teleport/integration/integration_test.go

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/*
Copyright 2016-2019 Gravitational, Inc.
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
*/
package integration
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"context"
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"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"net"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"os"
"os/exec"
"os/user"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"runtime/pprof"
"strconv"
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"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
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"github.com/gravitational/teleport"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/auth"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/auth/testauthority"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/bpf"
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"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/client"
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"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/defaults"
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"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/events"
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
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"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/fixtures"
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"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/pam"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/reversetunnel"
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"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/service"
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"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/services"
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"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/session"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/srv"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/sshutils"
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"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/utils"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/utils/testlog"
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"github.com/gravitational/trace"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"gopkg.in/check.v1"
)
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const (
HostID = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
Site = "local-site"
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
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AllocatePortsNum = 600
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)
type IntSuite struct {
ports utils.PortList
me *user.User
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// priv/pub pair to avoid re-generating it
priv []byte
pub []byte
// log defines the test-specific logger
log utils.Logger
w *testlog.TestWrapper
}
// bootstrap check
func TestIntegrations(t *testing.T) { check.TestingT(t) }
var _ = check.Suite(&IntSuite{})
// TestMain will re-execute Teleport to run a command if "exec" is passed to
// it as an argument. Otherwise it will run tests as normal.
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
// If the test is re-executing itself, execute the command that comes over
// the pipe.
if len(os.Args) == 2 &&
(os.Args[1] == teleport.ExecSubCommand || os.Args[1] == teleport.ForwardSubCommand) {
srv.RunAndExit(os.Args[1])
return
}
// Otherwise run tests as normal.
code := m.Run()
os.Exit(code)
}
func (s *IntSuite) SetUpSuite(c *check.C) {
utils.InitLoggerForTests(testing.Verbose())
SetTestTimeouts(time.Millisecond * time.Duration(100))
var err error
s.priv, s.pub, err = testauthority.New().GenerateKeyPair("")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Find AllocatePortsNum free listening ports to use.
s.ports, err = utils.GetFreeTCPPorts(AllocatePortsNum)
if err != nil {
c.Fatal(err)
}
s.me, _ = user.Current()
// close & re-open stdin because 'go test' runs with os.stdin connected to /dev/null
stdin, err := os.Open("/dev/tty")
if err == nil {
os.Stdin.Close()
os.Stdin = stdin
}
}
func (s *IntSuite) TearDownSuite(c *check.C) {
var err error
// restore os.Stdin to its original condition: connected to /dev/null
os.Stdin.Close()
os.Stdin, err = os.Open("/dev/null")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
}
func (s *IntSuite) SetUpTest(c *check.C) {
os.RemoveAll(client.FullProfilePath(""))
}
// setUpTest configures the specific test identified with the given c.
// Note, that this c is different from the one passed into SetUpTest/TearDownTest
// and reflects the actual test's state - e.g. c.Failed() will properly reflect whether
// the test failed
func (s *IntSuite) setUpTest(c *check.C) {
s.w = testlog.NewCheckTestWrapper(c)
s.log = s.w.Log
}
func (s *IntSuite) tearDownTest(c *check.C) {
s.w.Close()
}
// newUnstartedTeleport helper returns a created but not started Teleport instance pre-configured
// with the current user os.user.Current().
func (s *IntSuite) newUnstartedTeleport(c *check.C, logins []string, enableSSH bool) *TeleInstance {
t := s.newTeleportInstance(c)
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// use passed logins, but use suite's default login if nothing was passed
Fix remaining gosimple findings List of fixed items: ``` integration/helpers.go:1279:2 gosimple S1000: should use for range instead of for { select {} } integration/integration_test.go:144:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:173:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:296:28 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan error) instead integration/integration_test.go:570:41 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:685:40 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:759:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan string) instead lib/auth/init_test.go:62:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/auth/tls_test.go:1658:22 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:420:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:656:12 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf lib/backend/etcdbk/etcd.go:458:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/firestore/firestorebk.go:407:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:317:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:336:6 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:365:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:376:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(existingItem.Value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/test/suite.go:327:10 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/client/api.go:1410:9 gosimple S1003: should use strings.ContainsRune(name, ':') instead lib/client/api.go:2355:32 gosimple S1019: should use make([]ForwardedPort, len(spec)) instead lib/client/keyagent_test.go:85:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/client/player.go:54:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan int) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1024:52 gosimple S1019: should use make(services.CommandLabels) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1025:44 gosimple S1019: should use make(map[string]string) instead lib/config/configuration.go:930:21 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleNode) instead lib/config/configuration.go:931:22 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleAuthService) instead lib/config/configuration.go:932:23 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleProxy) instead lib/service/supervisor.go:387:2 gosimple S1001: should use copy() instead of a loop lib/tlsca/parsegen.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:167:40 gosimple S1010: should omit second index in slice, s[a:len(s)] is identical to s[a:] lib/utils/certs.go:204:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(certificateChain[0].SubjectKeyId, certificateChain[0].AuthorityKeyId) instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:45 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "}}") instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:6 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "{{") instead lib/utils/socks/socks.go:192:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/utils/socks/socks.go:199:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/web/apiserver.go:1054:18 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/web/apiserver.go:1954:9 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf tool/tsh/tsh.go:1193:14 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) ```
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if len(logins) == 0 {
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logins = []string{s.me.Username}
}
for _, login := range logins {
t.AddUser(login, []string{login})
}
if err := t.Create(nil, enableSSH, nil); err != nil {
c.Fatalf("Unexpected response from Create: %v", err)
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}
return t
}
// newTeleport helper returns a running Teleport instance pre-configured
// with the current user os.user.Current().
func (s *IntSuite) newTeleport(c *check.C, logins []string, enableSSH bool) *TeleInstance {
t := s.newUnstartedTeleport(c, logins, enableSSH)
if err := t.Start(); err != nil {
c.Fatalf("Unexpected response from Start: %v", err)
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}
return t
}
// newTeleportIoT helper returns a running Teleport instance with Host as a
// reversetunnel node.
func (s *IntSuite) newTeleportIoT(c *check.C, logins []string) *TeleInstance {
// Create a Teleport instance with Auth/Proxy.
mainConfig := func() *service.Config {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = false
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.SSH.Enabled = false
return tconf
}
main := s.newTeleportWithConfig(c, logins, nil, mainConfig())
// Create a Teleport instance with a Node.
nodeConfig := func() *service.Config {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Hostname = Host
tconf.Token = "token"
tconf.AuthServers = []utils.NetAddr{
{
AddrNetwork: "tcp",
Addr: net.JoinHostPort(Loopback, main.GetPortWeb()),
},
}
tconf.Auth.Enabled = false
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = false
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
return tconf
}
_, err := main.StartReverseTunnelNode(nodeConfig())
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
return main
}
// newTeleportWithConfig is a helper function that will create a running
// Teleport instance with the passed in user, instance secrets, and Teleport
// configuration.
func (s *IntSuite) newTeleportWithConfig(c *check.C, logins []string, instanceSecrets []*InstanceSecrets, teleportConfig *service.Config) *TeleInstance {
t := s.newTeleportInstance(c)
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// use passed logins, but use suite's default login if nothing was passed
Fix remaining gosimple findings List of fixed items: ``` integration/helpers.go:1279:2 gosimple S1000: should use for range instead of for { select {} } integration/integration_test.go:144:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:173:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:296:28 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan error) instead integration/integration_test.go:570:41 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:685:40 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:759:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan string) instead lib/auth/init_test.go:62:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/auth/tls_test.go:1658:22 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:420:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:656:12 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf lib/backend/etcdbk/etcd.go:458:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/firestore/firestorebk.go:407:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:317:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:336:6 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:365:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:376:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(existingItem.Value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/test/suite.go:327:10 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/client/api.go:1410:9 gosimple S1003: should use strings.ContainsRune(name, ':') instead lib/client/api.go:2355:32 gosimple S1019: should use make([]ForwardedPort, len(spec)) instead lib/client/keyagent_test.go:85:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/client/player.go:54:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan int) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1024:52 gosimple S1019: should use make(services.CommandLabels) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1025:44 gosimple S1019: should use make(map[string]string) instead lib/config/configuration.go:930:21 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleNode) instead lib/config/configuration.go:931:22 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleAuthService) instead lib/config/configuration.go:932:23 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleProxy) instead lib/service/supervisor.go:387:2 gosimple S1001: should use copy() instead of a loop lib/tlsca/parsegen.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:167:40 gosimple S1010: should omit second index in slice, s[a:len(s)] is identical to s[a:] lib/utils/certs.go:204:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(certificateChain[0].SubjectKeyId, certificateChain[0].AuthorityKeyId) instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:45 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "}}") instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:6 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "{{") instead lib/utils/socks/socks.go:192:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/utils/socks/socks.go:199:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/web/apiserver.go:1054:18 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/web/apiserver.go:1954:9 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf tool/tsh/tsh.go:1193:14 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) ```
2020-05-20 18:38:32 +00:00
if len(logins) == 0 {
logins = []string{s.me.Username}
}
for _, login := range logins {
t.AddUser(login, []string{login})
}
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// create a new teleport instance with passed in configuration
if err := t.CreateEx(instanceSecrets, teleportConfig); err != nil {
c.Fatalf("Unexpected response from CreateEx: %v", trace.DebugReport(err))
}
if err := t.Start(); err != nil {
c.Fatalf("Unexpected response from Start: %v", trace.DebugReport(err))
}
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return t
}
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
// TestAuditOn creates a live session, records a bunch of data through it
// and then reads it back and compares against simulated reality.
func (s *IntSuite) TestAuditOn(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
var tests = []struct {
comment string
inRecordLocation string
inForwardAgent bool
External events and sessions storage. Updates #1755 Design ------ This commit adds support for pluggable events and sessions recordings and adds several plugins. In case if external sessions recording storage is used, nodes or proxies depending on configuration store the session recordings locally and then upload the recordings in the background. Non-print session events are always sent to the remote auth server as usual. In case if remote events storage is used, auth servers download recordings from it during playbacks. DynamoDB event backend ---------------------- Transient DynamoDB backend is added for events storage. Events are stored with default TTL of 1 year. External lambda functions should be used to forward events from DynamoDB. Parameter audit_table_name in storage section turns on dynamodb backend. The table will be auto created. S3 sessions backend ------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to s3://bucket-name node or proxy depending on recording mode will start uploading the recorded sessions to the bucket. If the bucket does not exist, teleport will attempt to create a bucket with versioning and encryption turned on by default. Teleport will turn on bucket-side encryption for the tarballs using aws:kms key. File sessions backend --------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to file:///folder teleport will start writing tarballs to this folder instead of sending records to the file server. This is helpful for plugin writers who can use fuse or NFS mounted storage to handle the data. Working dynamic configuration.
2018-03-04 02:26:44 +00:00
auditSessionsURI string
}{
{
comment: "normal teleport",
External events and sessions storage. Updates #1755 Design ------ This commit adds support for pluggable events and sessions recordings and adds several plugins. In case if external sessions recording storage is used, nodes or proxies depending on configuration store the session recordings locally and then upload the recordings in the background. Non-print session events are always sent to the remote auth server as usual. In case if remote events storage is used, auth servers download recordings from it during playbacks. DynamoDB event backend ---------------------- Transient DynamoDB backend is added for events storage. Events are stored with default TTL of 1 year. External lambda functions should be used to forward events from DynamoDB. Parameter audit_table_name in storage section turns on dynamodb backend. The table will be auto created. S3 sessions backend ------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to s3://bucket-name node or proxy depending on recording mode will start uploading the recorded sessions to the bucket. If the bucket does not exist, teleport will attempt to create a bucket with versioning and encryption turned on by default. Teleport will turn on bucket-side encryption for the tarballs using aws:kms key. File sessions backend --------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to file:///folder teleport will start writing tarballs to this folder instead of sending records to the file server. This is helpful for plugin writers who can use fuse or NFS mounted storage to handle the data. Working dynamic configuration.
2018-03-04 02:26:44 +00:00
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtNode,
inForwardAgent: false,
},
{
comment: "recording proxy",
External events and sessions storage. Updates #1755 Design ------ This commit adds support for pluggable events and sessions recordings and adds several plugins. In case if external sessions recording storage is used, nodes or proxies depending on configuration store the session recordings locally and then upload the recordings in the background. Non-print session events are always sent to the remote auth server as usual. In case if remote events storage is used, auth servers download recordings from it during playbacks. DynamoDB event backend ---------------------- Transient DynamoDB backend is added for events storage. Events are stored with default TTL of 1 year. External lambda functions should be used to forward events from DynamoDB. Parameter audit_table_name in storage section turns on dynamodb backend. The table will be auto created. S3 sessions backend ------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to s3://bucket-name node or proxy depending on recording mode will start uploading the recorded sessions to the bucket. If the bucket does not exist, teleport will attempt to create a bucket with versioning and encryption turned on by default. Teleport will turn on bucket-side encryption for the tarballs using aws:kms key. File sessions backend --------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to file:///folder teleport will start writing tarballs to this folder instead of sending records to the file server. This is helpful for plugin writers who can use fuse or NFS mounted storage to handle the data. Working dynamic configuration.
2018-03-04 02:26:44 +00:00
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtProxy,
inForwardAgent: true,
},
{
comment: "normal teleport with upload to file server",
External events and sessions storage. Updates #1755 Design ------ This commit adds support for pluggable events and sessions recordings and adds several plugins. In case if external sessions recording storage is used, nodes or proxies depending on configuration store the session recordings locally and then upload the recordings in the background. Non-print session events are always sent to the remote auth server as usual. In case if remote events storage is used, auth servers download recordings from it during playbacks. DynamoDB event backend ---------------------- Transient DynamoDB backend is added for events storage. Events are stored with default TTL of 1 year. External lambda functions should be used to forward events from DynamoDB. Parameter audit_table_name in storage section turns on dynamodb backend. The table will be auto created. S3 sessions backend ------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to s3://bucket-name node or proxy depending on recording mode will start uploading the recorded sessions to the bucket. If the bucket does not exist, teleport will attempt to create a bucket with versioning and encryption turned on by default. Teleport will turn on bucket-side encryption for the tarballs using aws:kms key. File sessions backend --------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to file:///folder teleport will start writing tarballs to this folder instead of sending records to the file server. This is helpful for plugin writers who can use fuse or NFS mounted storage to handle the data. Working dynamic configuration.
2018-03-04 02:26:44 +00:00
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtNode,
inForwardAgent: false,
auditSessionsURI: c.MkDir(),
},
{
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtProxy,
inForwardAgent: false,
auditSessionsURI: c.MkDir(),
},
{
comment: "normal teleport, sync recording",
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtNodeSync,
inForwardAgent: false,
},
{
comment: "recording proxy, sync recording",
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtProxySync,
inForwardAgent: true,
},
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
}
for _, tt := range tests {
comment := check.Commentf(tt.comment)
makeConfig := func() (*check.C, []string, []*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: tt.inRecordLocation,
External events and sessions storage. Updates #1755 Design ------ This commit adds support for pluggable events and sessions recordings and adds several plugins. In case if external sessions recording storage is used, nodes or proxies depending on configuration store the session recordings locally and then upload the recordings in the background. Non-print session events are always sent to the remote auth server as usual. In case if remote events storage is used, auth servers download recordings from it during playbacks. DynamoDB event backend ---------------------- Transient DynamoDB backend is added for events storage. Events are stored with default TTL of 1 year. External lambda functions should be used to forward events from DynamoDB. Parameter audit_table_name in storage section turns on dynamodb backend. The table will be auto created. S3 sessions backend ------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to s3://bucket-name node or proxy depending on recording mode will start uploading the recorded sessions to the bucket. If the bucket does not exist, teleport will attempt to create a bucket with versioning and encryption turned on by default. Teleport will turn on bucket-side encryption for the tarballs using aws:kms key. File sessions backend --------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to file:///folder teleport will start writing tarballs to this folder instead of sending records to the file server. This is helpful for plugin writers who can use fuse or NFS mounted storage to handle the data. Working dynamic configuration.
2018-03-04 02:26:44 +00:00
Audit: services.AuditConfig{AuditSessionsURI: tt.auditSessionsURI},
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
return c, nil, nil, tconf
}
t := s.newTeleportWithConfig(makeConfig())
defer t.StopAll()
// Start a node.
nodeSSHPort := s.getPorts(1)[0]
nodeConfig := func() *service.Config {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.HostUUID = "node"
tconf.Hostname = "node"
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
tconf.SSH.Addr.Addr = net.JoinHostPort(t.Hostname, fmt.Sprintf("%v", nodeSSHPort))
return tconf
}
nodeProcess, err := t.StartNode(nodeConfig())
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
// get access to a authClient for the cluster
site := t.GetSiteAPI(Site)
c.Assert(site, check.NotNil, comment)
// wait 10 seconds for both nodes to show up, otherwise
// we'll have trouble connecting to the node below.
waitForNodes := func(site auth.ClientI, count int) error {
tickCh := time.Tick(500 * time.Millisecond)
stopCh := time.After(10 * time.Second)
for {
select {
case <-tickCh:
nodesInSite, err := site.GetNodes(defaults.Namespace, services.SkipValidation())
Teleport signal handling and live reload. This commit introduces signal handling. Parent teleport process is now capable of forking the child process and passing listeners file descriptors to the child. Parent process then can gracefully shutdown by tracking the amount of current connections and closing listeners once the amount goes to 0. Here are the signals handled: * USR2 signal will cause the parent to fork a child process and pass listener file descriptors to it. Child process will close unused file descriptors and will bind to the used ones. At this moment two processes - the parent and the forked child process will be serving requests. After looking at the traffic and the log files, administrator can either shut down the parent process or the child process if the child process is not functioning as expected. * TERM, INT signals will trigger graceful process shutdown. Auth, node and proxy processes will wait until the amount of active connections goes down to 0 and will exit after that. * KILL, QUIT signals will cause immediate non-graceful shutdown. * HUP signal combines USR2 and TERM signals in a convenient way: parent process will fork a child process and self-initate graceful shutdown. This is a more convenient than USR2/TERM sequence, but less agile and robust as if the connection to the parent process drops, but the new process exits with error, administrators can lock themselves out of the environment. Additionally, boltdb backend has to be phased out, as it does not support read/writes by two concurrent processes. This had required refactoring of the dir backend to use file locking to allow inter-process collaboration on read/write operations.
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if err != nil && !trace.IsNotFound(err) {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
if got, want := len(nodesInSite), count; got == want {
return nil
}
case <-stopCh:
return trace.BadParameter("waited 10s, did find %v nodes", count)
}
}
}
err = waitForNodes(site, 2)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
// should have no sessions:
sessions, err := site.GetSessions(defaults.Namespace)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
c.Assert(len(sessions), check.Equals, 0, comment)
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
// create interactive session (this goroutine is this user's terminal time)
Fix remaining gosimple findings List of fixed items: ``` integration/helpers.go:1279:2 gosimple S1000: should use for range instead of for { select {} } integration/integration_test.go:144:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:173:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:296:28 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan error) instead integration/integration_test.go:570:41 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:685:40 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:759:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan string) instead lib/auth/init_test.go:62:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/auth/tls_test.go:1658:22 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:420:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:656:12 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf lib/backend/etcdbk/etcd.go:458:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/firestore/firestorebk.go:407:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:317:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:336:6 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:365:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:376:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(existingItem.Value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/test/suite.go:327:10 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/client/api.go:1410:9 gosimple S1003: should use strings.ContainsRune(name, ':') instead lib/client/api.go:2355:32 gosimple S1019: should use make([]ForwardedPort, len(spec)) instead lib/client/keyagent_test.go:85:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/client/player.go:54:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan int) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1024:52 gosimple S1019: should use make(services.CommandLabels) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1025:44 gosimple S1019: should use make(map[string]string) instead lib/config/configuration.go:930:21 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleNode) instead lib/config/configuration.go:931:22 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleAuthService) instead lib/config/configuration.go:932:23 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleProxy) instead lib/service/supervisor.go:387:2 gosimple S1001: should use copy() instead of a loop lib/tlsca/parsegen.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:167:40 gosimple S1010: should omit second index in slice, s[a:len(s)] is identical to s[a:] lib/utils/certs.go:204:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(certificateChain[0].SubjectKeyId, certificateChain[0].AuthorityKeyId) instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:45 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "}}") instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:6 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "{{") instead lib/utils/socks/socks.go:192:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/utils/socks/socks.go:199:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/web/apiserver.go:1054:18 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/web/apiserver.go:1954:9 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf tool/tsh/tsh.go:1193:14 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) ```
2020-05-20 18:38:32 +00:00
endC := make(chan error)
myTerm := NewTerminal(250)
go func() {
cl, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: Host,
Port: nodeSSHPort,
ForwardAgent: tt.inForwardAgent,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
cl.Stdout = myTerm
cl.Stdin = myTerm
err = cl.SSH(context.TODO(), []string{}, false)
endC <- err
}()
// wait until we've found the session in the audit log
getSession := func(site auth.ClientI) (*session.Session, error) {
tickCh := time.Tick(500 * time.Millisecond)
stopCh := time.After(10 * time.Second)
for {
select {
case <-tickCh:
sessions, err = site.GetSessions(defaults.Namespace)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
if len(sessions) != 1 {
continue
}
return &sessions[0], nil
case <-stopCh:
return nil, trace.BadParameter("unable to find sessions after 10s (mode=%v)", tt.inRecordLocation)
}
}
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}
session, err := getSession(site)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
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// wait for the user to join this session:
for len(session.Parties) == 0 {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 5)
session, err = site.GetSession(defaults.Namespace, sessions[0].ID)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
}
// make sure it's us who joined! :)
c.Assert(session.Parties[0].User, check.Equals, s.me.Username, comment)
// lets type "echo hi" followed by "enter" and then "exit" + "enter":
myTerm.Type("\aecho hi\n\r\aexit\n\r\a")
// wait for session to end:
External events and sessions storage. Updates #1755 Design ------ This commit adds support for pluggable events and sessions recordings and adds several plugins. In case if external sessions recording storage is used, nodes or proxies depending on configuration store the session recordings locally and then upload the recordings in the background. Non-print session events are always sent to the remote auth server as usual. In case if remote events storage is used, auth servers download recordings from it during playbacks. DynamoDB event backend ---------------------- Transient DynamoDB backend is added for events storage. Events are stored with default TTL of 1 year. External lambda functions should be used to forward events from DynamoDB. Parameter audit_table_name in storage section turns on dynamodb backend. The table will be auto created. S3 sessions backend ------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to s3://bucket-name node or proxy depending on recording mode will start uploading the recorded sessions to the bucket. If the bucket does not exist, teleport will attempt to create a bucket with versioning and encryption turned on by default. Teleport will turn on bucket-side encryption for the tarballs using aws:kms key. File sessions backend --------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to file:///folder teleport will start writing tarballs to this folder instead of sending records to the file server. This is helpful for plugin writers who can use fuse or NFS mounted storage to handle the data. Working dynamic configuration.
