minio/cmd/sts-handlers.go
Aditya Manthramurthy c9e9a8e2b9
fix: ldap: use validated base DNs (#19406)
This fixes a regression from #19358 which prevents policy mappings
created in the latest release from being displayed in policy entity
listing APIs.

This is due to the possibility that the base DNs in the LDAP config are
not in a normalized form and #19358 introduced normalized of mapping
keys (user DNs and group DNs). When listing, we check if the policy
mappings are on entities that parse as valid DNs that are descendants of
the base DNs in the config.

Test added that demonstrates a failure without this fix.
2024-04-04 11:36:18 -07:00

1052 lines
35 KiB
Go

/// Copyright (c) 2015-2021 MinIO, Inc.
//
// This file is part of MinIO Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/identity/openid"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash/sha256"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
"github.com/minio/mux"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v2/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v2/wildcard"
)
const (
// STS API version.
stsAPIVersion = "2011-06-15"
stsVersion = "Version"
stsAction = "Action"
stsPolicy = "Policy"
stsToken = "Token"
stsRoleArn = "RoleArn"
stsWebIdentityToken = "WebIdentityToken"
stsWebIdentityAccessToken = "WebIdentityAccessToken" // only valid if UserInfo is enabled.
stsDurationSeconds = "DurationSeconds"
stsLDAPUsername = "LDAPUsername"
stsLDAPPassword = "LDAPPassword"
// STS API action constants
clientGrants = "AssumeRoleWithClientGrants"
webIdentity = "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"
ldapIdentity = "AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity"
clientCertificate = "AssumeRoleWithCertificate"
customTokenIdentity = "AssumeRoleWithCustomToken"
assumeRole = "AssumeRole"
stsRequestBodyLimit = 10 * (1 << 20) // 10 MiB
// JWT claim keys
expClaim = "exp"
subClaim = "sub"
audClaim = "aud"
issClaim = "iss"
// JWT claim to check the parent user
parentClaim = "parent"
// LDAP claim keys
ldapUser = "ldapUser" // this is a key name for a DN value
ldapUserN = "ldapUsername" // this is a key name for the short/login username
// Role Claim key
roleArnClaim = "roleArn"
)
// stsAPIHandlers implements and provides http handlers for AWS STS API.
type stsAPIHandlers struct{}
// registerSTSRouter - registers AWS STS compatible APIs.
func registerSTSRouter(router *mux.Router) {
// Initialize STS.
sts := &stsAPIHandlers{}
// STS Router
stsRouter := router.NewRoute().PathPrefix(SlashSeparator).Subrouter()
// Assume roles with no JWT, handles AssumeRole.
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).MatcherFunc(func(r *http.Request, rm *mux.RouteMatch) bool {
ctypeOk := wildcard.MatchSimple("application/x-www-form-urlencoded*", r.Header.Get(xhttp.ContentType))
authOk := wildcard.MatchSimple(signV4Algorithm+"*", r.Header.Get(xhttp.Authorization))
noQueries := len(r.URL.RawQuery) == 0
return ctypeOk && authOk && noQueries
}).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRole))
// Assume roles with JWT handler, handles both ClientGrants and WebIdentity.
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).MatcherFunc(func(r *http.Request, rm *mux.RouteMatch) bool {
ctypeOk := wildcard.MatchSimple("application/x-www-form-urlencoded*", r.Header.Get(xhttp.ContentType))
noQueries := len(r.URL.RawQuery) == 0
return ctypeOk && noQueries
}).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithSSO))
// AssumeRoleWithClientGrants
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithClientGrants)).
Queries(stsAction, clientGrants).
Queries(stsVersion, stsAPIVersion).
Queries(stsToken, "{Token:.*}")
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity)).
Queries(stsAction, webIdentity).
Queries(stsVersion, stsAPIVersion).
Queries(stsWebIdentityToken, "{Token:.*}")
// AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity)).
Queries(stsAction, ldapIdentity).
Queries(stsVersion, stsAPIVersion).
Queries(stsLDAPUsername, "{LDAPUsername:.*}").
Queries(stsLDAPPassword, "{LDAPPassword:.*}")
// AssumeRoleWithCertificate
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithCertificate)).
Queries(stsAction, clientCertificate).
Queries(stsVersion, stsAPIVersion)
// AssumeRoleWithCustomToken
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithCustomToken)).
Queries(stsAction, customTokenIdentity).
