Upgrade to OpenSSH 6.9p1.

svn path=/head/; revision=294336

crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL

@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ whitelisted to receive this message upon request.
 
 OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com"
 channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
-with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with 
+with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with
 interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
 requested by the client with the following packet:
 
@@ -453,4 +453,4 @@ respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
 "1".
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.27 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.28 2015/05/08 03:56:51 djm Exp $

crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent

@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ It may be requested using this message:
 
 "rsa_e" and "rsa_n" are used to identify which private key to use.
 "encrypted_challenge" is a challenge blob that has (presumably)
-been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range 
+been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range
 1 <= encrypted_challenge < 2^256. "session_id" is the SSH protocol 1
 session ID (computed from the server host key, the server semi-ephemeral
 key and the session cookie).
@@ -557,4 +557,4 @@ Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys.
 	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME			1
 	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM			2
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.7 2013/01/02 00:33:49 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.8 2015/05/08 03:56:51 djm Exp $

crypto/openssh/README

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.8 for the release notes.
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.9 for the release notes.
 
 - A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
 - available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html

crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c

@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"

crypto/openssh/auth-options.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.65 2015/01/14 10:30:34 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.67 2015/05/01 03:20:54 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -209,8 +209,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
 			goto next_option;
 		}
 		cp = "environment=\"";
-		if (options.permit_user_env &&
+		if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-		    strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
 			char *s;
 			struct envstring *new_envstring;
 
@@ -236,13 +235,19 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
 				goto bad_option;
 			}
 			s[i] = '\0';
-			auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
-			debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
 			opts++;
-			new_envstring = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct envstring));
+			if (options.permit_user_env) {
-			new_envstring->s = s;
+				auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: "
-			new_envstring->next = custom_environment;
+				    "%.900s", s);
-			custom_environment = new_envstring;
+				debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
+				new_envstring = xcalloc(1,
+				    sizeof(*new_envstring));
+				new_envstring->s = s;
+				new_envstring->next = custom_environment;
+				custom_environment = new_envstring;
+				s = NULL;
+			}
+			free(s);
 			goto next_option;
 		}
 		cp = "from=\"";
@@ -603,7 +608,7 @@ auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw)
 		    &cert_source_address_done) == -1)
 			return -1;
 		if (parse_option_list(k->cert->extensions, pw,
-		    OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1,
+		    OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0,
 		    &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
 		    &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
 		    &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,

crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c

@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
 			*num = 1;
 			len = plen + mlen + 1;
-			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len);
+			**prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
 			strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
 			plen += mlen;
 			**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
 			/* accumulate messages */
 			len = plen + mlen + 2;
-			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len);
+			**prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
 			strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
 			plen += mlen;
 			strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);

crypto/openssh/auth.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.110 2015/02/25 17:29:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.111 2015/05/01 04:17:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -401,8 +401,7 @@ expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
 char *
 authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
 {
-	if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL ||
+	if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
-	    strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0)
 		return NULL;
 	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
 }

crypto/openssh/auth.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.82 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.84 2015/05/08 06:41:56 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
 	int		 valid;		/* user exists and is allowed to login */
 	int		 attempt;
 	int		 failures;
-	int		 server_caused_failure; 
+	int		 server_caused_failure;
 	int		 force_pwchange;
 	char		*user;		/* username sent by the client */
 	char		*service;
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ int	 auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
 
 int	 auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
 int	 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
-int	 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+int	 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
 void	 pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...)
 	    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4)));
 void	 auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *);

crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.24 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.25 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -109,8 +109,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		goto done;
 	}
 	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-	    options.hostbased_key_types,
+	    options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) {
-	    strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) != 1) {
 		logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes",
 		    __func__, sshkey_type(key));
 		goto done;

crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.47 2015/02/17 00:14:05 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.53 2015/06/15 18:44:22 jsing Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
+#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -127,8 +130,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
 		goto done;
 	}
-	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_key_types,
+	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-	    strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) != 1) {
+	    options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
 		logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
 		    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
 		goto done;
@@ -169,7 +172,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 		/* test for correct signature */
 		authenticated = 0;
-		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
+		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
 		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
 		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
 			authenticated = 1;
@@ -191,7 +194,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		 * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
 		 * issue? -markus
 		 */
-		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))) {
+		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) {
 			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
 			packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
 			packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
@@ -248,6 +251,288 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
 	free(extra);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
+ * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
+ * and its members.
+ */
+static int
+split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
+	char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
+
+	*argvp = NULL;
+	*argcp = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+		/* Skip leading whitespace */
+		if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
+			continue;
+
+		/* Start of a token */
+		quote = 0;
+		if (s[i] == '\\' &&
+		    (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
+			i++;
+		else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
+			quote = s[i++];
+
+		argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
+		arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
+		argv[argc] = NULL;
+
+		/* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
+		for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+			if (s[i] == '\\') {
+				if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
+				    s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
+				    s[i + 1] == '\\') {
+					i++; /* Skip '\' */
+					arg[j++] = s[i];
+				} else {
+					/* Unrecognised escape */
+					arg[j++] = s[i];
+				}
+			} else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
+				break; /* done */
+			else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
+				break; /* done */
+			else
+				arg[j++] = s[i];
+		}
+		if (s[i] == '\0') {
+			if (quote != 0) {
+				/* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	*argcp = argc;
+	*argvp = argv;
+	argc = 0;
+	argv = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+			free(argv[i]);
+		free(argv);
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
+ * necessary. Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+static char *
+assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int i, j, ws, r;
+	char c, *ret;
+	struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		ws = 0;
+		sshbuf_reset(arg);
+		for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
+			r = 0;
+			c = argv[i][j];
+			switch (c) {
+			case ' ':
+			case '\t':
+				ws = 1;
+				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
+				break;
+			case '\\':
+			case '\'':
+			case '"':
+				if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
+					break;
+				/* FALLTHROUGH */
+			default:
+				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
+				break;
+			}
+			if (r != 0)
+				fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		}
+		if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
+		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
+		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
+	if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
+	memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sshbuf_free(arg);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the
+ * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure.
+ * NB. "command" is only used for logging.
+ */
+static pid_t
+subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	struct stat st;
+	int devnull, p[2], i;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char *cp, errmsg[512];
+	u_int envsize;
+	char **child_env;
+
+	*child = NULL;
+
+	debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__,
+	    tag, command, pw->pw_name);
+
+	/* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */
+	if (*av[0] != '/') {
+		error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+	if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
+		error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
+		    av[0], strerror(errno));
+		restore_uid();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0,
+	    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+		error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
+		restore_uid();
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the
+	 * authorized_keys output.
+	 */
+	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
+		error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+		restore_uid();
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+	 * run cleanup_exit() code.
+	 */
+	restore_uid();
+
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1: /* error */
+		error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+		close(p[0]);
+		close(p[1]);
+		return 0;
+	case 0: /* child */
+		/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
+		envsize = 5;
+		child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
+		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+		if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
+			child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
+
+		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
+			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
+
+		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+			error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
+		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
+			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
+		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+			error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
+		if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+
+		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
+		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(127);
+	default: /* parent */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	close(p[1]);
+	if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+		close(p[0]);
+		/* Don't leave zombie child */
+		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+			;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
+	*child = f;
+	return pid;
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
+static int
+exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd)
+{
+	int status;
+
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+		if (errno != EINTR) {
+			error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+		error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
+		return -1;
+	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+		error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int
 match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
 {
@@ -269,19 +554,13 @@ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
 }
 
 static int
-match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+    struct sshkey_cert *cert)
 {
-	FILE *f;
 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
 	u_long linenum = 0;
 	u_int i;
 
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-	debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
-	if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
-		restore_uid();
-		return 0;
-	}
 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
 		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
@@ -309,23 +588,127 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
 		}
 		for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
 			if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
-				debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
+				debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
-				    "from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
+				    file == NULL ? "(command)" : file,
-				    cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
+				    linenum, cert->principals[i]);
 				if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
 				    file, linenum) != 1)
 					continue;
-				fclose(f);
-				restore_uid();
 				return 1;
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	fclose(f);
-	restore_uid();
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int
+match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	int success;
+
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+	debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
+	if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
+		restore_uid();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert);
+	fclose(f);
+	restore_uid();
+	return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
+ * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	int ok, found_principal = 0;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+	if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
+		error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
+		    "skipping");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
+	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
+	 */
+	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
+	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
+	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+	pw = getpwnam(username);
+	if (pw == NULL) {
+		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
+		    username, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
+	if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
+		    "invalid quotes", command);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ac == 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
+		    command);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
+		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
+		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
+		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
+		    (char *)NULL);
+		if (tmp == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
+		free(av[i]);
+		av[i] = tmp;
+	}
+	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
+	command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
+
+	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command,
+	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	uid_swapped = 1;
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);
+
+	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Read completed successfully */
+	found_principal = ok;
+ out:
+	if (f != NULL)
+		fclose(f);
+	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		free(av[i]);
+	free(av);
+	if (uid_swapped)
+		restore_uid();
+	free(command);
+	free(username);
+	return found_principal;
+}
 /*
  * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
@@ -448,7 +831,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
 {
 	char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
 	const char *reason;
-	int ret = 0;
+	int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
 
 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
 		return 0;
@@ -470,17 +853,24 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
 	 * against the username.
 	 */
 	if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
-		if (!match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) {
+		if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert))
-			reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
+			found_principal = 1;
-			    "authorized principal";
+	}
+	/* Try querying command if specified */
+	if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key->cert))
+		found_principal = 1;
+	/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
+	use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
+            options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
+	if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
+		reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
  fail_reason:
-			error("%s", reason);
+		error("%s", reason);
-			auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+		auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
-			goto out;
+		goto out;
-		}
 	}
 	if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
-	    principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
+	    use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
 		goto fail_reason;
 	if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -526,144 +916,117 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
 static int
 user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 {
-	FILE *f;
+	FILE *f = NULL;
-	int ok, found_key = 0;
+	int r, ok, found_key = 0;
 	struct passwd *pw;
-	struct stat st;
+	int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
-	int status, devnull, p[2], i;
 	pid_t pid;
-	char *username, errmsg[512];
+	char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
+	char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
 
-	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
+	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
-	    options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
 		return 0;
-
 	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
 		error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
+	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
+	 */
+	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
 	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
 	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
 	pw = getpwnam(username);
 	if (pw == NULL) {
 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
 		    username, strerror(errno));
-		free(username);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	free(username);
-
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-	if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
-		error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
-	    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
-		error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
+	/* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
-		error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
+		error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
+	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
-	    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
+	if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
+		    command);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ac == 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
+		    command);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
+		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
+		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
+		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
+		    "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+		    "f", key_fp,
+		    "k", keytext,
+		    (char *)NULL);
+		if (tmp == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
+		free(av[i]);
+		av[i] = tmp;
+	}
+	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
+	command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
 
 	/*
-	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+	 * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
-	 * run cleanup_exit() code.
+	 * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
+	 * target username as a single argument.
 	 */
-	restore_uid();
+	if (ac == 1) {
-
+		av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
-	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+		av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
-	case -1: /* error */
+		av[2] = NULL;
-		error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		/* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
-		close(p[0]);
+		free(command);
-		close(p[1]);
+		xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
-		return 0;
-	case 0: /* child */
-		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
-			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
-
-		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
-			error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-			    strerror(errno));
-			_exit(1);
-		}
-		/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
-		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
-		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
-			error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-			_exit(1);
-		}
-		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
-		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
-		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
-			error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
-			    strerror(errno));
-			_exit(1);
-		}
-		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
-			error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
-			    strerror(errno));
-			_exit(1);
-		}
-		/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
-		if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
-			error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-			_exit(1);
-		}
-
-		execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
-
-		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-		_exit(127);
-	default: /* parent */
-		break;
 	}
 
+	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
+	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	uid_swapped = 1;
 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 
-	close(p[1]);
-	if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
-		error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-		close(p[0]);
-		/* Don't leave zombie child */
-		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
-		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
-			;
-		goto out;
-	}
 	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
-	fclose(f);
 
-	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
-		if (errno != EINTR) {
-			error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-			goto out;
-		}
-	}
-	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
-		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
 		goto out;
-	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+
-		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
+	/* Read completed successfully */
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
-		goto out;
-	}
 	found_key = ok;
  out:
-	restore_uid();
+	if (f != NULL)
+		fclose(f);
+	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		free(av[i]);
+	free(av);
+	if (uid_swapped)
+		restore_uid();
+	free(command);
+	free(username);
+	free(key_fp);
+	free(keytext);
 	return found_key;
 }
 
@@ -671,7 +1034,7 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
  * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
  */
 int
-user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
+user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt)
 {
 	u_int success, i;
 	char *file;

crypto/openssh/authfd.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.94 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.97 2015/03/26 19:32:19 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -438,10 +438,8 @@ ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
 	u_int flags = 0;
 	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
-	if (sigp != NULL)
+	*sigp = NULL;
-		*sigp = NULL;
+	*lenp = 0;
-	if (lenp != NULL)
-		*lenp = 0;
 
 	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;

crypto/openssh/authfile.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.111 2015/02/23 16:55:51 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.114 2015/04/17 13:32:09 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
 		error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
 		    (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
-		error("It is recommended that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
+		error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
 		error("This private key will be ignored.");
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
 	}
@@ -359,6 +359,8 @@ sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
 	case 0:
 		return r;
 	}
+#else /* WITH_SSH1 */
+	close(fd);
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 
 	/* try ssh2 public key */

crypto/openssh/channels.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.341 2015/02/06 23:21:59 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.347 2015/07/01 02:26:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL;
 static char *x11_saved_data = NULL;
 static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0;
 
+/* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */
+static u_int x11_refuse_time;
+
 /*
  * Fake X11 authentication data.  This is what the server will be sending us;
  * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data.
@@ -307,7 +310,7 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
 		if (channels_alloc > 10000)
 			fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d "
 			    "too big.", channels_alloc);
-		channels = xrealloc(channels, channels_alloc + 10,
+		channels = xreallocarray(channels, channels_alloc + 10,
 		    sizeof(Channel *));
 		channels_alloc += 10;
 		debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc);
@@ -913,6 +916,13 @@ x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
 	u_char *ucp;
 	u_int proto_len, data_len;
 
+	/* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */
+	if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
+		verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
+		    "expired");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	/* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
 	if (buffer_len(b) < 12)
 		return 0;
@@ -1484,6 +1494,12 @@ channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd)
 		error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
 }
 
+void
+channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int refuse_time)
+{
+	x11_refuse_time = refuse_time;
+}
+
 /*
  * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
  */
@@ -2193,8 +2209,8 @@ channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
 