2018-03-04 02:26:44 +00:00
select {
case <-endC:
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
c.Fatalf("%s: Timeout waiting for session to finish.", tt.comment)
External events and sessions storage. Updates #1755 Design ------ This commit adds support for pluggable events and sessions recordings and adds several plugins. In case if external sessions recording storage is used, nodes or proxies depending on configuration store the session recordings locally and then upload the recordings in the background. Non-print session events are always sent to the remote auth server as usual. In case if remote events storage is used, auth servers download recordings from it during playbacks. DynamoDB event backend ---------------------- Transient DynamoDB backend is added for events storage. Events are stored with default TTL of 1 year. External lambda functions should be used to forward events from DynamoDB. Parameter audit_table_name in storage section turns on dynamodb backend. The table will be auto created. S3 sessions backend ------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to s3://bucket-name node or proxy depending on recording mode will start uploading the recorded sessions to the bucket. If the bucket does not exist, teleport will attempt to create a bucket with versioning and encryption turned on by default. Teleport will turn on bucket-side encryption for the tarballs using aws:kms key. File sessions backend --------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to file:///folder teleport will start writing tarballs to this folder instead of sending records to the file server. This is helpful for plugin writers who can use fuse or NFS mounted storage to handle the data. Working dynamic configuration.
2018-03-04 02:26:44 +00:00
}
// wait for the upload of the right session to complete
timeoutC := time.After(10 * time.Second)
loop:
for {
select {
case event := <-t.UploadEventsC:
if event.SessionID != string(session.ID) {
c.Logf("Skipping mismatching session %v, expecting upload of %v.", event.SessionID, session.ID)
continue
External events and sessions storage. Updates #1755 Design ------ This commit adds support for pluggable events and sessions recordings and adds several plugins. In case if external sessions recording storage is used, nodes or proxies depending on configuration store the session recordings locally and then upload the recordings in the background. Non-print session events are always sent to the remote auth server as usual. In case if remote events storage is used, auth servers download recordings from it during playbacks. DynamoDB event backend ---------------------- Transient DynamoDB backend is added for events storage. Events are stored with default TTL of 1 year. External lambda functions should be used to forward events from DynamoDB. Parameter audit_table_name in storage section turns on dynamodb backend. The table will be auto created. S3 sessions backend ------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to s3://bucket-name node or proxy depending on recording mode will start uploading the recorded sessions to the bucket. If the bucket does not exist, teleport will attempt to create a bucket with versioning and encryption turned on by default. Teleport will turn on bucket-side encryption for the tarballs using aws:kms key. File sessions backend --------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to file:///folder teleport will start writing tarballs to this folder instead of sending records to the file server. This is helpful for plugin writers who can use fuse or NFS mounted storage to handle the data. Working dynamic configuration.
2018-03-04 02:26:44 +00:00
}
break loop
case <-timeoutC:
dumpGoroutineProfile()
c.Fatalf("%s: Timeout waiting for upload of session %v to complete to %v",
tt.comment, session.ID, tt.auditSessionsURI)
External events and sessions storage. Updates #1755 Design ------ This commit adds support for pluggable events and sessions recordings and adds several plugins. In case if external sessions recording storage is used, nodes or proxies depending on configuration store the session recordings locally and then upload the recordings in the background. Non-print session events are always sent to the remote auth server as usual. In case if remote events storage is used, auth servers download recordings from it during playbacks. DynamoDB event backend ---------------------- Transient DynamoDB backend is added for events storage. Events are stored with default TTL of 1 year. External lambda functions should be used to forward events from DynamoDB. Parameter audit_table_name in storage section turns on dynamodb backend. The table will be auto created. S3 sessions backend ------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to s3://bucket-name node or proxy depending on recording mode will start uploading the recorded sessions to the bucket. If the bucket does not exist, teleport will attempt to create a bucket with versioning and encryption turned on by default. Teleport will turn on bucket-side encryption for the tarballs using aws:kms key. File sessions backend --------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to file:///folder teleport will start writing tarballs to this folder instead of sending records to the file server. This is helpful for plugin writers who can use fuse or NFS mounted storage to handle the data. Working dynamic configuration.
2018-03-04 02:26:44 +00:00
}
}
// read back the entire session (we have to try several times until we get back
// everything because the session is closing)
var sessionStream []byte
for i := 0; i < 6; i++ {
sessionStream, err = site.GetSessionChunk(defaults.Namespace, session.ID, 0, events.MaxChunkBytes)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
if strings.Contains(string(sessionStream), "exit") {
break
}
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 250)
if i >= 5 {
// session stream keeps coming back short
c.Fatalf("%s: Stream is not getting data: %q.", tt.comment, string(sessionStream))
}
}
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
// see what we got. It looks different based on bash settings, but here it is
// on Ev's machine (hostname is 'edsger'):
//
// edsger ~: echo hi
// hi
// edsger ~: exit
// logout
//
sessionComment := check.Commentf("%q", string(sessionStream))
c.Assert(strings.Contains(string(sessionStream), "echo hi"), check.Equals, true, sessionComment)
c.Assert(strings.Contains(string(sessionStream), "exit"), check.Equals, true, sessionComment)
// Wait until session.start, session.leave, and session.end events have arrived.
getSessions := func(site auth.ClientI) ([]events.EventFields, error) {
tickCh := time.Tick(500 * time.Millisecond)
stopCh := time.After(10 * time.Second)
for {
select {
case <-tickCh:
// Get all session events from the backend.
External events and sessions storage. Updates #1755 Design ------ This commit adds support for pluggable events and sessions recordings and adds several plugins. In case if external sessions recording storage is used, nodes or proxies depending on configuration store the session recordings locally and then upload the recordings in the background. Non-print session events are always sent to the remote auth server as usual. In case if remote events storage is used, auth servers download recordings from it during playbacks. DynamoDB event backend ---------------------- Transient DynamoDB backend is added for events storage. Events are stored with default TTL of 1 year. External lambda functions should be used to forward events from DynamoDB. Parameter audit_table_name in storage section turns on dynamodb backend. The table will be auto created. S3 sessions backend ------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to s3://bucket-name node or proxy depending on recording mode will start uploading the recorded sessions to the bucket. If the bucket does not exist, teleport will attempt to create a bucket with versioning and encryption turned on by default. Teleport will turn on bucket-side encryption for the tarballs using aws:kms key. File sessions backend --------------------- If audit_sessions_uri is specified to file:///folder teleport will start writing tarballs to this folder instead of sending records to the file server. This is helpful for plugin writers who can use fuse or NFS mounted storage to handle the data. Working dynamic configuration.
2018-03-04 02:26:44 +00:00
sessionEvents, err := site.GetSessionEvents(defaults.Namespace, session.ID, 0, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
// Look through all session events for the three wanted.
var hasStart bool
var hasEnd bool
var hasLeave bool
for _, se := range sessionEvents {
if se.GetType() == events.SessionStartEvent {
hasStart = true
}
if se.GetType() == events.SessionEndEvent {
hasEnd = true
}
if se.GetType() == events.SessionLeaveEvent {
hasLeave = true
}
}
// Make sure all three events were found.
if hasStart && hasEnd && hasLeave {
return sessionEvents, nil
}
case <-stopCh:
return nil, trace.BadParameter("unable to find all session events after 10s (mode=%v)", tt.inRecordLocation)
}
}
}
history, err := getSessions(site)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
getChunk := func(e events.EventFields, maxlen int) string {
offset := e.GetInt("offset")
length := e.GetInt("bytes")
if length == 0 {
return ""
}
if length > maxlen {
length = maxlen
}
return string(sessionStream[offset : offset+length])
2016-05-06 23:10:50 +00:00
}
findByType := func(et string) events.EventFields {
for _, e := range history {
if e.GetType() == et {
return e
}
}
return nil
}
// there should alwys be 'session.start' event (and it must be first)
first := history[0]
start := findByType(events.SessionStartEvent)
c.Assert(start, check.DeepEquals, first, comment)
c.Assert(start.GetInt("bytes"), check.Equals, 0, comment)
c.Assert(start.GetString(events.SessionEventID) != "", check.Equals, true, comment)
c.Assert(start.GetString(events.TerminalSize) != "", check.Equals, true, comment)
// If session are being recorded at nodes, the SessionServerID should contain
// the ID of the node. If sessions are being recorded at the proxy, then
// SessionServerID should be that of the proxy.
expectedServerID := nodeProcess.Config.HostUUID
if services.IsRecordAtProxy(tt.inRecordLocation) {
expectedServerID = t.Process.Config.HostUUID
}
c.Assert(start.GetString(events.SessionServerID), check.Equals, expectedServerID, comment)
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
// make sure data is recorded properly
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
for _, e := range history {
out.WriteString(getChunk(e, 1000))
}
recorded := replaceNewlines(out.String())
c.Assert(recorded, check.Matches, ".*exit.*", comment)
c.Assert(recorded, check.Matches, ".*echo hi.*", comment)
// there should alwys be 'session.end' event
end := findByType(events.SessionEndEvent)
c.Assert(end, check.NotNil)
c.Assert(end.GetInt("bytes"), check.Equals, 0)
c.Assert(end.GetString(events.SessionEventID) != "", check.Equals, true)
// there should alwys be 'session.leave' event
leave := findByType(events.SessionLeaveEvent)
c.Assert(leave, check.NotNil, comment)
c.Assert(leave.GetInt("bytes"), check.Equals, 0, comment)
c.Assert(leave.GetString(events.SessionEventID) != "", check.Equals, true, comment)
// all of them should have a proper time:
for _, e := range history {
c.Assert(e.GetTime("time").IsZero(), check.Equals, false, comment)
}
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}
}
func replaceNewlines(in string) string {
return regexp.MustCompile(`\r?\n`).ReplaceAllString(in, `\n`)
}
// TestInteroperability checks if Teleport and OpenSSH behave in the same way
// when executing commands.
func (s *IntSuite) TestInteroperability(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
tempdir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "teleport-")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer os.RemoveAll(tempdir)
tempfile := filepath.Join(tempdir, "file.txt")
// create new teleport server that will be used by all tests
t := s.newTeleport(c, nil, true)
defer t.StopAll()
var tests = []struct {
inCommand string
inStdin string
outContains string
outFile bool
}{
// 0 - echo "1\n2\n" | ssh localhost "cat -"
// this command can be used to copy files by piping stdout to stdin over ssh.
{
inCommand: "cat -",
inStdin: "1\n2\n",
outContains: "1\n2\n",
outFile: false,
},
// 1 - ssh -tt locahost '/bin/sh -c "mkdir -p /tmp && echo a > /tmp/file.txt"'
// programs like ansible execute commands like this
{
inCommand: fmt.Sprintf(`/bin/sh -c "mkdir -p /tmp && echo a > %v"`, tempfile),
inStdin: "",
outContains: "a",
outFile: true,
},
// 2 - ssh localhost tty
// should print "not a tty"
{
inCommand: "tty",
inStdin: "",
outContains: "not a tty",
outFile: false,
},
}
for i, tt := range tests {
// create new teleport client
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cl, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{Login: s.me.Username, Cluster: Site, Host: Host, Port: t.GetPortSSHInt()})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// hook up stdin and stdout to a buffer for reading and writing
inbuf := bytes.NewReader([]byte(tt.inStdin))
outbuf := utils.NewSyncBuffer()
cl.Stdin = inbuf
cl.Stdout = outbuf
cl.Stderr = outbuf
// run command and wait a maximum of 10 seconds for it to complete
Fix remaining gosimple findings List of fixed items: ``` integration/helpers.go:1279:2 gosimple S1000: should use for range instead of for { select {} } integration/integration_test.go:144:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:173:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:296:28 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan error) instead integration/integration_test.go:570:41 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:685:40 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:759:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan string) instead lib/auth/init_test.go:62:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/auth/tls_test.go:1658:22 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:420:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:656:12 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf lib/backend/etcdbk/etcd.go:458:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/firestore/firestorebk.go:407:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:317:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:336:6 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:365:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:376:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(existingItem.Value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/test/suite.go:327:10 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/client/api.go:1410:9 gosimple S1003: should use strings.ContainsRune(name, ':') instead lib/client/api.go:2355:32 gosimple S1019: should use make([]ForwardedPort, len(spec)) instead lib/client/keyagent_test.go:85:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/client/player.go:54:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan int) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1024:52 gosimple S1019: should use make(services.CommandLabels) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1025:44 gosimple S1019: should use make(map[string]string) instead lib/config/configuration.go:930:21 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleNode) instead lib/config/configuration.go:931:22 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleAuthService) instead lib/config/configuration.go:932:23 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleProxy) instead lib/service/supervisor.go:387:2 gosimple S1001: should use copy() instead of a loop lib/tlsca/parsegen.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:167:40 gosimple S1010: should omit second index in slice, s[a:len(s)] is identical to s[a:] lib/utils/certs.go:204:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(certificateChain[0].SubjectKeyId, certificateChain[0].AuthorityKeyId) instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:45 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "}}") instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:6 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "{{") instead lib/utils/socks/socks.go:192:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/utils/socks/socks.go:199:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/web/apiserver.go:1054:18 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/web/apiserver.go:1954:9 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf tool/tsh/tsh.go:1193:14 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) ```
2020-05-20 18:38:32 +00:00
sessionEndC := make(chan interface{})
go func() {
// don't check for err, because sometimes this process should fail
// with an error and that's what the test is checking for.
cl.SSH(context.TODO(), []string{tt.inCommand}, false)
sessionEndC <- true
}()
err = waitFor(sessionEndC, time.Second*10)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// if we are looking for the output in a file, look in the file
// otherwise check stdout and stderr for the expected output
if tt.outFile {
bytes, err := ioutil.ReadFile(tempfile)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
comment := check.Commentf("Test %v: %q does not contain: %q", i, string(bytes), tt.outContains)
c.Assert(strings.Contains(string(bytes), tt.outContains), check.Equals, true, comment)
} else {
comment := check.Commentf("Test %v: %q does not contain: %q", i, outbuf.String(), tt.outContains)
c.Assert(strings.Contains(outbuf.String(), tt.outContains), check.Equals, true, comment)
}
}
}
2020-03-03 23:27:49 +00:00
// TestUUIDBasedProxy verifies that attempts to proxy to nodes using ambiguous
// hostnames fails with the correct error, and that proxying by UUID succeeds.
func (s *IntSuite) TestUUIDBasedProxy(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
2020-03-03 23:27:49 +00:00
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
t := s.newTeleport(c, nil, true)
defer t.StopAll()
2020-03-03 23:27:49 +00:00
site := t.GetSiteAPI(Site)
// addNode adds a node to the teleport instance, returning its uuid.
// All nodes added this way have the same hostname.
addNode := func() (string, error) {
nodeSSHPort := s.getPorts(1)[0]
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
2020-03-03 23:27:49 +00:00
tconf.Hostname = Host
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
tconf.SSH.Addr.Addr = net.JoinHostPort(t.Hostname, fmt.Sprintf("%v", nodeSSHPort))
node, err := t.StartNode(tconf)
if err != nil {
return "", trace.Wrap(err)
}
ident, err := node.GetIdentity(teleport.RoleNode)
if err != nil {
return "", trace.Wrap(err)
}
return ident.ID.HostID()
}
// add two nodes with the same hostname.
uuid1, err := addNode()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
uuid2, err := addNode()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait up to 10 seconds for supplied node names to show up.
waitForNodes := func(site auth.ClientI, nodes ...string) error {
tickCh := time.Tick(500 * time.Millisecond)
stopCh := time.After(10 * time.Second)
Outer:
for _, nodeName := range nodes {
for {
select {
case <-tickCh:
nodesInSite, err := site.GetNodes(defaults.Namespace, services.SkipValidation())
if err != nil && !trace.IsNotFound(err) {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
for _, node := range nodesInSite {
if node.GetName() == nodeName {
continue Outer
}
}
case <-stopCh:
return trace.BadParameter("waited 10s, did find node %s", nodeName)
}
}
}
return nil
}
err = waitForNodes(site, uuid1, uuid2)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// attempting to run a command by hostname should generate NodeIsAmbiguous error.
_, err = runCommand(t, []string{"echo", "Hello there!"}, ClientConfig{Login: s.me.Username, Cluster: Site, Host: Host}, 1)
c.Assert(err, check.NotNil)
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), teleport.NodeIsAmbiguous) {
c.Errorf("Expected %s, got %s", teleport.NodeIsAmbiguous, err.Error())
}
// attempting to run a command by uuid should succeed.
_, err = runCommand(t, []string{"echo", "Hello there!"}, ClientConfig{Login: s.me.Username, Cluster: Site, Host: uuid1}, 1)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
}
// TestInteractive covers SSH into shell and joining the same session from another client
// against a standard teleport node.
func (s *IntSuite) TestInteractiveRegular(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
t := s.newTeleport(c, nil, true)
defer t.StopAll()
2016-04-13 01:44:09 +00:00
s.verifySessionJoin(c, t)
}
// TestInteractive covers SSH into shell and joining the same session from another client
// against a reversetunnel node.
func (s *IntSuite) TestInteractiveReverseTunnel(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
// InsecureDevMode needed for IoT node handshake
lib.SetInsecureDevMode(true)
defer lib.SetInsecureDevMode(false)
t := s.newTeleportIoT(c, nil)
defer t.StopAll()
s.verifySessionJoin(c, t)
}
// verifySessionJoin covers SSH into shell and joining the same session from another client
func (s *IntSuite) verifySessionJoin(c *check.C, t *TeleInstance) {
Fix remaining gosimple findings List of fixed items: ``` integration/helpers.go:1279:2 gosimple S1000: should use for range instead of for { select {} } integration/integration_test.go:144:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:173:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:296:28 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan error) instead integration/integration_test.go:570:41 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:685:40 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:759:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan string) instead lib/auth/init_test.go:62:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/auth/tls_test.go:1658:22 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:420:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:656:12 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf lib/backend/etcdbk/etcd.go:458:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/firestore/firestorebk.go:407:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:317:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:336:6 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:365:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:376:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(existingItem.Value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/test/suite.go:327:10 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/client/api.go:1410:9 gosimple S1003: should use strings.ContainsRune(name, ':') instead lib/client/api.go:2355:32 gosimple S1019: should use make([]ForwardedPort, len(spec)) instead lib/client/keyagent_test.go:85:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/client/player.go:54:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan int) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1024:52 gosimple S1019: should use make(services.CommandLabels) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1025:44 gosimple S1019: should use make(map[string]string) instead lib/config/configuration.go:930:21 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleNode) instead lib/config/configuration.go:931:22 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleAuthService) instead lib/config/configuration.go:932:23 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleProxy) instead lib/service/supervisor.go:387:2 gosimple S1001: should use copy() instead of a loop lib/tlsca/parsegen.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:167:40 gosimple S1010: should omit second index in slice, s[a:len(s)] is identical to s[a:] lib/utils/certs.go:204:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(certificateChain[0].SubjectKeyId, certificateChain[0].AuthorityKeyId) instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:45 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "}}") instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:6 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "{{") instead lib/utils/socks/socks.go:192:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/utils/socks/socks.go:199:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/web/apiserver.go:1054:18 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/web/apiserver.go:1954:9 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf tool/tsh/tsh.go:1193:14 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) ```
2020-05-20 18:38:32 +00:00
sessionEndC := make(chan interface{})
// get a reference to site obj:
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
site := t.GetSiteAPI(Site)
c.Assert(site, check.NotNil)
personA := NewTerminal(250)
personB := NewTerminal(250)
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
// PersonA: SSH into the server, wait one second, then type some commands on stdin:
openSession := func() {
cl, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{Login: s.me.Username, Cluster: Site, Host: Host})
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
cl.Stdout = personA
cl.Stdin = personA
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
// Person A types something into the terminal (including "exit")
personA.Type("\aecho hi\n\r\aexit\n\r\a")
err = cl.SSH(context.TODO(), []string{}, false)
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
sessionEndC <- true
Teleport signal handling and live reload. This commit introduces signal handling. Parent teleport process is now capable of forking the child process and passing listeners file descriptors to the child. Parent process then can gracefully shutdown by tracking the amount of current connections and closing listeners once the amount goes to 0. Here are the signals handled: * USR2 signal will cause the parent to fork a child process and pass listener file descriptors to it. Child process will close unused file descriptors and will bind to the used ones. At this moment two processes - the parent and the forked child process will be serving requests. After looking at the traffic and the log files, administrator can either shut down the parent process or the child process if the child process is not functioning as expected. * TERM, INT signals will trigger graceful process shutdown. Auth, node and proxy processes will wait until the amount of active connections goes down to 0 and will exit after that. * KILL, QUIT signals will cause immediate non-graceful shutdown. * HUP signal combines USR2 and TERM signals in a convenient way: parent process will fork a child process and self-initate graceful shutdown. This is a more convenient than USR2/TERM sequence, but less agile and robust as if the connection to the parent process drops, but the new process exits with error, administrators can lock themselves out of the environment. Additionally, boltdb backend has to be phased out, as it does not support read/writes by two concurrent processes. This had required refactoring of the dir backend to use file locking to allow inter-process collaboration on read/write operations.