Queries(stsVersion, stsAPIVersion)
}
func apiToSTSError(authErr APIErrorCode) (stsErrCode STSErrorCode) {
switch authErr {
case ErrSignatureDoesNotMatch, ErrInvalidAccessKeyID, ErrAccessKeyDisabled:
return ErrSTSAccessDenied
case ErrServerNotInitialized:
return ErrSTSNotInitialized
case ErrInternalError:
return ErrSTSInternalError
default:
return ErrSTSAccessDenied
}
}
func checkAssumeRoleAuth(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request) (auth.Credentials, APIErrorCode) {
if !isRequestSignatureV4(r) {
return auth.Credentials{}, ErrAccessDenied
}
s3Err := isReqAuthenticated(ctx, r, globalSite.Region, serviceSTS)
if s3Err != ErrNone {
return auth.Credentials{}, s3Err
}
user, _, s3Err := getReqAccessKeyV4(r, globalSite.Region, serviceSTS)
if s3Err != ErrNone {
return auth.Credentials{}, s3Err
}
// Temporary credentials or Service accounts cannot generate further temporary credentials.
if user.IsTemp() || user.IsServiceAccount() {
return auth.Credentials{}, ErrAccessDenied
}
// Session tokens are not allowed in STS AssumeRole requests.
if getSessionToken(r) != "" {
return auth.Credentials{}, ErrAccessDenied
}
return user, ErrNone
}
func parseForm(r *http.Request) error {
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
return err
}
for k, v := range r.PostForm {
if _, ok := r.Form[k]; !ok {
r.Form[k] = v
}
}
return nil
}
// getTokenSigningKey returns secret key used to sign JWT session tokens
func getTokenSigningKey() (string, error) {
secret := globalActiveCred.SecretKey
if globalSiteReplicationSys.isEnabled() {
c, err := globalSiteReplicatorCred.Get(GlobalContext)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return c.SecretKey, nil
}
return secret, nil
}
// AssumeRole - implementation of AWS STS API AssumeRole to get temporary
// credentials for regular users on Minio.
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRole.html
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := newContext(r, w, "AssumeRole")
claims := make(map[string]interface{})
defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, claims)
// Check auth here (otherwise r.Form will have unexpected values from
// the call to `parseForm` below), but return failure only after we are
// able to validate that it is a valid STS request, so that we are able
// to send an appropriate audit log.
user, apiErrCode := checkAssumeRoleAuth(ctx, r)
if err := parseForm(r); err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
if r.Form.Get(stsVersion) != stsAPIVersion {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, fmt.Errorf("Invalid STS API version %s, expecting %s", r.Form.Get(stsVersion), stsAPIVersion))
return
}
action := r.Form.Get(stsAction)
switch action {
case assumeRole:
default:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Unsupported action %s", action))
return
}
ctx = newContext(r, w, action)
// Validate the authentication result here so that failures will be audit-logged.
if apiErrCode != ErrNone {
stsErr := apiToSTSError(apiErrCode)
// Borrow the description error from the API error code
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, stsErr, fmt.Errorf(errorCodes[apiErrCode].Description))
return
}
sessionPolicyStr := r.Form.Get(stsPolicy)
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRole.html
// The plain text that you use for both inline and managed session
// policies shouldn't exceed 2048 characters.
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 2048 {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, errSessionPolicyTooLarge)
return
}
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 0 {
sessionPolicy, err := policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader([]byte(sessionPolicyStr)))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
// Version in policy must not be empty
if sessionPolicy.Version == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Version cannot be empty expecting '2012-10-17'"))
return
}
}
duration, err := openid.GetDefaultExpiration(r.Form.Get(stsDurationSeconds))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
claims[expClaim] = UTCNow().Add(duration).Unix()
claims[parentClaim] = user.AccessKey
// Validate that user.AccessKey's policies can be retrieved - it may not
// be in case the user is disabled.
if _, err = globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(user.AccessKey, user.Groups...); err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 0 {
claims[policy.SessionPolicyName] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(sessionPolicyStr))
}
secret, err := getTokenSigningKey()
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, secret)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Set the parent of the temporary access key, so that it's access
// policy is inherited from `user.AccessKey`.
cred.ParentUser = user.AccessKey
// Set the newly generated credentials.
updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Call hook for site replication.