 	/* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */
 	if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
-		*readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+		*readsetp = xreallocarray(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
-		*writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+		*writesetp = xreallocarray(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
 		*nallocp = sz;
 	}
 	*maxfdp = n;
@@ -2271,7 +2287,7 @@ channel_output_poll(void)
 					packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
 					packet_put_string(data, dlen);
 					packet_send();
-					c->remote_window -= dlen + 4;
+					c->remote_window -= dlen;
 					free(data);
 				}
 				continue;
@@ -2642,7 +2658,7 @@ channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c;
 	int id;
-	u_int adjust;
+	u_int adjust, tmp;
 
 	if (!compat20)
 		return 0;
@@ -2658,7 +2674,10 @@ channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	adjust = packet_get_int();
 	packet_check_eom();
 	debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", id, adjust);
-	c->remote_window += adjust;
+	if ((tmp = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window)
+		fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u",
+		    id, adjust, c->remote_window);
+	c->remote_window = tmp;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2806,17 +2825,21 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd,
 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
 	in_port_t *lport_p;
 
-	host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ?
-	    fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host;
 	is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER);
 
-	if (host == NULL) {
+	if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
-		error("No forward host name.");
+		host = fwd->connect_path;
-		return 0;
+	} else {
-	}
+		host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ?
-	if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+		    fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host;
-		error("Forward host name too long.");
+		if (host == NULL) {
-		return 0;
+			error("No forward host name.");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+			error("Forward host name too long.");
+			return 0;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */
@@ -3238,7 +3261,7 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *fwd)
 	}
 	if (success) {
 		/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
-		permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens,
+		permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens,
 		    num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens));
 		idx = num_permitted_opens++;
 		if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
@@ -3469,7 +3492,7 @@ channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
 {
 	debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
 
-	permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens,
+	permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens,
 	    num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens));
 	permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host);
 	permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
@@ -3519,7 +3542,7 @@ channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
 {
 	debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
 
-	permitted_adm_opens = xrealloc(permitted_adm_opens,
+	permitted_adm_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_adm_opens,
 	    num_adm_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens));
 	permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect
 	     = xstrdup(host);
@@ -3534,7 +3557,7 @@ void
 channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void)
 {
 	channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
-	permitted_adm_opens = xmalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens));
+	permitted_adm_opens = xcalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens), 1);
 	permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = NULL;
 	num_adm_permitted_opens = 1;
 }

crypto/openssh/channels.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.116 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.118 2015/07/01 02:26:31 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 /*
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ struct Channel {
 	time_t	notbefore;	/* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */
 	int     delayed;	/* post-select handlers for newly created
 				 * channels are delayed until the first call
-				 * to a matching pre-select handler. 
+				 * to a matching pre-select handler.
 				 * this way post-select handlers are not
 				 * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
 	Buffer  input;		/* data read from socket, to be sent over
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
 
 /* x11 forwarding */
 
+void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int);
 int	 x11_connect_display(void);
 int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
 int      x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);

crypto/openssh/clientloop.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.272 2015/02/25 19:54:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.274 2015/07/01 02:26:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int connection_in;	/* Connection to server (input). */
 static int connection_out;	/* Connection to server (output). */
 static int need_rekeying;	/* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
 static int session_closed;	/* In SSH2: login session closed. */
-static int x11_refuse_time;	/* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
+static u_int x11_refuse_time;	/* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
 
 static void client_init_dispatch(void);
 int	session_ident = -1;
@@ -299,7 +299,8 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
+#define SSH_X11_PROTO		"MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
+#define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK	60
 void
 client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
     u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data)
@@ -312,7 +313,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
 	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
 	char *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
 	struct stat st;
-	u_int now;
+	u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
 
 	xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
 	*_proto = proto;
@@ -345,6 +346,15 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
 			xauthdir = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
 			xauthfile = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
 			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, PATH_MAX);
+			/*
+			 * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
+			 * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
+			 * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
+			 */
+			if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
+				x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
+			else
+				x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
 			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
 				do_unlink = 1;
 				snprintf(xauthfile, PATH_MAX, "%s/xauthfile",
@@ -352,17 +362,20 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
 				snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
 				    "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
 				    " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
-				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display, timeout);
+				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
+				    x11_timeout_real);
 				debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
-				if (system(cmd) == 0)
-					generated = 1;
 				if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
 					now = monotime() + 1;
 					if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
 						x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
 					else
 						x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
+					channel_set_x11_refuse_time(
+					    x11_refuse_time);
 				}
+				if (system(cmd) == 0)
+					generated = 1;
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -1890,7 +1903,7 @@ client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan)
 		    "malicious server.");
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
+	if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
 		verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
 		    "expired");
 		return NULL;
@@ -2353,8 +2366,7 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void)
 		/* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
 		if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL &&
 		    match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-		    options.hostkeyalgorithms,
+		    options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
-		    strlen(options.hostkeyalgorithms), 0) != 1) {
 			debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
 			    __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
 			continue;

crypto/openssh/compat.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.87 2015/01/19 20:20:20 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.94 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
 		  "1.2.22*",		SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
 		{ "1.3.2*",		/* F-Secure */
 					SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
+		{ "Cisco-1.*",		SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE },
 		{ "*SSH Compatible Server*",			/* Netscreen */
 					SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
 		{ "*OSU_0*,"
@@ -166,15 +167,34 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
 		  "OSU_1.5alpha3*",	SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
 		{ "*SSH_Version_Mapper*",
 					SSH_BUG_SCANNER },
+		{ "PuTTY-Release-0.5*," /* 0.50-0.57, DH-GEX in >=0.52 */
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.5*,"	/* 0.58-0.59 */
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.60*,"
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.61*,"
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.62*,"
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.63*,"
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.64*",
+					SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
 		{ "Probe-*",
 					SSH_BUG_PROBE },
+		{ "TeraTerm SSH*,"
+		  "TTSSH/1.5.*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.1*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.2*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.3*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.4*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.5*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.6*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.70*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.71*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.72*",	SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS },
+		{ "WinSCP*",		SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
 		{ NULL,			0 }
 	};
 
 	/* process table, return first match */
 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
-		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat,
+		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
-		    strlen(check[i].pat), 0) == 1) {
 			debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
 			datafellows = check[i].bugs;	/* XXX for now */
@@ -200,9 +220,11 @@ proto_spec(const char *spec)
 	for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) {
 		switch (atoi(p)) {
 		case 1:
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 			if (ret == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
 				ret |= SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED;
 			ret |= SSH_PROTO_1;
+#endif
 			break;
 		case 2:
 			ret |= SSH_PROTO_2;
@@ -230,7 +252,7 @@ filter_proposal(char *proposal, const char *filter)
 	buffer_init(&b);
 	tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(proposal);
 	while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
-		if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, strlen(cp), 0) != 1) {
+		if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) {
 			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
 				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
 			buffer_append(&b, cp, strlen(cp));
@@ -272,15 +294,20 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
 }
 
 char *
-compat_kex_proposal(char *kex_prop)
+compat_kex_proposal(char *p)
 {
-	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD))
+	if ((datafellows & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
-		return kex_prop;
+		return p;
-	debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
+	debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
-	kex_prop = filter_proposal(kex_prop, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
+	if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
-	debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
+		p = filter_proposal(p, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
-	if (*kex_prop == '\0')
+	if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
+		p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256");
+		p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1");
+	}
+	debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
+	if (*p == '\0')
 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
-	return kex_prop;
+	return p;
 }
 

crypto/openssh/compat.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.46 2015/01/19 20:20:20 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.48 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 /*
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
 #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH		0x04000000
 #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT	0x08000000
 #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD	0x10000000
+#define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS	0x20000000
+#define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE	0x40000000
 
 void     enable_compat13(void);
 void     enable_compat20(void);

crypto/openssh/config.guess

@@ -982,6 +982,12 @@ EOF
     ppc:Linux:*:*)
 	echo powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu
 	exit ;;
+    ppc64le:Linux:*:*)
+	echo powerpc64le-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
+    ppcle:Linux:*:*)
+	echo powerpcle-unknown-linux-gnu
+	exit ;;
     s390:Linux:*:* | s390x:Linux:*:*)
 	echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-linux
 	exit ;;

crypto/openssh/configure

@@ -665,6 +665,7 @@ SED
 PERL
 KILL
 CAT
+ac_ct_AR
 AR
 INSTALL_DATA
 INSTALL_SCRIPT
@@ -1424,7 +1425,7 @@ Optional Packages:
   --with-PACKAGE[=ARG]    use PACKAGE [ARG=yes]
   --without-PACKAGE       do not use PACKAGE (same as --with-PACKAGE=no)
   --without-openssl       Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL**
-  --without-ssh1          Disable support for SSH protocol 1
+  --without-ssh1          Enable support for SSH protocol 1
   --without-stackprotect  Don't use compiler's stack protection
   --without-hardening     Don't use toolchain hardening flags
   --without-rpath         Disable auto-added -R linker paths
@@ -1460,8 +1461,8 @@ Optional Packages:
   --with-mantype=man|cat|doc  Set man page type
   --with-md5-passwords    Enable use of MD5 passwords
   --without-shadow        Disable shadow password support
-  --with-ipaddr-display   Use ip address instead of hostname in \$DISPLAY
+  --with-ipaddr-display   Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
-  --with-default-path=    Specify default \$PATH environment for server
+  --with-default-path=    Specify default $PATH environment for server
   --with-superuser-path=  Specify different path for super-user
   --with-4in6             Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses
   --with-bsd-auth         Enable BSD auth support
@@ -4556,26 +4557,27 @@ $as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; }
  EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
 
 
-# Extract the first word of "ar", so it can be a program name with args.
+if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
-set dummy ar; ac_word=$2
+  for ac_prog in ar
+  do
+    # Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2
 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_AR+:} false; then :
+if ${ac_cv_prog_AR+:} false; then :
   $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
 else
-  case $AR in
+  if test -n "$AR"; then
-  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_prog_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test.
-  ac_cv_path_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+else
-  ;;
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-  *)
-  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
 for as_dir in $PATH
 do
   IFS=$as_save_IFS
   test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
     for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
   if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
-    ac_cv_path_AR="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    ac_cv_prog_AR="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog"
     $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
     break 2
   fi
@@ -4583,10 +4585,9 @@ done
   done
 IFS=$as_save_IFS
 
-  ;;
-esac
 fi
-AR=$ac_cv_path_AR
+fi
+AR=$ac_cv_prog_AR
 if test -n "$AR"; then
   { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AR" >&5
 $as_echo "$AR" >&6; }
@@ -4596,6 +4597,66 @@ $as_echo "no" >&6; }
 fi
 
 
+    test -n "$AR" && break
+  done
+fi
+if test -z "$AR"; then
+  ac_ct_AR=$AR
+  for ac_prog in ar
+do
+  # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR+:} false; then :
+  $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+  if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then
+  ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_ct_AR" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_prog"
+    $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+ac_ct_AR=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR
+if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then
+  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_AR" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_ct_AR" >&6; }
+else
+  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+  test -n "$ac_ct_AR" && break
+done
+
+  if test "x$ac_ct_AR" = x; then
+    AR=""
+  else
+    case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
+$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+    AR=$ac_ct_AR
+  fi
+fi
+
 # Extract the first word of "cat", so it can be a program name with args.
 set dummy cat; ac_word=$2
 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
@@ -5655,10 +5716,15 @@ fi
 # Check whether --with-ssh1 was given.
 if test "${with_ssh1+set}" = set; then :
   withval=$with_ssh1;
-		if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+			if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+				as_fn_error $? "Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5
+			fi
+			ssh1=yes
+		elif test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
 			ssh1=no
-		elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+		else
-			as_fn_error $? "Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5
+			as_fn_error $? "unknown --with-ssh1 argument" "$LINENO" 5
 		fi
 
 
@@ -7628,9 +7694,12 @@ $as_echo_n "checking for seccomp architecture... " >&6; }
 	i*86-*)
 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
 		;;
-        arm*-*)
+	arm*-*)
 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
-                ;;
+		;;
+	aarch64*-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
+		;;
 	esac
 	if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
 		{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: \"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&5

crypto/openssh/configure.ac

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ AC_PROG_CPP
 AC_PROG_RANLIB
 AC_PROG_INSTALL
 AC_PROG_EGREP
-AC_PATH_PROG([AR], [ar])
+AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar])
 AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat])
 AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill])
 AC_PATH_PROGS([PERL], [perl5 perl])
@@ -140,12 +140,17 @@ else
 fi
 
 AC_ARG_WITH([ssh1],
-	[  --without-ssh1          Disable support for SSH protocol 1],
+	[  --without-ssh1          Enable support for SSH protocol 1],
 	[
-		if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+			if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+				AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled])
+			fi
+			ssh1=yes
+		elif test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
 			ssh1=no
-		elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+		else
-			AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled])
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown --with-ssh1 argument])
 		fi
 	]
 )
@@ -782,14 +787,17 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	i*86-*)
 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
 		;;
-        arm*-*)
+	arm*-*)
 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
-                ;;
+		;;
+	aarch64*-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
+		;;
 	esac
 	if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
 		AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
-                AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
+		AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
-                    [Specify the system call convention in use])
+		    [Specify the system call convention in use])
 	else
 		AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
 	fi
@@ -4413,7 +4421,7 @@ if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
 else
 	DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
 	AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display],
-		[  --with-ipaddr-display   Use ip address instead of hostname in \$DISPLAY],
+		[  --with-ipaddr-display   Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY],
 		[
 			if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
 				AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY])
@@ -4459,7 +4467,7 @@ fi
 # Whether to mess with the default path
 SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
 AC_ARG_WITH([default-path],
-	[  --with-default-path=    Specify default \$PATH environment for server],
+	[  --with-default-path=    Specify default $PATH environment for server],
 	[
 		if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
 			AC_MSG_WARN([

crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-%define ver 6.8p1
+%define ver 6.9p1
 %define rel 1
 
 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID

crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 
 Summary:	OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
 Name:		openssh
-Version:	6.8p1
+Version:	6.9p1
 URL:		http://www.openssh.com/
 Release:	1
 Source0:	openssh-%{version}.tar.gz

crypto/openssh/dh.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.55 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.57 2015/05/27 23:39:18 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
 	    (f = fopen(_PATH_DH_PRIMES, "r")) == NULL) {
 		logit("WARNING: %s does not exist, using fixed modulus",
 		    _PATH_DH_MODULI);
-		return (dh_new_group14());
+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
 	}
 
 	linenum = 0;
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
 	if (bestcount == 0) {
 		fclose(f);
 		logit("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s", _PATH_DH_PRIMES);
-		return (dh_new_group14());
+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
 	}
 
 	linenum = 0;
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
 	if (linenum != which+1) {
 		logit("WARNING: line %d disappeared in %s, giving up",
 		    which, _PATH_DH_PRIMES);
-		return (dh_new_group14());
+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
 	}
 
 	return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p));
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
 
 	if (need < 0 || dh->p == NULL ||
 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0 ||
-	    need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need >= pbits)
+	    need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	dh->length = MIN(need * 2, pbits - 1);
 	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0 ||
@@ -338,6 +338,45 @@ dh_new_group14(void)
 	return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group14));
 }
 