2018-02-08 02:32:50 +00:00
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
}
// PersonB: wait for a session to become available, then join:
joinSession := func() {
var sessionID string
for {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
2016-12-19 00:58:53 +00:00
sessions, _ := site.GetSessions(defaults.Namespace)
if len(sessions) == 0 {
continue
}
sessionID = string(sessions[0].ID)
break
}
cl, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{Login: s.me.Username, Cluster: Site, Host: Host})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
cl.Stdout = personB
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
err = cl.Join(context.TODO(), defaults.Namespace, session.ID(sessionID), personB)
if err == nil {
break
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
}
go openSession()
go joinSession()
// wait for the session to end
err := waitFor(sessionEndC, time.Second*10)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// make sure the output of B is mirrored in A
outputOfA := personA.Output(100)
outputOfB := personB.Output(100)
c.Assert(strings.Contains(outputOfA, outputOfB), check.Equals, true)
2016-04-13 01:44:09 +00:00
}
Teleport signal handling and live reload. This commit introduces signal handling. Parent teleport process is now capable of forking the child process and passing listeners file descriptors to the child. Parent process then can gracefully shutdown by tracking the amount of current connections and closing listeners once the amount goes to 0. Here are the signals handled: * USR2 signal will cause the parent to fork a child process and pass listener file descriptors to it. Child process will close unused file descriptors and will bind to the used ones. At this moment two processes - the parent and the forked child process will be serving requests. After looking at the traffic and the log files, administrator can either shut down the parent process or the child process if the child process is not functioning as expected. * TERM, INT signals will trigger graceful process shutdown. Auth, node and proxy processes will wait until the amount of active connections goes down to 0 and will exit after that. * KILL, QUIT signals will cause immediate non-graceful shutdown. * HUP signal combines USR2 and TERM signals in a convenient way: parent process will fork a child process and self-initate graceful shutdown. This is a more convenient than USR2/TERM sequence, but less agile and robust as if the connection to the parent process drops, but the new process exits with error, administrators can lock themselves out of the environment. Additionally, boltdb backend has to be phased out, as it does not support read/writes by two concurrent processes. This had required refactoring of the dir backend to use file locking to allow inter-process collaboration on read/write operations.
2018-02-08 02:32:50 +00:00
// TestShutdown tests scenario with a graceful shutdown,
// that session will be working after
func (s *IntSuite) TestShutdown(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
Teleport signal handling and live reload. This commit introduces signal handling. Parent teleport process is now capable of forking the child process and passing listeners file descriptors to the child. Parent process then can gracefully shutdown by tracking the amount of current connections and closing listeners once the amount goes to 0. Here are the signals handled: * USR2 signal will cause the parent to fork a child process and pass listener file descriptors to it. Child process will close unused file descriptors and will bind to the used ones. At this moment two processes - the parent and the forked child process will be serving requests. After looking at the traffic and the log files, administrator can either shut down the parent process or the child process if the child process is not functioning as expected. * TERM, INT signals will trigger graceful process shutdown. Auth, node and proxy processes will wait until the amount of active connections goes down to 0 and will exit after that. * KILL, QUIT signals will cause immediate non-graceful shutdown. * HUP signal combines USR2 and TERM signals in a convenient way: parent process will fork a child process and self-initate graceful shutdown. This is a more convenient than USR2/TERM sequence, but less agile and robust as if the connection to the parent process drops, but the new process exits with error, administrators can lock themselves out of the environment. Additionally, boltdb backend has to be phased out, as it does not support read/writes by two concurrent processes. This had required refactoring of the dir backend to use file locking to allow inter-process collaboration on read/write operations.
2018-02-08 02:32:50 +00:00
t := s.newTeleport(c, nil, true)
// get a reference to site obj:
site := t.GetSiteAPI(Site)
c.Assert(site, check.NotNil)
person := NewTerminal(250)
// commandsC receive commands
Fix remaining gosimple findings List of fixed items: ``` integration/helpers.go:1279:2 gosimple S1000: should use for range instead of for { select {} } integration/integration_test.go:144:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:173:5 gosimple S1009: should omit nil check; len() for nil slices is defined as zero integration/integration_test.go:296:28 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan error) instead integration/integration_test.go:570:41 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:685:40 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan interface{}) instead integration/integration_test.go:759:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan string) instead lib/auth/init_test.go:62:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/auth/tls_test.go:1658:22 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:420:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/dynamo/dynamodbbk.go:656:12 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf lib/backend/etcdbk/etcd.go:458:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/firestore/firestorebk.go:407:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:317:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/lite/lite.go:336:6 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:365:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(expected.Key, replaceWith.Key) instead lib/backend/memory/memory.go:376:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(existingItem.Value, expected.Value) instead lib/backend/test/suite.go:327:10 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/client/api.go:1410:9 gosimple S1003: should use strings.ContainsRune(name, ':') instead lib/client/api.go:2355:32 gosimple S1019: should use make([]ForwardedPort, len(spec)) instead lib/client/keyagent_test.go:85:2 gosimple S1021: should merge variable declaration with assignment on next line lib/client/player.go:54:33 gosimple S1019: should use make(chan int) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1024:52 gosimple S1019: should use make(services.CommandLabels) instead lib/config/configuration.go:1025:44 gosimple S1019: should use make(map[string]string) instead lib/config/configuration.go:930:21 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleNode) instead lib/config/configuration.go:931:22 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleAuthService) instead lib/config/configuration.go:932:23 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(clf.Roles, defaults.RoleProxy) instead lib/service/supervisor.go:387:2 gosimple S1001: should use copy() instead of a loop lib/tlsca/parsegen.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:140:9 gosimple S1034: assigning the result of this type assertion to a variable (switch generalKey := generalKey.(type)) could eliminate type assertions in switch cases lib/utils/certs.go:167:40 gosimple S1010: should omit second index in slice, s[a:len(s)] is identical to s[a:] lib/utils/certs.go:204:5 gosimple S1004: should use !bytes.Equal(certificateChain[0].SubjectKeyId, certificateChain[0].AuthorityKeyId) instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:45 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "}}") instead lib/utils/parse/parse.go:116:6 gosimple S1003: should use strings.Contains(variable, "{{") instead lib/utils/socks/socks.go:192:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/utils/socks/socks.go:199:10 gosimple S1025: should use String() instead of fmt.Sprintf lib/web/apiserver.go:1054:18 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) lib/web/apiserver.go:1954:9 gosimple S1039: unnecessary use of fmt.Sprintf tool/tsh/tsh.go:1193:14 gosimple S1024: should use time.Until instead of t.Sub(time.Now()) ```
2020-05-20 18:38:32 +00:00
commandsC := make(chan string)
Teleport signal handling and live reload. This commit introduces signal handling. Parent teleport process is now capable of forking the child process and passing listeners file descriptors to the child. Parent process then can gracefully shutdown by tracking the amount of current connections and closing listeners once the amount goes to 0. Here are the signals handled: * USR2 signal will cause the parent to fork a child process and pass listener file descriptors to it. Child process will close unused file descriptors and will bind to the used ones. At this moment two processes - the parent and the forked child process will be serving requests. After looking at the traffic and the log files, administrator can either shut down the parent process or the child process if the child process is not functioning as expected. * TERM, INT signals will trigger graceful process shutdown. Auth, node and proxy processes will wait until the amount of active connections goes down to 0 and will exit after that. * KILL, QUIT signals will cause immediate non-graceful shutdown. * HUP signal combines USR2 and TERM signals in a convenient way: parent process will fork a child process and self-initate graceful shutdown. This is a more convenient than USR2/TERM sequence, but less agile and robust as if the connection to the parent process drops, but the new process exits with error, administrators can lock themselves out of the environment. Additionally, boltdb backend has to be phased out, as it does not support read/writes by two concurrent processes. This had required refactoring of the dir backend to use file locking to allow inter-process collaboration on read/write operations.
2018-02-08 02:32:50 +00:00
// PersonA: SSH into the server, wait one second, then type some commands on stdin:
openSession := func() {
cl, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{Login: s.me.Username, Cluster: Site, Host: Host, Port: t.GetPortSSHInt()})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
cl.Stdout = person
cl.Stdin = person
Teleport signal handling and live reload. This commit introduces signal handling. Parent teleport process is now capable of forking the child process and passing listeners file descriptors to the child. Parent process then can gracefully shutdown by tracking the amount of current connections and closing listeners once the amount goes to 0. Here are the signals handled: * USR2 signal will cause the parent to fork a child process and pass listener file descriptors to it. Child process will close unused file descriptors and will bind to the used ones. At this moment two processes - the parent and the forked child process will be serving requests. After looking at the traffic and the log files, administrator can either shut down the parent process or the child process if the child process is not functioning as expected. * TERM, INT signals will trigger graceful process shutdown. Auth, node and proxy processes will wait until the amount of active connections goes down to 0 and will exit after that. * KILL, QUIT signals will cause immediate non-graceful shutdown. * HUP signal combines USR2 and TERM signals in a convenient way: parent process will fork a child process and self-initate graceful shutdown. This is a more convenient than USR2/TERM sequence, but less agile and robust as if the connection to the parent process drops, but the new process exits with error, administrators can lock themselves out of the environment. Additionally, boltdb backend has to be phased out, as it does not support read/writes by two concurrent processes. This had required refactoring of the dir backend to use file locking to allow inter-process collaboration on read/write operations.
2018-02-08 02:32:50 +00:00
go func() {
for command := range commandsC {
person.Type(command)
}
}()
err = cl.SSH(context.TODO(), []string{}, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
}
go openSession()
retry := func(command, pattern string) {
person.Type(command)
// wait for both sites to see each other via their reverse tunnels (for up to 10 seconds)
abortTime := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)
var matched bool
var output string
for {
output = replaceNewlines(person.Output(1000))
Teleport signal handling and live reload. This commit introduces signal handling. Parent teleport process is now capable of forking the child process and passing listeners file descriptors to the child. Parent process then can gracefully shutdown by tracking the amount of current connections and closing listeners once the amount goes to 0. Here are the signals handled: * USR2 signal will cause the parent to fork a child process and pass listener file descriptors to it. Child process will close unused file descriptors and will bind to the used ones. At this moment two processes - the parent and the forked child process will be serving requests. After looking at the traffic and the log files, administrator can either shut down the parent process or the child process if the child process is not functioning as expected. * TERM, INT signals will trigger graceful process shutdown. Auth, node and proxy processes will wait until the amount of active connections goes down to 0 and will exit after that. * KILL, QUIT signals will cause immediate non-graceful shutdown. * HUP signal combines USR2 and TERM signals in a convenient way: parent process will fork a child process and self-initate graceful shutdown. This is a more convenient than USR2/TERM sequence, but less agile and robust as if the connection to the parent process drops, but the new process exits with error, administrators can lock themselves out of the environment. Additionally, boltdb backend has to be phased out, as it does not support read/writes by two concurrent processes. This had required refactoring of the dir backend to use file locking to allow inter-process collaboration on read/write operations.
2018-02-08 02:32:50 +00:00
matched, _ = regexp.MatchString(pattern, output)
if matched {
break
}
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 200)
if time.Now().After(abortTime) {
c.Fatalf("failed to capture output: %v", pattern)
}
}
if !matched {
c.Fatalf("output %q does not match pattern %q", output, pattern)
}
}
retry("echo start \r\n", ".*start.*")
// initiate shutdown
ctx := context.TODO()
shutdownContext := t.Process.StartShutdown(ctx)
// make sure that terminal still works
retry("echo howdy \r\n", ".*howdy.*")
// now type exit and wait for shutdown to complete
person.Type("exit\n\r")
select {
case <-shutdownContext.Done():
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
c.Fatalf("Failed to shut down the server.")
Teleport signal handling and live reload. This commit introduces signal handling. Parent teleport process is now capable of forking the child process and passing listeners file descriptors to the child. Parent process then can gracefully shutdown by tracking the amount of current connections and closing listeners once the amount goes to 0. Here are the signals handled: * USR2 signal will cause the parent to fork a child process and pass listener file descriptors to it. Child process will close unused file descriptors and will bind to the used ones. At this moment two processes - the parent and the forked child process will be serving requests. After looking at the traffic and the log files, administrator can either shut down the parent process or the child process if the child process is not functioning as expected. * TERM, INT signals will trigger graceful process shutdown. Auth, node and proxy processes will wait until the amount of active connections goes down to 0 and will exit after that. * KILL, QUIT signals will cause immediate non-graceful shutdown. * HUP signal combines USR2 and TERM signals in a convenient way: parent process will fork a child process and self-initate graceful shutdown. This is a more convenient than USR2/TERM sequence, but less agile and robust as if the connection to the parent process drops, but the new process exits with error, administrators can lock themselves out of the environment. Additionally, boltdb backend has to be phased out, as it does not support read/writes by two concurrent processes. This had required refactoring of the dir backend to use file locking to allow inter-process collaboration on read/write operations.
2018-02-08 02:32:50 +00:00
}
}
type disconnectTestCase struct {
recordingMode string
options services.RoleOptions
disconnectTimeout time.Duration
concurrentConns int
sessCtlTimeout time.Duration
assertExpected func(*check.C, error)
postFunc func(context.Context, *check.C, *TeleInstance)
comment string
}
// TestDisconnectScenarios tests multiple scenarios with client disconnects
func (s *IntSuite) TestDisconnectScenarios(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
testCases := []disconnectTestCase{
{
recordingMode: services.RecordAtNode,
options: services.RoleOptions{
ClientIdleTimeout: services.NewDuration(500 * time.Millisecond),
},
disconnectTimeout: time.Second,
},
{
recordingMode: services.RecordAtProxy,
options: services.RoleOptions{
ForwardAgent: services.NewBool(true),
ClientIdleTimeout: services.NewDuration(500 * time.Millisecond),
},
disconnectTimeout: time.Second,
},
{
recordingMode: services.RecordAtNode,
options: services.RoleOptions{
DisconnectExpiredCert: services.NewBool(true),
MaxSessionTTL: services.NewDuration(2 * time.Second),
},
disconnectTimeout: 4 * time.Second,
},
{
recordingMode: services.RecordAtProxy,
options: services.RoleOptions{
ForwardAgent: services.NewBool(true),
DisconnectExpiredCert: services.NewBool(true),
MaxSessionTTL: services.NewDuration(2 * time.Second),
},
disconnectTimeout: 4 * time.Second,
},
{
comment: "verify that concurrent connection limits are applied when recording at node",
recordingMode: services.RecordAtNode,
options: services.RoleOptions{
MaxConnections: 1,
},
disconnectTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
concurrentConns: 2,
assertExpected: func(c *check.C, err error) {
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "administratively prohibited") {
c.Fatalf("Expected 'administratively prohibited', got: %v", err)
}
},
},
{
comment: "verify that concurrent connection limits are applied when recording at proxy",
recordingMode: services.RecordAtProxy,
options: services.RoleOptions{
ForwardAgent: services.NewBool(true),
MaxConnections: 1,
},
disconnectTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
concurrentConns: 2,
assertExpected: func(c *check.C, err error) {
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "administratively prohibited") {
c.Fatalf("Expected 'administratively prohibited', got: %v", err)
}
},
},
{
comment: "verify that lost connections to auth server terminate controlled conns",
recordingMode: services.RecordAtNode,
options: services.RoleOptions{
MaxConnections: 1,
},
disconnectTimeout: time.Second,
sessCtlTimeout: 500 * time.Millisecond,
// use postFunc to wait for the semaphore to be acquired and a session
// to be started, then shut down the auth server.
postFunc: func(ctx context.Context, c *check.C, t *TeleInstance) {
site := t.GetSiteAPI(Site)
var sems []services.Semaphore
var err error
for i := 0; i < 6; i++ {
sems, err = site.GetSemaphores(ctx, services.SemaphoreFilter{
SemaphoreKind: services.SemaphoreKindConnection,
})
if err == nil && len(sems) > 0 {
break
}
select {
case <-time.After(time.Millisecond * 100):
case <-ctx.Done():
return
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(len(sems), check.Equals, 1)
var ss []session.Session
for i := 0; i < 6; i++ {
ss, err = site.GetSessions(defaults.Namespace)
if err == nil && len(ss) > 0 {
break
}
select {
case <-time.After(time.Millisecond * 100):
case <-ctx.Done():
return
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(len(ss), check.Equals, 1)
c.Assert(t.StopAuth(false), check.IsNil)
},
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
s.runDisconnectTest(c, tc)
}
}
func (s *IntSuite) runDisconnectTest(c *check.C, tc disconnectTestCase) {
t := s.newTeleportInstance(c)
comment := check.Commentf(tc.comment)
username := s.me.Username
role, err := services.NewRole("devs", services.RoleSpecV3{
Options: tc.options,
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{username},
},
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
t.AddUserWithRole(username, role)
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: tc.recordingMode,
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
SessionControlTimeout: services.Duration(tc.sessCtlTimeout),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
cfg := s.defaultServiceConfig()
cfg.Auth.Enabled = true
cfg.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
cfg.Proxy.DisableWebService = true
cfg.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
cfg.Proxy.Enabled = true
cfg.SSH.Enabled = true
c.Assert(t.CreateEx(nil, cfg), check.IsNil, comment)
c.Assert(t.Start(), check.IsNil, comment)
defer t.StopAll()
// get a reference to site obj:
site := t.GetSiteAPI(Site)
c.Assert(site, check.NotNil, comment)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.TODO())
defer cancel()
if tc.concurrentConns < 1 {
// test cases that don't specify concurrentConns are single-connection tests.
tc.concurrentConns = 1
}
for i := 0; i < tc.concurrentConns; i++ {
person := NewTerminal(250)
openSession := func() {
defer cancel()
cl, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{Login: username, Cluster: Site, Host: Host, Port: t.GetPortSSHInt()})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, comment)
cl.Stdout = person
cl.Stdin = person
err = cl.SSH(ctx, []string{}, false)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
// either we timed out, or a different session
// triggered closure.
return
default:
}
if tc.assertExpected != nil {
tc.assertExpected(c, err)
} else if err != nil && !trace.IsEOF(err) {
c.Fatalf("%s: expected EOF or nil, got %v instead", tc.comment, err)
}
}
go openSession()
go enterInput(ctx, c, person, "echo start \r\n", ".*start.*")
}
if tc.postFunc != nil {
// test case modifies the teleport instance after session start
tc.postFunc(ctx, c, t)
}
select {
case <-time.After(tc.disconnectTimeout + time.Second):
dumpGoroutineProfile()
c.Fatalf("%s: timeout waiting for session to exit: %+v", timeNow(), tc)
case <-ctx.Done():
// session closed. a test case is successful if the first
// session to close encountered the expected error variant.
}
}
func timeNow() string {
return time.Now().Format(time.StampMilli)
}
func enterInput(ctx context.Context, c *check.C, person *Terminal, command, pattern string) {
person.Type(command)
abortTime := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)
var matched bool
var output string
for {
output = replaceNewlines(person.Output(1000))
matched, _ = regexp.MatchString(pattern, output)
if matched {
return
}
select {
case <-time.After(time.Millisecond * 50):
case <-ctx.Done():
// cancellation means that we don't care about the input being
// confirmed anymore; not equivalent to a timeout.
return
}
if time.Now().After(abortTime) {
c.Fatalf("failed to capture pattern %q in %q", pattern, output)
}
}
}
// TestInvalidLogins validates that you can't login with invalid login or
// with invalid 'site' parameter
func (s *IntSuite) TestEnvironmentVariables(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
t := s.newTeleport(c, nil, true)
defer t.StopAll()
testKey, testVal := "TELEPORT_TEST_ENV", "howdy"
2017-02-24 01:05:51 +00:00
cmd := []string{"printenv", testKey}
// make sure sessions set run command
2017-10-12 17:35:46 +00:00
tc, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{Login: s.me.Username, Cluster: Site, Host: Host, Port: t.GetPortSSHInt()})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
tc.Env = map[string]string{testKey: testVal}
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
tc.Stdout = out
tc.Stdin = nil
err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), cmd, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(strings.TrimSpace(out.String()), check.Equals, testVal)
}
2016-04-13 01:44:09 +00:00
// TestInvalidLogins validates that you can't login with invalid login or
// with invalid 'site' parameter
func (s *IntSuite) TestInvalidLogins(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
2016-05-04 23:49:59 +00:00
t := s.newTeleport(c, nil, true)
defer t.StopAll()
2016-04-13 01:44:09 +00:00
cmd := []string{"echo", "success"}
// try the wrong site:
2017-10-12 17:35:46 +00:00
tc, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{Login: s.me.Username, Cluster: "wrong-site", Host: Host, Port: t.GetPortSSHInt()})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), cmd, false)
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c.Assert(err, check.ErrorMatches, "cluster wrong-site not found")
2016-04-13 01:44:09 +00:00
}
// TestTwoClustersTunnel creates two teleport clusters: "a" and "b" and creates a
// tunnel from A to B.
//
// Two tests are run, first is when both A and B record sessions at nodes. It
// executes an SSH command on A by connecting directly to A and by connecting
// to B via B<->A tunnel. All sessions should end up in A.
//
// In the second test, sessions are recorded at B. All sessions still show up on
// A (they are Teleport nodes) but in addition, two show up on B when connecting
// over the B<->A tunnel because sessions are recorded at the proxy.
func (s *IntSuite) TestTwoClustersTunnel(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
now := time.Now().In(time.UTC).Round(time.Second)
var tests = []struct {
inRecordLocation string
outExecCountSiteA int
outExecCountSiteB int
}{
// normal teleport. since all events are recorded at the node, all events
// end up on site-a and none on site-b.
{
services.RecordAtNode,
3,
0,
},
// recording proxy. since events are recorded at the proxy, 3 events end up
// on site-a (because it's a teleport node so it still records at the node)
// and 2 events end up on site-b because it's recording.
{
services.RecordAtProxy,
3,
2,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
s.twoClustersTunnel(c, now, tt.inRecordLocation, tt.outExecCountSiteA, tt.outExecCountSiteB)
}
}
func (s *IntSuite) twoClustersTunnel(c *check.C, now time.Time, proxyRecordMode string, execCountSiteA, execCountSiteB int) {
// start the http proxy, we need to make sure this was not used
ps := &proxyServer{}
ts := httptest.NewServer(ps)
defer ts.Close()
2016-04-08 02:01:31 +00:00
// clear out any proxy environment variables
for _, v := range []string{"http_proxy", "https_proxy", "HTTP_PROXY", "HTTPS_PROXY"} {
os.Setenv(v, "")
}
username := s.me.Username
a := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, "site-A")
b := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, "site-B")
a.AddUser(username, []string{username})
b.AddUser(username, []string{username})
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: proxyRecordMode,
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
acfg := s.defaultServiceConfig()
acfg.Auth.Enabled = true
acfg.Proxy.Enabled = true
acfg.Proxy.DisableWebService = true
acfg.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
acfg.SSH.Enabled = true
bcfg := s.defaultServiceConfig()
bcfg.Auth.Enabled = true
bcfg.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
bcfg.Proxy.Enabled = true
bcfg.Proxy.DisableWebService = true
bcfg.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
bcfg.SSH.Enabled = false
c.Assert(b.CreateEx(a.Secrets.AsSlice(), bcfg), check.IsNil)
defer b.StopAll()
c.Assert(a.CreateEx(b.Secrets.AsSlice(), acfg), check.IsNil)
defer a.StopAll()
c.Assert(b.Start(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(a.Start(), check.IsNil)
// wait for both sites to see each other via their reverse tunnels (for up to 10 seconds)
abortTime := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 10)
for len(checkGetClusters(c, a.Tunnel)) < 2 && len(checkGetClusters(c, b.Tunnel)) < 2 {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 200)
if time.Now().After(abortTime) {
c.Fatalf("Two clusters do not see each other: tunnels are not working.")