if cred.ParentUser != globalActiveCred.AccessKey {
replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
Type: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,
STSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
SessionToken: cred.SessionToken,
ParentUser: cred.ParentUser,
},
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}))
}
assumeRoleResponse := &AssumeRoleResponse{
Result: AssumeRoleResult{
Credentials: cred,
},
}
assumeRoleResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodeResponse(assumeRoleResponse))
}
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithSSO(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := newContext(r, w, "AssumeRoleSSOCommon")
claims := make(map[string]interface{})
defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, claims)
// Parse the incoming form data.
if err := parseForm(r); err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
if r.Form.Get(stsVersion) != stsAPIVersion {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, fmt.Errorf("Invalid STS API version %s, expecting %s", r.Form.Get("Version"), stsAPIVersion))
return
}
action := r.Form.Get(stsAction)
switch action {
case ldapIdentity:
sts.AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity(w, r)
return
case clientGrants, webIdentity:
default:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Unsupported action %s", action))
return
}
ctx = newContext(r, w, action)
token := r.Form.Get(stsToken)
if token == "" {
token = r.Form.Get(stsWebIdentityToken)
}
accessToken := r.Form.Get(stsWebIdentityAccessToken)
// RoleARN parameter processing: If a role ARN is given in the request, we
// use that and validate the authentication request. If not, we assume this
// is an STS request for a claim based IDP (if one is present) and set
// roleArn = openid.DummyRoleARN.
//
// Currently, we do not support multiple claim based IDPs, as there is no
// defined parameter to disambiguate the intended IDP in this STS request.
roleArn := openid.DummyRoleARN
roleArnStr := r.Form.Get(stsRoleArn)
if roleArnStr != "" {
var err error
roleArn, _, err = globalIAMSys.GetRolePolicy(roleArnStr)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
fmt.Errorf("Error processing %s parameter: %v", stsRoleArn, err))
return
}
}
if !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSIAMNotInitialized, errIAMNotInitialized)
return
}
// Validate JWT; check clientID in claims matches the one associated with the roleArn
if err := globalIAMSys.OpenIDConfig.Validate(r.Context(), roleArn, token, accessToken, r.Form.Get(stsDurationSeconds), claims); err != nil {
switch err {
case openid.ErrTokenExpired:
switch action {
case clientGrants:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSClientGrantsExpiredToken, err)
case webIdentity:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSWebIdentityExpiredToken, err)
}
return
case auth.ErrInvalidDuration:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
var policyName string
if roleArnStr != "" && globalIAMSys.HasRolePolicy() {
// If roleArn is used, we set it as a claim, and use the
// associated policy when credentials are used.
claims[roleArnClaim] = roleArn.String()
} else {
// If no role policy is configured, then we use claims from the
// JWT. This is a MinIO STS API specific value, this value
// should be set and configured on your identity provider as
// part of JWT custom claims.
policySet, ok := policy.GetPoliciesFromClaims(claims, iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID())
policies := strings.Join(policySet.ToSlice(), ",")
if ok {
policyName = globalIAMSys.CurrentPolicies(policies)
}
if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil {
if !ok {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
fmt.Errorf("%s claim missing from the JWT token, credentials will not be generated", iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID()))
return
} else if policyName == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
fmt.Errorf("None of the given policies (`%s`) are defined, credentials will not be generated", policies))
return
}
}
claims[iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID()] = policyName
}
sessionPolicyStr := r.Form.Get(stsPolicy)
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity.html
// The plain text that you use for both inline and managed session
// policies shouldn't exceed 2048 characters.
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 2048 {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Session policy should not exceed 2048 characters"))
return
}
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 0 {
sessionPolicy, err := policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader([]byte(sessionPolicyStr)))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
// Version in policy must not be empty
if sessionPolicy.Version == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Invalid session policy version"))
return
}
claims[policy.SessionPolicyName] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(sessionPolicyStr))
}
secret, err := getTokenSigningKey()
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, secret)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ClaimStability
// claim is only considered stable when subject and iss are used together
// this is to ensure that ParentUser doesn't change and we get to use
// parentUser as per the requirements for service accounts for OpenID
// based logins.
var subFromToken string
if v, ok := claims[subClaim]; ok {
subFromToken, _ = v.(string)
}
if subFromToken == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
errors.New("STS JWT Token has `sub` claim missing, `sub` claim is mandatory"))
return
}
var issFromToken string
if v, ok := claims[issClaim]; ok {
issFromToken, _ = v.(string)
}
// Since issFromToken can have `/` characters (it is typically the
// provider URL), we hash and encode it to base64 here. This is needed
// because there will be a policy mapping stored on drives whose
// filename is this parentUser: therefore, it needs to have only valid
// filename characters and needs to have bounded length.