+/*
+ * 4k bit fallback group used by DH-GEX if moduli file cannot be read.
+ * Source: MODP group 16 from RFC3526.
+ */
+DH *
+dh_new_group_fallback(int max)
+{
+	static char *gen = "2", *group16 =
+	    "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+	    "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+	    "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+	    "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+	    "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
+	    "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
+	    "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
+	    "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
+	    "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
+	    "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
+	    "15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64"
+	    "ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7"
+	    "ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B"
+	    "F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C"
+	    "BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31"
+	    "43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7"
+	    "88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA"
+	    "2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6"
+	    "287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED"
+	    "1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9"
+	    "93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34063199"
+	    "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+	if (max < 4096) {
+		debug3("requested max size %d, using 2k bit group 14", max);
+		return dh_new_group14();
+	}
+	debug3("using 4k bit group 16");
+	return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group16));
+}
+
 /*
  * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an
  * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).

crypto/openssh/dh.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.12 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.13 2015/05/27 23:39:18 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *);
 DH	*dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
 DH	*dh_new_group1(void);
 DH	*dh_new_group14(void);
+DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
 
 int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
 int	 dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);

crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.4 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.5 2015/05/05 02:48:17 jsg Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.

crypto/openssh/dispatch.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.26 2015/02/12 20:34:19 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.27 2015/05/01 07:10:01 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -137,22 +137,6 @@ ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done,
 {
 	int r;
 
-	if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done, ctxt)) != 0) {
+	if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done, ctxt)) != 0)
-		switch (r) {
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
-		case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
-			logit("Connection closed by %.200s",
-			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
-			cleanup_exit(255);
-		case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
-			logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while "
-			    "waiting to read", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
-			cleanup_exit(255);
-		case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
-			logit("Disconnected from %.200s",
-			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
-			cleanup_exit(255);
-		default:
-			fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-		}
-	}
 }

crypto/openssh/dns.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.14 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.15 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ enum sshfp_types {
 	SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1,
 	SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2,
 	SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3,
-	SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4 
+	SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4
 };
 
 enum sshfp_hashes {

crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.15 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -97,11 +97,9 @@ int
 ga_match_pattern_list(const char *group_pattern)
 {
 	int i, found = 0;
-	size_t len = strlen(group_pattern);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
-		switch (match_pattern_list(groups_byname[i],
+		switch (match_pattern_list(groups_byname[i], group_pattern, 0)) {
-		    group_pattern, len, 0)) {
 		case -1:
 			return 0;	/* Negated match wins */
 		case 0:

crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"

crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.28 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.29 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -44,9 +44,12 @@
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "session.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
 
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
 static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
     GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
@@ -99,25 +102,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
 	char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
 	gss_OID_set oidset;
 
-	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+	if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
-	gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+		gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+		gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
 
-	if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
+		if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+			gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-		return (-1);
+			return (-1);
-	}
+		}
+
+		if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+			gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+			return (ctx->major);
+		}
+
+		if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+		    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
+		    NULL, NULL)))
+			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
 
-	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
 		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
 		return (ctx->major);
+	} else {
+		ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+		ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
 	}
-
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-	if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-	    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
-		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
-	gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-	return (ctx->major);
 }
 
 /* Privileged */

crypto/openssh/hmac.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.11 2015/01/15 21:37:14 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.12 2015/03/24 20:03:44 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *e, size_t elen)
 
 	if (memcmp(e, digest, elen)) {
 		for (i = 0; i < elen; i++)
-			printf("[%zd] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]);
+			printf("[%zu] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]);
 		printf("mismatch\n");
 	} else
 		printf("ok\n");

crypto/openssh/hostfile.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.64 2015/02/16 22:08:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.66 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 	struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
 
 	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
-		error("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file",
+		/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
+		debug("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file",
 		    l->path, l->linenum);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -662,7 +663,7 @@ match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed)
 		return nlen == strlen(hashed_host) &&
 		    strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0;
 	}
-	return match_hostname(host, names, nlen) == 1;
+	return match_hostname(host, names) == 1;
 }
 
 int
@@ -810,7 +811,7 @@ hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
 			memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l);
 			ktype[l] = '\0';
 			lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+
 			/*
 			 * Assume RSA1 if the first component is a short
 			 * decimal number.
@@ -818,7 +819,7 @@ hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
 			if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 &&
 			    strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l)
 				lineinfo.keytype = KEY_RSA1;
-#endif
+
 			/*
 			 * Check that something other than whitespace follows
 			 * the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but

crypto/openssh/kex.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.105 2015/01/30 00:22:25 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.106 2015/04/17 13:25:52 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
 {
 	u_int i;
 
+	if (proposal == NULL)
+		return;
 	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
 		free(proposal[i]);
 	free(proposal);

crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.8 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.9 2015/03/26 07:00:04 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -66,6 +66,11 @@ kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
 	u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
 	int r;
 
+	/* Check for all-zero public key */
+	explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+	if (timingsafe_bcmp(pub, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+
 	crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub);
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);

crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.8 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.9 2015/04/27 00:37:53 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 

crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.20 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.22 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 
+#include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -65,25 +66,17 @@ kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
 	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
 	kex->nbits = nbits;
-	if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) {
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
-		/* Old GEX request */
+		kex->nbits = MIN(kex->nbits, 4096);
-		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD))
+	/* New GEX request */
-		    != 0 ||
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
-			goto out;
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 ||
-		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", kex->nbits);
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-	} else {
+		goto out;
-		/* New GEX request */
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent",
-		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
-		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent",
-		    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
-	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n",
 	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);

crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.24 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.25 2015/04/13 02:04:08 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -60,8 +60,6 @@ static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 int
 kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD,
-	    &input_kex_dh_gex_request);
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST,
 	    &input_kex_dh_gex_request);
 	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST");
@@ -76,36 +74,19 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	int r;
 	u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0;
 
-	switch (type) {
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
-	case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST:
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
-		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
-		if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-		    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-		kex->nbits = nbits;
-		kex->min = min;
-		kex->max = max;
-		min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-		max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
-		nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
-		nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
-		break;
-	case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD:
-		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received");
-		if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-		kex->nbits = nbits;
-		/* unused for old GEX */
-		kex->min = min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-		kex->max = max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-		break;
-	default:
-		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 		goto out;
-	}
+	kex->nbits = nbits;
+	kex->min = min;
+	kex->max = max;
+	min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+	max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+	nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+	nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
 
 	if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min ||
 	    kex->max < kex->nbits) {
@@ -131,10 +112,6 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	/* old KEX does not use min/max in kexgex_hash() */
-	if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD)
-		kex->min = kex->max = -1;
-
 	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT");
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init);
 	r = 0;

crypto/openssh/krl.c

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.31 2015/01/30 01:10:33 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.32 2015/06/24 23:47:23 djm Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
 			goto out;
 
 		if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen,
-		    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), 0)) == -1)
+		    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), 0)) != 0)
 			goto out;
 		KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen));
 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0)

crypto/openssh/match.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.29 2013/11/20 20:54:10 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.30 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -115,15 +115,13 @@ match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
  * indicate negation).  Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
  * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
  */
-
 int
-match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, u_int len,
+match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
-    int dolower)
 {
 	char sub[1024];
 	int negated;
 	int got_positive;
-	u_int i, subi;
+	u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern);
 
 	got_positive = 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < len;) {
@@ -177,9 +175,9 @@ match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, u_int len,
  * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
  */
 int
-match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern, u_int len)
+match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern)
 {
-	return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, len, 1);
+	return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, 1);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -200,7 +198,7 @@ match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
 		return 0;
 
 	/* negative hostname match */
-	if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns, strlen(patterns))) == -1)
+	if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1)
 		return 0;
 	/* no match at all */
 	if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)

crypto/openssh/match.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.15 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@
 #define MATCH_H
 
 int	 match_pattern(const char *, const char *);
-int	 match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, u_int, int);
+int	 match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, int);
-int	 match_hostname(const char *, const char *, u_int);
+int	 match_hostname(const char *, const char *);
 int	 match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
 int	 match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
 char	*match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);

crypto/openssh/misc.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.96 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.97 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
 	} else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc)
 		nalloc *= 2;
 
-	args->list = xrealloc(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
+	args->list = xreallocarray(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
 	args->nalloc = nalloc;
 	args->list[args->num++] = cp;
 	args->list[args->num] = NULL;

crypto/openssh/moduli

@@ -1,34 +1,5 @@
-#    $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.12 2015/05/22 02:45:42 dtucker Exp $
+#    $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.13 2015/05/28 00:03:06 dtucker Exp $
 # Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus
-20150520233853 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2AC62AF
-20150520233854 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2BCC50F
-20150520233854 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2C241F3
-20150520233855 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2DDF347
-20150520233856 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2E3FDBB
-20150520233857 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3006603
-20150520233858 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA31D9C37
-20150520233859 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA333355B
-20150520233900 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3428B23
-20150520233902 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA37C9A43
-20150520233903 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA384B367
-20150520233903 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3903453
-20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3946C77
-20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA39F6A9B
-20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3A0E88B
-20150520233905 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3A37763
-20150520233906 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3BBDD57
-20150520233906 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3BDCDD7
-20150520233906 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3BF5D73
-20150520233907 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3C9BB83
-20150520233908 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3E5ADCF
-20150520233909 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3F82077
-20150520233910 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA406944F
-20150520233910 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA40F7457
-20150520233912 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA438733B
-20150520233913 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA44707FB
-20150520233914 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA4588A2B
-20150520233916 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA48CC01B
-20150520233917 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA4960077
 20150520234251 2 6 100 1535 2 F8F4A446A6C7196643612A6C5CC26A47E491FB737740D68BBEBF0130F7AAADC59075781FB1723B644C0ADCE548C02E726DE5233C484FB4481F3EF3ED0585A0D687B2E0A6987AD2BC910754FC1A1E06B87710CFF0BC2E9868BA15BA20C103D3DCA6B65D8D0182B277F7CAE61D83A785BDD0B3CE471B4B8FAB224438D7A6772130167110AFD1FF584861996117F67B41CF3D2D5FAB020F2EB7F53E299AACF98797AEB6BAC3F0BB892DB4E4F8CDDE28C112C73EB556D0C381C6B9CC78A740BE2123
 20150520234255 2 6 100 1535 5 F8F4A446A6C7196643612A6C5CC26A47E491FB737740D68BBEBF0130F7AAADC59075781FB1723B644C0ADCE548C02E726DE5233C484FB4481F3EF3ED0585A0D687B2E0A6987AD2BC910754FC1A1E06B87710CFF0BC2E9868BA15BA20C103D3DCA6B65D8D0182B277F7CAE61D83A785BDD0B3CE471B4B8FAB224438D7A6772130167110AFD1FF584861996117F67B41CF3D2D5FAB020F2EB7F53E299AACF98797AEB6BAC3F0BB892DB4E4F8CDDE28C112C73EB556D0C381C6B9CC78A740D85877
 20150520234257 2 6 100 1535 2 F8F4A446A6C7196643612A6C5CC26A47E491FB737740D68BBEBF0130F7AAADC59075781FB1723B644C0ADCE548C02E726DE5233C484FB4481F3EF3ED0585A0D687B2E0A6987AD2BC910754FC1A1E06B87710CFF0BC2E9868BA15BA20C103D3DCA6B65D8D0182B277F7CAE61D83A785BDD0B3CE471B4B8FAB224438D7A6772130167110AFD1FF584861996117F67B41CF3D2D5FAB020F2EB7F53E299AACF98797AEB6BAC3F0BB892DB4E4F8CDDE28C112C73EB556D0C381C6B9CC78A740E6494B

crypto/openssh/monitor.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.145 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.150 2015/06/22 23:42:16 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
 			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
-			if (!authenticated)
+			if (!partial && !authenticated)
 				authctxt->failures++;
 		}
 	}
@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	Key *key;
 	char *cuser, *chost;
 	u_char *blob;
-	u_int bloblen;
+	u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
 	enum mm_keytype type = 0;
 	int allowed = 0;
 
@@ -1195,6 +1195,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
 	chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
 	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+	pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m);
 
 	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
 
@@ -1215,19 +1216,19 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 			allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
 			    !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
 			    match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-			    options.pubkey_key_types,
+			    options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
-			    strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
+			    user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
-			    user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+			    pubkey_auth_attempt);
 			pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
 			auth_method = "publickey";
-			if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
+			if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
+			    (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
 				auth_clear_options();
 			break;
 		case MM_HOSTKEY:
 			allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
 			    match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-			    options.hostbased_key_types,
+			    options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
-			    strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
 			    hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
 			    cuser, chost, key);
 			pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
@@ -1474,6 +1475,9 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
 	socklen_t fromlen;
 	struct sockaddr_storage from;
 
+	if (options.use_login)
+		return;
+
 	/*
 	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
 	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.

crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.84 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.85 2015/05/01 03:23:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -153,10 +153,8 @@ mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
 
 	if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
-		if (errno == EPIPE) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE)
-			error("%s: socket closed", __func__);
 			cleanup_exit(255);
-		}
 		fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 	}
 	msg_len = get_u32(buf);
@@ -373,16 +371,17 @@ mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
 }
 
 int
-mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
+mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt)
 {
-	return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key));
+	return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key,
+	    pubkey_auth_attempt));
 }
 
 int
 mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host,
     Key *key)
 {
-	return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key));
+	return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0));
 }
 
 int
@@ -392,13 +391,14 @@ mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user,
 	int ret;
 
 	key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */
-	ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key);
+	ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0);
 	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
 	return (ret);
 }
 
 int
-mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key)
+mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key,
+    int pubkey_auth_attempt)
 {
 	Buffer m;
 	u_char *blob;
@@ -416,6 +416,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key)
 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : "");
 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : "");
 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, pubkey_auth_attempt);
 	free(blob);
 
