD))
+		    != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", kex->nbits);
 	} else {
 		/* New GEX request */
-		min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-		max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
-		packet_put_int(min);
-		packet_put_int(nbits);
-		packet_put_int(max);
-
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			goto out;
 		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent",
-		    min, nbits, max);
+		    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
 	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n",
-	    min, nbits, max);
+	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
 #endif
-	packet_send();
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP,
+	    &input_kex_dh_gex_group);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
 
-	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
-	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP);
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
+	int r, bits;
 
-	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("BN_new");
-	packet_get_bignum2(p);
-	if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("BN_new");
-	packet_get_bignum2(g);
-	packet_check_eom();
+	debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
 
-	if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
-		fatal("DH_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-		    min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
-
-	dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
-	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (g = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 ||
+	    (u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
 
+	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
 	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 #endif
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, NULL);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply);
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if (p)
+		BN_clear_free(p);
+	if (g)
+		BN_clear_free(g);
+	return r;
+}
 
-	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
-	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);
-	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-	packet_send();
-
-	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
-	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY);
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
+	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+	int kout, r;
 
+	debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
+	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	/* key, cert */
-	server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
-	server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
-	if (server_host_key == NULL)
-		fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
-	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
-		fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
-	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
-		fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
-	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
-		fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
-
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
+	    &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+	    &server_host_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
+	    (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+	    server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	/* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
-	if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
-	packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-
+	if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* signed H */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_server_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
 	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 	debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
 #endif
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_server_pub)) {
+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad server public DH value");
+		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
-	/* signed H */
-	signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
-		packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-
-	klen = DH_size(dh);
-	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh)) < 0)
-		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
 #endif
-	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("kexgex_client: BN_new failed");
-	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-		fatal("kexgex_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
-	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
-	free(kbuf);
-
-	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
-		min = max = -1;
+	if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
+		kex->min = kex->max = -1;
 
 	/* calc and verify H */
-	kexgex_hash(
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
 	    kex->client_version_string,
 	    kex->server_version_string,
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
-	    min, nbits, max,
-	    dh->p, dh->g,
-	    dh->pub_key,
+	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
+	    kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g,
+	    kex->dh->pub_key,
 	    dh_server_pub,
 	    shared_secret,
-	    &hash, &hashlen
-	);
+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
-	/* have keys, free DH */
-	DH_free(dh);
-	free(server_host_key_blob);
-	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-
-	if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
-		fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
-	key_free(server_host_key);
-	free(signature);
+	if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash,
+	    hashlen, ssh->compat)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* save session id */
 	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
 		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
 	}
-	kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
 
-	kex_finish(kex);
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	DH_free(kex->dh);
+	kex->dh = NULL;
+	if (dh_server_pub)
+		BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+	if (kbuf) {
+		explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+		free(kbuf);
+	}
+	if (shared_secret)
+		BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+	sshkey_free(server_host_key);
+	free(server_host_key_blob);
+	free(signature);
+	return r;
 }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.19 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.24 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/param.h>	/* MIN MAX */
 
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -35,10 +37,9 @@
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -49,33 +50,43 @@
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 #endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 
-void
-kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+int
+kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-	Key *server_host_public, *server_host_private;
-	DH *dh;
-	u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-	u_int sbloblen, klen, slen, hashlen;
-	int omin = -1, min = -1, omax = -1, max = -1, onbits = -1, nbits = -1;
-	int type, kout;
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD,
+	    &input_kex_dh_gex_request);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST,
+	    &input_kex_dh_gex_request);
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST");
+	return 0;
+}
 
-	if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
-	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL)
-		fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
-	server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type);
-	if (server_host_public == NULL)
-		fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
-	server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type);
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
+	u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0;
 
-	type = packet_read();
 	switch (type) {
 	case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST:
 		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
-		omin = min = packet_get_int();
-		onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
-		omax = max = packet_get_int();
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		kex->nbits = nbits;
+		kex->min = min;
+		kex->max = max;
 		min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
 		max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
 		nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
@@ -83,45 +94,89 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
 		break;
 	case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD:
 		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received");
-		onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		kex->nbits = nbits;
 		/* unused for old GEX */
-		omin = min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-		omax = max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+		kex->min = min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+		kex->max = max = DH_GRP_MAX;
 		break;
 	default:
-		fatal("protocol error during kex, no DH_GEX_REQUEST: %d", type);
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
 	}
-	packet_check_eom();
 