{
h := sha256.New()
h.Write([]byte("openid:" + subFromToken + ":" + issFromToken))
bs := h.Sum(nil)
cred.ParentUser = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(bs)
}
// Deny this assume role request if the policy that the user intends to bind
// has a sts:DurationSeconds condition, which is not satisfied as well
{
p := policyName
if p == "" {
var err error
_, p, err = globalIAMSys.GetRolePolicy(roleArnStr)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSAccessDenied, err)
return
}
}
if !globalIAMSys.doesPolicyAllow(p, policy.Args{
DenyOnly: true,
Action: policy.AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityAction,
ConditionValues: getSTSConditionValues(r, "", cred),
Claims: cred.Claims,
}) {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSAccessDenied, errors.New("this user does not have enough permission"))
return
}
}
// Set the newly generated credentials.
updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, policyName)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Call hook for site replication.
replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
Type: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,
STSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
SessionToken: cred.SessionToken,
ParentUser: cred.ParentUser,
ParentPolicyMapping: policyName,
},
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}))
var encodedSuccessResponse []byte
switch action {
case clientGrants:
clientGrantsResponse := &AssumeRoleWithClientGrantsResponse{
Result: ClientGrantsResult{
Credentials: cred,
SubjectFromToken: subFromToken,
},
}
clientGrantsResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
encodedSuccessResponse = encodeResponse(clientGrantsResponse)
case webIdentity:
webIdentityResponse := &AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse{
Result: WebIdentityResult{
Credentials: cred,
SubjectFromWebIdentityToken: subFromToken,
},
}
webIdentityResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
encodedSuccessResponse = encodeResponse(webIdentityResponse)
}
writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodedSuccessResponse)
}
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity - implementation of AWS STS API supporting OAuth2.0
// users from web identity provider such as Facebook, Google, or any OpenID
// Connect-compatible identity provider.
//
// Eg:-
//
// $ curl https://minio:9000/?Action=AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity&WebIdentityToken=<jwt>
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sts.AssumeRoleWithSSO(w, r)
}
// AssumeRoleWithClientGrants - implementation of AWS STS extension API supporting
// OAuth2.0 client credential grants.
//
// Eg:-
//
// $ curl https://minio:9000/?Action=AssumeRoleWithClientGrants&Token=<jwt>
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithClientGrants(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sts.AssumeRoleWithSSO(w, r)
}
// AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity - implements user auth against LDAP server
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := newContext(r, w, "AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity")
claims := make(map[string]interface{})
defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, claims, stsLDAPPassword)
// Parse the incoming form data.
if err := parseForm(r); err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
if r.Form.Get(stsVersion) != stsAPIVersion {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter,
fmt.Errorf("Invalid STS API version %s, expecting %s", r.Form.Get("Version"), stsAPIVersion))
return
}
ldapUsername := r.Form.Get(stsLDAPUsername)
ldapPassword := r.Form.Get(stsLDAPPassword)
if ldapUsername == "" || ldapPassword == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, fmt.Errorf("LDAPUsername and LDAPPassword cannot be empty"))
return
}
action := r.Form.Get(stsAction)
switch action {
case ldapIdentity:
default:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Unsupported action %s", action))
return
}
sessionPolicyStr := r.Form.Get(stsPolicy)
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRole.html
// The plain text that you use for both inline and managed session
// policies shouldn't exceed 2048 characters.
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 2048 {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Session policy should not exceed 2048 characters"))
return
}
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 0 {
sessionPolicy, err := policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader([]byte(sessionPolicyStr)))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
// Version in policy must not be empty
if sessionPolicy.Version == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Version needs to be specified in session policy"))
return
}
}
if !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSIAMNotInitialized, errIAMNotInitialized)
return
}
ldapUserDN, groupDistNames, err := globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.Bind(ldapUsername, ldapPassword)
if err != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("LDAP server error: %w", err)
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
// Check if this user or their groups have a policy applied.
ldapPolicies, err := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(ldapUserDN, groupDistNames...)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
if len(ldapPolicies) == 0 && newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
fmt.Errorf("expecting a policy to be set for user `%s` or one of their groups: `%s` - rejecting this request",
ldapUserDN, strings.Join(groupDistNames, "`,`")))
return
}
expiryDur, err := globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.GetExpiryDuration(r.Form.Get(stsDurationSeconds))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
claims[expClaim] = UTCNow().Add(expiryDur).Unix()
claims[ldapUser] = ldapUserDN
claims[ldapUserN] = ldapUsername
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 0 {
claims[policy.SessionPolicyName] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(sessionPolicyStr))
}
secret, err := getTokenSigningKey()
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, secret)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Set the parent of the temporary access key, this is useful
// in obtaining service accounts by this cred.