 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m);

crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.26 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.27 2015/05/01 03:23:51 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
 struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
 char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
 int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
-int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *);
+int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *, int);
-int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
 int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
 int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
 int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);

crypto/openssh/mux.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.50 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.53 2015/05/01 04:03:20 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
 			free(cp);
 			continue;
 		}
-		cctx->env = xrealloc(cctx->env, env_len + 2,
+		cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2,
 		    sizeof(*cctx->env));
 		cctx->env[env_len++] = cp;
 		cctx->env[env_len] = NULL;
@@ -594,7 +594,9 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		return;
 	}
 	buffer_init(&out);
-	if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards) {
+	if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards ||
+	    (options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL &&
+	    options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) {
 		xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid);
 		goto fail;
 	}
@@ -606,7 +608,7 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
 		if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
 			rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int();
-			logit("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward"
+			debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward"
 			    " to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port,
 			    rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
 			buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT);
@@ -628,6 +630,17 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		else
 			xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
 			    "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+
+                debug2("%s: clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, "
+		    "connect %s:%d", __func__, rfwd->listen_port,
+		    rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
+		    rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+
+		free(rfwd->listen_host);
+		free(rfwd->listen_path);
+		free(rfwd->connect_host);
+		free(rfwd->connect_path);
+		memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd));
 	}
  fail:
 	error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg);
@@ -1723,7 +1736,7 @@ mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
 		if (cancel_flag)
 			fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__);
 		fwd->allocated_port = buffer_get_int(&m);
-		logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
+		verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
 		    fwd->allocated_port,
 		    fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "",
 		    fwd->connect_port);

crypto/openssh/myproposal.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.41 2014/07/11 13:54:34 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.44 2015/05/27 23:51:10 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
 # define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \
-	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,"
+	",aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
 #else
 # define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
 #endif
@@ -83,14 +83,17 @@
 # else
 #  define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS ""
 # endif
-#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
+#define KEX_COMMON_KEX \
 	KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
 	KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
-	KEX_SHA256_METHODS \
+	KEX_SHA256_METHODS
-	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
 
-#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX "," \
+#define KEX_SERVER_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" \
+
+#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
 	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
 	"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
 
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	\
@@ -108,9 +111,9 @@
 /* the actual algorithms */
 
 #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
-	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
-	AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \
+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
-	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
+	AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
 
 #define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT "," \
 	"arcfour256,arcfour128," \
@@ -148,8 +151,8 @@
 	"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
 	"ssh-ed25519"
 #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
-	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
-	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr"
 #define	KEX_SERVER_MAC \
 	"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
 	"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \

crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.9 2014/07/13 21:21:25 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.13 2015/01/12 03:20:04 tedu Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
 #endif
 #define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES
 
+#define	MINIMUM(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+
 /*
  * pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash
  *
@@ -61,8 +63,8 @@
  * wise caller could do; we just do it for you.
  */
 
-#define BCRYPT_BLOCKS 8
+#define BCRYPT_WORDS 8
-#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_BLOCKS * 4)
+#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_WORDS * 4)
 
 static void
 bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out)
@@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out)
 	blf_ctx state;
 	u_int8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] =
 	    "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite";
-	uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_BLOCKS];
+	uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_WORDS];
 	int i;
 	uint16_t j;
 	size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
@@ -85,14 +87,14 @@ bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out)
 
 	/* encryption */
 	j = 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_BLOCKS; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++)
 		cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext),
 		    &j);
 	for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
 		blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t));
 
 	/* copy out */
-	for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_BLOCKS; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) {
 		out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff;
 		out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff;
 		out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff;
@@ -156,9 +158,9 @@ bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t salt
 		}
 
 		/*
-		 * pbkdf2 deviation: ouput the key material non-linearly.
+		 * pbkdf2 deviation: output the key material non-linearly.
 		 */
-		amt = MIN(amt, keylen);
+		amt = MINIMUM(amt, keylen);
 		for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) {
 			size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1);
 			if (dest >= origkeylen)

crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ cygwin_ssh_privsep_user()
       if (cygwin_internal (CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME, "sshd", cyg_privsep_user,
 			   sizeof cyg_privsep_user) != 0)
 #endif
-	strcpy (cyg_privsep_user, "sshd");
+	strlcpy(cyg_privsep_user, "sshd", sizeof(cyg_privsep_user));
     }
   return cyg_privsep_user;
 }

crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ pid_t getpgid(pid_t);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT
-# define endgrent() do { } while (0)
+# define endgrent() do { } while(0)
 #endif
 
 #ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE

crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h

@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
 
 /* multibyte character support */
 #ifndef HAVE_MBLEN
-# define mblen(x, y)	1
+# define mblen(x, y)	(1)
 #endif
 
 #if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)

crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c

@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
 #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
 #include <endian.h>
+#endif
 #include <string.h>
 #include <rmd160.h>
 

crypto/openssh/packet.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.208 2015/02/13 18:57:00 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.212 2015/05/01 07:10:01 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
 	    (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none,
 	    (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) {
 		error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		free(ssh);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
@@ -792,7 +793,9 @@ ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(struct ssh *ssh, void *ctx,
 void
 ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number)
 {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+#ifndef WITH_SSH1
+	fatal("no SSH protocol 1 support");
+#else /* WITH_SSH1 */
 	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
 	const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number);
 	int r;
@@ -1280,7 +1283,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 	 * been sent.
 	 */
 	if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
-		return r;
+		goto out;
 
 	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
 	for (;;) {
@@ -1338,15 +1341,20 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 			len = roaming_read(state->connection_in, buf,
 			    sizeof(buf), &cont);
 		} while (len == 0 && cont);
-		if (len == 0)
+		if (len == 0) {
-			return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
+			r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
-		if (len < 0)
+			goto out;
-			return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		}
+		if (len < 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
 
 		/* Append it to the buffer. */
 		if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
-			return r;
+			goto out;
 	}
+ out:
 	free(setp);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -1913,9 +1921,19 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
 		logit("Connection closed by %.200s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
 		cleanup_exit(255);
 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
-		logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while "
+		logit("Connection to %.200s timed out", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
-		    "waiting to write", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
 		cleanup_exit(255);
+	case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
+		logit("Disconnected from %.200s",
+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+		if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
+			logit("Connection reset by %.200s",
+			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	default:
 		fatal("%s%sConnection to %.200s: %s",
 		    tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
@@ -2728,13 +2746,14 @@ sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v)
 	return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
 }
 
-#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 int
 sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
 {
 	return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g);
 }
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
 
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 int
@@ -2744,7 +2763,6 @@ sshpkt_put_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
 }
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 int
 sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
 {
@@ -2796,13 +2814,14 @@ sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
 	return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
 }
 
-#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 int
 sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
 {
 	return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g);
 }
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
 
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 int
@@ -2812,7 +2831,6 @@ sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v)
 }
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 int
 sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v)
 {

crypto/openssh/readconf.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.232 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.237 2015/06/26 05:13:20 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
 	    newfwd->listen_path == NULL)
 		fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root.");
 #endif
-	options->local_forwards = xrealloc(options->local_forwards,
+	options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards,
 	    options->num_local_forwards + 1,
 	    sizeof(*options->local_forwards));
 	fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
 {
 	struct Forward *fwd;
 
-	options->remote_forwards = xrealloc(options->remote_forwards,
+	options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards,
 	    options->num_remote_forwards + 1,
 	    sizeof(*options->remote_forwards));
 	fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
@@ -514,7 +514,6 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
 	char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria;
 	const char *ruser;
 	int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
-	size_t len;
 	char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
 
 	/*
@@ -567,25 +566,24 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
 			result = -1;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		len = strlen(arg);
 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
 			criteria = xstrdup(host);
-			r = match_hostname(host, arg, len) == 1;
+			r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1;
 			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
 				this_result = result = 0;
 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) {
 			criteria = xstrdup(original_host);
-			r = match_hostname(original_host, arg, len) == 1;
+			r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1;
 			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
 				this_result = result = 0;
 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
 			criteria = xstrdup(ruser);
-			r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, len, 0) == 1;
+			r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1;
 			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
 				this_result = result = 0;
 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) {
 			criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
-			r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, len, 0) == 1;
+			r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1;
 			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
 				this_result = result = 0;
 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) {
@@ -687,8 +685,8 @@ parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum,
 	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
 		if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0)
 			return keywords[i].opcode;
-	if (ignored_unknown != NULL && match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown,
+	if (ignored_unknown != NULL &&
-	    strlen(ignored_unknown), 1) == 1)
+	    match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1)
 		return oIgnoredUnknownOption;
 	error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
 	    filename, linenum, cp);
@@ -785,7 +783,9 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 	}
 
 	/* Strip trailing whitespace */
-	for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
+	if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
 		if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL)
 			break;
 		line[len] = '\0';
@@ -1258,13 +1258,13 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 		arg = strdelim(&s);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
-		if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 &&
+		if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+			value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
+		else if (arg[1] == '\0')
+			value = (u_char) arg[0];
+		else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 &&
 		    (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128)
 			value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31;
-		else if (strlen(arg) == 1)
-			value = (u_char) arg[0];
-		else if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
-			value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
 		else {
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.",
 			    filename, linenum);
@@ -1973,7 +1973,8 @@ parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd)
 		switch (*cp) {
 		case '\\':
 			memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1);
-			cp++;
+			if (*cp == '\0')
+				return -1;
 			break;
 		case '/':
 			ispath = 1;

crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.78 2015/01/26 06:12:18 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.81 2015/05/21 06:44:25 djm Exp $
 
 REGRESS_TARGETS=	unit t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t-exec
 tests:		prep $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
 		multiplex \
 		reexec \
 		brokenkeys \
+		cfgparse \
 		cfgmatch \
 		addrmatch \
 		localcommand \
@@ -72,7 +73,8 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
 		limit-keytype \
 		hostkey-agent \
 		keygen-knownhosts \
-		hostkey-rotate
+		hostkey-rotate \
+		principals-command
 
 
 #		dhgex \
@@ -180,10 +182,10 @@ t11:
 	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
 		awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok
 
-t12.out:
+$(OBJ)/t12.out:
-	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $(OBJ)/$@
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@
 
-t12: t12.out
+t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out
 	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null
 
 t-exec:	${LTESTS:=.sh}

crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ TEST_SHELL: shell used for running the test scripts.
 TEST_SSH_PORT: TCP port to be used for the listening tests.
 TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to ssh_config
 	before running each test.
-TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOTPS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config
+TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config
 	before running each test.
 
 

crypto/openssh/regress/cfgparse.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cfgparse.sh,v 1.5 2015/05/29 03:05:13 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="config parse"
+
+# This is a reasonable proxy for IPv6 support.
+if ! config_defined HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR ; then
+	SKIP_IPV6=yes
+fi
+
+# We need to use the keys generated for the regression test because sshd -T
+# will fail if we're not running with SUDO (no permissions for real keys) or
+# if we are # running tests on a system that has never had sshd installed
+# (keys won't exist).
+
+grep "HostKey " $OBJ/sshd_config > $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal
+SSHD_KEYS="`cat $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal`"
+
+verbose "reparse minimal config"
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 &&
+ $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config"
+
+verbose "reparse regress config"
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 &&
+ $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse regress config"
+
+verbose "listenaddress order"
+# expected output
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <<EOD
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4:1234
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4:5678
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <<EOD
+listenaddress [::1]:1234
+listenaddress [::1]:5678
+EOD
+
+# test input sets.  should all result in the output above.
+# test 1: addressfamily and port first
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+${SSHD_KEYS}
+addressfamily any
+port 1234
+port 5678
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+listenaddress ::1
+EOD
+
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \
+ grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \
+ fail "listenaddress order 1"
+# test 2: listenaddress first
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+${SSHD_KEYS}
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4
+port 1234
+port 5678
+addressfamily any
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+listenaddress ::1
+EOD
+
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \
+ grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \
+ fail "listenaddress order 2"
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.[012]

crypto/openssh/regress/cipher-speed.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.12 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.13 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="cipher speed"
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
 		fi
 	done
 	# No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they are ignored.
-	if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+	if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
 		break
 	fi
 	n=`expr $n + 1`

crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.2 2015/03/03 17:53:40 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="hostkey rotate"
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ rm $OBJ/known_hosts
 trace "prepare hostkeys"
 nkeys=0
 all_algs=""
-for k in `ssh -Q key-plain` ; do
+for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
 	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
 	nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1`
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
 check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn keys"
 
 # Check each key type
-for k in `ssh -Q key-plain` ; do
+for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
 	verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k"
 	dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k,$all_algs
 	expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k"
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa
 expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys"
 check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key"
 
-#	$OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.2 2015/03/03 17:53:40 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="hostkey rotate"

crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.15 2015/01/19 20:42:31 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.16 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="integrity"
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ for m in $macs; do
 		cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
 		# modify output from sshd at offset $off
 		pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1"
-		if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
 			echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
 			macopt="-c $m"
 		else

crypto/openssh/regress/kextype.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.5 2014/04/21 22:15:37 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.6 2015/03/24 20:19:15 markus Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="login with different key exchange algorithms"
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
 cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
 
 # Make server accept all key exchanges.
-ALLKEX=`ssh -Q kex`
+ALLKEX=`${SSH} -Q kex`
 KEXOPT=`echo $ALLKEX | tr ' ' ,`
 echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
 

crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.2 2012/12/06 06:06:54 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/21 06:40:02 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="authorized keys from command"
@@ -9,26 +9,63 @@ if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
 	exit 0
 fi
 
+rm -f $OBJ/keys-command-args
+
+touch $OBJ/keys-command-args
+chmod a+rw $OBJ/keys-command-args
+
+expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/rsa.pub`
+expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/rsa.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
+
 # Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have
 # acceptable directory permissions.
 KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}"
-cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'"
+cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "rm -f '$KEY_COMMAND' ; cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'"
 #!/bin/sh
+echo args: "\$@" >> $OBJ/keys-command-args
+echo "$PATH" | grep -q mekmitasdigoat && exit 7
 test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
+if test $# -eq 6 ; then
+	test "x\$2" != "xblah" && exit 2
+	test "x\$3" != "x${expected_key_text}" && exit 3
+	test "x\$4" != "xssh-rsa" && exit 4
+	test "x\$5" != "x${expected_key_fp}" && exit 5
+	test "x\$6" != "xblah" && exit 6
+fi
 exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}"
 _EOF
 $SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND"
 
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
-(
-	grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
-	echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
-	echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND
-	echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
-) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
 if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then
-	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+
+	verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand with arguments"
+	(
+		grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+		echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND %u blah %k %t %f blah
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	# Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd
+	env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \
+	    ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "connect failed"
+	fi
+
+	verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand without arguments"
+	# Check legacy behavior of no-args resulting in username being passed.
+	(
+		grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+		echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	# Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd
+	env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \
+	    ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
 	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
 		fail "connect failed"
 	fi

crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c

@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <netinet/tcp.h>
 #include <netinet/ip.h>
-#include <arpa/telnet.h>
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <netdb.h>
@@ -63,6 +62,13 @@
 # endif
 #endif
 