-	if (omax < omin || onbits < omin || omax < onbits)
-		fatal("DH_GEX_REQUEST, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-		    omin, onbits, omax);
+	if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min ||
+	    kex->max < kex->nbits) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Contact privileged parent */
-	dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
-	if (dh == NULL)
-		packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching DH grp found");
-
+	kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
+	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent");
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP);
-	packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
-	packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
-	packet_send();
-
-	/* flush */
-	packet_write_wait();
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->p)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->g)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
-	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* old KEX does not use min/max in kexgex_hash() */
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD)
+		kex->min = kex->max = -1;
 
 	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT");
-	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private;
+	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t sbloblen, slen;
+	size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
+	int kout, r;
+
+	if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
+	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+	    kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+	server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+	    kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+	if (server_host_public == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* key, cert */
-	if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-	packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
-	packet_check_eom();
+	if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
@@ -131,78 +186,92 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
 	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 #endif
-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-		packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_client_pub)) {
+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad client public DH value");
+		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
-	klen = DH_size(dh);
-	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh)) < 0)
-		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
 #endif
-	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("kexgex_server: BN_new failed");
-	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-		fatal("kexgex_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
-	explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
-	free(kbuf);
-
-	key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
-
-	if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD)
-		omin = min = omax = max = -1;
-
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
+	    &sbloblen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 	/* calc H */
-	kexgex_hash(
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
 	    kex->client_version_string,
 	    kex->server_version_string,
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
-	    omin, onbits, omax,
-	    dh->p, dh->g,
+	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
+	    kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g,
 	    dh_client_pub,
-	    dh->pub_key,
+	    kex->dh->pub_key,
 	    shared_secret,
-	    &hash, &hashlen
-	);
-	BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* save session id := H */
 	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
 		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
+		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
 	}
 
 	/* sign H */
-	kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen,
-	    hash, hashlen);
+	if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public,
+	    &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, ssh->compat)) < 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
 
 	/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
-	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY sent");
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY);
-	packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
-	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);	/* f */
-	packet_put_string(signature, slen);
-	packet_send();
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||     /* f */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 
-	free(signature);
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+ out:
+	DH_free(kex->dh);
+	kex->dh = NULL;
+	if (dh_client_pub)
+		BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+	if (kbuf) {
+		explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
+		free(kbuf);
+	}
+	if (shared_secret)
+		BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
 	free(server_host_key_blob);
-	/* have keys, free DH */
-	DH_free(dh);
-
-	kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-
-	kex_finish(kex);
+	free(signature);
+	return r;
 }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

crypto/openssh/key.c

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.122 2014/07/22 01:18:50 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.127 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * placed in the public domain
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 #define SSH_KEY_NO_DEFINE
 #include "key.h"
@@ -39,24 +39,6 @@ key_new_private(int type)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-u_char*
-key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
-    u_int *dgst_raw_length)
-{
-	u_char *ret = NULL;
-	size_t dlen;
-	int r;
-
-	if (dgst_raw_length != NULL)
-		*dgst_raw_length = 0;
-	if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_type, &ret, &dlen)) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-	if (dlen > INT_MAX)
-		fatal("%s: giant len %zu", __func__, dlen);
-	*dgst_raw_length = dlen;
-	return ret;
-}
-
 int
 key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
 {
@@ -329,7 +311,7 @@ key_load_file(int fd, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *blob)
 {
 	int r;
 
-	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, filename, blob)) != 0) {
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, blob)) != 0) {
 		fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
 		error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 		return 0;
@@ -436,44 +418,9 @@ key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-Key *
-key_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
-    char **commentp)
-{
-	int r;
-	Key *ret = NULL;
-
-	if ((r = sshkey_load_private_pem(fd, type, passphrase,
-	     &ret, commentp)) != 0) {
-		fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
-		if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
-			debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-		else
-			error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	return ret;
-}
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-
 int
 key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
 {
 	return sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) == 0 ? 1 : 0;
 }
 
-int
-key_in_file(Key *key, const char *filename, int strict_type)
-{
-	int r;
-
-	if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, filename, strict_type)) != 0) {
-		fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR);
-		if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT)
-			return 0;
-		error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-		return r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND ? 0 : -1;
-	}
-	return 1;
-}

crypto/openssh/key.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.42 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.47 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ typedef struct sshkey Key;
 #define key_free		sshkey_free
 #define key_equal_public	sshkey_equal_public
 #define key_equal		sshkey_equal
-#define key_fingerprint		sshkey_fingerprint
 #define key_type		sshkey_type
 #define key_cert_type		sshkey_cert_type
 #define key_ssh_name		sshkey_ssh_name
@@ -50,7 +49,6 @@ typedef struct sshkey Key;
 #define key_size		sshkey_size
 #define key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid	sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid
 #define key_ecdsa_key_to_nid	sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid
-#define key_names_valid2	sshkey_names_valid2
 #define key_is_cert		sshkey_is_cert
 #define key_type_plain		sshkey_type_plain
 #define key_cert_is_legacy	sshkey_cert_is_legacy
@@ -60,14 +58,12 @@ typedef struct sshkey Key;
 #define key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg	sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg
 #define key_dump_ec_point	sshkey_dump_ec_point
 #define key_dump_ec_key		sshkey_dump_ec_key
-#define key_fingerprint		sshkey_fingerprint
 #endif
 