}
}
var (
outputA bytes.Buffer
outputB bytes.Buffer
)
// make sure the direct dialer was used and not the proxy dialer
c.Assert(ps.Count(), check.Equals, 0)
// if we got here, it means two sites are cross-connected. lets execute SSH commands
sshPort := a.GetPortSSHInt()
cmd := []string{"echo", "hello world"}
// directly:
tc, err := a.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: username,
Cluster: a.Secrets.SiteName,
Host: Host,
Port: sshPort,
ForwardAgent: true,
})
tc.Stdout = &outputA
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), cmd, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(outputA.String(), check.Equals, "hello world\n")
// Update trusted CAs.
err = tc.UpdateTrustedCA(context.TODO(), a.Secrets.SiteName)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
2018-09-06 21:52:41 +00:00
// The known_hosts file should have two certificates, the way bytes.Split
// works that means the output will be 3 (2 certs + 1 empty).
buffer, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(tc.KeysDir, "known_hosts"))
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
parts := bytes.Split(buffer, []byte("\n"))
c.Assert(parts, check.HasLen, 3)
2018-09-06 21:52:41 +00:00
// The certs.pem file should have 2 certificates.
buffer, err = ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(tc.KeysDir, "keys", Host, "certs.pem"))
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
roots := x509.NewCertPool()
ok := roots.AppendCertsFromPEM(buffer)
c.Assert(ok, check.Equals, true)
c.Assert(roots.Subjects(), check.HasLen, 2)
// wait for active tunnel connections to be established
waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, b.Tunnel, a.Secrets.SiteName, 1)
// via tunnel b->a:
tc, err = b.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: username,
Cluster: a.Secrets.SiteName,
Host: Host,
Port: sshPort,
ForwardAgent: true,
})
tc.Stdout = &outputB
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), cmd, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(outputA.String(), check.DeepEquals, outputB.String())
// Stop "site-A" and try to connect to it again via "site-A" (expect a connection error)
err = a.StopAuth(false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), cmd, false)
c.Assert(err, check.FitsTypeOf, trace.ConnectionProblem(nil, ""))
// Reset and start "Site-A" again
err = a.Reset()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = a.Start()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// try to execute an SSH command using the same old client to Site-B
// "site-A" and "site-B" reverse tunnels are supposed to reconnect,
// and 'tc' (client) is also supposed to reconnect
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), cmd, false)
if err == nil {
break
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
searchAndAssert := func(site auth.ClientI, count int) error {
tickCh := time.Tick(500 * time.Millisecond)
stopCh := time.After(5 * time.Second)
// only look for exec events
execQuery := fmt.Sprintf("%s=%s", events.EventType, events.ExecEvent)
for {
select {
case <-tickCh:
eventsInSite, err := site.SearchEvents(now, now.Add(1*time.Hour), execQuery, 0)
if err != nil {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
// found the number of events we were looking for
if got, want := len(eventsInSite), count; got == want {
return nil
}
case <-stopCh:
return trace.BadParameter("unable to find %v events after 5s", count)
}
}
}
siteA := a.GetSiteAPI(a.Secrets.SiteName)
err = searchAndAssert(siteA, execCountSiteA)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
siteB := b.GetSiteAPI(b.Secrets.SiteName)
err = searchAndAssert(siteB, execCountSiteB)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// stop both sites for real
c.Assert(b.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(a.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
}
// TestTwoClustersProxy checks if the reverse tunnel uses a HTTP PROXY to
// establish a connection.
func (s *IntSuite) TestTwoClustersProxy(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
// start the http proxy
ps := &proxyServer{}
ts := httptest.NewServer(ps)
defer ts.Close()
// set the http_proxy environment variable
u, err := url.Parse(ts.URL)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
os.Setenv("http_proxy", u.Host)
defer os.Setenv("http_proxy", "")
username := s.me.Username
a := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, "site-A")
b := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, "site-B")
a.AddUser(username, []string{username})
b.AddUser(username, []string{username})
c.Assert(b.Create(a.Secrets.AsSlice(), false, nil), check.IsNil)
defer b.StopAll()
c.Assert(a.Create(b.Secrets.AsSlice(), true, nil), check.IsNil)
defer a.StopAll()
c.Assert(b.Start(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(a.Start(), check.IsNil)
// wait for both sites to see each other via their reverse tunnels (for up to 10 seconds)
abortTime := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 10)
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
for len(checkGetClusters(c, a.Tunnel)) < 2 && len(checkGetClusters(c, b.Tunnel)) < 2 {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 200)
if time.Now().After(abortTime) {
c.Fatalf("two sites do not see each other: tunnels are not working")
}
}
// make sure the reverse tunnel went through the proxy
c.Assert(ps.Count() > 0, check.Equals, true, check.Commentf("proxy did not intercept any connection"))
// stop both sites for real
c.Assert(b.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(a.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
}
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// TestHA tests scenario when auth server for the cluster goes down
// and we switch to local persistent caches
func (s *IntSuite) TestHA(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
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username := s.me.Username
a := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, "cluster-a")
b := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, "cluster-b")
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a.AddUser(username, []string{username})
b.AddUser(username, []string{username})
c.Assert(b.Create(a.Secrets.AsSlice(), false, nil), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(a.Create(b.Secrets.AsSlice(), true, nil), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(b.Start(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(a.Start(), check.IsNil)
nodePorts := s.getPorts(3)
sshPort, proxyWebPort, proxySSHPort := nodePorts[0], nodePorts[1], nodePorts[2]
c.Assert(a.StartNodeAndProxy("cluster-a-node", sshPort, proxyWebPort, proxySSHPort), check.IsNil)
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// wait for both sites to see each other via their reverse tunnels (for up to 10 seconds)
abortTime := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 10)
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
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for len(checkGetClusters(c, a.Tunnel)) < 2 && len(checkGetClusters(c, b.Tunnel)) < 2 {
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time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 2000)
if time.Now().After(abortTime) {
c.Fatalf("two sites do not see each other: tunnels are not working")
}
}
cmd := []string{"echo", "hello world"}
tc, err := b.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: username,
Cluster: "cluster-a",
Host: Loopback,
Port: sshPort,
})
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c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
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output := &bytes.Buffer{}
tc.Stdout = output
// try to execute an SSH command using the same old client to Site-B
// "site-A" and "site-B" reverse tunnels are supposed to reconnect,
// and 'tc' (client) is also supposed to reconnect
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 50)
err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), cmd, false)
if err == nil {
break
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(output.String(), check.Equals, "hello world\n")
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// stop auth server a now
c.Assert(a.StopAuth(true), check.IsNil)
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// try to execute an SSH command using the same old client to site-B
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// "site-A" and "site-B" reverse tunnels are supposed to reconnect,
// and 'tc' (client) is also supposed to reconnect
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for i := 0; i < 30; i++ {
time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
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err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), cmd, false)
if err == nil {
break
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// stop cluster and remaining nodes
c.Assert(a.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(b.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
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}
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// TestMapRoles tests local to remote role mapping and access patterns
func (s *IntSuite) TestMapRoles(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
ctx := context.Background()
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
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username := s.me.Username
clusterMain := "cluster-main"
clusterAux := "cluster-aux"
main := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, clusterMain)
aux := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, clusterAux)
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// main cluster has a local user and belongs to role "main-devs"
mainDevs := "main-devs"
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role, err := services.NewRole(mainDevs, services.RoleSpecV3{
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{username},
},
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})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
main.AddUserWithRole(username, role)
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// for role mapping test we turn on Web API on the main cluster
// as it's used
makeConfig := func(enableSSH bool) ([]*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
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tconf.SSH.Enabled = enableSSH
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = false
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
return nil, tconf
}
lib.SetInsecureDevMode(true)
defer lib.SetInsecureDevMode(false)
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c.Assert(main.CreateEx(makeConfig(false)), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(aux.CreateEx(makeConfig(true)), check.IsNil)
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// auxiliary cluster has a role aux-devs
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// connect aux cluster to main cluster
// using trusted clusters, so remote user will be allowed to assume
// role specified by mapping remote role "devs" to local role "local-devs"
auxDevs := "aux-devs"
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role, err = services.NewRole(auxDevs, services.RoleSpecV3{
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{username},
},
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})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = aux.Process.GetAuthServer().UpsertRole(ctx, role)
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c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
trustedClusterToken := "trusted-cluster-token"
err = main.Process.GetAuthServer().UpsertToken(
services.MustCreateProvisionToken(trustedClusterToken, []teleport.Role{teleport.RoleTrustedCluster}, time.Time{}))
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c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
trustedCluster := main.Secrets.AsTrustedCluster(trustedClusterToken, services.RoleMap{
{Remote: mainDevs, Local: []string{auxDevs}},
})
// modify trusted cluster resource name so it would not
// match the cluster name to check that it does not matter
trustedCluster.SetName(main.Secrets.SiteName + "-cluster")
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c.Assert(main.Start(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(aux.Start(), check.IsNil)
err = trustedCluster.CheckAndSetDefaults()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// try and upsert a trusted cluster
tryCreateTrustedCluster(c, aux.Process.GetAuthServer(), trustedCluster)
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nodePorts := s.getPorts(3)
sshPort, proxyWebPort, proxySSHPort := nodePorts[0], nodePorts[1], nodePorts[2]
c.Assert(aux.StartNodeAndProxy("aux-node", sshPort, proxyWebPort, proxySSHPort), check.IsNil)
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// wait for both sites to see each other via their reverse tunnels (for up to 10 seconds)
abortTime := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 10)
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
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for len(checkGetClusters(c, main.Tunnel)) < 2 && len(checkGetClusters(c, aux.Tunnel)) < 2 {
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time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 2000)
if time.Now().After(abortTime) {
c.Fatalf("two clusters do not see each other: tunnels are not working")
}
}
// Make sure that GetNodes returns nodes in the remote site. This makes
// sure identity aware GetNodes works for remote clusters. Testing of the
// correct nodes that identity aware GetNodes is done in TestList.
Events and GRPC API This commit introduces several key changes to Teleport backend and API infrastructure in order to achieve scalability improvements on 10K+ node deployments. Events and plain keyspace -------------------------- New backend interface supports events, pagination and range queries and moves away from buckets to plain keyspace, what better aligns with DynamoDB and Etcd featuring similar interfaces. All backend implementations are exposing Events API, allowing multiple subscribers to consume the same event stream and avoid polling database. Replacing BoltDB, Dir with SQLite ------------------------------- BoltDB backend does not support having two processes access the database at the same time. This prevented Teleport using BoltDB backend to be live reloaded. SQLite supports reads/writes by multiple processes and makes Dir backend obsolete as SQLite is more efficient on larger collections, supports transactions and can detect data corruption. Teleport automatically migrates data from Bolt and Dir backends into SQLite. GRPC API and protobuf resources ------------------------------- GRPC API has been introduced for the auth server. The auth server now serves both GRPC and JSON-HTTP API on the same TLS socket and uses the same client certificate authentication. All future API methods should use GRPC and HTTP-JSON API is considered obsolete. In addition to that some resources like Server and CertificateAuthority are now generated from protobuf service specifications in a way that is fully backward compatible with original JSON spec and schema, so the same resource can be encoded and decoded from JSON, YAML and protobuf. All models should be refactored into new proto specification over time. Streaming presence service -------------------------- In order to cut bandwidth, nodes are sending full updates only when changes to labels or spec have occured, otherwise new light-weight GRPC keep alive updates are sent over to the presence service, reducing bandwidth usage on multi-node deployments. In addition to that nodes are no longer polling auth server for certificate authority rotation updates, instead they subscribe to event updates to detect updates as soon as they happen. This is a new API, so the errors are inevitable, that's why polling is still done, but on a way slower rate.
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var nodes []services.Server
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
nodes, err = aux.Process.GetAuthServer().GetNodes(defaults.Namespace, services.SkipValidation())
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
if len(nodes) != 2 {
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
continue
}
}
c.Assert(nodes, check.HasLen, 2)
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cmd := []string{"echo", "hello world"}
tc, err := main.NewClient(ClientConfig{Login: username, Cluster: clusterAux, Host: Loopback, Port: sshPort})
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c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
output := &bytes.Buffer{}
tc.Stdout = output
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// try to execute an SSH command using the same old client to Site-B
// "site-A" and "site-B" reverse tunnels are supposed to reconnect,
// and 'tc' (client) is also supposed to reconnect
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 50)
err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), cmd, false)
if err == nil {
break
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(output.String(), check.Equals, "hello world\n")
// make sure both clusters have the right certificate authorities with the right signing keys.
var tests = []struct {
mainClusterName string
auxClusterName string
inCluster *TeleInstance
outChkMainUserCA check.Checker
outLenMainUserCA int
outChkMainHostCA check.Checker
outLenMainHostCA int
outChkAuxUserCA check.Checker
outLenAuxUserCA int
outChkAuxHostCA check.Checker
outLenAuxHostCA int
}{
// 0 - main
// * User CA for main has one signing key.
// * Host CA for main has one signing key.
// * User CA for aux does not exist.
// * Host CA for aux has no signing keys.
{
main.Secrets.SiteName,
aux.Secrets.SiteName,
main,
check.IsNil, 1,
check.IsNil, 1,
check.NotNil, 0,
check.IsNil, 0,
},
// 1 - aux
// * User CA for main has no signing keys.
// * Host CA for main has no signing keys.
// * User CA for aux has one signing key.
// * Host CA for aux has one signing key.
{
trustedCluster.GetName(),
aux.Secrets.SiteName,
aux,
check.IsNil, 0,
check.IsNil, 0,
check.IsNil, 1,
check.IsNil, 1,
},
}
for i, tt := range tests {
cid := services.CertAuthID{Type: services.UserCA, DomainName: tt.mainClusterName}
mainUserCAs, err := tt.inCluster.Process.GetAuthServer().GetCertAuthority(cid, true)
c.Assert(err, tt.outChkMainUserCA)
if tt.outChkMainUserCA == check.IsNil {
c.Assert(mainUserCAs.GetSigningKeys(), check.HasLen, tt.outLenMainUserCA, check.Commentf("Test %v, Main User CA", i))
}
cid = services.CertAuthID{Type: services.HostCA, DomainName: tt.mainClusterName}
mainHostCAs, err := tt.inCluster.Process.GetAuthServer().GetCertAuthority(cid, true)
c.Assert(err, tt.outChkMainHostCA)
if tt.outChkMainHostCA == check.IsNil {
c.Assert(mainHostCAs.GetSigningKeys(), check.HasLen, tt.outLenMainHostCA, check.Commentf("Test %v, Main Host CA", i))
}
cid = services.CertAuthID{Type: services.UserCA, DomainName: tt.auxClusterName}
auxUserCAs, err := tt.inCluster.Process.GetAuthServer().GetCertAuthority(cid, true)
c.Assert(err, tt.outChkAuxUserCA)
if tt.outChkAuxUserCA == check.IsNil {
c.Assert(auxUserCAs.GetSigningKeys(), check.HasLen, tt.outLenAuxUserCA, check.Commentf("Test %v, Aux User CA", i))
}
cid = services.CertAuthID{Type: services.HostCA, DomainName: tt.auxClusterName}
auxHostCAs, err := tt.inCluster.Process.GetAuthServer().GetCertAuthority(cid, true)
c.Assert(err, tt.outChkAuxHostCA)
if tt.outChkAuxHostCA == check.IsNil {
c.Assert(auxHostCAs.GetSigningKeys(), check.HasLen, tt.outLenAuxHostCA, check.Commentf("Test %v, Aux Host CA", i))
}
}
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// stop clusters and remaining nodes
c.Assert(main.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(aux.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
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}
// tryCreateTrustedCluster performs several attempts to create a trusted cluster,
// retries on connection problems and access denied errors to let caches
// propagate and services to start
func tryCreateTrustedCluster(c *check.C, authServer *auth.Server, trustedCluster services.TrustedCluster) {
ctx := context.TODO()
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
log.Debugf("Will create trusted cluster %v, attempt %v.", trustedCluster, i)
_, err := authServer.UpsertTrustedCluster(ctx, trustedCluster)
if err == nil {
return
}
if trace.IsConnectionProblem(err) {
log.Debugf("Retrying on connection problem: %v.", err)
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
continue
}
if trace.IsAccessDenied(err) {
log.Debugf("Retrying on access denied: %v.", err)
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
continue
}
c.Fatalf("Terminating on unexpected problem %v.", err)
}
c.Fatalf("Timeout creating trusted cluster")
}
// trustedClusterTest is a test setup for trusted clusters tests
type trustedClusterTest struct {
// multiplex sets up multiplexing of the reversetunnel SSH
// socket and the proxy's web socket
multiplex bool
// useJumpHost turns on jump host mode for the access
// to the proxy instead of the proxy command
useJumpHost bool
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
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// useLabels turns on trusted cluster labels and
// verifies RBAC
useLabels bool
}
// TestTrustedClusters tests remote clusters scenarios
// using trusted clusters feature
func (s *IntSuite) TestTrustedClusters(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
s.trustedClusters(c, trustedClusterTest{multiplex: false})
}
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
// TestTrustedClustersWithLabels tests remote clusters scenarios
// using trusted clusters feature and access labels
func (s *IntSuite) TestTrustedClustersWithLabels(c *check.C) {
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
s.trustedClusters(c, trustedClusterTest{multiplex: false, useLabels: true})
}
// TestJumpTrustedClusters tests remote clusters scenarios
// using trusted clusters feature using jumphost connection
func (s *IntSuite) TestJumpTrustedClusters(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
s.trustedClusters(c, trustedClusterTest{multiplex: false, useJumpHost: true})
}
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
// TestJumpTrustedClusters tests remote clusters scenarios
// using trusted clusters feature using jumphost connection
func (s *IntSuite) TestJumpTrustedClustersWithLabels(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
s.trustedClusters(c, trustedClusterTest{multiplex: false, useJumpHost: true, useLabels: true})
}
// TestMultiplexingTrustedClusters tests remote clusters scenarios
// using trusted clusters feature
func (s *IntSuite) TestMultiplexingTrustedClusters(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
s.trustedClusters(c, trustedClusterTest{multiplex: true})
}
func (s *IntSuite) trustedClusters(c *check.C, test trustedClusterTest) {
ctx := context.Background()
username := s.me.Username
clusterMain := "cluster-main"
clusterAux := "cluster-aux"
main := NewInstance(InstanceConfig{
ClusterName: clusterMain,
HostID: HostID,
NodeName: Host,
Ports: s.getPorts(6),
Priv: s.priv,
Pub: s.pub,
MultiplexProxy: test.multiplex,
log: s.log,
})
aux := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, clusterAux)
// main cluster has a local user and belongs to role "main-devs" and "main-admins"
mainDevs := "main-devs"
devsRole, err := services.NewRole(mainDevs, services.RoleSpecV3{
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{username},
},
})
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
// If the test is using labels, the cluster will be labeled
// and user will be granted access if labels match.
// Otherwise, to preserve backwards-compatibility
// roles with no labels will grant access to clusters with no labels.
if test.useLabels {
devsRole.SetClusterLabels(services.Allow, services.Labels{"access": []string{"prod"}})
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
mainAdmins := "main-admins"
adminsRole, err := services.NewRole(mainAdmins, services.RoleSpecV3{
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{"superuser"},
},
})
Fix staticcheck findings in integration/ and tool/ Original finding list: ``` tool/tctl/common/node_command.go:163:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(out)) ^ tool/tctl/common/status_command.go:110:2: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(view()) ^ tool/tctl/common/status_command.go:126:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(view()) ^ tool/tctl/common/token_command.go:201:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(tokensView()) ^ tool/tctl/common/token_command.go:207:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(data)) ^ tool/tctl/common/user_command.go:248:2: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(out)) ^ tool/tctl/common/user_command.go:294:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(out)) ^ integration/helpers.go:200:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) cryptoPubKey, err := sshutils.CryptoPublicKey(cfg.Pub) ^ integration/helpers.go:399:3: SA4006: this value of `roles` is never used (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/helpers.go:597:4: SA4006: this value of `roles` is never used (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/helpers.go:599:4: SA4006: this value of `roles` is never used (staticcheck) roles = user.Roles ^ integration/integration_test.go:1625:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) adminsRole, err := services.NewRole(mainAdmins, services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/integration_test.go:2185:2: SA4006: this value of `output` is never used (staticcheck) output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfg, 1) ^ integration/integration_test.go:2340:2: SA4006: this value of `output` is never used (staticcheck) output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfgProxy, 1) ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:154:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:321:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:366:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:386:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) pods, err := s.CoreV1().Pods(kubeSystemNamespace).List(metav1.ListOptions{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:465:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) mainRole, err := services.NewRole("main-kube", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:579:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) pods, err := proxyClient.CoreV1().Pods(kubeSystemNamespace).List(metav1.ListOptions{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:727:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) mainRole, err := services.NewRole("main-kube", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:840:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) pods, err := proxyClient.CoreV1().Pods(kubeSystemNamespace).List(metav1.ListOptions{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:1008:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ tool/teleport/common/teleport_test.go:83:2: SA4006: this value of `cmd` is never used (staticcheck) cmd, conf := Run(Options{ ^ tool/teleport/common/teleport_test.go:91:2: SA4006: this value of `cmd` is never used (staticcheck) cmd, conf = Run(Options{ ^ tool/tsh/tsh.go:170:2: SA4006: this value of `cmdLine` is never used (staticcheck) cmdLine := []string{} ^ integration/helpers.go:399:11: SA4010: this result of append is never used, except maybe in other appends (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/helpers.go:597:12: SA4010: this result of append is never used, except maybe in other appends (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/integration_test.go:1092:7: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(b.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(b.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/integration_test.go:1426:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/integration_test.go:1691:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/integration_test.go:1895:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:548:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:814:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ ```
2020-04-27 17:39:58 +00:00
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
main.AddUserWithRole(username, devsRole, adminsRole)
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
// Ops users can only access remote clusters with label 'access': 'ops'
mainOps := "main-ops"
mainOpsRole, err := services.NewRole(mainOps, services.RoleSpecV3{
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{username},
ClusterLabels: services.Labels{"access": []string{"ops"}},
},
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
main.AddUserWithRole(mainOps, mainOpsRole, adminsRole)
// for role mapping test we turn on Web API on the main cluster
// as it's used
makeConfig := func(enableSSH bool) ([]*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = false
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.SSH.Enabled = enableSSH
return nil, tconf
}
lib.SetInsecureDevMode(true)
defer lib.SetInsecureDevMode(false)
c.Assert(main.CreateEx(makeConfig(false)), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(aux.CreateEx(makeConfig(true)), check.IsNil)
// auxiliary cluster has only a role aux-devs
// connect aux cluster to main cluster
// using trusted clusters, so remote user will be allowed to assume
// role specified by mapping remote role "devs" to local role "local-devs"
auxDevs := "aux-devs"
auxRole, err := services.NewRole(auxDevs, services.RoleSpecV3{
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{username},
},
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = aux.Process.GetAuthServer().UpsertRole(ctx, auxRole)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
trustedClusterToken := "trusted-cluster-token"
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
tokenResource, err := services.NewProvisionToken(trustedClusterToken, []teleport.Role{teleport.RoleTrustedCluster}, time.Time{})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
if test.useLabels {
meta := tokenResource.GetMetadata()
meta.Labels = map[string]string{"access": "prod"}
tokenResource.SetMetadata(meta)
}
err = main.Process.GetAuthServer().UpsertToken(tokenResource)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Note that the mapping omits admins role, this is to cover the scenario
// when root cluster and leaf clusters have different role sets
trustedCluster := main.Secrets.AsTrustedCluster(trustedClusterToken, services.RoleMap{
{Remote: mainDevs, Local: []string{auxDevs}},
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
{Remote: mainOps, Local: []string{auxDevs}},
})
// modify trusted cluster resource name so it would not
// match the cluster name to check that it does not matter
trustedCluster.SetName(main.Secrets.SiteName + "-cluster")
c.Assert(main.Start(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(aux.Start(), check.IsNil)
err = trustedCluster.CheckAndSetDefaults()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// try and upsert a trusted cluster
tryCreateTrustedCluster(c, aux.Process.GetAuthServer(), trustedCluster)
nodePorts := s.getPorts(3)
sshPort, proxyWebPort, proxySSHPort := nodePorts[0], nodePorts[1], nodePorts[2]
c.Assert(aux.StartNodeAndProxy("aux-node", sshPort, proxyWebPort, proxySSHPort), check.IsNil)
// wait for both sites to see each other via their reverse tunnels (for up to 10 seconds)
abortTime := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 10)
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
for len(checkGetClusters(c, main.Tunnel)) < 2 && len(checkGetClusters(c, aux.Tunnel)) < 2 {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 2000)
if time.Now().After(abortTime) {
c.Fatalf("two clusters do not see each other: tunnels are not working")
}
}
cmd := []string{"echo", "hello world"}
// Try and connect to a node in the Aux cluster from the Main cluster using
// direct dialing.