+/* Telnet options from arpa/telnet.h */
+#define IAC	255
+#define DONT	254
+#define DO	253
+#define WONT	252
+#define WILL	251
+
 #ifndef SUN_LEN
 #define SUN_LEN(su) \
 	(sizeof(*(su)) - sizeof((su)->sun_path) + strlen((su)->sun_path))

crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.1 2015/05/21 06:44:25 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="authorized principals command"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
+	echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
+	echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+# Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have
+# acceptable directory permissions.
+PRINCIPALS_COMMAND="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}"
+cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND'"
+#!/bin/sh
+test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
+test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" &&
+	exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}"
+_EOF
+test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command"
+$SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND"
+
+# Create a CA key and a user certificate.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519  -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+    -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
+	fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key"
+
+# Test explicitly-specified principals
+for privsep in yes no ; do
+	_prefix="privsep $privsep"
+
+	# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+	rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+		echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none"
+		echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND %u"
+		echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}"
+		echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	# XXX test missing command
+	# XXX test failing command
+
+	# Empty authorized_principals
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
+	echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+
+	# Wrong authorized_principals
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
+	echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+
+	# Correct authorized_principals
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
+	echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+	fi
+
+	# authorized_principals with bad key option
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
+	echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+
+	# authorized_principals with command=false
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
+	echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+	    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+
+
+	# authorized_principals with command=true
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
+	echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+	    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+	fi
+
+	# Setup for principals= key option
+	rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	# Wrong principals list
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
+	(
+		printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
+		cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+	) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+
+	# Correct principals list
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
+	(
+		printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
+		cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+	) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+	fi
+done

crypto/openssh/regress/ssh-com.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.8 2013/05/17 00:37:40 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.9 2015/05/08 07:29:00 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="connect to ssh.com server"
@@ -44,14 +44,14 @@ cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd2_config
 	HostKeyFile			${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv
 	PublicHostKeyFile		${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub
 	RandomSeedFile			${OBJ}/random_seed
-	MaxConnections			0 
+	MaxConnections			0
 	PermitRootLogin			yes
 	VerboseMode			no
 	CheckMail			no
 	Ssh1Compatibility		no
 EOF
 
-# create client config 
+# create client config
 sed "s/HostKeyAlias.*/HostKeyAlias ssh2-localhost-with-alias/" \
 	< $OBJ/ssh_config > $OBJ/ssh_config_com
 

crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-#	$OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.2 2009/10/06 23:51:49 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/08 07:26:13 djm Exp $
 
 if test "x$1" = "x" -o "x$2" = "x" -o "x$3" = "x" ; then
 	echo "Usage: ssh2putty hostname port ssh-private-key"
@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ else
 fi
 
 public_exponent=`
-	openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent | 
+	openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent |
 	sed 's/.*(//;s/).*//'
 `
 test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
 
 modulus=`
-	openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= | 
+	openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= |
 	sed 's/^Modulus=/0x/' | tr A-Z a-z
 `
 test $? -ne 0 && exit 1

crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh

@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ Host *
 EOF
 
 if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then
-	trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS"
+	trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS"
 	echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
 fi
 

crypto/openssh/regress/try-ciphers.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.24 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.25 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="try ciphers"
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
 		fi
 		# No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they
 		# are ignored.
-		if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
 			break
 		fi
 		n=`expr $n + 1`

crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* 	$OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.3 2015/03/07 04:41:48 djm Exp $ */
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.4 2015/03/31 22:59:01 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Regress test for hostfile.h hostkeys_foreach()
  *
@@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ check(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 	    expected->l.keytype : expected->no_parse_keytype;
 
 #ifndef WITH_SSH1
-	if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_RSA1 ||
+	if (parse_key && (expected->l.keytype == KEY_RSA1 ||
-	    expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_RSA1) {
+	    expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_RSA1)) {
 		expected_status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID;
 		expected_keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
 		parse_key = 0;

crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.3 2015/01/26 06:11:28 djm Exp $ */
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.4 2015/04/22 01:38:36 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API
  *
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
 	    NULL), 0);
-	k3 = get_private("ed25519_2");
+	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
 	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);

crypto/openssh/rijndael.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.19 2014/11/18 22:38:48 mikeb Exp $ */
+/*	$OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.20 2015/03/16 11:09:52 djm Exp $ */
 
 /**
  * rijndael-alg-fst.c

crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include <sys/resource.h>
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
 
+#include <linux/net.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/filter.h>
 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
@@ -79,6 +80,16 @@
 #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
+	/* load first syscall argument */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
+	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
 
 /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
 static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
@@ -90,45 +101,105 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
 	/* Load the syscall number for checking. */
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
 		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+
+	/* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */
+#ifdef __NR_fstat
+	SC_DENY(fstat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_fstat64
+	SC_DENY(fstat64, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_open
 	SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_openat
+	SC_DENY(openat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_newfstatat
+	SC_DENY(newfstatat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_stat
 	SC_DENY(stat, EACCES),
-	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
-	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
-	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
-#ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */
-	SC_ALLOW(time),
 #endif
-	SC_ALLOW(read),
+#ifdef __NR_stat64
-	SC_ALLOW(write),
+	SC_DENY(stat64, EACCES),
-	SC_ALLOW(close),
-#ifdef __NR_shutdown /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */
-	SC_ALLOW(shutdown),
 #endif
+
+	/* Syscalls to permit */
+#ifdef __NR_brk
 	SC_ALLOW(brk),
-	SC_ALLOW(poll),
-#ifdef __NR__newselect
-	SC_ALLOW(_newselect),
-#else
-	SC_ALLOW(select),
 #endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
+	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_close
+	SC_ALLOW(close),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_exit
+	SC_ALLOW(exit),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_exit_group
+	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getpgid
+	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getpid
+	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_madvise
 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),
-#ifdef __NR_mmap2 /* EABI ARM only has mmap2() */
-	SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
 #endif
 #ifdef __NR_mmap
 	SC_ALLOW(mmap),
 #endif
-#ifdef __dietlibc__
+#ifdef __NR_mmap2
-	SC_ALLOW(mremap),
+	SC_ALLOW(mmap2),
-	SC_ALLOW(exit),
 #endif
+#ifdef __NR_mremap
+	SC_ALLOW(mremap),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_munmap
 	SC_ALLOW(munmap),
-	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR__newselect
+	SC_ALLOW(_newselect),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_poll
+	SC_ALLOW(poll),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_pselect6
+	SC_ALLOW(pselect6),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_read
+	SC_ALLOW(read),
+#endif
 #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
 	SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask),
-#else
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_select
+	SC_ALLOW(select),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_shutdown
+	SC_ALLOW(shutdown),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
 	SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask),
 #endif
+#ifdef __NR_time
+	SC_ALLOW(time),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_write
+	SC_ALLOW(write),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_socketcall
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+#endif
+
+	/* Default deny */
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
 };
 

crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.14 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.16 2015/06/29 22:35:12 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
@@ -50,8 +50,9 @@ struct sandbox_policy {
 
 /* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */
 static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = {
-	{ SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER },
+	{ SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
-
+	{ SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 #ifdef SYS_getentropy
 	/* OpenBSD 5.6 and newer use getentropy(2) to seed arc4random(3). */
 	{ SYS_getentropy, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
@@ -59,23 +60,21 @@ static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = {
 	/* Previous releases used sysctl(3)'s kern.arnd variable. */
 	{ SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 #endif
-
-#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog
- 	{ SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
-#endif
-	{ SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
-	{ SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_getpgid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
-	{ SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
-	{ SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER },
+	{ SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog
+ 	{ SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#endif
 	{ SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
 	{ SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },

crypto/openssh/scp.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.181 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.182 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * scp - secure remote copy.  This is basically patched BSD rcp which
  * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
@@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize)
 	if (bp->buf == NULL)
 		bp->buf = xmalloc(size);
 	else
-		bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, 1, size);
+		bp->buf = xreallocarray(bp->buf, 1, size);
 	memset(bp->buf, 0, size);
 	bp->cnt = size;
 	return (bp);

crypto/openssh/servconf.c

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
-
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.274 2015/07/01 02:32:17 djm Exp $ */
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.260 2015/02/02 01:57:44 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -80,6 +79,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	/* Standard Options */
 	options->num_ports = 0;
 	options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
+	options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
+	options->num_queued_listens = 0;
 	options->listen_addrs = NULL;
 	options->address_family = -1;
 	options->num_host_key_files = 0;
@@ -117,6 +118,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
 	options->password_authentication = -1;
 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
@@ -161,6 +163,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
 	options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
 	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
+	options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
+	options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
@@ -207,6 +211,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	/* No certificates by default */
 	if (options->num_ports == 0)
 		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+	if (options->address_family == -1)
+		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
 	if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
 		add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0);
 	if (options->pid_file == NULL)
@@ -273,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
 		options->password_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -351,6 +359,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner);
 	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys);
 	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file);
 	for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++)
 		CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]);
 	for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++)
@@ -393,11 +402,13 @@ typedef enum {
 	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+	sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
 	sHostCertificate,
 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+	sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
 	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
 	sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
@@ -464,9 +475,11 @@ static struct {
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #else
 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #endif
 	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -530,6 +543,8 @@ static struct {
 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -596,10 +611,6 @@ add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
 {
 	u_int i;
 
-	if (options->num_ports == 0)
-		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
-	if (options->address_family == -1)
-		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
 	if (port == 0)
 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++)
 			add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]);
@@ -629,6 +640,51 @@ add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
 	options->listen_addrs = aitop;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports
+ * and AddressFamily options.
+ */
+static void
+queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
+{
+	options->queued_listen_addrs = xreallocarray(
+	    options->queued_listen_addrs, options->num_queued_listens + 1,
+	    sizeof(addr));
+	options->queued_listen_ports = xreallocarray(
+	    options->queued_listen_ports, options->num_queued_listens + 1,
+	    sizeof(port));
+	options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens] =
+	    xstrdup(addr);
+	options->queued_listen_ports[options->num_queued_listens] = port;
+	options->num_queued_listens++;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries.
+ */
+static void
+process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (options->num_ports == 0)
+		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+	if (options->address_family == -1)
+		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) {
+		add_listen_addr(options, options->queued_listen_addrs[i],
+		    options->queued_listen_ports[i]);
+		free(options->queued_listen_addrs[i]);
+		options->queued_listen_addrs[i] = NULL;
+	}
+	free(options->queued_listen_addrs);
+	options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
+	free(options->queued_listen_ports);
+	options->queued_listen_ports = NULL;
+	options->num_queued_listens = 0;
+}
+
 struct connection_info *
 get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns)
 {
@@ -714,7 +770,6 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
 {
 	int result = 1, attributes = 0, port;
 	char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition;
-	size_t len;
 
 	if (ci == NULL)
 		debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp);
@@ -741,13 +796,12 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
 			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
 			return -1;
 		}
-		len = strlen(arg);
 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
 			if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) {
 				result = 0;
 				continue;
 			}
-			if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, len, 0) != 1)
+			if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, 0) != 1)
 				result = 0;
 			else
 				debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
@@ -768,7 +822,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
 				result = 0;
 				continue;
 			}
-			if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg, len) != 1)
+			if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1)
 				result = 0;
 			else
 				debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
@@ -945,9 +999,6 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
 		if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
 			return 0;
-		if (options->listen_addrs != NULL)
-			fatal("%s line %d: ports must be specified before "
-			    "ListenAddress.", filename, linenum);
 		if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS)
 			fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.",
 			    filename, linenum);
@@ -983,7 +1034,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
 			fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if (*intptr == -1)
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
 			*intptr = value;
 		break;
 
@@ -999,7 +1050,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		/* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */
 		if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL
 		    && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) {
-			add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
+			queue_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
 			break;
 		}
 		p = hpdelim(&arg);
@@ -1012,16 +1063,13 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
 			fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum);
 
-		add_listen_addr(options, p, port);
+		queue_listen_addr(options, p, port);
 
 		break;
 
 	case sAddressFamily:
 		intptr = &options->address_family;
 		multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
-		if (options->listen_addrs != NULL)
-			fatal("%s line %d: address family must be specified "
-			    "before ListenAddress.", filename, linenum);
  parse_multistate:
 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
@@ -1175,6 +1223,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
+	case sGssStrictAcceptor:
+		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -1449,7 +1501,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		len = strlen(p) + 1;
 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
 			len += 1 + strlen(arg);
-			p = xrealloc(p, 1, len);
+			p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len);
 			strlcat(p, " ", len);
 			strlcat(p, arg, len);
 		}
@@ -1564,7 +1616,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		if (value == -1)
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/"
 			    "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
-		if (*intptr == -1)
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
 			*intptr = value;
 		break;
 
@@ -1617,7 +1669,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		break;
 
 	case sForceCommand:
-		if (cp == NULL)
+		if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
 			    linenum);
 		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
@@ -1662,7 +1714,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		break;
 
 	case sVersionAddendum:
-		if (cp == NULL)
+		if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
 			    linenum);
 		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
@@ -1702,8 +1754,36 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
 		break;
 
+	case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand:
+		if (cp == NULL)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+			    linenum);
+		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+		if (*activep &&
+		    options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) {
+			if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
+				fatal("%.200s line %d: "
+				    "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be "
+				    "an absolute path", filename, linenum);
+			options->authorized_principals_command =
+			    xstrdup(cp + len);
+		}
+		return 0;
+
+	case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser:
+		charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user;
+
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing "
+			    "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
 	case sAuthenticationMethods:
-		if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
+		if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
 			while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
 				if (options->num_auth_methods >=
 				    MAX_AUTH_METHODS)
@@ -1714,6 +1794,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 					fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
 					    "authentication method list.",
 					    filename, linenum);
+				if (!*activep)
+					continue;
 				options->auth_methods[
 				    options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg);
 			}
@@ -1723,13 +1805,14 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 	case sStreamLocalBindMask:
 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-			fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.",
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask "
-			    filename, linenum);
+			    "argument.", filename, linenum);
 		/* Parse mode in octal format */
 		value = strtol(arg, &p, 8);
 		if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777)
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
-		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
+		if (*activep)
+			options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
 		break;
 
 	case sStreamLocalBindUnlink:
@@ -1956,6 +2039,7 @@ parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf,
 	if (bad_options > 0)
 		fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
 		    filename, bad_options);
+	process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
 }
 
 static const char *
@@ -2032,6 +2116,12 @@ dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
 	printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
 }
 
+static void
+dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+	printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
+}
+
 static void
 dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
 {
@@ -2061,6 +2151,8 @@ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
 {
 	u_int i;
 