 void	 key_add_private(Key *);
 Key	*key_new_private(int);
 void	 key_free(Key *);
 Key	*key_demote(const Key *);
-u_char	*key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
 int	 key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
 int	 key_read(Key *, char **);
 
@@ -104,8 +100,6 @@ Key	*key_load_public(const char *, char **);
 Key	*key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **);
 Key	*key_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, int *);
 Key	*key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *);
-Key	*key_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, char **);
 int	 key_perm_ok(int, const char *);
-int	 key_in_file(Key *, const char *, int);
 
 #endif

crypto/openssh/krl.h

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.2 2013/01/18 00:24:58 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.4 2015/01/13 19:06:49 djm Exp $ */
 
 #ifndef _KRL_H
 #define _KRL_H
@@ -36,28 +36,30 @@
 #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP	0x22
 #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID		0x23
 
+struct sshkey;
+struct sshbuf;
 struct ssh_krl;
 
 struct ssh_krl *ssh_krl_init(void);
 void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl);
 void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version);
-void ssh_krl_set_sign_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *sign_key);
-void ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
-    u_int64_t serial);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
-    u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
-    const char *key_id);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
-int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
-int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, Buffer *buf, const Key **sign_keys,
-    u_int nsign_keys);
-int ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
-    const Key **sign_ca_keys, u_int nsign_ca_keys);
-int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key);
-int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const Key *key);
+void ssh_krl_set_sign_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *sign_key);
+int ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+    const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t serial);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+    const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+    const struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *key_id);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
+    const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys);
+int ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
+    const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys);
+int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key);
 
 #endif /* _KRL_H */
 

crypto/openssh/loginrec.c

@@ -787,12 +787,12 @@ construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
 	/* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
 	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
 		sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
-		memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
+		memcpy(utx->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
 		if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
-			ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3];
-			ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
-			ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
-			ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[0] = utx->ut_addr_v6[3];
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
 		}
 	}
 # endif

crypto/openssh/mac.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.30 2014/04/30 19:07:48 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.32 2015/01/15 18:32:54 naddy Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -27,22 +27,16 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
-#include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "mac.h"
-#include "misc.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
 
 #include "digest.h"
 #include "hmac.h"
 #include "umac.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 
@@ -95,7 +89,7 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = {
 char *
 mac_alg_list(char sep)
 {
-	char *ret = NULL;
+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
 	const struct macalg *m;
 
@@ -103,20 +97,24 @@ mac_alg_list(char sep)
 		if (ret != NULL)
 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
 		nlen = strlen(m->name);
-		ret = xrealloc(ret, 1, rlen + nlen + 2);
+		if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
+			free(ret);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		ret = tmp;
 		memcpy(ret + rlen, m->name, nlen + 1);
 		rlen += nlen;
 	}
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static void
-mac_setup_by_alg(Mac *mac, const struct macalg *macalg)
+static int
+mac_setup_by_alg(struct sshmac *mac, const struct macalg *macalg)
 {
 	mac->type = macalg->type;
 	if (mac->type == SSH_DIGEST) {
 		if ((mac->hmac_ctx = ssh_hmac_start(macalg->alg)) == NULL)
-			fatal("ssh_hmac_start(alg=%d) failed", macalg->alg);
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = ssh_hmac_bytes(macalg->alg);
 	} else {
 		mac->mac_len = macalg->len / 8;
@@ -126,61 +124,61 @@ mac_setup_by_alg(Mac *mac, const struct macalg *macalg)
 	if (macalg->truncatebits != 0)
 		mac->mac_len = macalg->truncatebits / 8;
 	mac->etm = macalg->etm;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 int
-mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
+mac_setup(struct sshmac *mac, char *name)
 {
 	const struct macalg *m;
 