creds, err := GenerateUserCreds(UserCredsRequest{
Process: main.Process,
Username: username,
RouteToCluster: clusterAux,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
tc, err := main.NewClientWithCreds(ClientConfig{
Login: username,
Cluster: clusterAux,
Host: Loopback,
Port: sshPort,
JumpHost: test.useJumpHost,
}, *creds)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// tell the client to trust aux cluster CAs (from secrets). this is the
// equivalent of 'known hosts' in openssh
auxCAS := aux.Secrets.GetCAs()
for i := range auxCAS {
err = tc.AddTrustedCA(auxCAS[i])
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
}
output := &bytes.Buffer{}
tc.Stdout = output
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 50)
err = tc.SSH(ctx, cmd, false)
if err == nil {
break
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(output.String(), check.Equals, "hello world\n")
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
// Try and connect to a node in the Aux cluster from the Main cluster using
// direct dialing as ops user
opsCreds, err := GenerateUserCreds(UserCredsRequest{
Process: main.Process,
Username: mainOps,
RouteToCluster: clusterAux,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
opsClient, err := main.NewClientWithCreds(ClientConfig{
Login: username,
Cluster: clusterAux,
Host: Loopback,
Port: sshPort,
JumpHost: test.useJumpHost,
}, *opsCreds)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// tell the client to trust aux cluster CAs (from secrets). this is the
// equivalent of 'known hosts' in openssh
auxCAS = aux.Secrets.GetCAs()
for _, ca := range auxCAS {
err = opsClient.AddTrustedCA(ca)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
}
opsClient.Stdout = &bytes.Buffer{}
err = opsClient.SSH(ctx, cmd, false)
// verify that ops user can not access the cluster
fixtures.ExpectNotFound(c, err)
// ListNodes expect labels as a value of host
tc.Host = ""
servers, err := tc.ListNodes(ctx)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(servers, check.HasLen, 2)
tc.Host = Loopback
// check that remote cluster has been provisioned
remoteClusters, err := main.Process.GetAuthServer().GetRemoteClusters()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(remoteClusters, check.HasLen, 1)
c.Assert(remoteClusters[0].GetName(), check.Equals, clusterAux)
// after removing the remote cluster, the connection will start failing
err = main.Process.GetAuthServer().DeleteRemoteCluster(clusterAux)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 50)
err = tc.SSH(ctx, cmd, false)
if err != nil {
break
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.NotNil, check.Commentf("expected tunnel to close and SSH client to start failing"))
// remove trusted cluster from aux cluster side, and recrete right after
// this should re-establish connection
err = aux.Process.GetAuthServer().DeleteTrustedCluster(ctx, trustedCluster.GetName())
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
_, err = aux.Process.GetAuthServer().UpsertTrustedCluster(ctx, trustedCluster)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// check that remote cluster has been re-provisioned
remoteClusters, err = main.Process.GetAuthServer().GetRemoteClusters()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(remoteClusters, check.HasLen, 1)
c.Assert(remoteClusters[0].GetName(), check.Equals, clusterAux)
// wait for both sites to see each other via their reverse tunnels (for up to 10 seconds)
abortTime = time.Now().Add(time.Second * 10)
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
for len(checkGetClusters(c, main.Tunnel)) < 2 {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 2000)
if time.Now().After(abortTime) {
c.Fatalf("two clusters do not see each other: tunnels are not working")
}
}
// connection and client should recover and work again
output = &bytes.Buffer{}
tc.Stdout = output
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 50)
err = tc.SSH(ctx, cmd, false)
if err == nil {
break
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(output.String(), check.Equals, "hello world\n")
// stop clusters and remaining nodes
c.Assert(main.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(aux.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
}
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
func checkGetClusters(c *check.C, tun reversetunnel.Server) []reversetunnel.RemoteSite {
clusters, err := tun.GetSites()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
return clusters
}
func (s *IntSuite) TestTrustedTunnelNode(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
ctx := context.Background()
username := s.me.Username
clusterMain := "cluster-main"
clusterAux := "cluster-aux"
main := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, clusterMain)
aux := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, clusterAux)
// main cluster has a local user and belongs to role "main-devs"
mainDevs := "main-devs"
role, err := services.NewRole(mainDevs, services.RoleSpecV3{
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{username},
},
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
main.AddUserWithRole(username, role)
// for role mapping test we turn on Web API on the main cluster
// as it's used
makeConfig := func(enableSSH bool) ([]*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = false
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.SSH.Enabled = enableSSH
return nil, tconf
}
lib.SetInsecureDevMode(true)
defer lib.SetInsecureDevMode(false)
c.Assert(main.CreateEx(makeConfig(false)), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(aux.CreateEx(makeConfig(true)), check.IsNil)
// auxiliary cluster has a role aux-devs
// connect aux cluster to main cluster
// using trusted clusters, so remote user will be allowed to assume
// role specified by mapping remote role "devs" to local role "local-devs"
auxDevs := "aux-devs"
role, err = services.NewRole(auxDevs, services.RoleSpecV3{
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{username},
},
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = aux.Process.GetAuthServer().UpsertRole(ctx, role)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
trustedClusterToken := "trusted-cluster-token"
err = main.Process.GetAuthServer().UpsertToken(
services.MustCreateProvisionToken(trustedClusterToken, []teleport.Role{teleport.RoleTrustedCluster}, time.Time{}))
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
trustedCluster := main.Secrets.AsTrustedCluster(trustedClusterToken, services.RoleMap{
{Remote: mainDevs, Local: []string{auxDevs}},
})
// modify trusted cluster resource name so it would not
// match the cluster name to check that it does not matter
trustedCluster.SetName(main.Secrets.SiteName + "-cluster")
c.Assert(main.Start(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(aux.Start(), check.IsNil)
err = trustedCluster.CheckAndSetDefaults()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// try and upsert a trusted cluster
tryCreateTrustedCluster(c, aux.Process.GetAuthServer(), trustedCluster)
// Create a Teleport instance with a node that dials back to the aux cluster.
tunnelNodeHostname := "cluster-aux-node"
nodeConfig := func() *service.Config {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Hostname = tunnelNodeHostname
tconf.Token = "token"
tconf.AuthServers = []utils.NetAddr{
{
AddrNetwork: "tcp",
Addr: net.JoinHostPort(Loopback, aux.GetPortWeb()),
},
}
tconf.Auth.Enabled = false
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = false
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
return tconf
}
_, err = aux.StartNode(nodeConfig())
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait for both sites to see each other via their reverse tunnels (for up to 10 seconds)
abortTime := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 10)
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
for len(checkGetClusters(c, main.Tunnel)) < 2 && len(checkGetClusters(c, aux.Tunnel)) < 2 {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 2000)
if time.Now().After(abortTime) {
c.Fatalf("two clusters do not see each other: tunnels are not working")
}
}
// Wait for both nodes to show up before attempting to dial to them.
err = waitForNodeCount(main, clusterAux, 2)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
cmd := []string{"echo", "hello world"}
// Try and connect to a node in the Aux cluster from the Main cluster using
// direct dialing.
tc, err := main.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: username,
Cluster: clusterAux,
Host: Loopback,
Port: aux.GetPortSSHInt(),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
output := &bytes.Buffer{}
tc.Stdout = output
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 50)
err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), cmd, false)
if err == nil {
break
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(output.String(), check.Equals, "hello world\n")
// Try and connect to a node in the Aux cluster from the Main cluster using
// tunnel dialing.
tunnelClient, err := main.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: username,
Cluster: clusterAux,
Host: tunnelNodeHostname,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
tunnelOutput := &bytes.Buffer{}
tunnelClient.Stdout = tunnelOutput
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 50)
err = tunnelClient.SSH(context.Background(), cmd, false)
if err == nil {
break
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(tunnelOutput.String(), check.Equals, "hello world\n")
// Stop clusters and remaining nodes.
c.Assert(main.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(aux.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
}
// TestDiscoveryRecovers ensures that discovery protocol recovers from a bad discovery
// state (all known proxies are offline).
func (s *IntSuite) TestDiscoveryRecovers(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
username := s.me.Username
// create load balancer for main cluster proxies
frontend := *utils.MustParseAddr(net.JoinHostPort(Loopback, strconv.Itoa(s.getPorts(1)[0])))
lb, err := utils.NewLoadBalancer(context.TODO(), frontend)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(lb.Listen(), check.IsNil)
go lb.Serve()
defer lb.Close()
remote := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, "cluster-remote")
main := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, "cluster-main")
remote.AddUser(username, []string{username})
main.AddUser(username, []string{username})
c.Assert(main.Create(remote.Secrets.AsSlice(), false, nil), check.IsNil)
mainSecrets := main.Secrets
// switch listen address of the main cluster to load balancer
mainProxyAddr := *utils.MustParseAddr(mainSecrets.ListenAddr)
lb.AddBackend(mainProxyAddr)
mainSecrets.ListenAddr = frontend.String()
c.Assert(remote.Create(mainSecrets.AsSlice(), true, nil), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(main.Start(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(remote.Start(), check.IsNil)
// wait for both sites to see each other via their reverse tunnels (for up to 10 seconds)
abortTime := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 10)
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
for len(checkGetClusters(c, main.Tunnel)) < 2 && len(checkGetClusters(c, remote.Tunnel)) < 2 {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 2000)
if time.Now().After(abortTime) {
c.Fatalf("two clusters do not see each other: tunnels are not working")
}
}
// Helper function for adding a new proxy to "main".
addNewMainProxy := func(name string) (reversetunnel.Server, ProxyConfig) {
c.Logf("adding main proxy %q...", name)
nodePorts := s.getPorts(3)
proxyReverseTunnelPort, proxyWebPort, proxySSHPort := nodePorts[0], nodePorts[1], nodePorts[2]
newConfig := ProxyConfig{
Name: name,
SSHPort: proxySSHPort,
WebPort: proxyWebPort,
ReverseTunnelPort: proxyReverseTunnelPort,
}
newProxy, err := main.StartProxy(newConfig)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// add proxy as a backend to the load balancer
lb.AddBackend(*utils.MustParseAddr(net.JoinHostPort(Loopback, strconv.Itoa(proxyReverseTunnelPort))))
return newProxy, newConfig
}
killMainProxy := func(name string) {
c.Logf("killing main proxy %q...", name)
for _, p := range main.Nodes {
if !p.Config.Proxy.Enabled {
continue
}
if p.Config.Hostname == name {
reverseTunnelPort := utils.MustParseAddr(p.Config.Proxy.ReverseTunnelListenAddr.Addr).Port(0)
c.Assert(lb.RemoveBackend(*utils.MustParseAddr(net.JoinHostPort(Loopback, strconv.Itoa(reverseTunnelPort)))), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(p.Close(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(p.Wait(), check.IsNil)
return
}
}
c.Errorf("cannot close proxy %q (not found)", name)
}
// Helper function for testing that a proxy in main has been discovered by
// (and is able to use reverse tunnel into) remote. If conf is nil, main's
// first/default proxy will be called.
testProxyConn := func(conf *ProxyConfig, shouldFail bool) {
clientConf := ClientConfig{
Login: username,
Cluster: "cluster-remote",
Host: Loopback,
Port: remote.GetPortSSHInt(),
Proxy: conf,
}
output, err := runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, clientConf, 10)
cmt := check.Commentf("testProxyConn(conf=%+v,shouldFail=%v)", conf, shouldFail)
if shouldFail {
c.Assert(err, check.NotNil, cmt)
} else {
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil, cmt)
c.Assert(output, check.Equals, "hello world\n")
}
}
// ensure that initial proxy's tunnel has been established
waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, main.Tunnel, "cluster-remote", 1)
// execute the connection via initial proxy; should not fail
testProxyConn(nil, false)
// helper funcion for making numbered proxy names
pname := func(n int) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("cluster-main-proxy-%d", n)
}
// create first numbered proxy
_, c0 := addNewMainProxy(pname(0))
// check that we now have two tunnel connections
c.Assert(waitForProxyCount(remote, "cluster-main", 2), check.IsNil)
// check that first numbered proxy is OK.
testProxyConn(&c0, false)
// remove the initial proxy.
c.Assert(lb.RemoveBackend(mainProxyAddr), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(waitForProxyCount(remote, "cluster-main", 1), check.IsNil)
// force bad state by iteratively removing previous proxy before
// adding next proxy; this ensures that discovery protocol's list of
// known proxies is all invalid.
for i := 0; i < 6; i++ {
prev, next := pname(i), pname(i+1)
killMainProxy(prev)
c.Assert(waitForProxyCount(remote, "cluster-main", 0), check.IsNil)
_, cn := addNewMainProxy(next)
c.Assert(waitForProxyCount(remote, "cluster-main", 1), check.IsNil)
testProxyConn(&cn, false)
}
// Stop both clusters and remaining nodes.
c.Assert(remote.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(main.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
}
2017-10-11 23:36:25 +00:00
// TestDiscovery tests case for multiple proxies and a reverse tunnel
// agent that eventually connnects to the the right proxy
func (s *IntSuite) TestDiscovery(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
2017-10-11 23:36:25 +00:00
username := s.me.Username
2017-10-12 17:35:46 +00:00
// create load balancer for main cluster proxies
frontend := *utils.MustParseAddr(net.JoinHostPort(Loopback, strconv.Itoa(s.getPorts(1)[0])))
2017-10-12 17:35:46 +00:00
lb, err := utils.NewLoadBalancer(context.TODO(), frontend)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(lb.Listen(), check.IsNil)
2017-10-12 23:51:18 +00:00
go lb.Serve()
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defer lb.Close()
2017-10-11 23:36:25 +00:00
remote := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, "cluster-remote")
main := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, "cluster-main")
2017-10-11 23:36:25 +00:00
2017-10-12 17:35:46 +00:00
remote.AddUser(username, []string{username})
main.AddUser(username, []string{username})
2017-10-11 23:36:25 +00:00
2017-10-12 17:35:46 +00:00
c.Assert(main.Create(remote.Secrets.AsSlice(), false, nil), check.IsNil)
mainSecrets := main.Secrets
// switch listen address of the main cluster to load balancer
2017-10-12 23:51:18 +00:00
mainProxyAddr := *utils.MustParseAddr(mainSecrets.ListenAddr)
lb.AddBackend(mainProxyAddr)
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mainSecrets.ListenAddr = frontend.String()
c.Assert(remote.Create(mainSecrets.AsSlice(), true, nil), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(main.Start(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(remote.Start(), check.IsNil)
2017-10-11 23:36:25 +00:00
// wait for both sites to see each other via their reverse tunnels (for up to 10 seconds)
abortTime := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 10)
Add cluster labels Fixes #3604 This commit adds support for cluster_labels role parameter limiting access to remote clusters by label. New tctl update rc provides interface to set labels on remote clusters. Consider two clusers, `one` - root and `remote` - leaf. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online two online ``` Create the trusted cluster join token with labels: ```bash $ tctl tokens add --type=trusted_cluster --labels=env=prod ``` Every cluster joined using this token will inherit env:prod labels. Alternatively, update remote cluster labels by modifying `rc` command. Letting remote clusters to propagate their labels creates a problem of rogue clusters updating their labels to bad values. Instead, administrator of root cluster control the labels using remote clusters API without fear of override: ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" version: v3 ``` ```bash $ tctl update rc/two --set-labels=env=prod cluster two has been updated ``` ```bash $ tctl get rc kind: remote_cluster metadata: labels: env: prod name: two status: connection: online last_heartbeat: "2020-09-14T03:13:59.35518164Z" ``` Update the role to deny access to prod env: ```yaml kind: role metadata: name: dev spec: allow: logins: [root] node_labels: '*': '*' # Cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. If no role in the role set is using labels and cluster is not labeled, # the cluster labels check is not applied. Otherwise, cluster labels are always enforced. # This makes the feature backwards-compatible. cluster_labels: 'env': 'staging' deny: # cluster labels control what clusters user can connect to. The wildcard ('*') means # any cluster. By default none is set in deny rules to preserve backwards compatibility cluster_labels: 'env': 'prod' ``` ```bash $ tctl create -f dev.yaml ``` Cluster two is now invisible to user with `dev` role. ```bash $ tsh clusters Cluster Name Status ------------ ------ one online ```
2020-09-14 02:48:13 +00:00
for len(checkGetClusters(c, main.Tunnel)) < 2 && len(checkGetClusters(c, remote.Tunnel)) < 2 {
2017-10-11 23:36:25 +00:00
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 2000)
if time.Now().After(abortTime) {
c.Fatalf("two clusters do not see each other: tunnels are not working")
}
}
2017-10-12 17:35:46 +00:00
// start second proxy
nodePorts := s.getPorts(3)
proxyReverseTunnelPort, proxyWebPort, proxySSHPort := nodePorts[0], nodePorts[1], nodePorts[2]
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proxyConfig := ProxyConfig{
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Name: "cluster-main-proxy",
SSHPort: proxySSHPort,
WebPort: proxyWebPort,
ReverseTunnelPort: proxyReverseTunnelPort,
2017-10-12 23:51:18 +00:00
}
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
secondProxy, err := main.StartProxy(proxyConfig)
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c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// add second proxy as a backend to the load balancer
lb.AddBackend(*utils.MustParseAddr(net.JoinHostPort(Loopback, strconv.Itoa(proxyReverseTunnelPort))))
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// At this point the main cluster should observe two tunnels
// connected to it from remote cluster
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waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, main.Tunnel, "cluster-remote", 1)
waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, secondProxy, "cluster-remote", 1)
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// execute the connection via first proxy
cfg := ClientConfig{
Login: username,
Cluster: "cluster-remote",
Host: Loopback,
Port: remote.GetPortSSHInt(),
}
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output, err := runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfg, 1)
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c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
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c.Assert(output, check.Equals, "hello world\n")
// Execute the connection via second proxy, should work. This command is
// tried 10 times with 250 millisecond delay between each attempt to allow
// the discovery request to be received and the connection added to the agent
// pool.
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cfgProxy := ClientConfig{
Login: username,
Cluster: "cluster-remote",
Host: Loopback,
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Port: remote.GetPortSSHInt(),
Proxy: &proxyConfig,
}
output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfgProxy, 10)
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c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
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c.Assert(output, check.Equals, "hello world\n")
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// Now disconnect the main proxy and make sure it will reconnect eventually.
c.Assert(lb.RemoveBackend(mainProxyAddr), check.IsNil)
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waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, secondProxy, "cluster-remote", 1)
2017-10-12 23:51:18 +00:00
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
// Requests going via main proxy should fail.
Fix staticcheck findings in integration/ and tool/ Original finding list: ``` tool/tctl/common/node_command.go:163:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(out)) ^ tool/tctl/common/status_command.go:110:2: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(view()) ^ tool/tctl/common/status_command.go:126:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(view()) ^ tool/tctl/common/token_command.go:201:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(tokensView()) ^ tool/tctl/common/token_command.go:207:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(data)) ^ tool/tctl/common/user_command.go:248:2: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(out)) ^ tool/tctl/common/user_command.go:294:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(out)) ^ integration/helpers.go:200:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) cryptoPubKey, err := sshutils.CryptoPublicKey(cfg.Pub) ^ integration/helpers.go:399:3: SA4006: this value of `roles` is never used (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/helpers.go:597:4: SA4006: this value of `roles` is never used (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/helpers.go:599:4: SA4006: this value of `roles` is never used (staticcheck) roles = user.Roles ^ integration/integration_test.go:1625:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) adminsRole, err := services.NewRole(mainAdmins, services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/integration_test.go:2185:2: SA4006: this value of `output` is never used (staticcheck) output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfg, 1) ^ integration/integration_test.go:2340:2: SA4006: this value of `output` is never used (staticcheck) output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfgProxy, 1) ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:154:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:321:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:366:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:386:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) pods, err := s.CoreV1().Pods(kubeSystemNamespace).List(metav1.ListOptions{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:465:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) mainRole, err := services.NewRole("main-kube", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:579:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) pods, err := proxyClient.CoreV1().Pods(kubeSystemNamespace).List(metav1.ListOptions{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:727:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) mainRole, err := services.NewRole("main-kube", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:840:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) pods, err := proxyClient.CoreV1().Pods(kubeSystemNamespace).List(metav1.ListOptions{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:1008:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ tool/teleport/common/teleport_test.go:83:2: SA4006: this value of `cmd` is never used (staticcheck) cmd, conf := Run(Options{ ^ tool/teleport/common/teleport_test.go:91:2: SA4006: this value of `cmd` is never used (staticcheck) cmd, conf = Run(Options{ ^ tool/tsh/tsh.go:170:2: SA4006: this value of `cmdLine` is never used (staticcheck) cmdLine := []string{} ^ integration/helpers.go:399:11: SA4010: this result of append is never used, except maybe in other appends (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/helpers.go:597:12: SA4010: this result of append is never used, except maybe in other appends (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/integration_test.go:1092:7: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(b.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(b.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/integration_test.go:1426:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/integration_test.go:1691:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/integration_test.go:1895:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:548:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:814:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ ```
2020-04-27 17:39:58 +00:00
_, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfg, 1)
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c.Assert(err, check.NotNil)
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// Requests going via second proxy should succeed.