+	if (count <= 0)
+		return;
 	printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
 		printf(" %s",  vals[i]);
@@ -2074,6 +2166,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	int ret;
 	struct addrinfo *ai;
 	char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV], *s = NULL;
+	char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL;
 
 	/* these are usually at the top of the config */
 	for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++)
@@ -2081,7 +2174,11 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sProtocol, o->protocol);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family);
 
-	/* ListenAddress must be after Port */
+	/*
+	 * ListenAddress must be after Port.  add_one_listen_addr pushes
+	 * addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to
+	 * print these in reverse order.
+	 */
 	for (ai = o->listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
 		if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr,
 		    sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
@@ -2090,16 +2187,22 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 			    (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
 			    strerror(errno));
 		} else {
+			laddr2 = laddr1;
 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
-				printf("listenaddress [%s]:%s\n", addr, port);
+				xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s\n%s",
+				    addr, port, laddr2);
 			else
-				printf("listenaddress %s:%s\n", addr, port);
+				xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s\n%s",
+				    addr, port, laddr2);
+			free(laddr2);
 		}
 	}
+	printf("%s", laddr1);
+	free(laddr1);
 
 	/* integer arguments */
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	dump_cfg_int(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
 #endif
 	dump_cfg_int(sServerKeyBits, o->server_key_bits);
 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
@@ -2109,6 +2212,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
+	dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
 
 	/* formatted integer arguments */
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
@@ -2152,6 +2256,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
@@ -2168,9 +2273,12 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file);
 	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
 	    o->authorized_principals_file);
-	dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);
+	dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0'
+	    ? "none" : o->version_addendum);
 	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
 	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user);
 	dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
 	dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms,
 	    o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX);
@@ -2188,7 +2296,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	    o->authorized_keys_files);
 	dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files,
 	     o->host_key_files);
-	dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_cert_files,
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files,
 	     o->host_cert_files);
 	dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users);
 	dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users);

crypto/openssh/servconf.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.116 2015/01/13 07:39:19 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.119 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -58,7 +58,9 @@ typedef struct {
 	u_int	num_ports;
 	u_int	ports_from_cmdline;
 	int	ports[MAX_PORTS];	/* Port number to listen on. */
-	char   *listen_addr;		/* Address on which the server listens. */
+	u_int	num_queued_listens;
+	char   **queued_listen_addrs;
+	int    *queued_listen_ports;
 	struct addrinfo *listen_addrs;	/* Addresses on which the server listens. */
 	int     address_family;		/* Address family used by the server. */
 	char   *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS];	/* Files containing host keys. */
@@ -116,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+	int     gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
 	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
@@ -176,9 +179,11 @@ typedef struct {
 	char   *chroot_directory;
 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
-	char   *authorized_principals_file;
 	char   *authorized_keys_command;
 	char   *authorized_keys_command_user;
+	char   *authorized_principals_file;
+	char   *authorized_principals_command;
+	char   *authorized_principals_command_user;
 
 	int64_t rekey_limit;
 	int	rekey_interval;
@@ -214,9 +219,11 @@ struct connection_info {
 		M_CP_STROPT(banner); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \
-		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_key_types); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_key_types); \
 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \

crypto/openssh/session.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.277 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.278 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
 			if (envsize >= 1000)
 				fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars");
 			envsize += 50;
-			env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
+			env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
 			*envsizep = envsize;
 		}
 		/* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
@@ -1926,7 +1926,7 @@ session_new(void)
 			return NULL;
 		debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)",
 		    __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions);
-		tmp = xrealloc(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1,
+		tmp = xreallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1,
 		    sizeof(*sessions));
 		if (tmp == NULL) {
 			error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions",
@@ -2253,7 +2253,7 @@ session_env_req(Session *s)
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
 		if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
 			debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
-			s->env = xrealloc(s->env, s->num_env + 1,
+			s->env = xreallocarray(s->env, s->num_env + 1,
 			    sizeof(*s->env));
 			s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
 			s->env[s->num_env].val = val;

crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.117 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.120 2015/05/28 04:50:53 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests,
 		error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)",
 		    type);
 		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		free(ret);
 		return(NULL);
 	}
 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0)
@@ -621,7 +622,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
 				error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" "
 				    "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path);
 			} else if (dir) {
-				*dir = xrealloc(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir));
+				*dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir));
 				(*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir));
 				(*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename);
 				(*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname);
@@ -1384,7 +1385,9 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path,
 			    "server reordered requests", local_path);
 		}
 		debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
-		ftruncate(local_fd, highwater);
+		if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1)
+			error("ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+			    strerror(errno));
 	}
 	if (read_error) {
 		error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s",

crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.26 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.27 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
     Attrib *, int, int, int);
 
 /*
- * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve 
+ * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve
  * times if 'pflag' is set
  */
 int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
 int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int);
 
 /*
- * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve 
+ * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve
  * times if 'pflag' is set
  */
 int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,

crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.105 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.106 2015/04/24 01:36:01 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
 #include <time.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
@@ -310,7 +309,7 @@ handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp)
 		if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles)
 			return -1;
 		num_handles++;
-		handles = xrealloc(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle));
+		handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle));
 		handle_unused(num_handles - 1);
 	}
 
@@ -1063,7 +1062,7 @@ process_readdir(u_int32_t id)
 		while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
 			if (count >= nstats) {
 				nstats *= 2;
-				stats = xrealloc(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat));
+				stats = xreallocarray(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat));
 			}
 /* XXX OVERFLOW ? */
 			snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path,

crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0

@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
 
      -c      Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation
              before being used for authentication.  Confirmation is performed
-             by the SSH_ASKPASS program mentioned below.  Successful
+             by ssh-askpass(1).  Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero
-             confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from the
+             exit status from ssh-askpass(1), rather than text entered into
-             SSH_ASKPASS program, rather than text entered into the requester.
+             the requester.
 
      -D      Deletes all identities from the agent.
 
@@ -78,10 +78,11 @@ ENVIRONMENT
              the current terminal if it was run from a terminal.  If ssh-add
              does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and
              SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by
-             SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.  This
+             SSH_ASKPASS (by default M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-askpassM-bM-^@M-^]) and open an X11 window to
-             is particularly useful when calling ssh-add from a .xsession or
+             read the passphrase.  This is particularly useful when calling
-             related script.  (Note that on some machines it may be necessary
+             ssh-add from a .xsession or related script.  (Note that on some
-             to redirect the input from /dev/null to make this work.)
+             machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null
+             to make this work.)
 
      SSH_AUTH_SOCK
              Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ EXIT STATUS
      ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent.
 
 SEE ALSO
-     ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
+     ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-askpass(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
 
 AUTHORS
      OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
@@ -125,4 +126,4 @@ AUTHORS
      created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 5.7                    December 21, 2014                   OpenBSD 5.7
+OpenBSD 5.7                     March 30, 2015                     OpenBSD 5.7

crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.61 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.62 2015/03/30 18:28:37 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2014 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: March 30 2015 $
 .Dt SSH-ADD 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -88,12 +88,11 @@ The options are as follows:
 .It Fl c
 Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before
 being used for authentication.
-Confirmation is performed by the
+Confirmation is performed by
-.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
-program mentioned below.
+Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from
-Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from the
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
-.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+rather than text entered into the requester.
-program, rather than text entered into the requester.
 .It Fl D
 Deletes all identities from the agent.
 .It Fl d
@@ -156,6 +155,8 @@ and
 .Ev SSH_ASKPASS
 are set, it will execute the program specified by
 .Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+(by default
+.Dq ssh-askpass )
 and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
 This is particularly useful when calling
 .Nm
@@ -197,6 +198,7 @@ is unable to contact the authentication agent.
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr ssh 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
 .Xr sshd 8
 .Sh AUTHORS

crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.120 2015/02/21 21:46:57 halex Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.122 2015/03/26 12:32:38 naddy Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ static char *default_files[] = {
 #endif
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519,
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY,
+#endif
 	NULL
 };
 
@@ -164,11 +166,10 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd)
 {
 	int ret = -1;
 
-	if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1) == 0)
+	if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0)
 		ret = 0;
-	/* ignore error-code for ssh2 */
+	/* ignore error-code for ssh1 */
-	/* XXX revisit */
+	ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1);
-	ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2);
 
 	if (ret == 0)
 		fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n");
@@ -364,11 +365,16 @@ static int
 list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp)
 {
 	char *fp;
-	int version, r, had_identities = 0;
+	int r, had_identities = 0;
 	struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
 	size_t i;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+	int version = 1;
+#else
+	int version = 2;
+#endif
 
-	for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) {
+	for (; version <= 2; version++) {
 		if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, version,
 		    &idlist)) != 0) {
 			if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)

crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME
      ssh-agent M-bM-^@M-^S authentication agent
 
 SYNOPSIS
-     ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-d] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]
+     ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]
                [-t life] [command [arg ...]]
      ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k
 
@@ -32,8 +32,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
      -c      Generate C-shell commands on stdout.  This is the default if
              SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell.
 
+     -D      Foreground mode.  When this option is specified ssh-agent will
+             not fork.
+
      -d      Debug mode.  When this option is specified ssh-agent will not
-             fork.
+             fork and will write debug information to standard error.
 
      -E fingerprint_hash
              Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
@@ -106,4 +109,4 @@ AUTHORS
      created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 5.7                    December 21, 2014                   OpenBSD 5.7
+OpenBSD 5.7                     April 24, 2015                     OpenBSD 5.7

crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.57 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.59 2015/04/24 06:26:49 jmc Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2014 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: April 24 2015 $
 .Dt SSH-AGENT 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
 .Sh SYNOPSIS
 .Nm ssh-agent
 .Op Fl c | s
-.Op Fl dx
+.Op Fl Ddx
 .Op Fl a Ar bind_address
 .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
 .Op Fl t Ar life
@@ -93,11 +93,16 @@ Generate C-shell commands on
 This is the default if
 .Ev SHELL
 looks like it's a csh style of shell.
+.It Fl D
+Foreground mode.
+When this option is specified
+.Nm
+will not fork.
 .It Fl d
 Debug mode.
 When this option is specified
 .Nm
-will not fork.
+will not fork and will write debug information to standard error.
 .It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
 Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
 Valid options are:

crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.199 2015/03/04 21:12:59 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.203 2015/05/15 05:44:21 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <time.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
 
 #include "key.h"	/* XXX for typedef */
 #include "buffer.h"	/* XXX for typedef */
@@ -141,8 +144,12 @@ char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
 char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
 
 /* locking */
+#define LOCK_SIZE	32
+#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
+#define LOCK_ROUNDS	1
 int locked = 0;
-char *lock_passwd = NULL;
+char lock_passwd[LOCK_SIZE];
+char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
 
 extern char *__progname;
 
@@ -680,23 +687,45 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 static void
 process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
 {
-	int r, success = 0;
+	int r, success = 0, delay;
-	char *passwd;
+	char *passwd, passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE];
+	static u_int fail_count = 0;
+	size_t pwlen;
 
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, NULL)) != 0)
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-	if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) {
+	if (pwlen == 0) {
-		locked = 0;
+		debug("empty password not supported");
-		explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, strlen(lock_passwd));
+	} else if (locked && !lock) {
-		free(lock_passwd);
+		if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
-		lock_passwd = NULL;
+		    passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
-		success = 1;
+			fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
+		if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_passwd, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
+			debug("agent unlocked");
+			locked = 0;
+			fail_count = 0;
+			explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd));
+			success = 1;
+		} else {
+			/* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */
+			if (fail_count < 100)
+				fail_count++;
+			delay = 100000 * fail_count;
+			debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds",
+			    (double)delay/1000000);
+			usleep(delay);
+		}
+		explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash));
 	} else if (!locked && lock) {
+		debug("agent locked");
 		locked = 1;
-		lock_passwd = xstrdup(passwd);
+		arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt));
+		if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
+		    lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
+			fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
 		success = 1;
 	}
-	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
+	explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen);
 	free(passwd);
 	send_status(e, success);
 }
@@ -953,7 +982,7 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
 		}
 	old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
 	new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
-	sockets = xrealloc(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
+	sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
 	for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
 		sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
 	sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
@@ -1161,7 +1190,7 @@ static void
 usage(void)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr,
-	    "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-d] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
+	    "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
 	    "                 [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
 	    "       ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -x          Exit when the last client disconnects.\n");
@@ -1171,7 +1200,7 @@ usage(void)
 int
 main(int ac, char **av)
 {
-	int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
+	int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
 	int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
 	u_int nalloc;
 	char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
@@ -1207,7 +1236,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
 	seed_rng();
 
-	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksE:a:t:x")) != -1) {
+	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:t:x")) != -1) {
 		switch (ch) {
 		case 'E':
 			fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
@@ -1228,10 +1257,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			s_flag++;
 			break;
 		case 'd':
-			if (d_flag)
+			if (d_flag || D_flag)
 				usage();
 			d_flag++;
 			break;
+		case 'D':
+			if (d_flag || D_flag)
+				usage();
+			D_flag++;
+			break;
 		case 'a':
 			agentsocket = optarg;
 			break;
@@ -1251,7 +1285,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	ac -= optind;
 	av += optind;
 
-	if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag))
+	if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
 		usage();
 
 	if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
@@ -1320,8 +1354,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	 * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
 	 * the socket data.  The child continues as the authentication agent.
 	 */
-	if (d_flag) {
+	if (D_flag || d_flag) {
-		log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+		log_init(__progname,
+		    d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+		    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
 		format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
 		printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
 		    SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
@@ -1393,7 +1429,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		parent_alive_interval = 10;
 	idtab_init();
 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-	signal(SIGINT, d_flag ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
+	signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
 	signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
 	signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
 	nalloc = 0;

crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.266 2015/02/26 20:45:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.274 2015/05/28 07:37:31 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@
 #include "krl.h"
 #include "digest.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
+#else
+# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
+#endif
+
 /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key.  This value can be set on the command line. */
 #define DEFAULT_BITS		2048
 #define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA	1024
@@ -174,23 +180,22 @@ extern char *__progname;
 
 char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 /* moduli.c */
 int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
 int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
     unsigned long);
+#endif
 
 static void
 type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
 {
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-	u_int maxbits;
+	u_int maxbits, nid;
-	int nid;
 #endif
 
-	if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+	if (type == KEY_UNSPEC)
-		fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name);
+		fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name);
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	if (*bitsp == 0) {
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 		if (type == KEY_DSA)
@@ -208,10 +213,8 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 	maxbits = (type == KEY_DSA) ?
 	    OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS;
-	if (*bitsp > maxbits) {
+	if (*bitsp > maxbits)
-		fprintf(stderr, "key bits exceeds maximum %d\n", maxbits);
+		fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits);
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024)
 		fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits");
 	else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 768)
@@ -256,13 +259,13 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
 			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
 			break;
 		default:
-			fprintf(stderr, "bad key type\n");
+			fatal("bad key type");
-			exit(1);
-			break;
 		}
 	}
-	snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
+	snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file),
-	fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
+	    "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
+	printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
+	fflush(stdout);
 	if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
 		exit(1);
 	buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0';
@@ -308,14 +311,10 @@ do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k)
 	char comment[61];
 	int r;
 