 	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
 		if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
 			continue;
-		if (mac != NULL) {
-			mac_setup_by_alg(mac, m);
-			debug2("mac_setup: setup %s", name);
-		}
-		return (0);
+		if (mac != NULL)
+			return mac_setup_by_alg(mac, m);
+		return 0;
 	}
-	debug2("mac_setup: unknown %s", name);
-	return (-1);
+	return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 }
 
 int
-mac_init(Mac *mac)
+mac_init(struct sshmac *mac)
 {
 	if (mac->key == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: no key", __func__);
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	switch (mac->type) {
 	case SSH_DIGEST:
 		if (mac->hmac_ctx == NULL ||
 		    ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len) < 0)
-			return -1;
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 		return 0;
 	case SSH_UMAC:
-		mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key);
+		if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key)) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		return 0;
 	case SSH_UMAC128:
-		mac->umac_ctx = umac128_new(mac->key);
+		if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac128_new(mac->key)) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		return 0;
 	default:
-		return -1;
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	}
 }
 
-u_char *
-mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
+int
+mac_compute(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, const u_char *data, int datalen,
+    u_char *digest, size_t dlen)
 {
 	static union {
-		u_char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+		u_char m[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
 		u_int64_t for_align;
 	} u;
 	u_char b[4];
 	u_char nonce[8];
 
 	if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(u))
-		fatal("mac_compute: mac too long %u %zu",
-		    mac->mac_len, sizeof(u));
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
 	switch (mac->type) {
 	case SSH_DIGEST:
@@ -190,10 +188,10 @@ mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
 		    ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, b, sizeof(b)) < 0 ||
 		    ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, data, datalen) < 0 ||
 		    ssh_hmac_final(mac->hmac_ctx, u.m, sizeof(u.m)) < 0)
-			fatal("ssh_hmac failed");
+			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		break;
 	case SSH_UMAC:
-		put_u64(nonce, seqno);
+		POKE_U64(nonce, seqno);
 		umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
 		umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce);
 		break;
@@ -203,13 +201,18 @@ mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
 		umac128_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce);
 		break;
 	default:
-		fatal("mac_compute: unknown MAC type");
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	}
-	return (u.m);
+	if (digest != NULL) {
+		if (dlen > mac->mac_len)
+			dlen = mac->mac_len;
+		memcpy(digest, u.m, dlen);
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void
-mac_clear(Mac *mac)
+mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
 {
 	if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) {
 		if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
@@ -231,17 +234,16 @@ mac_valid(const char *names)
 	char *maclist, *cp, *p;
 
 	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
-		return (0);
-	maclist = cp = xstrdup(names);
+		return 0;
+	if ((maclist = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
 	    (p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) {
 		if (mac_setup(NULL, p) < 0) {
-			debug("bad mac %s [%s]", p, names);
 			free(maclist);
-			return (0);
+			return 0;
 		}
 	}
-	debug3("macs ok: [%s]", names);
 	free(maclist);
-	return (1);
+	return 1;
 }

crypto/openssh/mac.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.8 2013/11/07 11:58:27 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.9 2015/01/13 19:31:40 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,9 +23,29 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
+#ifndef SSHMAC_H
+#define SSHMAC_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+struct sshmac {
+	char	*name;
+	int	enabled;
+	u_int	mac_len;
+	u_char	*key;
+	u_int	key_len;
+	int	type;
+	int	etm;		/* Encrypt-then-MAC */
+	struct ssh_hmac_ctx	*hmac_ctx;
+	struct umac_ctx		*umac_ctx;
+};
+
 int	 mac_valid(const char *);
 char	*mac_alg_list(char);
-int	 mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
-int	 mac_init(Mac *);
-u_char	*mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
-void	 mac_clear(Mac *);
+int	 mac_setup(struct sshmac *, char *);
+int	 mac_init(struct sshmac *);
+int	 mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, int,
+    u_char *, size_t);
+void	 mac_clear(struct sshmac *);
+
+#endif /* SSHMAC_H */

crypto/openssh/misc.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.94 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.96 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/un.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
 
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid)
 	if (path != NULL)
 		filename = path + 1;
 
-	if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= MAXPATHLEN)
+	if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= PATH_MAX)
 		fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
 
 	return (ret);

crypto/openssh/moduli.0

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 MODULI(5)                     File Formats Manual                    MODULI(5)
 
 NAME
-     moduli - Diffie-Hellman moduli
+     moduli M-bM-^@M-^S Diffie-Hellman moduli
 
 DESCRIPTION
      The /etc/moduli file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
                         bitmask of the following values:
 
                         0x00  Not tested.
-                        0x01  Composite number - not prime.
+                        0x01  Composite number M-bM-^@M-^S not prime.
                         0x02  Sieve of Eratosthenes.
                         0x04  Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests.
 
@@ -71,4 +71,4 @@ STANDARDS
      the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006,
      2006.
 
-OpenBSD 5.6                   September 26, 2012                   OpenBSD 5.6
+OpenBSD 5.7                   September 26, 2012                   OpenBSD 5.7