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output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfgProxy, 1)
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c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
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c.Assert(output, check.Equals, "hello world\n")
// Connect the main proxy back and make sure agents have reconnected over time.
// This command is tried 10 times with 250 millisecond delay between each
// attempt to allow the discovery request to be received and the connection
// added to the agent pool.
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lb.AddBackend(mainProxyAddr)
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// Once the proxy is added a matching tunnel connection should be created.
waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, main.Tunnel, "cluster-remote", 1)
waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, secondProxy, "cluster-remote", 1)
// Requests going via main proxy should succeed.
Events and GRPC API This commit introduces several key changes to Teleport backend and API infrastructure in order to achieve scalability improvements on 10K+ node deployments. Events and plain keyspace -------------------------- New backend interface supports events, pagination and range queries and moves away from buckets to plain keyspace, what better aligns with DynamoDB and Etcd featuring similar interfaces. All backend implementations are exposing Events API, allowing multiple subscribers to consume the same event stream and avoid polling database. Replacing BoltDB, Dir with SQLite ------------------------------- BoltDB backend does not support having two processes access the database at the same time. This prevented Teleport using BoltDB backend to be live reloaded. SQLite supports reads/writes by multiple processes and makes Dir backend obsolete as SQLite is more efficient on larger collections, supports transactions and can detect data corruption. Teleport automatically migrates data from Bolt and Dir backends into SQLite. GRPC API and protobuf resources ------------------------------- GRPC API has been introduced for the auth server. The auth server now serves both GRPC and JSON-HTTP API on the same TLS socket and uses the same client certificate authentication. All future API methods should use GRPC and HTTP-JSON API is considered obsolete. In addition to that some resources like Server and CertificateAuthority are now generated from protobuf service specifications in a way that is fully backward compatible with original JSON spec and schema, so the same resource can be encoded and decoded from JSON, YAML and protobuf. All models should be refactored into new proto specification over time. Streaming presence service -------------------------- In order to cut bandwidth, nodes are sending full updates only when changes to labels or spec have occured, otherwise new light-weight GRPC keep alive updates are sent over to the presence service, reducing bandwidth usage on multi-node deployments. In addition to that nodes are no longer polling auth server for certificate authority rotation updates, instead they subscribe to event updates to detect updates as soon as they happen. This is a new API, so the errors are inevitable, that's why polling is still done, but on a way slower rate.
2018-11-07 23:33:38 +00:00
output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfg, 40)
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c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(output, check.Equals, "hello world\n")
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// Stop one of proxies on the main cluster.
err = main.StopProxy()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Wait for the remote cluster to detect the outbound connection is gone.
c.Assert(waitForProxyCount(remote, "cluster-main", 1), check.IsNil)
// Stop both clusters and remaining nodes.
c.Assert(remote.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
c.Assert(main.StopAll(), check.IsNil)
2017-10-11 23:36:25 +00:00
}
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
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// TestDiscoveryNode makes sure the discovery protocol works with nodes.
func (s *IntSuite) TestDiscoveryNode(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
lib.SetInsecureDevMode(true)
defer lib.SetInsecureDevMode(false)
// Create and start load balancer for proxies.
frontend := *utils.MustParseAddr(net.JoinHostPort(Loopback, strconv.Itoa(s.getPorts(1)[0])))
lb, err := utils.NewLoadBalancer(context.TODO(), frontend)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
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err = lb.Listen()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
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go lb.Serve()
defer lb.Close()
// Create a Teleport instance with Auth/Proxy.
mainConfig := func() (*check.C, []string, []*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
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tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.TunnelPublicAddrs = []utils.NetAddr{
{
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
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AddrNetwork: "tcp",
Addr: frontend.String(),
},
}
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = false
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.SSH.Enabled = false
return c, nil, nil, tconf
}
main := s.newTeleportWithConfig(mainConfig())
defer main.StopAll()
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
// Create a Teleport instance with a Proxy.
nodePorts := s.getPorts(3)
proxyReverseTunnelPort, proxyWebPort, proxySSHPort := nodePorts[0], nodePorts[1], nodePorts[2]
proxyConfig := ProxyConfig{
Name: "cluster-main-proxy",
SSHPort: proxySSHPort,
WebPort: proxyWebPort,
ReverseTunnelPort: proxyReverseTunnelPort,
}
proxyTunnel, err := main.StartProxy(proxyConfig)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
proxyOneBackend := utils.MustParseAddr(net.JoinHostPort(Loopback, main.GetPortReverseTunnel()))
lb.AddBackend(*proxyOneBackend)
proxyTwoBackend := utils.MustParseAddr(net.JoinHostPort(Loopback, strconv.Itoa(proxyReverseTunnelPort)))
lb.AddBackend(*proxyTwoBackend)
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
// Create a Teleport instance with a Node.
nodeConfig := func() *service.Config {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
tconf.Hostname = "cluster-main-node"
tconf.Token = "token"
tconf.AuthServers = []utils.NetAddr{
{
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
AddrNetwork: "tcp",
Addr: net.JoinHostPort(Loopback, main.GetPortWeb()),
},
}
tconf.Auth.Enabled = false
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = false
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
return tconf
}
_, err = main.StartNode(nodeConfig())
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
// Wait for active tunnel connections to be established.
waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, main.Tunnel, Site, 1)
waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, proxyTunnel, Site, 1)
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
// Execute the connection via first proxy.
cfg := ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: "cluster-main-node",
}
output, err := runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfg, 1)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(output, check.Equals, "hello world\n")
// Execute the connection via second proxy, should work. This command is
// tried 10 times with 250 millisecond delay between each attempt to allow
// the discovery request to be received and the connection added to the agent
// pool.
cfgProxy := ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: "cluster-main-node",
Proxy: &proxyConfig,
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
}
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfgProxy, 10)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(output, check.Equals, "hello world\n")
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
// Remove second proxy from LB.
c.Assert(lb.RemoveBackend(*proxyTwoBackend), check.IsNil)
waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, main.Tunnel, Site, 1)
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
// Requests going via main proxy will succeed. Requests going via second
// proxy will fail.
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfg, 1)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(output, check.Equals, "hello world\n")
Fix staticcheck findings in integration/ and tool/ Original finding list: ``` tool/tctl/common/node_command.go:163:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(out)) ^ tool/tctl/common/status_command.go:110:2: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(view()) ^ tool/tctl/common/status_command.go:126:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(view()) ^ tool/tctl/common/token_command.go:201:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(tokensView()) ^ tool/tctl/common/token_command.go:207:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(data)) ^ tool/tctl/common/user_command.go:248:2: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(out)) ^ tool/tctl/common/user_command.go:294:3: SA1006: printf-style function with dynamic format string and no further arguments should use print-style function instead (staticcheck) fmt.Printf(string(out)) ^ integration/helpers.go:200:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) cryptoPubKey, err := sshutils.CryptoPublicKey(cfg.Pub) ^ integration/helpers.go:399:3: SA4006: this value of `roles` is never used (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/helpers.go:597:4: SA4006: this value of `roles` is never used (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/helpers.go:599:4: SA4006: this value of `roles` is never used (staticcheck) roles = user.Roles ^ integration/integration_test.go:1625:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) adminsRole, err := services.NewRole(mainAdmins, services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/integration_test.go:2185:2: SA4006: this value of `output` is never used (staticcheck) output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfg, 1) ^ integration/integration_test.go:2340:2: SA4006: this value of `output` is never used (staticcheck) output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfgProxy, 1) ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:154:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:321:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:366:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:386:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) pods, err := s.CoreV1().Pods(kubeSystemNamespace).List(metav1.ListOptions{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:465:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) mainRole, err := services.NewRole("main-kube", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:579:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) pods, err := proxyClient.CoreV1().Pods(kubeSystemNamespace).List(metav1.ListOptions{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:727:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) mainRole, err := services.NewRole("main-kube", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:840:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) pods, err := proxyClient.CoreV1().Pods(kubeSystemNamespace).List(metav1.ListOptions{ ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:1008:2: SA4006: this value of `err` is never used (staticcheck) role, err := services.NewRole("kubemaster", services.RoleSpecV3{ ^ tool/teleport/common/teleport_test.go:83:2: SA4006: this value of `cmd` is never used (staticcheck) cmd, conf := Run(Options{ ^ tool/teleport/common/teleport_test.go:91:2: SA4006: this value of `cmd` is never used (staticcheck) cmd, conf = Run(Options{ ^ tool/tsh/tsh.go:170:2: SA4006: this value of `cmdLine` is never used (staticcheck) cmdLine := []string{} ^ integration/helpers.go:399:11: SA4010: this result of append is never used, except maybe in other appends (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/helpers.go:597:12: SA4010: this result of append is never used, except maybe in other appends (staticcheck) roles = append(roles, role) ^ integration/integration_test.go:1092:7: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(b.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(b.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/integration_test.go:1426:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/integration_test.go:1691:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/integration_test.go:1895:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:548:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ integration/kube_integration_test.go:814:6: SA4000: identical expressions on the left and right side of the '&&' operator (staticcheck) for len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 && len(main.Tunnel.GetSites()) < 2 { ^ ```
2020-04-27 17:39:58 +00:00
_, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfgProxy, 1)
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
c.Assert(err, check.NotNil)
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
// Add second proxy to LB, both should have a connection.
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
lb.AddBackend(*proxyTwoBackend)
waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, main.Tunnel, Site, 1)
waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c, proxyTunnel, Site, 1)
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
// Requests going via both proxies will succeed.
output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfg, 1)
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(output, check.Equals, "hello world\n")
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
output, err = runCommand(main, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, cfgProxy, 40)
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
c.Assert(output, check.Equals, "hello world\n")
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
// Stop everything.
err = proxyTunnel.Shutdown(context.Background())
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = main.StopAll()
2019-05-09 00:41:52 +00:00
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
Added support for nodes dialing back to cluster. Updated services.ReverseTunnel to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, when a services.ReverseTunnel is created, it's created on the remote side with name /reverseTunnels/example.com. For node types, services.ReverseTunnel is created on the main side as /reverseTunnels/{nodeUUID}.clusterName. Updated services.TunnelConn to support type (proxy or node). For proxy types, which represent trusted cluster connections, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/remote.example.com/{proxyUUID}-remote.example.com. For nodes, tunnel connections are created on the main side under /tunnelConnections/example.com/{proxyUUID}-example.com. This allows searching for tunnel connections by cluster then allows easily creating a set of proxies that are missing matching services.TunnelConn. The reverse tunnel server has been updated to handle heartbeats from proxies as well as nodes. Proxy heartbeat behavior has not changed. Heartbeats from nodes now add remote connections to the matching local site. In addition, the reverse tunnel server now proxies connection to the Auth Server for requests that are already authenticated (a second authentication to the Auth Server is required). For registration, nodes try and connect to the Auth Server to fetch host credentials. Upon failure, nodes now try and fallback to fetching host credentials from the web proxy. To establish a connection to an Auth Server, nodes first try and connect directly, and if the connection fails, fallback to obtaining a connection to the Auth Server through the reverse tunnel. If a connection is established directly, node startup behavior has not changed. If a node establishes a connection through the reverse tunnel, it creates an AgentPool that attempts to dial back to the cluster and establish a reverse tunnel. When nodes heartbeat, they also heartbeat if they are connected directly to the cluster or through a reverse tunnel. For nodes that are connected through a reverse tunnel, the proxy subsystem now directs the reverse tunnel server to establish a connection through the reverse tunnel instead of directly. When sending discovery requests, the domain field has been replaced with tunnelID. The tunnelID field is either the cluster name (same as before) for proxies, or {nodeUUID}.example.com for nodes.
2019-04-26 20:51:59 +00:00
}
// waitForActiveTunnelConnections waits for remote cluster to report a minimum number of active connections
func waitForActiveTunnelConnections(c *check.C, tunnel reversetunnel.Server, clusterName string, expectedCount int) {
var lastCount int
var lastErr error
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for i := 0; i < 30; i++ {
cluster, err := tunnel.GetSite(clusterName)
if err != nil {
lastErr = err
continue
}
lastCount = cluster.GetTunnelsCount()
if lastCount >= expectedCount {
return
}
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time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
}
c.Fatalf("Connections count on %v: %v, expected %v, last error: %v", clusterName, lastCount, expectedCount, lastErr)
}
// waitForProxyCount waits a set time for the proxy count in clusterName to
// reach some value.
func waitForProxyCount(t *TeleInstance, clusterName string, count int) error {
var counts map[string]int
start := time.Now()
for time.Since(start) < 17*time.Second {
counts = t.RemoteClusterWatcher.Counts()
if counts[clusterName] == count {
return nil
}
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
}
return trace.BadParameter("proxy count on %v: %v (wanted %v)", clusterName, counts[clusterName], count)
}
// waitForNodeCount waits for a certain number of nodes to show up in the remote site.
func waitForNodeCount(t *TeleInstance, clusterName string, count int) error {
for i := 0; i < 30; i++ {
remoteSite, err := t.Tunnel.GetSite(clusterName)
if err != nil {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
accessPoint, err := remoteSite.CachingAccessPoint()
if err != nil {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
nodes, err := accessPoint.GetNodes(defaults.Namespace)
if err != nil {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
if len(nodes) == count {
return nil
}
time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
}
return trace.BadParameter("did not find %v nodes", count)
}
// waitForTunnelConnections waits for remote tunnels connections
func waitForTunnelConnections(c *check.C, authServer *auth.Server, clusterName string, expectedCount int) {
var conns []services.TunnelConnection
for i := 0; i < 30; i++ {
conns, err := authServer.Presence.GetTunnelConnections(clusterName)
if err != nil {
c.Fatal(err)
}
if len(conns) == expectedCount {
return
}
time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
}
c.Fatalf("proxy count on %v: %v, expected %v", clusterName, len(conns), expectedCount)
}
// TestExternalClient tests if we can connect to a node in a Teleport
// cluster. Both normal and recording proxies are tested.
func (s *IntSuite) TestExternalClient(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
// Only run this test if we have access to the external SSH binary.
_, err := exec.LookPath("ssh")
if err != nil {
c.Skip("Skipping TestExternalClient, no external SSH binary found.")
return
}
var tests = []struct {
inRecordLocation string
inForwardAgent bool
inCommand string
outError bool
outExecOutput string
}{
// Record at the node, forward agent. Will still work even though the agent
// will be rejected by the proxy (agent forwarding request rejection is a
// soft failure).
{
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtNode,
inForwardAgent: true,
inCommand: "echo hello",
outError: false,
outExecOutput: "hello",
},
// Record at the node, don't forward agent, will work. This is the normal
// Teleport mode of operation.
{
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtNode,
inForwardAgent: false,
inCommand: "echo hello",
outError: false,
outExecOutput: "hello",
},
// Record at the proxy, forward agent. Will work.
{
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtProxy,
inForwardAgent: true,
inCommand: "echo hello",
outError: false,
outExecOutput: "hello",
},
// Record at the proxy, don't forward agent, request will fail because
// recording proxy requires an agent.
{
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtProxy,
inForwardAgent: false,
inCommand: "echo hello",
outError: true,
outExecOutput: "",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
// Create a Teleport instance with auth, proxy, and node.
makeConfig := func() (*check.C, []string, []*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: tt.inRecordLocation,
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
return c, nil, nil, tconf
}
t := s.newTeleportWithConfig(makeConfig())
defer t.StopAll()
// Start (and defer close) a agent that runs during this integration test.
teleAgent, socketDirPath, socketPath, err := createAgent(
s.me,
t.Secrets.Users[s.me.Username].Key.Priv,
t.Secrets.Users[s.me.Username].Key.Cert)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer closeAgent(teleAgent, socketDirPath)
// Create a *exec.Cmd that will execute the external SSH command.
execCmd, err := externalSSHCommand(commandOptions{
forwardAgent: tt.inForwardAgent,
socketPath: socketPath,
proxyPort: t.GetPortProxy(),
nodePort: t.GetPortSSH(),
command: tt.inCommand,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Execute SSH command and check the output is what we expect.
output, err := execCmd.Output()
if tt.outError {
c.Assert(err, check.NotNil)
} else {
if err != nil {
// If an *exec.ExitError is returned, parse it and return stderr. If this
// is not done then c.Assert will just print a byte array for the error.
er, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError)
if ok {
c.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %v", string(er.Stderr))
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(strings.TrimSpace(string(output)), check.Equals, tt.outExecOutput)
}
}
}
// TestControlMaster checks if multiple SSH channels can be created over the
// same connection. This is frequently used by tools like Ansible.
func (s *IntSuite) TestControlMaster(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
// Only run this test if we have access to the external SSH binary.
_, err := exec.LookPath("ssh")
if err != nil {
c.Skip("Skipping TestControlMaster, no external SSH binary found.")
return
}
var tests = []struct {
inRecordLocation string
}{
// Run tests when Teleport is recording sessions at the node.
{
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtNode,
},
// Run tests when Teleport is recording sessions at the proxy.
{
inRecordLocation: services.RecordAtProxy,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
controlDir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "teleport-")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer os.RemoveAll(controlDir)
controlPath := filepath.Join(controlDir, "control-path")
// Create a Teleport instance with auth, proxy, and node.
makeConfig := func() (*check.C, []string, []*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: tt.inRecordLocation,
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
return c, nil, nil, tconf
}
t := s.newTeleportWithConfig(makeConfig())
defer t.StopAll()
// Start (and defer close) a agent that runs during this integration test.
teleAgent, socketDirPath, socketPath, err := createAgent(
s.me,
t.Secrets.Users[s.me.Username].Key.Priv,
t.Secrets.Users[s.me.Username].Key.Cert)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer closeAgent(teleAgent, socketDirPath)
// Create and run an exec command twice with the passed in ControlPath. This
// will cause re-use of the connection and creation of two sessions within
// the connection.
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
execCmd, err := externalSSHCommand(commandOptions{
forcePTY: true,
forwardAgent: true,
controlPath: controlPath,
socketPath: socketPath,
proxyPort: t.GetPortProxy(),
nodePort: t.GetPortSSH(),
command: "echo hello",
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Execute SSH command and check the output is what we expect.
output, err := execCmd.Output()
if err != nil {
// If an *exec.ExitError is returned, parse it and return stderr. If this
// is not done then c.Assert will just print a byte array for the error.
er, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError)
if ok {
c.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %v", string(er.Stderr))
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(strings.TrimSpace(string(output)), check.Equals, "hello")
}
}
}
// TestProxyHostKeyCheck uses the forwarding proxy to connect to a server that
// presents a host key instead of a certificate in different configurations
// for the host key checking parameter in services.ClusterConfig.
func (s *IntSuite) TestProxyHostKeyCheck(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
var tests = []struct {
inHostKeyCheck string
outError bool
}{
// disable host key checking, should be able to connect
{
services.HostKeyCheckNo,
false,
},
// enable host key checking, should NOT be able to connect
{
services.HostKeyCheckYes,
true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
hostSigner, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey(s.priv)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// start a ssh server that presents a host key instead of a certificate
nodePort := s.getPorts(1)[0]
sshNode, err := newDiscardServer(Host, nodePort, hostSigner)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = sshNode.Start()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer sshNode.Stop()
// create a teleport instance with auth, proxy, and node
makeConfig := func() (*check.C, []string, []*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: services.RecordAtProxy,
ProxyChecksHostKeys: tt.inHostKeyCheck,
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
return c, nil, nil, tconf
}
t := s.newTeleportWithConfig(makeConfig())
defer t.StopAll()
// create a teleport client and exec a command
clientConfig := ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: Host,
Port: nodePort,
ForwardAgent: true,
}
_, err = runCommand(t, []string{"echo hello"}, clientConfig, 1)
// check if we were able to exec the command or not
if tt.outError {
c.Assert(err, check.NotNil)
} else {
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
}
}
}
// TestAuditOff checks that when session recording has been turned off,
// sessions are not recorded.
func (s *IntSuite) TestAuditOff(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
var err error
// create a teleport instance with auth, proxy, and node
makeConfig := func() (*check.C, []string, []*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: services.RecordOff,
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
return c, nil, nil, tconf
}
t := s.newTeleportWithConfig(makeConfig())
defer t.StopAll()
// get access to a authClient for the cluster
site := t.GetSiteAPI(Site)
c.Assert(site, check.NotNil)
// should have no sessions in it to start with
sessions, _ := site.GetSessions(defaults.Namespace)
c.Assert(len(sessions), check.Equals, 0)
// create interactive session (this goroutine is this user's terminal time)
endCh := make(chan error, 1)
myTerm := NewTerminal(250)
go func() {
cl, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: Host,
Port: t.GetPortSSHInt(),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
cl.Stdout = myTerm
cl.Stdin = myTerm
err = cl.SSH(context.TODO(), []string{}, false)
endCh <- err
}()
// wait until there's a session in there:
for i := 0; len(sessions) == 0; i++ {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 20)
sessions, _ = site.GetSessions(defaults.Namespace)
if i > 100 {
c.Fatalf("Waited %v, but no sessions found", 100*20*time.Millisecond)
return
}
}
session := &sessions[0]
// wait for the user to join this session
for len(session.Parties) == 0 {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 5)
session, err = site.GetSession(defaults.Namespace, sessions[0].ID)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
}
// make sure it's us who joined! :)
c.Assert(session.Parties[0].User, check.Equals, s.me.Username)
// lets type "echo hi" followed by "enter" and then "exit" + "enter":
myTerm.Type("\aecho hi\n\r\aexit\n\r\a")
// wait for session to end
select {
case <-time.After(1 * time.Minute):
c.Fatalf("Timed out waiting for session to end.")
case <-endCh:
}
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// audit log should have the fact that the session occurred recorded in it
sessions, err = site.GetSessions(defaults.Namespace)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(len(sessions), check.Equals, 1)
// however, attempts to read the actual sessions should fail because it was
// not actually recorded
_, err = site.GetSessionChunk(defaults.Namespace, session.ID, 0, events.MaxChunkBytes)
c.Assert(err, check.NotNil)
}
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// TestPAM checks that Teleport PAM integration works correctly. In this case
// that means if the account and session modules return success, the user
// should be allowed to log in. If either the account or session module does
// not return success, the user should not be able to log in.
func (s *IntSuite) TestPAM(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
// Check if TestPAM can run. For PAM tests to run, the binary must have
// been built with PAM support and the system running the tests must have
// libpam installed, and have the policy files installed. This test is
// always run in a container as part of the CI/CD pipeline. To run this
// test locally, install the pam_teleport.so module by running 'sudo make
// install' from the build.assets/pam/ directory. This will install the PAM
// module as well as the policy files.