-	if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+	if (k->type == KEY_RSA1)
-		fprintf(stderr, "version 1 keys are not supported\n");
+		fatal("version 1 keys are not supported");
-		exit(1);
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(k, &blob, &len)) != 0)
-	}
+		fatal("key_to_blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-	if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(k, &blob, &len)) != 0) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "key_to_blob failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	/* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */
 	snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment),
 	    "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH",
@@ -544,17 +543,13 @@ get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len)
 
 	line[0] = '\0';
 	while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) {
-		if (pos >= len - 1) {
+		if (pos >= len - 1)
-			fprintf(stderr, "input line too long.\n");
+			fatal("input line too long.");
-			exit(1);
-		}
 		switch (c) {
 		case '\r':
 			c = fgetc(fp);
-			if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) {
+			if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF)
-				fprintf(stderr, "unget: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+				fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno));
-				exit(1);
-			}
 			return pos;
 		case '\n':
 			return pos;
@@ -606,16 +601,12 @@ do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private)
 	    (encoded[len-3] == '='))
 		encoded[len-3] = '\0';
 	blen = uudecode(encoded, blob, sizeof(blob));
-	if (blen < 0) {
+	if (blen < 0)
-		fprintf(stderr, "uudecode failed.\n");
+		fatal("uudecode failed.");
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	if (*private)
 		*k = do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen);
-	else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, k)) != 0) {
+	else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, k)) != 0)
-		fprintf(stderr, "decode blob failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+		fatal("decode blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	fclose(fp);
 }
 
@@ -749,10 +740,8 @@ do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (!ok) {
+	if (!ok)
-		fprintf(stderr, "key write failed\n");
+		fatal("key write failed");
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	sshkey_free(k);
 	exit(0);
 }
@@ -767,13 +756,11 @@ do_print_public(struct passwd *pw)
 
 	if (!have_identity)
 		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
-	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
-		perror(identity_file);
+		fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	prv = load_identity(identity_file);
 	if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0)
-		fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+		error("key_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 	sshkey_free(prv);
 	fprintf(stdout, "\n");
 	exit(0);
@@ -838,10 +825,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
 	if (!have_identity)
 		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
-	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
-		perror(identity_file);
+		fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &public, &comment)) != 0)
 		debug2("Error loading public key \"%s\": %s",
 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
@@ -933,10 +918,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
 	}
 	fclose(f);
 
-	if (invalid) {
+	if (invalid)
-		printf("%s is not a public key file.\n", identity_file);
+		fatal("%s is not a public key file.", identity_file);
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	exit(0);
 }
 
@@ -948,12 +931,16 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
 		char *key_type_display;
 		char *path;
 	} key_types[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 		{ "rsa1", "RSA1", _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE },
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 		{ "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE },
 		{ "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE },
 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 		{ "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE },
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 		{ "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE },
 		{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
 	};
@@ -969,7 +956,7 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
 		if (stat(key_types[i].path, &st) == 0)
 			continue;
 		if (errno != ENOENT) {
-			printf("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path,
+			error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path,
 			    strerror(errno));
 			first = 0;
 			continue;
@@ -986,8 +973,7 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
 		bits = 0;
 		type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits);
 		if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed: %s\n",
+			error("key_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-			    ssh_err(r));
 			first = 0;
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -997,8 +983,8 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
 		    hostname);
 		if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, "",
 		    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-			printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s\n", identity_file,
+			error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
-			    ssh_err(r));
+			    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
 			sshkey_free(private);
 			sshkey_free(public);
 			first = 0;
@@ -1008,7 +994,7 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
 		strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
 		fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
 		if (fd == -1) {
-			printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n",
+			error("Could not save your public key in %s",
 			    identity_file);
 			sshkey_free(public);
 			first = 0;
@@ -1016,14 +1002,14 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
 		}
 		f = fdopen(fd, "w");
 		if (f == NULL) {
-			printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file);
+			error("fdopen %s failed", identity_file);
 			close(fd);
 			sshkey_free(public);
 			first = 0;
 			continue;
 		}
 		if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "write key failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+			error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 			fclose(f);
 			sshkey_free(public);
 			first = 0;
@@ -1064,8 +1050,8 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 		    has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
 			fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
 			if (has_wild && !find_host) {
-				fprintf(stderr, "%s:%ld: ignoring host name "
+				logit("%s:%ld: ignoring host name "
-				    "with wildcard: %.64s\n", l->path,
+				    "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path,
 				    l->linenum, l->hosts);
 			}
 			return 0;
@@ -1086,7 +1072,7 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 	case HKF_STATUS_INVALID:
 		/* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */
 		ctx->invalid = 1;
-		fprintf(stderr, "%s:%ld: invalid line\n", l->path, l->linenum);
+		logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	default:
 		fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
@@ -1100,6 +1086,12 @@ static int
 known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 {
 	struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
+	enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
+	int fptype;
+	char *fp;
+
+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
+	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
 
 	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
 		if (delete_host) {
@@ -1128,7 +1120,12 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 			}
 			if (hash_hosts)
 				known_hosts_hash(l, ctx);
-			else
+			else if (print_fingerprint) {
+				fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep);
+				printf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host,
+				    sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment);
+				free(fp);
+			} else
 				fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -1136,8 +1133,7 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
 		/* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */
 		if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
 			ctx->invalid = 1;
-			fprintf(stderr, "%s:%ld: invalid line\n",
+			logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
-			    l->path, l->linenum);
 		}
 		fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
 	}
@@ -1150,6 +1146,7 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name)
 	char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX];
 	int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0;
 	struct known_hosts_ctx ctx;
+	u_int foreach_options;
 
 	if (!have_identity) {
 		cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
@@ -1186,26 +1183,26 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name)
 	}
 
 	/* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */
+	foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0;
+	foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0;
 	if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file,
 	    hash_hosts ? known_hosts_hash : known_hosts_find_delete, &ctx,
-	    name, NULL, find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0)) != 0)
+	    name, NULL, foreach_options)) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 
 	if (inplace)
 		fclose(ctx.out);
 
 	if (ctx.invalid) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a valid known_hosts file.\n",
+		error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file);
-		    identity_file);
 		if (inplace) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "Not replacing existing known_hosts "
+			error("Not replacing existing known_hosts "
-			    "file because of errors\n");
+			    "file because of errors");
 			unlink(tmp);
 		}
 		exit(1);
 	} else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "Host %s not found in %s\n",
+		logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file);
-		    name, identity_file);
 		unlink(tmp);
 	} else if (inplace) {
 		/* Backup existing file */
@@ -1223,13 +1220,12 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name)
 			exit(1);
 		}
 
-		fprintf(stderr, "%s updated.\n", identity_file);
+		printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file);
-		fprintf(stderr, "Original contents retained as %s\n", old);
+		printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old);
 		if (ctx.has_unhashed) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: %s contains unhashed "
+			logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old);
-			    "entries\n", old);
+			logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy "
-			fprintf(stderr, "Delete this file to ensure privacy "
+			    "of hostnames");
-			    "of hostnames\n");
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1251,10 +1247,8 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
 
 	if (!have_identity)
 		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
-	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
-		perror(identity_file);
+		fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	/* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */
 	r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment);
 	if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
@@ -1272,9 +1266,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
 			goto badkey;
 	} else if (r != 0) {
  badkey:
-		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to load key \"%s\": %s\n",
+		fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r));
-		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
-		exit(1);
 	}
 	if (comment)
 		printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
@@ -1307,7 +1299,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
 	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
 	    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-		printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.\n",
+		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.",
 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
 		explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
 		free(passphrase1);
@@ -1341,14 +1333,11 @@ do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname)
 	if (stat(fname, &st) < 0) {
 		if (errno == ENOENT)
 			return 0;
-		perror(fname);
+		fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno));
-		exit(1);
 	}
-	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0) {
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0)
-		printf("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.\n",
+		fatal("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.",
 		    fname, ssh_err(r));
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic);
 	sshkey_free(public);
 	free(comment);
@@ -1370,18 +1359,15 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
 
 	if (!have_identity)
 		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
-	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
-		perror(identity_file);
+		fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "",
 	    &private, &comment)) == 0)
 		passphrase = xstrdup("");
-	else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+	else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
-		printf("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.\n",
+		fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.",
 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
-		exit(1);
+	else {
-	} else {
 		if (identity_passphrase)
 			passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
 		else if (identity_new_passphrase)
@@ -1394,13 +1380,14 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
 		    &private, &comment)) != 0) {
 			explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
 			free(passphrase);
-			printf("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.\n",
+			fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.",
 			    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
-			exit(1);
 		}
 	}
+	/* XXX what about new-format keys? */
 	if (private->type != KEY_RSA1) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys.\n");
+		error("Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys.");
+		explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
 		sshkey_free(private);
 		exit(1);
 	}
@@ -1422,7 +1409,7 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
 	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
 	    new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-		printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s\n",
+		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
 		explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
 		free(passphrase);
@@ -1438,17 +1425,13 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
 
 	strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
 	fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
-	if (fd == -1) {
+	if (fd == -1)
-		printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file);
+		fatal("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file);
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	f = fdopen(fd, "w");
-	if (f == NULL) {
+	if (f == NULL)
-		printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file);
+		fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0)
-		fprintf(stderr, "write key failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+		fatal("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 	sshkey_free(public);
 	fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment);
 	fclose(f);
@@ -1608,8 +1591,7 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
 				break;
 			/* FALLTHROUGH */
 		default:
-			fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name);
+			fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name);
-			exit(1);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1631,7 +1613,7 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
 			otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals);
 			plist = NULL;
 			for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) {
-				plist = xrealloc(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist));
+				plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist));
 				if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0')
 					fatal("Empty principal name");
 			}
@@ -2216,9 +2198,11 @@ usage(void)
 	    "       ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g]\n"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 	    "       ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]\n"
 	    "                  [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]\n"
+#endif
 	    "       ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals]\n"
 	    "                  [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...\n"
 	    "       ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n"
@@ -2236,19 +2220,22 @@ int
 main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
-	char *checkpoint = NULL;
+	char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra;
-	char out_file[PATH_MAX], *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra;
 	struct sshkey *private, *public;
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	struct stat st;
 	int r, opt, type, fd;
-	u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0;
-	int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0;
 	int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0;
-	unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
-	BIGNUM *start = NULL;
 	FILE *f;
 	const char *errstr;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	/* Moduli generation/screening */
+	char out_file[PATH_MAX], *checkpoint = NULL;
+	u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0;
+	int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0;
+	unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
+	BIGNUM *start = NULL;
+#endif
 
 	extern int optind;
 	extern char *optarg;
@@ -2267,14 +2254,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 
 	/* we need this for the home * directory.  */
 	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
-	if (!pw) {
+	if (!pw)
-		printf("No user exists for uid %lu\n", (u_long)getuid());
+		fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
-		exit(1);
+	if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0)
-	}
+		fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
-	if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) {
-		perror("gethostname");
-		exit(1);
-	}
 
 	/* Remaining characters: UYdw */
 	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQXceghiklopquvxy"
@@ -2305,12 +2288,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		case 'I':
 			cert_key_id = optarg;
 			break;
-		case 'J':
-			lines_to_process = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-                        break;
-		case 'j':
-			start_lineno = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-                        break;
 		case 'R':
 			delete_host = 1;
 			rr_hostname = optarg;
@@ -2352,8 +2329,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			change_comment = 1;
 			break;
 		case 'f':
-			if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
+			if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg,
-			    sizeof(identity_file))
+			    sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file))
 				fatal("Identity filename too long");
 			have_identity = 1;
 			break;
@@ -2425,6 +2402,24 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		case 'r':
 			rr_hostname = optarg;
 			break;
+		case 'a':
+			rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+					optarg, errstr);
+			break;
+		case 'V':
+			parse_cert_times(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'z':
+			errno = 0;
+			cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10);
+			if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' ||
+			    (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX))
+				fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+		/* Moduli generation/screening */
 		case 'W':
 			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1,
 			    UINT_MAX, &errstr);
@@ -2432,13 +2427,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 				fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)",
 					optarg, errstr);
 			break;
-		case 'a':
-			rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr);
-			if (errstr)
-				fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
-					optarg, errstr);
-			break;
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 		case 'M':
 			memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
 			if (errstr)
@@ -2467,16 +2455,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 				fatal("Invalid start point.");
 			break;
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-		case 'V':
-			parse_cert_times(optarg);
-			break;
-		case 'z':
-			errno = 0;
-			cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10);
-			if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' ||
-			    (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX))
-				fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg);
-			break;
 		case '?':
 		default:
 			usage();
@@ -2491,19 +2469,19 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 
 	if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
 		if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) {
-			printf("Too few arguments.\n");
+			error("Too few arguments.");
 			usage();
 		}
 	} else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl) {
-		printf("Too many arguments.\n");
+		error("Too many arguments.");
 		usage();
 	}
 	if (change_passphrase && change_comment) {
-		printf("Can only have one of -p and -c.\n");
+		error("Can only have one of -p and -c.");
 		usage();
 	}
 	if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) {
-		printf("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.\n");
+		error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.");
 		usage();
 	}
 	if (gen_krl) {
@@ -2545,10 +2523,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		if (have_identity) {
 			n = do_print_resource_record(pw,
 			    identity_file, rr_hostname);
-			if (n == 0) {
+			if (n == 0)
-				perror(identity_file);
+				fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
-				exit(1);
-			}
 			exit(0);
 		} else {
 
@@ -2566,6 +2542,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		}
 	}
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 	if (do_gen_candidates) {
 		FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w");
 
@@ -2605,6 +2582,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			fatal("modulus screening failed");
 		return (0);
 	}
+#endif
 
 	if (gen_all_hostkeys) {
 		do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw);
@@ -2612,7 +2590,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	}
 