cred.ParentUser = ldapUserDN
// Set this value to LDAP groups, LDAP user can be part
// of large number of groups
cred.Groups = groupDistNames
// Set the newly generated credentials, policyName is empty on purpose
// LDAP policies are applied automatically using their ldapUser, ldapGroups
// mapping.
updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Call hook for site replication.
replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
Type: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,
STSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
SessionToken: cred.SessionToken,
ParentUser: cred.ParentUser,
},
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}))
ldapIdentityResponse := &AssumeRoleWithLDAPResponse{
Result: LDAPIdentityResult{
Credentials: cred,
},
}
ldapIdentityResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
encodedSuccessResponse := encodeResponse(ldapIdentityResponse)
writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodedSuccessResponse)
}
// AssumeRoleWithCertificate implements user authentication with client certificates.
// It verifies the client-provided X.509 certificate, maps the certificate to an S3 policy
// and returns temp. S3 credentials to the client.
//
// API endpoint: https://minio:9000?Action=AssumeRoleWithCertificate&Version=2011-06-15
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := newContext(r, w, "AssumeRoleWithCertificate")
claims := make(map[string]interface{})
defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, claims)
if !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSIAMNotInitialized, errIAMNotInitialized)
return
}
if !globalIAMSys.STSTLSConfig.Enabled {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSNotInitialized, errors.New("STS API 'AssumeRoleWithCertificate' is disabled"))
return
}
// We have to establish a TLS connection and the
// client must provide exactly one client certificate.
// Otherwise, we don't have a certificate to verify or
// the policy lookup would ambiguous.
if r.TLS == nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInsecureConnection, errors.New("No TLS connection attempt"))
return
}
// A client may send a certificate chain such that we end up
// with multiple peer certificates. However, we can only accept
// a single client certificate. Otherwise, the certificate to
// policy mapping would be ambiguous.
// However, we can filter all CA certificates and only check
// whether they client has sent exactly one (non-CA) leaf certificate.
peerCertificates := make([]*x509.Certificate, 0, len(r.TLS.PeerCertificates))
for _, cert := range r.TLS.PeerCertificates {
if cert.IsCA {
continue
}
peerCertificates = append(peerCertificates, cert)
}
r.TLS.PeerCertificates = peerCertificates
// Now, we have to check that the client has provided exactly one leaf
// certificate that we can map to a policy.
if len(r.TLS.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, errors.New("No client certificate provided"))
return
}
if len(r.TLS.PeerCertificates) > 1 {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, errors.New("More than one client certificate provided"))
return
}
certificate := r.TLS.PeerCertificates[0]
if !globalIAMSys.STSTLSConfig.InsecureSkipVerify { // Verify whether the client certificate has been issued by a trusted CA.
_, err := certificate.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{
x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth,
},
Roots: globalRootCAs,
})
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidClientCertificate, err)
return
}
} else {
// Technically, there is no security argument for verifying the key usage
// when we don't verify that the certificate has been issued by a trusted CA.
// Any client can create a certificate with arbitrary key usage settings.
//
// However, this check ensures that a certificate with an invalid key usage
// gets rejected even when we skip certificate verification. This helps
// clients detect malformed certificates during testing instead of e.g.
// a self-signed certificate that works while a comparable certificate
// issued by a trusted CA fails due to the MinIO server being less strict
// w.r.t. key usage verification.
//
// Basically, MinIO is more consistent (from a client perspective) when
// we verify the key usage all the time.
var validKeyUsage bool
for _, usage := range certificate.ExtKeyUsage {
if usage == x509.ExtKeyUsageAny || usage == x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth {
validKeyUsage = true
break
}
}
if !validKeyUsage {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, errors.New("certificate is not valid for client authentication"))
return
}
}
// We map the X.509 subject common name to the policy. So, a client
// with the common name "foo" will be associated with the policy "foo".
// Other mapping functions - e.g. public-key hash based mapping - are
// possible but not implemented.
//
// Group mapping is not possible with standard X.509 certificates.
if certificate.Subject.CommonName == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, errors.New("certificate subject CN cannot be empty"))
return
}
expiry, err := globalIAMSys.STSTLSConfig.GetExpiryDuration(r.Form.Get(stsDurationSeconds))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, err)
return
}
// We set the expiry of the temp. credentials to the minimum of the
// configured expiry and the duration until the certificate itself
// expires.