2018-02-24 01:23:09 +00:00
if !pam.BuildHasPAM() || !pam.SystemHasPAM() || !hasPAMPolicy() {
skipMessage := "Skipping TestPAM: no policy found. To run PAM tests run " +
"'sudo make install' from the build.assets/pam/ directory."
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c.Skip(skipMessage)
}
var tests = []struct {
inEnabled bool
inServiceName string
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inUsePAMAuth bool
2018-02-24 01:23:09 +00:00
outContains []string
}{
// 0 - No PAM support, session should work but no PAM related output.
{
inEnabled: false,
inServiceName: "",
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inUsePAMAuth: true,
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outContains: []string{},
},
// 1 - PAM enabled, module account and session functions return success.
{
inEnabled: true,
inServiceName: "teleport-success",
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inUsePAMAuth: true,
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outContains: []string{
"pam_sm_acct_mgmt OK",
"pam_sm_authenticate OK",
"pam_sm_open_session OK",
"pam_sm_close_session OK",
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},
},
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// 2 - PAM enabled, module account and session functions return success.
{
inEnabled: true,
inServiceName: "teleport-success",
inUsePAMAuth: false,
outContains: []string{
"pam_sm_acct_mgmt OK",
"pam_sm_open_session OK",
"pam_sm_close_session OK",
},
},
// 3 - PAM enabled, module account functions fail.
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{
inEnabled: true,
inServiceName: "teleport-acct-failure",
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inUsePAMAuth: true,
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outContains: []string{},
},
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// 4 - PAM enabled, module session functions fail.
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{
inEnabled: true,
inServiceName: "teleport-session-failure",
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inUsePAMAuth: true,
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outContains: []string{},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
// Create a teleport instance with auth, proxy, and node.
makeConfig := func() (*check.C, []string, []*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
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tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
tconf.SSH.PAM.Enabled = tt.inEnabled
tconf.SSH.PAM.ServiceName = tt.inServiceName
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tconf.SSH.PAM.UsePAMAuth = tt.inUsePAMAuth
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return c, nil, nil, tconf
}
t := s.newTeleportWithConfig(makeConfig())
defer t.StopAll()
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termSession := NewTerminal(250)
// Create an interactive session and write something to the terminal.
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go func() {
cl, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: Host,
Port: t.GetPortSSHInt(),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
cl.Stdout = termSession
cl.Stdin = termSession
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termSession.Type("\aecho hi\n\r\aexit\n\r\a")
err = cl.SSH(context.TODO(), []string{}, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
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cancel()
}()
// Wait for the session to end or timeout after 10 seconds.
select {
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
dumpGoroutineProfile()
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c.Fatalf("Timeout exceeded waiting for session to complete.")
case <-ctx.Done():
}
// If any output is expected, check to make sure it was output.
if len(tt.outContains) > 0 {
for _, expectedOutput := range tt.outContains {
output := termSession.Output(1024)
c.Logf("got output: %q; want output to contain: %q", output, expectedOutput)
c.Assert(strings.Contains(output, expectedOutput), check.Equals, true)
}
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}
}
}
// TestRotateSuccess tests full cycle cert authority rotation
func (s *IntSuite) TestRotateSuccess(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
t := s.newTeleportInstance(c)
defer t.StopAll()
logins := []string{s.me.Username}
for _, login := range logins {
t.AddUser(login, []string{login})
}
tconf := s.rotationConfig(true)
config, err := t.GenerateConfig(nil, tconf)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
serviceC := make(chan *service.TeleportProcess, 20)
runErrCh := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
runErrCh <- service.Run(ctx, *config, func(cfg *service.Config) (service.Process, error) {
svc, err := service.NewTeleport(cfg)
if err == nil {
serviceC <- svc
}
return svc, err
})
}()
svc, err := waitForProcessStart(serviceC)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer svc.Shutdown(context.TODO())
// Setup user in the cluster
err = SetupUser(svc, s.me.Username, nil)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// capture credentials before reload started to simulate old client
initialCreds, err := GenerateUserCreds(UserCredsRequest{Process: svc, Username: s.me.Username})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Service started. Setting rotation state to %v", services.RotationPhaseUpdateClients)
// start rotation
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseInit,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
hostCA, err := svc.GetAuthServer().GetCertAuthority(services.CertAuthID{Type: services.HostCA, DomainName: Site}, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Cert authority: %v", auth.CertAuthorityInfo(hostCA))
// wait until service phase update to be broadcasted (init phase does not trigger reload)
err = waitForProcessEvent(svc, service.TeleportPhaseChangeEvent, 10*time.Second)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// update clients
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseUpdateClients,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service reload
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer svc.Shutdown(context.TODO())
cfg := ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Host: Loopback,
Port: t.GetPortSSHInt(),
}
clt, err := t.NewClientWithCreds(cfg, *initialCreds)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// client works as is before servers have been rotated
err = runAndMatch(clt, 8, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, ".*hello world.*")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Service reloaded. Setting rotation state to %v", services.RotationPhaseUpdateServers)
// move to the next phase
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseUpdateServers,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
hostCA, err = svc.GetAuthServer().GetCertAuthority(services.CertAuthID{Type: services.HostCA, DomainName: Site}, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Cert authority: %v", auth.CertAuthorityInfo(hostCA))
// wait until service reloaded
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer svc.Shutdown(context.TODO())
// new credentials will work from this phase to others
newCreds, err := GenerateUserCreds(UserCredsRequest{Process: svc, Username: s.me.Username})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
clt, err = t.NewClientWithCreds(cfg, *newCreds)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// new client works
err = runAndMatch(clt, 8, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, ".*hello world.*")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Service reloaded. Setting rotation state to %v.", services.RotationPhaseStandby)
// complete rotation
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseStandby,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
hostCA, err = svc.GetAuthServer().GetCertAuthority(services.CertAuthID{Type: services.HostCA, DomainName: Site}, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Cert authority: %v", auth.CertAuthorityInfo(hostCA))
// wait until service reloaded
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer svc.Shutdown(context.TODO())
// new client still works
err = runAndMatch(clt, 8, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, ".*hello world.*")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Service reloaded. Rotation has completed. Shuttting down service.")
// shut down the service
cancel()
// close the service without waiting for the connections to drain
svc.Close()
select {
case err := <-runErrCh:
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
case <-time.After(20 * time.Second):
c.Fatalf("failed to shut down the server")
}
}
// TestRotateRollback tests cert authority rollback
func (s *IntSuite) TestRotateRollback(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
tconf := s.rotationConfig(true)
t := s.newTeleportInstance(c)
logins := []string{s.me.Username}
for _, login := range logins {
t.AddUser(login, []string{login})
}
config, err := t.GenerateConfig(nil, tconf)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
serviceC := make(chan *service.TeleportProcess, 20)
runErrCh := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
runErrCh <- service.Run(ctx, *config, func(cfg *service.Config) (service.Process, error) {
svc, err := service.NewTeleport(cfg)
if err == nil {
serviceC <- svc
}
return svc, err
})
}()
svc, err := waitForProcessStart(serviceC)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Setup user in the cluster
err = SetupUser(svc, s.me.Username, nil)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// capture credentials before reload started to simulate old client
initialCreds, err := GenerateUserCreds(UserCredsRequest{Process: svc, Username: s.me.Username})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Service started. Setting rotation state to %q.", services.RotationPhaseInit)
// start rotation
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseInit,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = waitForProcessEvent(svc, service.TeleportPhaseChangeEvent, 10*time.Second)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Setting rotation state to %q.", services.RotationPhaseUpdateClients)
// start rotation
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseUpdateClients,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service reload
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
cfg := ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Host: Loopback,
Port: t.GetPortSSHInt(),
}
clt, err := t.NewClientWithCreds(cfg, *initialCreds)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// client works as is before servers have been rotated
err = runAndMatch(clt, 8, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, ".*hello world.*")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Service reloaded. Setting rotation state to %q.", services.RotationPhaseUpdateServers)
// move to the next phase
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseUpdateServers,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service reloaded
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Service reloaded. Setting rotation state to %q.", services.RotationPhaseRollback)
// complete rotation
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseRollback,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service reloaded
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// old client works
err = runAndMatch(clt, 8, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, ".*hello world.*")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Log("Service reloaded. Rotation has completed. Shuttting down service.")
// shut down the service
cancel()
// close the service without waiting for the connections to drain
svc.Close()
select {
case err := <-runErrCh:
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
case <-time.After(20 * time.Second):
c.Fatalf("failed to shut down the server")
}
}
// TestRotateTrustedClusters tests CA rotation support for trusted clusters
func (s *IntSuite) TestRotateTrustedClusters(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
clusterMain := "rotate-main"
clusterAux := "rotate-aux"
tconf := s.rotationConfig(false)
main := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, clusterMain)
aux := s.newNamedTeleportInstance(c, clusterAux)
logins := []string{s.me.Username}
for _, login := range logins {
main.AddUser(login, []string{login})
}
config, err := main.GenerateConfig(nil, tconf)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
serviceC := make(chan *service.TeleportProcess, 20)
runErrCh := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
runErrCh <- service.Run(ctx, *config, func(cfg *service.Config) (service.Process, error) {
svc, err := service.NewTeleport(cfg)
if err == nil {
serviceC <- svc
}
return svc, err
})
}()
svc, err := waitForProcessStart(serviceC)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// main cluster has a local user and belongs to role "main-devs"
mainDevs := "main-devs"
role, err := services.NewRole(mainDevs, services.RoleSpecV3{
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{s.me.Username},
},
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = SetupUser(svc, s.me.Username, []services.Role{role})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
2018-11-15 19:14:20 +00:00
// create auxiliary cluster and setup trust
c.Assert(aux.CreateEx(nil, s.rotationConfig(false)), check.IsNil)
// auxiliary cluster has a role aux-devs
// connect aux cluster to main cluster
// using trusted clusters, so remote user will be allowed to assume
// role specified by mapping remote role "devs" to local role "local-devs"
auxDevs := "aux-devs"
role, err = services.NewRole(auxDevs, services.RoleSpecV3{
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{s.me.Username},
},
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = aux.Process.GetAuthServer().UpsertRole(ctx, role)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
trustedClusterToken := "trusted-clsuter-token"
err = svc.GetAuthServer().UpsertToken(
services.MustCreateProvisionToken(trustedClusterToken, []teleport.Role{teleport.RoleTrustedCluster}, time.Time{}))
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
trustedCluster := main.Secrets.AsTrustedCluster(trustedClusterToken, services.RoleMap{
{Remote: mainDevs, Local: []string{auxDevs}},
})
c.Assert(aux.Start(), check.IsNil)
// try and upsert a trusted cluster
lib.SetInsecureDevMode(true)
defer lib.SetInsecureDevMode(false)
tryCreateTrustedCluster(c, aux.Process.GetAuthServer(), trustedCluster)
waitForTunnelConnections(c, svc.GetAuthServer(), aux.Secrets.SiteName, 1)
// capture credentials before has reload started to simulate old client
initialCreds, err := GenerateUserCreds(UserCredsRequest{
Process: svc,
Username: s.me.Username,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// credentials should work
cfg := ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Host: Loopback,
Cluster: clusterAux,
Port: aux.GetPortSSHInt(),
}
clt, err := main.NewClientWithCreds(cfg, *initialCreds)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = runAndMatch(clt, 8, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, ".*hello world.*")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Setting rotation state to %v", services.RotationPhaseInit)
// start rotation
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseInit,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service phase update to be broadcasted (init phase does not trigger reload)
err = waitForProcessEvent(svc, service.TeleportPhaseChangeEvent, 10*time.Second)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// waitForPhase waits until aux cluster detects the rotation
waitForPhase := func(phase string) error {
var lastPhase string
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
ca, err := aux.Process.GetAuthServer().GetCertAuthority(services.CertAuthID{
Type: services.HostCA,
DomainName: clusterMain,
}, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
if ca.GetRotation().Phase == phase {
return nil
}
lastPhase = ca.GetRotation().Phase
time.Sleep(tconf.PollingPeriod / 2)
}
return trace.CompareFailed("failed to converge to phase %q, last phase %q", phase, lastPhase)
}
err = waitForPhase(services.RotationPhaseInit)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// update clients
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseUpdateClients,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service reloaded
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = waitForPhase(services.RotationPhaseUpdateClients)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// old client should work as is
err = runAndMatch(clt, 8, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, ".*hello world.*")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Service reloaded. Setting rotation state to %v", services.RotationPhaseUpdateServers)
// move to the next phase
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseUpdateServers,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service reloaded
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = waitForPhase(services.RotationPhaseUpdateServers)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// new credentials will work from this phase to others
newCreds, err := GenerateUserCreds(UserCredsRequest{Process: svc, Username: s.me.Username})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
clt, err = main.NewClientWithCreds(cfg, *newCreds)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// new client works
err = runAndMatch(clt, 8, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, ".*hello world.*")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Service reloaded. Setting rotation state to %v.", services.RotationPhaseStandby)
// complete rotation
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseStandby,
Mode: services.RotationModeManual,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service reloaded
c.Log("Waiting for service reload.")
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Log("Service reload completed, waiting for phase.")
err = waitForPhase(services.RotationPhaseStandby)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Log("Phase completed.")
// new client still works
err = runAndMatch(clt, 8, []string{"echo", "hello world"}, ".*hello world.*")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Log("Service reloaded. Rotation has completed. Shuttting down service.")
// shut down the service
cancel()
// close the service without waiting for the connections to drain
svc.Close()
select {
case err := <-runErrCh:
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
case <-time.After(20 * time.Second):
c.Fatalf("failed to shut down the server")
}
}
// TestRotateChangeSigningAlg tests the change of CA signing algorithm on
// manual rotation.
func (s *IntSuite) TestRotateChangeSigningAlg(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
// Start with an instance using default signing alg.
tconf := s.rotationConfig(true)
t := s.newTeleportInstance(c)
logins := []string{s.me.Username}
for _, login := range logins {
t.AddUser(login, []string{login})
}
config, err := t.GenerateConfig(nil, tconf)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
serviceC := make(chan *service.TeleportProcess, 20)
runErrCh := make(chan error, 1)
restart := func(svc *service.TeleportProcess, cancel func()) (*service.TeleportProcess, func()) {
if svc != nil && cancel != nil {
// shut down the service
cancel()
// close the service without waiting for the connections to drain
err := svc.Close()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
err = svc.Wait()
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
select {
case err := <-runErrCh:
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
case <-time.After(20 * time.Second):
c.Fatalf("failed to shut down the server")
}
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go func() {
runErrCh <- service.Run(ctx, *config, func(cfg *service.Config) (service.Process, error) {
svc, err := service.NewTeleport(cfg)
if err == nil {
serviceC <- svc
}
return svc, err
})
}()
svc, err = waitForProcessStart(serviceC)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
return svc, cancel
}
assertSigningAlg := func(svc *service.TeleportProcess, alg string) {
hostCA, err := svc.GetAuthServer().GetCertAuthority(services.CertAuthID{Type: services.HostCA, DomainName: Site}, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(sshutils.GetSigningAlgName(hostCA), check.Equals, alg)
userCA, err := svc.GetAuthServer().GetCertAuthority(services.CertAuthID{Type: services.UserCA, DomainName: Site}, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(sshutils.GetSigningAlgName(userCA), check.Equals, alg)
}
rotate := func(svc *service.TeleportProcess, mode string) *service.TeleportProcess {
c.Logf("Rotation phase: %q.", services.RotationPhaseInit)
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseInit,
Mode: mode,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service phase update to be broadcasted (init phase does not trigger reload)
err = waitForProcessEvent(svc, service.TeleportPhaseChangeEvent, 10*time.Second)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Rotation phase: %q.", services.RotationPhaseUpdateClients)
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseUpdateClients,
Mode: mode,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service reload
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("Rotation phase: %q.", services.RotationPhaseUpdateServers)
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseUpdateServers,
Mode: mode,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service reloaded
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Logf("rotation phase: %q", services.RotationPhaseStandby)
err = svc.GetAuthServer().RotateCertAuthority(auth.RotateRequest{
TargetPhase: services.RotationPhaseStandby,
Mode: mode,
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// wait until service reloaded
svc, err = s.waitForReload(serviceC, svc)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
return svc
}
// Start the instance.
svc, cancel := restart(nil, nil)
c.Log("default signature algorithm due to empty config value")
// Verify the default signing algorithm with config value empty.
assertSigningAlg(svc, defaults.CASignatureAlgorithm)
c.Log("change signature algorithm with custom config value and manual rotation")
// Change the signing algorithm in config file.
signingAlg := ssh.SigAlgoRSA
config.CASignatureAlgorithm = &signingAlg
svc, cancel = restart(svc, cancel)
// Do a manual rotation - this should change the signing algorithm.
svc = rotate(svc, services.RotationModeManual)
assertSigningAlg(svc, ssh.SigAlgoRSA)
c.Log("preserve signature algorithm with empty config value and manual rotation")
// Unset the config value.
config.CASignatureAlgorithm = nil
svc, cancel = restart(svc, cancel)
// Do a manual rotation - this should leave the signing algorithm
// unaffected because config value is not set.
svc = rotate(svc, services.RotationModeManual)
assertSigningAlg(svc, ssh.SigAlgoRSA)
// shut down the service
cancel()
// close the service without waiting for the connections to drain
svc.Close()
select {
case err := <-runErrCh:
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
case <-time.After(20 * time.Second):
c.Fatalf("failed to shut down the server")
}
}
// rotationConfig sets up default config used for CA rotation tests
func (s *IntSuite) rotationConfig(disableWebService bool) *service.Config {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = disableWebService
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.PollingPeriod = 500 * time.Millisecond
tconf.ClientTimeout = time.Second
tconf.ShutdownTimeout = 2 * tconf.ClientTimeout
return tconf
}
// waitForProcessEvent waits for process event to occur or timeout
func waitForProcessEvent(svc *service.TeleportProcess, event string, timeout time.Duration) error {
eventC := make(chan service.Event, 1)
svc.WaitForEvent(context.TODO(), event, eventC)
select {
case <-eventC:
return nil
case <-time.After(timeout):
return trace.BadParameter("timeout waiting for service to broadcast event %v", event)
}
}
// waitForProcessStart is waiting for the process to start
func waitForProcessStart(serviceC chan *service.TeleportProcess) (*service.TeleportProcess, error) {
var svc *service.TeleportProcess
select {
case svc = <-serviceC:
case <-time.After(1 * time.Minute):
dumpGoroutineProfile()
return nil, trace.BadParameter("timeout waiting for service to start")
}
return svc, nil
}
// waitForReload waits for multiple events to happen:
//
// 1. new service to be created and started
// 2. old service, if present to shut down
//
// this helper function allows to serialize tests for reloads.
func (s *IntSuite) waitForReload(serviceC chan *service.TeleportProcess, old *service.TeleportProcess) (*service.TeleportProcess, error) {
var svc *service.TeleportProcess
select {
case svc = <-serviceC:
case <-time.After(1 * time.Minute):
dumpGoroutineProfile()
return nil, trace.BadParameter("timeout waiting for service to start")
}
eventC := make(chan service.Event, 1)
svc.WaitForEvent(context.TODO(), service.TeleportReadyEvent, eventC)
select {
case <-eventC:
case <-time.After(20 * time.Second):
dumpGoroutineProfile()
return nil, trace.BadParameter("timeout waiting for service to broadcast ready status")
}
// if old service is present, wait for it to complete shut down procedure
if old != nil {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.TODO())
go func() {
defer cancel()
old.Supervisor.Wait()
}()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
case <-time.After(1 * time.Minute):
dumpGoroutineProfile()
return nil, trace.BadParameter("timeout waiting for old service to stop")
}
}
return svc, nil
}
// runAndMatch runs command and makes sure it matches the pattern
func runAndMatch(tc *client.TeleportClient, attempts int, command []string, pattern string) error {
output := &bytes.Buffer{}
tc.Stdout = output
var err error
for i := 0; i < attempts; i++ {
err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), command, false)
if err != nil {
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
continue
}
out := output.String()
out = replaceNewlines(out)
matched, _ := regexp.MatchString(pattern, out)
if matched {
return nil
}
err = trace.CompareFailed("output %q did not match pattern %q", out, pattern)
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
}
return err
}
// TestWindowChange checks if custom Teleport window change requests are sent
// when the server side PTY changes its size.
func (s *IntSuite) TestWindowChange(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
t := s.newTeleport(c, nil, true)
defer t.StopAll()
site := t.GetSiteAPI(Site)
c.Assert(site, check.NotNil)
personA := NewTerminal(250)
personB := NewTerminal(250)
// openSession will open a new session on a server.
openSession := func() {
cl, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: Host,
Port: t.GetPortSSHInt(),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
cl.Stdout = personA
cl.Stdin = personA
err = cl.SSH(context.TODO(), []string{}, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
}
// joinSession will join the existing session on a server.
joinSession := func() {
// Find the existing session in the backend.
var sessionID string
for {
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
sessions, _ := site.GetSessions(defaults.Namespace)
if len(sessions) == 0 {
continue
}
sessionID = string(sessions[0].ID)
break
}
cl, err := t.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: Host,
Port: t.GetPortSSHInt(),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
cl.Stdout = personB
cl.Stdin = personB
// Change the size of the window immediately after it is created.
cl.OnShellCreated = func(s *ssh.Session, c *ssh.Client, terminal io.ReadWriteCloser) (exit bool, err error) {
err = s.WindowChange(48, 160)
if err != nil {
return true, trace.Wrap(err)
}
return false, nil
}
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
err = cl.Join(context.TODO(), defaults.Namespace, session.ID(sessionID), personB)
if err == nil {
break
}
}
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
}
// waitForOutput checks that the output of the passed in terminal contains
// one of the strings in `outputs` until some timeout has occurred.
waitForOutput := func(t *Terminal, outputs ...string) error {
tickerCh := time.Tick(500 * time.Millisecond)
timeoutCh := time.After(30 * time.Second)
for {
select {
case <-tickerCh:
out := t.Output(5000)
for _, s := range outputs {
if strings.Contains(out, s) {
return nil
}
}
case <-timeoutCh:
dumpGoroutineProfile()
return trace.BadParameter("timed out waiting for output, last output: %q doesn't contain any of the expected substrings: %q", t.Output(5000), outputs)
}
}
}
// Open session, the initial size will be 80x24.
go openSession()
// Use the "printf" command to print the terminal size on the screen and
// make sure it is 80x25.
personA.Type("\atput cols; tput lines\n\r\a")
err := waitForOutput(personA, "80\r\n25", "80\n\r25", "80\n25")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// As soon as person B joins the session, the terminal is resized to 160x48.