 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
-		key_type_name = "rsa";
+		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
 
 	type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name);
 	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
@@ -2620,14 +2598,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (!quiet)
 		printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n",
 		    key_type_name);
-	if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) {
+	if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0)
-		fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed\n");
+		fatal("key_generate failed");
-		exit(1);
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
-	}
+		fatal("key_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-	if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "key_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-		exit(1);
-	}
 
 	if (!have_identity)
 		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key");
@@ -2697,7 +2671,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	/* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
 	    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-		printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s\n",
+		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
 		explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
 		free(passphrase1);
@@ -2714,18 +2688,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file);
 
 	strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
-	fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
+	if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
-	if (fd == -1) {
+		fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s",
-		printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file);
+		    identity_file, strerror(errno));
-		exit(1);
+	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL)
-	}
+		fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
-	f = fdopen(fd, "w");
-	if (f == NULL) {
-		printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file);
-		exit(1);
-	}
 	if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0)
-		fprintf(stderr, "write key failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+		error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 	fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
 	fclose(f);
 

crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.99 2015/01/30 10:44:49 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.101 2015/04/10 00:08:55 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
  *
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ typedef struct Connection {
 	int c_len;		/* Total bytes which must be read. */
 	int c_off;		/* Length of data read so far. */
 	int c_keytype;		/* Only one of KT_RSA1, KT_DSA, or KT_RSA */
-	int c_done;		/* SSH2 done */
+	sig_atomic_t c_done;	/* SSH2 done */
 	char *c_namebase;	/* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */
 	char *c_name;		/* Hostname of connection for errors */
 	char *c_namelist;	/* Pointer to other possible addresses */
@@ -299,15 +299,18 @@ static void
 keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key)
 {
 	char *host = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name;
+	char *hostport = NULL;
 
 	if (!key)
 		return;
 	if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
 		fatal("host_hash failed");
 
-	fprintf(stdout, "%s ", host);
+	hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port);
+	fprintf(stdout, "%s ", hostport);
 	sshkey_write(key, stdout);
 	fputs("\n", stdout);
+	free(hostport);
 }
 
 static int
@@ -488,7 +491,7 @@ congreet(int s)
 		confree(s);
 		return;
 	}
-	fprintf(stderr, "# %s %s\n", c->c_name, chop(buf));
+	fprintf(stderr, "# %s:%d %s\n", c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf));
 	n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
 	    c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2,
 	    c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);

crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.47 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.48 2015/03/24 20:09:11 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret,
 
 	if (fail && key != NULL)
 		sshkey_free(key);
-	else
+	else if (ret != NULL)
 		*ret = key;
 
 	return (fail ? -1 : 0);

crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.17 2015/02/03 08:07:20 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.19 2015/05/27 05:15:02 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
 		{CKA_ID, NULL, 0},
 		{CKA_SIGN, NULL, sizeof(true_val) }
 	};
-	char			*pin, prompt[1024];
+	char			*pin = NULL, prompt[1024];
 	int			rval = -1;
 
 	key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class;
@@ -255,22 +255,30 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
 	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
 	if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
 		if (!pkcs11_interactive) {
-			error("need pin");
+			error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags &
+			    CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ?
+			    " on reader keypad" : "");
 			return (-1);
 		}
-		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
+		if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
-		    si->token.label);
+			verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad.");
-		pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+		else {
-		if (pin == NULL)
+			snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
-			return (-1);	/* bail out */
+			    "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label);
-		rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER,
+			pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
-		    (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin));
+			if (pin == NULL)
-		if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) {
+				return (-1);	/* bail out */
+		}
+		rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin,
+		    (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
+		if (pin != NULL) {
+			explicit_bzero(pin, strlen(pin));
 			free(pin);
+		}
+		if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) {
 			error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv);
 			return (-1);
 		}
-		free(pin);
 		si->logged_in = 1;
 	}
 	key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid;
@@ -527,7 +535,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
 				sshkey_free(key);
 			} else {
 				/* expand key array and add key */
-				*keysp = xrealloc(*keysp, *nkeys + 1,
+				*keysp = xreallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys + 1,
 				    sizeof(struct sshkey *));
 				(*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
 				*nkeys = *nkeys + 1;

crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.52 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.53 2015/06/15 01:32:50 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 	}
 	if (b != NULL)
 		sshbuf_free(b);
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int

crypto/openssh/ssh.0

@@ -354,9 +354,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
              applications (eg. sftp(1)).  The subsystem is specified as the
              remote command.
 
-     -T      Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
+     -T      Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
 
-     -t      Force pseudo-tty allocation.  This can be used to execute
+     -t      Force pseudo-terminal allocation.  This can be used to execute
              arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
              very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services.  Multiple -t
              options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
@@ -510,17 +510,22 @@ AUTHENTICATION
      whose host key is not known or has changed.
 
      When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
-     either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives the
+     either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no
-     user a normal shell on the remote machine.  All communication with the
+     command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a
+     normal shell as an interactive session.  All communication with the
      remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
 
-     If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the user
+     If an interactive session is requested ssh by default will only request a
-     may use the escape characters noted below.
+     pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one.
+     The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour.
 
-     If no pseudo-tty has been allocated, the session is transparent and can
+     If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape
-     be used to reliably transfer binary data.  On most systems, setting the
+     characters noted below.
-     escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent even if
+
-     a tty is used.
+     If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and
+     can be used to reliably transfer binary data.  On most systems, setting
+     the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent
+     even if a tty is used.
 
      The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine
      exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
@@ -638,16 +643,20 @@ VERIFYING HOST KEYS
            $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
 
      If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be
-     accepted or rejected.  Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys
+     accepted or rejected.  If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server
-     just by looking at fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare
+     are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the
-     host keys visually, using random art.  By setting the VisualHostKey
+     fingerprint algorithm to match.
-     option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a
+
-     server, no matter if the session itself is interactive or not.  By
+     Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at
-     learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out
+     fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually,
-     that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern is
+     using random art.  By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small
-     displayed.  Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern
+     ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the
-     that looks similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good
+     session itself is interactive or not.  By learning the pattern a known
-     probability that the host key is the same, not guaranteed proof.
+     server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed
+     when a completely different pattern is displayed.  Because these patterns
+     are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern
+     remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same,
+     not guaranteed proof.
 
      To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all
      known hosts, the following command line can be used:
@@ -948,4 +957,4 @@ AUTHORS
      created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 5.7                      March 3, 2015                     OpenBSD 5.7
+OpenBSD 5.7                      May 22, 2015                      OpenBSD 5.7

crypto/openssh/ssh.1

@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.356 2015/03/03 06:48:58 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.358 2015/05/22 05:28:45 djm Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd $Mdocdate: March 3 2015 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: May 22 2015 $
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -586,9 +586,9 @@ of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg.\&
 .Xr sftp 1 ) .
 The subsystem is specified as the remote command.
 .It Fl T
-Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
+Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
 .It Fl t
-Force pseudo-tty allocation.
+Force pseudo-terminal allocation.
 This can be used to execute arbitrary
 screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful,
 e.g. when implementing menu services.
@@ -878,15 +878,26 @@ option can be used to control logins to machines whose
 host key is not known or has changed.
 .Pp
 When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
-either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives
+either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or,
-the user a normal shell on the remote machine.
+if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives
+the user a normal shell as an interactive session.
 All communication with
 the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
 .Pp
-If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the
+If an interactive session is requested
+.Nm
+by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive
+sessions when the client has one.
+The flags
+.Fl T
+and
+.Fl t
+can be used to override this behaviour.
+.Pp
+If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the
 user may use the escape characters noted below.
 .Pp
-If no pseudo-tty has been allocated,
+If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated,
 the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data.
 On most systems, setting the escape character to
 .Dq none
@@ -1097,6 +1108,11 @@ Fingerprints can be determined using
 .Pp
 If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched
 and the key can be accepted or rejected.
+If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+.Fl E
+option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match.
+.Pp
 Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys
 just by looking at fingerprint strings,
 there is also support to compare host keys visually,

crypto/openssh/ssh.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.416 2015/03/03 06:48:58 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.418 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -357,10 +357,8 @@ check_follow_cname(char **namep, const char *cname)
 	debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname);
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
 		rule = options.permitted_cnames + i;
-		if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list,
+		if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 ||
-		    strlen(rule->source_list), 1) != 1 ||
+		    match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1)
-		    match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list,
-		    strlen(rule->target_list), 1) != 1)
 			continue;
 		verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname "
 		    "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
@@ -1685,6 +1683,8 @@ ssh_session(void)
 	}
 	/* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
 	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
+		debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
 	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
 		char *proto, *data;
 		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
@@ -1786,6 +1786,8 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg)
 		return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
 
 	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
+		debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
 	if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
 		char *proto, *data;
 		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */

crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
              require an argument.  Criteria may be negated by prepending an
              exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y).
 
-             The canonical keywork matches only when the configuration file is
+             The canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is
              being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the
              CanonicalizeHostname option.)  This may be useful to specify
              conditions that work with canonical host names only.  The exec
@@ -165,9 +165,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
      CheckHostIP
              If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) will additionally check the
              host IP address in the known_hosts file.  This allows ssh to
-             detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing.  If the option
+             detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add
-             is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], the check will not be executed.  The default is
+             addresses of destination hosts to ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the
-             M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+             process, regardless of the setting of StrictHostKeyChecking.  If
+             the option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], the check will not be executed.  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
 
      Cipher  Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in
              protocol version 1.  Currently, M-bM-^@M-^\blowfishM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\desM-bM-^@M-^] are
@@ -252,9 +254,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
              or is not listening.
 
              Setting this to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^] will cause ssh to listen for control
-             connections, but require confirmation using the SSH_ASKPASS
+             connections, but require confirmation using ssh-askpass(1).  If
-             program before they are accepted (see ssh-add(1) for details).
+             the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without
-             If the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without
              connecting to a master instance.
 
              X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these
@@ -552,8 +553,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
                    curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
                    ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
                    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
-                   diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
                    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
+                   diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
                    diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
 
              The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
@@ -768,12 +769,15 @@ DESCRIPTION
              Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent
              to the server.  Note that environment passing is only supported
              for protocol 2.  The server must also support it, and the server
-             must be configured to accept these environment variables.  Refer
+             must be configured to accept these environment variables.  Note
-             to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the server.
+             that the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a
-             Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard
+             pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
-             characters.  Multiple environment variables may be separated by
+             Refer to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the
-             whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv directives.  The
+             server.  Variables are specified by name, which may contain
-             default is not to send any environment variables.
+             wildcard characters.  Multiple environment variables may be
+             separated by whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv
+             directives.  The default is not to send any environment
+             variables.
 
              See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
 
@@ -978,4 +982,4 @@ AUTHORS
      created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
      versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 
-OpenBSD 5.7                    February 20, 2015                   OpenBSD 5.7
+OpenBSD 5.7                      June 2, 2015                      OpenBSD 5.7

crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5

@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.205 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.211 2015/06/02 09:10:40 djm Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 20 2015 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 2 2015 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark
 .Pp
 The
 .Cm canonical
-keywork matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed
+keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed
 after hostname canonicalization (see the
 .Cm CanonicalizeHostname
 option.)
@@ -341,7 +341,11 @@ If this flag is set to
 will additionally check the host IP address in the
 .Pa known_hosts
 file.
-This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing.
+This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing
+and will add addresses of destination hosts to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+in the process, regardless of the setting of
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking .
 If the option is set to
 .Dq no ,
 the check will not be executed.
@@ -485,11 +489,8 @@ if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening.
 Setting this to
 .Dq ask
 will cause ssh
-to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using the
+to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using
-.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
-program before they are accepted (see
-.Xr ssh-add 1
-for details).
 If the
 .Cm ControlPath
 cannot be opened,
@@ -979,8 +980,8 @@ The default is:
 curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
 diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
 .Ed
 .Pp
@@ -1337,6 +1338,10 @@ should be sent to the server.
 Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
 The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
 accept these environment variables.
+Note that the
+.Ev TERM
+environment variable is always sent whenever a
+pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
 Refer to
 .Cm AcceptEnv
 in

crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*
  * Namespace munging inspired by an equivalent hack in NetBSD's tree: add
- * the "ssh_" prefix to every symbol in libssh which doesn't already have
+ * the "Fssh_" prefix to every symbol in libssh which doesn't already have
  * it.  This prevents collisions between symbols in libssh and symbols in
  * other libraries or applications which link with libssh, either directly
  * or indirectly (e.g. through PAM loading pam_ssh).
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@
 #define channel_send_window_changes		Fssh_channel_send_window_changes
 #define channel_set_af				Fssh_channel_set_af
 #define channel_set_fds				Fssh_channel_set_fds
+#define channel_set_x11_refuse_time		Fssh_channel_set_x11_refuse_time
 #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal	Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal
 #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip	Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip
 #define channel_setup_local_fwd_listener	Fssh_channel_setup_local_fwd_listener
@@ -314,6 +315,7 @@
 #define dh_new_group1				Fssh_dh_new_group1
 #define dh_new_group14				Fssh_dh_new_group14
 #define dh_new_group_asc			Fssh_dh_new_group_asc
+#define dh_new_group_fallback			Fssh_dh_new_group_fallback
 #define dh_pub_is_valid				Fssh_dh_pub_is_valid
 #define dispatch_protocol_error			Fssh_dispatch_protocol_error
 #define dispatch_protocol_ignore		Fssh_dispatch_protocol_ignore
@@ -846,6 +848,7 @@
 #define sshkey_size				Fssh_sshkey_size
 #define sshkey_ssh_name				Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name
 #define sshkey_ssh_name_plain			Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name_plain
+#define sshkey_to_base64			Fssh_sshkey_to_base64
 #define sshkey_to_blob				Fssh_sshkey_to_blob
 #define sshkey_to_certified			Fssh_sshkey_to_certified
 #define sshkey_try_load_public			Fssh_sshkey_try_load_public
@@ -928,4 +931,5 @@
 #define xmalloc					Fssh_xmalloc
 #define xmmap					Fssh_xmmap
 #define xrealloc				Fssh_xrealloc
+#define xreallocarray				Fssh_xreallocarray
 #define xstrdup					Fssh_xstrdup

crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.3 2015/02/05 12:59:57 millert Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.4 2015/03/24 20:03:44 markus Exp $	*/
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
  *
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f)
 	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)s;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
-		fprintf(f, "%.4zd: ", i);
+		fprintf(f, "%.4zu: ", i);
 		for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
 			if (j < len)
 				fprintf(f, "%02x ", p[j]);

crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.259 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.262 2015/05/28 05:41:29 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
 			    host_key, options.hash_known_hosts))
 				logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
 				    "address '%.128s' to the list of known "
-				    "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip,
+				    "hosts (%.500s).", type, ip,
 				    user_hostfiles[0]);
 			else
 				logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
@@ -1351,6 +1351,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
 
 	/* key exchange */
 	/* authenticate user */
+	debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user);
 	if (compat20) {
 		ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port);
 		ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
@@ -1359,7 +1360,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
 		ssh_kex(host, hostaddr);
 		ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
 #else
-		fatal("ssh1 is not unsupported");
+		fatal("ssh1 is not supported");
 #endif
 	}
 	free(local_user);