kcrypto_aes: Use separate sessions for AES and SHA1

Some hardware supports AES acceleration but not SHA1, e.g., AES-NI
extensions.  It is useful to have accelerated AES even if SHA1 must be
software.

Suggested by:	asomers
Reviewed by:	asomers, dfr
Sponsored by:	EMC / Isilon Storage Division
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5146
This commit is contained in:
Conrad Meyer 2016-02-02 00:14:51 +00:00
parent d233a81b5a
commit 92deafc3a3
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=295134

View file

@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
struct aes_state {
struct mtx as_lock;
uint64_t as_session;
uint64_t as_session_aes;
uint64_t as_session_sha1;
};
static void
@ -61,8 +62,10 @@ aes_destroy(struct krb5_key_state *ks)
{
struct aes_state *as = ks->ks_priv;
if (as->as_session)
crypto_freesession(as->as_session);
if (as->as_session_aes != 0)
crypto_freesession(as->as_session_aes);
if (as->as_session_sha1 != 0)
crypto_freesession(as->as_session_sha1);
mtx_destroy(&as->as_lock);
free(ks->ks_priv, M_GSSAPI);
}
@ -72,32 +75,35 @@ aes_set_key(struct krb5_key_state *ks, const void *in)
{
void *kp = ks->ks_key;
struct aes_state *as = ks->ks_priv;
struct cryptoini cri[2];
struct cryptoini cri;
if (kp != in)
bcopy(in, kp, ks->ks_class->ec_keylen);
if (as->as_session)
crypto_freesession(as->as_session);
bzero(cri, sizeof(cri));
if (as->as_session_aes != 0)
crypto_freesession(as->as_session_aes);
if (as->as_session_sha1 != 0)
crypto_freesession(as->as_session_sha1);
/*
* We only want the first 96 bits of the HMAC.
*/
cri[0].cri_alg = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC;
cri[0].cri_klen = ks->ks_class->ec_keybits;
cri[0].cri_mlen = 12;
cri[0].cri_key = ks->ks_key;
cri[0].cri_next = &cri[1];
bzero(&cri, sizeof(cri));
cri.cri_alg = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC;
cri.cri_klen = ks->ks_class->ec_keybits;
cri.cri_mlen = 12;
cri.cri_key = ks->ks_key;
cri.cri_next = NULL;
crypto_newsession(&as->as_session_sha1, &cri,
CRYPTOCAP_F_HARDWARE | CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE);
cri[1].cri_alg = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
cri[1].cri_klen = ks->ks_class->ec_keybits;
cri[1].cri_mlen = 0;
cri[1].cri_key = ks->ks_key;
cri[1].cri_next = NULL;
crypto_newsession(&as->as_session, cri,
bzero(&cri, sizeof(cri));
cri.cri_alg = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
cri.cri_klen = ks->ks_class->ec_keybits;
cri.cri_mlen = 0;
cri.cri_key = ks->ks_key;
cri.cri_next = NULL;
crypto_newsession(&as->as_session_aes, &cri,
CRYPTOCAP_F_HARDWARE | CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE);
}
@ -114,7 +120,7 @@ aes_crypto_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
int error;
struct aes_state *as = (struct aes_state *) crp->crp_opaque;
if (CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC)
if (CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(crp->crp_sid) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC)
return (0);
error = crp->crp_etype;
@ -151,7 +157,7 @@ aes_encrypt_1(const struct krb5_key_state *ks, int buftype, void *buf,
crd->crd_next = NULL;
crd->crd_alg = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
crp->crp_sid = as->as_session;
crp->crp_sid = as->as_session_aes;
crp->crp_flags = buftype | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
crp->crp_buf = buf;
crp->crp_opaque = (void *) as;
@ -159,7 +165,7 @@ aes_encrypt_1(const struct krb5_key_state *ks, int buftype, void *buf,
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
if ((CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) {
if ((CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session_aes) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) {
mtx_lock(&as->as_lock);
if (!error && !(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_DONE))
error = msleep(crp, &as->as_lock, 0, "gssaes", 0);
@ -326,7 +332,7 @@ aes_checksum(const struct krb5_key_state *ks, int usage,
crd->crd_next = NULL;
crd->crd_alg = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC;
crp->crp_sid = as->as_session;
crp->crp_sid = as->as_session_sha1;
crp->crp_ilen = inlen;
crp->crp_olen = 12;
crp->crp_etype = 0;
@ -337,7 +343,7 @@ aes_checksum(const struct krb5_key_state *ks, int usage,
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
if ((CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) {
if ((CRYPTO_SESID2CAPS(as->as_session_sha1) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) {
mtx_lock(&as->as_lock);
if (!error && !(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_DONE))
error = msleep(crp, &as->as_lock, 0, "gssaes", 0);