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doas/vidoas

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#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (c) 2020 Kimmo Suominen <kim@netbsd.org>
#
# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL
# WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED
# WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
# AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
# DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA
# OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER
# TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
# PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
# Edit a temporary copy of the doas.conf file and check it for syntax
# errors before installing it as the actual doas.conf file.
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
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set -eu
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
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PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin
export PATH
PROG="${0##*/}"
umask 022
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
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DOAS_CONF=@DOAS_CONF@
doas_conf_mode="0600"
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
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die()
{
echo "${PROG}: ${@}" 1>&2
exit 1
}
warn()
{
echo "${PROG}: ${@}" 1>&2
}
get_intr()
{
stty -a \
| sed -En '
/^(.* )?intr = / {
s///
s/;.*$//
p
}
'
}
owner_of()
{
local file
file="${1}"
if stat --version >/dev/null 2>&1
then
stat -c '%U' "${file}"
else
stat -f '%Su' "${file}"
fi \
| awk '{print $1; exit}'
}
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
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set_trap_rm()
{
local file file_list
file_list=
for file
do
file_list="${file_list} '${file}'"
done
if [ -n "${file_list}" ]
then
trap "rm -f ${file_list}" 0 1 2 15
fi
}
usage()
{
cat <<EOF
Usage: ${PROG} [-n] [file]
${PROG} -h
Edit a temporary copy of a doas configuration file and check it for
syntax errors before installing it as the actual configuration file.
When no file is named, ${PROG} will edit the default configuration file
for doas(1): @DOAS_CONF@
Options:
-h Show this usage.
-n Do not edit the file, just perform prerequisite checks. If this
switch is repeated, all output will be suppressed and the check
result is only indicated by the exit status.
EOF
}
noop=0
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while getopts hn opt
do
case "${opt}" in
h) usage; exit 0;;
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n) noop=$((${noop} + 1));;
*) usage 1>&2; exit 1;;
esac
done
shift $((${OPTIND} - 1))
case ${#} in
0) ;;
1) DOAS_CONF="${1}";;
*) usage 1>&2; exit 1;;
esac
case ${noop} in
0) noop=false;;
1) noop=true;;
*) noop=true; exec >/dev/null 2>&1;;
esac
case "${DOAS_CONF}" in
-*)
warn "Invalid filename: ${DOAS_CONF}"
die "Try using './${DOAS_CONF}' instead"
;;
esac
doas_conf_dir="$(dirname "${DOAS_CONF}")"
doas_conf_base="$(basename "${DOAS_CONF}")"
DOAS_CONF="${doas_conf_dir}/${doas_conf_base}"
doas_lock_file="${DOAS_CONF}.lck"
# These checks are only for producing nicer diagnostic messages to the
# user. They are not relied on by the rest of the code.
if [ ! -e "${doas_conf_dir}" ]
then
die "${doas_conf_dir} does not exist"
fi
if [ ! -d "${doas_conf_dir}" ]
then
die "${doas_conf_dir} is not a directory"
fi
if [ ! -w "${doas_conf_dir}" ]
then
owner="$(owner_of "${doas_conf_dir}")"
warn "${doas_conf_dir} is not writable"
die "You probably need to run ${PROG} as ${owner:-root}"
fi
tmp_doas="$(mktemp "${DOAS_CONF}.XXXXXXXXXX")" \
|| die "You probably need to run ${PROG} as root"
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
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set_trap_rm "${tmp_doas}"
# It is important that the ln(1) command fails if the target already
# exists. Some versions are known to behave like "ln -f" by default
# (removing any existing target). Adjust PATH to avoid such ln(1)
# implementations.
tmp_test_ln="$(mktemp "${DOAS_CONF}.XXXXXXXXXX")"
set_trap_rm "${tmp_doas}" "${tmp_test_ln}"
if ln "${tmp_doas}" "${tmp_test_ln}" 2>/dev/null
then
die 'ln(1) is not safe for creating lock files, bailing'
fi
# If a doas.conf file exists, copy it into the temporary file for
# editing. If none exist, the editor will open with an empty file.
if [ -f "${DOAS_CONF}" ]
then
if [ -r "${DOAS_CONF}" ]
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
2020-10-22 08:23:56 +00:00
then
cp "${DOAS_CONF}" "${tmp_doas}"
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
2020-10-22 08:23:56 +00:00
else
die "${DOAS_CONF} is not readable"
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
2020-10-22 08:23:56 +00:00
fi
fi
if ${noop}
then
if ! doas -C "${DOAS_CONF}"
then
die "${DOAS_CONF} contains syntax errors."