// Have another user join the session. As soon as the second shell is
// created, the window is resized to 160x48 (see joinSession implementation).
go joinSession()
// Use the "printf" command to print the window size again and make sure it's
// 160x48.
personA.Type("\atput cols; tput lines\n\r\a")
err = waitForOutput(personA, "160\r\n48", "160\n\r48", "160\n48")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Close the session.
personA.Type("\aexit\r\n\a")
}
// TestList checks that the list of servers returned is identity aware.
func (s *IntSuite) TestList(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
// Create and start a Teleport cluster with auth, proxy, and node.
makeConfig := func() (*check.C, []string, []*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: services.RecordOff,
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Hostname = "server-01"
tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
tconf.SSH.Labels = map[string]string{
"role": "worker",
}
return c, nil, nil, tconf
}
t := s.newTeleportWithConfig(makeConfig())
defer t.StopAll()
// Create and start a Teleport node.
nodeSSHPort := s.getPorts(1)[0]
nodeConfig := func() *service.Config {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Hostname = "server-02"
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
tconf.SSH.Addr.Addr = net.JoinHostPort(t.Hostname, fmt.Sprintf("%v", nodeSSHPort))
tconf.SSH.Labels = map[string]string{
"role": "database",
}
return tconf
}
_, err := t.StartNode(nodeConfig())
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Get an auth client to the cluster.
clt := t.GetSiteAPI(Site)
c.Assert(clt, check.NotNil)
// Wait 10 seconds for both nodes to show up to make sure they both have
// registered themselves.
waitForNodes := func(clt auth.ClientI, count int) error {
tickCh := time.Tick(500 * time.Millisecond)
stopCh := time.After(10 * time.Second)
for {
select {
case <-tickCh:
nodesInCluster, err := clt.GetNodes(defaults.Namespace, services.SkipValidation())
if err != nil && !trace.IsNotFound(err) {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
if got, want := len(nodesInCluster), count; got == want {
return nil
}
case <-stopCh:
return trace.BadParameter("waited 10s, did find %v nodes", count)
}
}
}
err = waitForNodes(clt, 2)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
var tests = []struct {
inRoleName string
inLabels services.Labels
inLogin string
outNodes []string
}{
// 0 - Role has label "role:worker", only server-01 is returned.
{
inRoleName: "worker-only",
inLogin: "foo",
inLabels: services.Labels{"role": []string{"worker"}},
outNodes: []string{"server-01"},
},
// 1 - Role has label "role:database", only server-02 is returned.
{
inRoleName: "database-only",
inLogin: "bar",
inLabels: services.Labels{"role": []string{"database"}},
outNodes: []string{"server-02"},
},
// 2 - Role has wildcard label, all nodes are returned server-01 and server-2.
{
inRoleName: "worker-and-database",
inLogin: "baz",
inLabels: services.Labels{services.Wildcard: []string{services.Wildcard}},
outNodes: []string{"server-01", "server-02"},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
// Create role with logins and labels for this test.
role, err := services.NewRole(tt.inRoleName, services.RoleSpecV3{
Allow: services.RoleConditions{
Logins: []string{tt.inLogin},
NodeLabels: tt.inLabels,
},
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Create user, role, and generate credentials.
err = SetupUser(t.Process, tt.inLogin, []services.Role{role})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
initialCreds, err := GenerateUserCreds(UserCredsRequest{Process: t.Process, Username: tt.inLogin})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Create a Teleport client.
cfg := ClientConfig{
Login: tt.inLogin,
Port: t.GetPortSSHInt(),
}
userClt, err := t.NewClientWithCreds(cfg, *initialCreds)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Get list of nodes and check that the returned nodes match the
// expected nodes.
nodes, err := userClt.ListNodes(context.Background())
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
for _, node := range nodes {
ok := utils.SliceContainsStr(tt.outNodes, node.GetHostname())
if !ok {
c.Fatalf("Got nodes: %v, want: %v.", nodes, tt.outNodes)
}
}
}
}
// TestCmdLabels verifies the behavior of running commands via labels
// with a mixture of regular and reversetunnel nodes.
func (s *IntSuite) TestCmdLabels(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
// InsecureDevMode needed for IoT node handshake
lib.SetInsecureDevMode(true)
defer lib.SetInsecureDevMode(false)
// Create and start a Teleport cluster with auth, proxy, and node.
makeConfig := func() *service.Config {
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: services.RecordOff,
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Hostname = "server-01"
tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = false
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
tconf.SSH.Labels = map[string]string{
"role": "worker",
"spam": "eggs",
}
return tconf
}
t := s.newTeleportWithConfig(c, nil, nil, makeConfig())
defer t.StopAll()
// Create and start a reversetunnel node.
nodeConfig := func() *service.Config {
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
tconf.Hostname = "server-02"
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
tconf.SSH.Labels = map[string]string{
"role": "database",
"spam": "eggs",
}
return tconf
}
_, err := t.StartReverseTunnelNode(nodeConfig())
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// test label patterns that match both nodes, and each
// node individually.
tts := []struct {
command []string
labels map[string]string
expect string
}{
{
command: []string{"echo", "two"},
labels: map[string]string{"spam": "eggs"},
expect: "two\ntwo\n",
},
{
command: []string{"echo", "worker"},
labels: map[string]string{"role": "worker"},
expect: "worker\n",
},
{
command: []string{"echo", "database"},
labels: map[string]string{"role": "database"},
expect: "database\n",
},
}
for _, tt := range tts {
cfg := ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Labels: tt.labels,
}
output, err := runCommand(t, tt.command, cfg, 1)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
c.Assert(output, check.Equals, tt.expect)
}
}
// TestDataTransfer makes sure that a "session.data" event is emitted at the
// end of a session that matches the amount of data that was transferred.
func (s *IntSuite) TestDataTransfer(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
KB := 1024
MB := 1048576
// Create a Teleport cluster.
main := s.newTeleport(c, nil, true)
defer main.StopAll()
// Create a client to the above Teleport cluster.
clientConfig := ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: Host,
Port: main.GetPortSSHInt(),
}
// Write 1 MB to stdout.
command := []string{"dd", "if=/dev/zero", "bs=1024", "count=1024"}
output, err := runCommand(main, command, clientConfig, 1)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Make sure exactly 1 MB was written to output.
c.Assert(len(output) == MB, check.Equals, true)
// Make sure the session.data event was emitted to the audit log.
eventFields, err := findEventInLog(main, events.SessionDataEvent)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Make sure the audit event shows that 1 MB was written to the output.
c.Assert(eventFields.GetInt(events.DataReceived) > MB, check.Equals, true)
c.Assert(eventFields.GetInt(events.DataTransmitted) > KB, check.Equals, true)
}
func (s *IntSuite) TestBPFInteractive(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
// Check if BPF tests can be run on this host.
err := canTestBPF()
if err != nil {
c.Skip(fmt.Sprintf("Tests for BPF functionality can not be run: %v.", err))
return
}
lsPath, err := exec.LookPath("ls")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
var tests = []struct {
inSessionRecording string
inBPFEnabled bool
outFound bool
}{
// For session recorded at the node, enhanced events should be found.
{
inSessionRecording: services.RecordAtNode,
inBPFEnabled: true,
outFound: true,
},
// For session recorded at the node, but BPF is turned off, no events
// should be found.
{
inSessionRecording: services.RecordAtNode,
inBPFEnabled: false,
outFound: false,
},
// For session recorded at the proxy, enhanced events should not be found.
// BPF turned off simulates an OpenSSH node.
{
inSessionRecording: services.RecordAtProxy,
inBPFEnabled: false,
outFound: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
// Create temporary directory where cgroup2 hierarchy will be mounted.
dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "cgroup-test")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer os.RemoveAll(dir)
// Create and start a Teleport cluster.
makeConfig := func() (*check.C, []string, []*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: tt.inSessionRecording,
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Create default config.
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
// Configure Auth.
tconf.Auth.Preference.SetSecondFactor("off")
tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
// Configure Proxy.
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = false
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
// Configure Node. If session are being recorded at the proxy, don't enable
// BPF to simulate an OpenSSH node.
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
if tt.inBPFEnabled {
tconf.SSH.BPF.Enabled = true
tconf.SSH.BPF.CgroupPath = dir
}
return c, nil, nil, tconf
}
main := s.newTeleportWithConfig(makeConfig())
defer main.StopAll()
// Create a client terminal and context to signal when the client is done
// with the terminal.
term := NewTerminal(250)
doneContext, doneCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
func() {
client, err := main.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: Host,
Port: main.GetPortSSHInt(),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Connect terminal to std{in,out} of client.
client.Stdout = term
client.Stdin = term
// "Type" a command into the terminal.
term.Type(fmt.Sprintf("\a%v\n\r\aexit\n\r\a", lsPath))
err = client.SSH(context.TODO(), []string{}, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Signal that the client has finished the interactive session.
doneCancel()
}()
// Wait 10 seconds for the client to finish up the interactive session.
select {
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
c.Fatalf("Timed out waiting for client to finish interactive session.")
case <-doneContext.Done():
}
// Enhanced events should show up for session recorded at the node but not
// at the proxy.
if tt.outFound {
_, err = findCommandEventInLog(main, events.SessionCommandEvent, lsPath)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
} else {
_, err = findCommandEventInLog(main, events.SessionCommandEvent, lsPath)
c.Assert(err, check.NotNil)
}
}
}
func (s *IntSuite) TestBPFExec(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
// Check if BPF tests can be run on this host.
err := canTestBPF()
if err != nil {
c.Skip(fmt.Sprintf("Tests for BPF functionality can not be run: %v.", err))
return
}
lsPath, err := exec.LookPath("ls")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
var tests = []struct {
inSessionRecording string
inBPFEnabled bool
outFound bool
}{
// For session recorded at the node, enhanced events should be found.
{
inSessionRecording: services.RecordAtNode,
inBPFEnabled: true,
outFound: true,
},
// For session recorded at the node, but BPF is turned off, no events
// should be found.
{
inSessionRecording: services.RecordAtNode,
inBPFEnabled: false,
outFound: false,
},
// For session recorded at the proxy, enhanced events should not be found.
// BPF turned off simulates an OpenSSH node.
{
inSessionRecording: services.RecordAtProxy,
inBPFEnabled: false,
outFound: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
// Create temporary directory where cgroup2 hierarchy will be mounted.
dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "cgroup-test")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer os.RemoveAll(dir)
// Create and start a Teleport cluster.
makeConfig := func() (*check.C, []string, []*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: tt.inSessionRecording,
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Create default config.
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
// Configure Auth.
tconf.Auth.Preference.SetSecondFactor("off")
tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
// Configure Proxy.
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = false
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
// Configure Node. If session are being recorded at the proxy, don't enable
// BPF to simulate an OpenSSH node.
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
if tt.inBPFEnabled {
tconf.SSH.BPF.Enabled = true
tconf.SSH.BPF.CgroupPath = dir
}
return c, nil, nil, tconf
}
main := s.newTeleportWithConfig(makeConfig())
defer main.StopAll()
// Create a client to the above Teleport cluster.
clientConfig := ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: Host,
Port: main.GetPortSSHInt(),
}
// Run exec command.
_, err = runCommand(main, []string{lsPath}, clientConfig, 1)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Enhanced events should show up for session recorded at the node but not
// at the proxy.
if tt.outFound {
_, err = findCommandEventInLog(main, events.SessionCommandEvent, lsPath)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
} else {
_, err = findCommandEventInLog(main, events.SessionCommandEvent, lsPath)
c.Assert(err, check.NotNil)
}
}
}
// TestBPFSessionDifferentiation verifies that the bpf package can
// differentiate events from two different sessions. This test in turn also
// verifies the cgroup package.
func (s *IntSuite) TestBPFSessionDifferentiation(c *check.C) {
s.setUpTest(c)
defer s.tearDownTest(c)
tr := utils.NewTracer(utils.ThisFunction()).Start()
defer tr.Stop()
// Check if BPF tests can be run on this host.
err := canTestBPF()
if err != nil {
c.Skip(fmt.Sprintf("Tests for BPF functionality can not be run: %v.", err))
return
}
lsPath, err := exec.LookPath("ls")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Create temporary directory where cgroup2 hierarchy will be mounted.
dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", "cgroup-test")
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
defer os.RemoveAll(dir)
// Create and start a Teleport cluster.
makeConfig := func() (*check.C, []string, []*InstanceSecrets, *service.Config) {
clusterConfig, err := services.NewClusterConfig(services.ClusterConfigSpecV3{
SessionRecording: services.RecordAtNode,
LocalAuth: services.NewBool(true),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Create default config.
tconf := s.defaultServiceConfig()
// Configure Auth.
tconf.Auth.Preference.SetSecondFactor("off")
tconf.Auth.Enabled = true
tconf.Auth.ClusterConfig = clusterConfig
// Configure Proxy.
tconf.Proxy.Enabled = true
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebService = false
tconf.Proxy.DisableWebInterface = true
// Configure Node. If session are being recorded at the proxy, don't enable
// BPF to simulate an OpenSSH node.
tconf.SSH.Enabled = true
tconf.SSH.BPF.Enabled = true
tconf.SSH.BPF.CgroupPath = dir
return c, nil, nil, tconf
}
main := s.newTeleportWithConfig(makeConfig())
defer main.StopAll()
// Create two client terminals and channel to signal when the clients are
// done with the terminals.
termA := NewTerminal(250)
termB := NewTerminal(250)
doneCh := make(chan bool, 2)
// Open a terminal and type "ls" into both and exit.
writeTerm := func(term *Terminal) {
client, err := main.NewClient(ClientConfig{
Login: s.me.Username,
Cluster: Site,
Host: Host,
Port: main.GetPortSSHInt(),
})
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Connect terminal to std{in,out} of client.
client.Stdout = term
client.Stdin = term
// "Type" a command into the terminal.
term.Type(fmt.Sprintf("\a%v\n\r\aexit\n\r\a", lsPath))
err = client.SSH(context.Background(), []string{}, false)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// Signal that the client has finished the interactive session.
doneCh <- true
}
writeTerm(termA)
writeTerm(termB)
// Wait 10 seconds for both events to arrive, otherwise timeout.
timeout := time.After(10 * time.Second)
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
select {
case <-doneCh:
if i == 1 {
break
}
case <-timeout:
dumpGoroutineProfile()
c.Fatalf("Timed out waiting for client to finish interactive session.")
}
}
// Try to find two command events from different sessions. Timeout after
// 10 seconds.
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
sessionIDs := map[string]bool{}
eventFields, err := eventsInLog(main.Config.DataDir+"/log/events.log", events.SessionCommandEvent)
if err != nil {
time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
continue
}
for _, fields := range eventFields {
if fields.GetString(events.EventType) == events.SessionCommandEvent &&
fields.GetString(events.Path) == lsPath {
sessionIDs[fields.GetString(events.SessionEventID)] = true
}
}
// If two command events for "ls" from different sessions, return right
// away, test was successful.
if len(sessionIDs) == 2 {
return
}
time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
}
c.Fatalf("Failed to find command events from two different sessions.")
}
// findEventInLog polls the event log looking for an event of a particular type.
func findEventInLog(t *TeleInstance, eventName string) (events.EventFields, error) {
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
eventFields, err := eventsInLog(t.Config.DataDir+"/log/events.log", eventName)
if err != nil {
time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
continue
}
for _, fields := range eventFields {
eventType, ok := fields[events.EventType]
if !ok {
return nil, trace.BadParameter("not found")
}
if eventType == eventName {
return fields, nil
}
}
time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
}
return nil, trace.NotFound("event not found")
}
// findCommandEventInLog polls the event log looking for an event of a particular type.
func findCommandEventInLog(t *TeleInstance, eventName string, programName string) (events.EventFields, error) {
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
eventFields, err := eventsInLog(t.Config.DataDir+"/log/events.log", eventName)
if err != nil {
time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
continue
}
for _, fields := range eventFields {
eventType, ok := fields[events.EventType]
if !ok {
continue
}
eventPath, ok := fields[events.Path]
if !ok {
continue
}
if eventType == eventName && eventPath == programName {
return fields, nil
}
}
time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
}
return nil, trace.NotFound("event not found")
}
// eventsInLog returns all events in a log file.
func eventsInLog(path string, eventName string) ([]events.EventFields, error) {
var ret []events.EventFields
file, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
defer file.Close()
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(file)
for scanner.Scan() {
var fields events.EventFields
err = json.Unmarshal(scanner.Bytes(), &fields)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
ret = append(ret, fields)
}
if len(ret) == 0 {
return nil, trace.NotFound("event not found")
}
return ret, nil
}
// runCommand is a shortcut for running SSH command, it creates a client
// connected to proxy of the passed in instance, runs the command, and returns
// the result. If multiple attempts are requested, a 250 millisecond delay is
// added between them before giving up.
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func runCommand(instance *TeleInstance, cmd []string, cfg ClientConfig, attempts int) (string, error) {
tc, err := instance.NewClient(cfg)
if err != nil {
return "", trace.Wrap(err)
}
// since this helper is sometimes used for running commands on
// multiple nodes concurrently, we use io.Pipe to protect our
// output buffer from concurrent writes.
read, write := io.Pipe()
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output := &bytes.Buffer{}
doneC := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
io.Copy(output, read)
close(doneC)
}()
tc.Stdout = write
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for i := 0; i < attempts; i++ {
err = tc.SSH(context.TODO(), cmd, false)
if err == nil {
break
}
time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
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}
write.Close()
if err != nil {
return "", trace.Wrap(err)
}
<-doneC
return output.String(), nil
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}
// getPorts helper returns a range of unallocated ports available for listening on
func (s *IntSuite) getPorts(num int) []int {
if len(s.ports) < num {
panic("do not have enough ports! increase AllocatePortsNum constant")
}
ports := make([]int, num)
for i := range ports {
p, _ := strconv.Atoi(s.ports.Pop())
ports[i] = p
}
return ports
}
func (s *IntSuite) newTeleportInstance(c *check.C) *TeleInstance {
return NewInstance(InstanceConfig{
ClusterName: Site,
HostID: HostID,
NodeName: Host,
Ports: s.getPorts(6),
Priv: s.priv,
Pub: s.pub,
log: s.log,
})
}
func (s *IntSuite) newNamedTeleportInstance(c *check.C, clusterName string) *TeleInstance {
return NewInstance(InstanceConfig{
ClusterName: clusterName,
HostID: HostID,
NodeName: Host,
Ports: s.getPorts(6),
Priv: s.priv,
Pub: s.pub,
log: s.log,
})
}
func (s *IntSuite) defaultServiceConfig() *service.Config {
cfg := service.MakeDefaultConfig()
cfg.Console = nil
cfg.Log = s.log
return cfg
}
// Terminal emulates stdin+stdout for integration testing
type Terminal struct {
typed chan byte
mu *sync.Mutex
written *bytes.Buffer
}
func NewTerminal(capacity int) *Terminal {
return &Terminal{
typed: make(chan byte, capacity),
mu: &sync.Mutex{},
written: bytes.NewBuffer(nil),
}
}
func (t *Terminal) Type(data string) {
for _, b := range []byte(data) {
t.typed <- b
}
}
2016-05-06 23:10:50 +00:00
// Output returns a number of first 'limit' bytes printed into this fake terminal
func (t *Terminal) Output(limit int) string {
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
2016-05-06 23:10:50 +00:00
buff := t.written.Bytes()
if len(buff) > limit {
buff = buff[:limit]
}
2016-05-06 23:10:50 +00:00
// clean up white space for easier comparison:
return strings.TrimSpace(string(buff))
}
func (t *Terminal) Write(data []byte) (n int, err error) {
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
return t.written.Write(data)
}
func (t *Terminal) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
for n = 0; n < len(p); n++ {
p[n] = <-t.typed
if p[n] == '\r' {
break
}
if p[n] == '\a' { // 'alert' used for debugging, means 'pause for 1 second'
time.Sleep(time.Second)
n--
}
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond * 10)
}
return n, nil
}
// waitFor helper waits on a challen for up to the given timeout
func waitFor(c chan interface{}, timeout time.Duration) error {
tick := time.Tick(timeout)
select {
case <-c:
return nil
case <-tick:
return fmt.Errorf("timeout waiting for event")
}
}
2018-02-24 01:23:09 +00:00
// hasPAMPolicy checks if the three policy files needed for tests exists. If
// they do it returns true, otherwise returns false.
func hasPAMPolicy() bool {
pamPolicyFiles := []string{
"/etc/pam.d/teleport-acct-failure",
"/etc/pam.d/teleport-session-failure",
"/etc/pam.d/teleport-success",
}
for _, fileName := range pamPolicyFiles {
_, err := os.Stat(fileName)
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
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// isRoot returns a boolean if the test is being run as root or not.
func isRoot() bool {
return os.Geteuid() == 0
}
// canTestBPF runs checks to determine whether BPF tests will run or not.
// Tests for this package must be run as root.
func canTestBPF() error {
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if !isRoot() {
return trace.BadParameter("not root")
}
err := bpf.IsHostCompatible()
if err != nil {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
return nil
}
func dumpGoroutineProfile() {
pprof.Lookup("goroutine").WriteTo(os.Stderr, 2)
}