// We must not issue credentials that out-live the certificate.
if validUntil := time.Until(certificate.NotAfter); validUntil < expiry {
expiry = validUntil
}
// Associate any service accounts to the certificate CN
parentUser := "tls:" + certificate.Subject.CommonName
claims[expClaim] = UTCNow().Add(expiry).Unix()
claims[subClaim] = certificate.Subject.CommonName
claims[audClaim] = certificate.Subject.Organization
claims[issClaim] = certificate.Issuer.CommonName
claims[parentClaim] = parentUser
secretKey, err := getTokenSigningKey()
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
tmpCredentials, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, secretKey)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
tmpCredentials.ParentUser = parentUser
policyName := certificate.Subject.CommonName
updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, tmpCredentials.AccessKey, tmpCredentials, policyName)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Call hook for site replication.
replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
Type: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,
STSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{
AccessKey: tmpCredentials.AccessKey,
SecretKey: tmpCredentials.SecretKey,
SessionToken: tmpCredentials.SessionToken,
ParentUser: tmpCredentials.ParentUser,
ParentPolicyMapping: policyName,
},
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}))
response := new(AssumeRoleWithCertificateResponse)
response.Result.Credentials = tmpCredentials
response.Metadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodeResponse(response))
}
// AssumeRoleWithCustomToken implements user authentication with custom tokens.
// These tokens are opaque to MinIO and are verified by a configured (external)
// Identity Management Plugin.
//
// API endpoint: https://minio:9000?Action=AssumeRoleWithCustomToken&Token=xxx
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithCustomToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := newContext(r, w, "AssumeRoleWithCustomToken")
claims := make(map[string]interface{})
defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, claims)
if !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSIAMNotInitialized, errIAMNotInitialized)
return
}
authn := newGlobalAuthNPluginFn()
if authn == nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSNotInitialized, errors.New("STS API 'AssumeRoleWithCustomToken' is disabled"))
return
}
action := r.Form.Get(stsAction)
if action != customTokenIdentity {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Unsupported action %s", action))
return
}
token := r.Form.Get(stsToken)
if token == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Invalid empty `Token` parameter provided"))
return
}
durationParam := r.Form.Get(stsDurationSeconds)
var requestedDuration int
if durationParam != "" {
var err error
requestedDuration, err = strconv.Atoi(durationParam)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Invalid requested duration: %s", durationParam))
return
}
}
roleArnStr := r.Form.Get(stsRoleArn)
roleArn, _, err := globalIAMSys.GetRolePolicy(roleArnStr)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
fmt.Errorf("Error processing parameter %s: %v", stsRoleArn, err))
return
}
res, err := authn.Authenticate(roleArn, token)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
// If authentication failed, return the error message to the user.
if res.Failure != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSUpstreamError, errors.New(res.Failure.Reason))
return
}
// It is required that parent user be set.
if res.Success.User == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSUpstreamError, errors.New("A valid user was not returned by the authenticator."))
return
}
// Expiry is set as minimum of requested value and value allowed by auth
// plugin.
expiry := res.Success.MaxValiditySeconds
if durationParam != "" && requestedDuration < expiry {
expiry = requestedDuration
}
parentUser := "custom:" + res.Success.User
// metadata map
claims[expClaim] = UTCNow().Add(time.Duration(expiry) * time.Second).Unix()
claims[subClaim] = parentUser
claims[roleArnClaim] = roleArn.String()
claims[parentClaim] = parentUser
// Add all other claims from the plugin **without** replacing any
// existing claims.
for k, v := range res.Success.Claims {
if _, ok := claims[k]; !ok {
claims[k] = v
}
}
secretKey, err := getTokenSigningKey()
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
tmpCredentials, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, secretKey)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
tmpCredentials.ParentUser = parentUser
updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, tmpCredentials.AccessKey, tmpCredentials, "")
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Call hook for site replication.
replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
Type: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,
STSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{
AccessKey: tmpCredentials.AccessKey,
SecretKey: tmpCredentials.SecretKey,
SessionToken: tmpCredentials.SessionToken,
ParentUser: tmpCredentials.ParentUser,
},
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}))
response := new(AssumeRoleWithCustomTokenResponse)
response.Result.Credentials = tmpCredentials
response.Result.AssumedUser = parentUser
response.Metadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodeResponse(response))
}