fi
warn 'OK: Prerequisite checks passed'
exit 0
fi
# Link the temporary file to the lock file.
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
2020-10-22 08:23:56 +00:00
if ln "${tmp_doas}" "${doas_lock_file}"
then
set_trap_rm "${tmp_doas}" "${tmp_test_ln}" "${doas_lock_file}"
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
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else
die "${DOAS_CONF} is already locked"
fi
# Some versions of vi(1) exit with a code that reflects the number of
# editing errors made. This is why we ignore the exit code from the
# editor.
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
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"${EDITOR:-vi}" "${tmp_doas}" || true
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
2020-10-22 08:23:56 +00:00
while ! doas -C "${tmp_doas}"
do
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
2020-10-22 08:23:56 +00:00
warn "Press enter to edit doas.conf again to fix it,"
warn "or interrupt ($(get_intr)) to cancel."
read status
"${EDITOR:-vi}" "${tmp_doas}" || true
done
# Use mv(1) to rename the temporary file to doas.conf as it is atomic.
# Update: No longer use mv as it messes up permissions on the doas.conf file.
# Use install with ownership set to root.
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
2020-10-22 08:23:56 +00:00
if [ -s "${tmp_doas}" ]
then
if cmp -s "${tmp_doas}" "${DOAS_CONF}"
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
2020-10-22 08:23:56 +00:00
then
warn "No changes made"
warn "${DOAS_CONF} unchanged"
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
2020-10-22 08:23:56 +00:00
else
install -o root -m "${doas_conf_mode}" \
"${tmp_doas}" "${DOAS_CONF}" \
&& warn "${DOAS_CONF} updated"
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
2020-10-22 08:23:56 +00:00
fi
else
warn "Not installing an empty doas.conf file"
warn "${DOAS_CONF} unchanged"
vidoas: Address security concerns and improve some behaviour I'm not claiming this script is now safe. It would certainly benefit from additional review. I do think (and hope) that I did not make things worse, at least. It might be better to look at vipw(8) or visudo(8), which both are written in C, for prior art on how to do this kind of thing securely. Security changes: - Exit on errors and if referencing unset variables. - Set PATH so that we don't run unintended commands from the PATH that is in the caller's environment. - Set umask to prevent other users from having write access to the temporary files. - Use /var/tmp instead of /tmp, as /tmp is not shared between users on all systems. (So trying to install a file from /tmp as root would not find the file, if the user running vidoas is not root.) XXX: Using /var/tmp does not guarantee this either, but is more likely to work. - Create a temporary file for editing and use ln(1) to acquire the lock. This addresses a race condition between checking for the lock file and creating it. - Use "install -r" to avoid a truncated doas.conf from existing as would happen with cp (or install without the "-r" option). XXX: "install -r" is not portable. - Use "install -m" to set the mode of the installed doas.conf file. Changes to user experience: - Don't check for executability of ${EDITOR} as it is not required to be an absolute path to the executable. - Don't install an unchanged doas.conf file. - Don't install an empty doas.conf file. - The above two checks result in a no-op in the case that ${EDITOR} could not be run. - Present the user with a choice of fixing errors or canceling changes. - Output diagnostic messages to stderr (just like other tools do, e.g. doas, ln, and cp). TODO: - Avoid using hard-coded paths (/usr/local/bin and /usr/local/etc). They should be replaced with @PREFIX@/bin and @SYSCONFDIR@ before installing.
2020-10-22 08:23:56 +00:00
fi